

ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY

— HARPER'S SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES

Under the Editorship of

F. STUART CHAPIN

ANALYTICAL

Social Situations

BOOK I

THE SOCIAL WORLD IN BEING

By LOWELL JULLIARD CARR

HARPER & BROTHERS



SOCIOLOGY

and Social Problems

BOOK II

THE SOCIAL WORLD IN TROUBLE

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ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY: SOCIAL SITUATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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
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Parts of this book were published in an altered form under the title of *Situational Analysis*



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This volume has a twofold purpose: (1) to provide a handbook for anyone who wishes to begin the systematic observation of human association by describing and analyzing sample units called situations; and (2) to direct the attention of the student to the values involved in all current social problems from the little matter of how to get along with other people to the slightly larger difficulty of how to get along with the Soviet Union.

It is organized in two Books. Book I, "The Social World in Being," presents simply the conceptual tools and the operational procedures necessary for observing and analyzing situations. This consists of fourteen observational assignments, or projects, ranging from the mere identification of simple in-presence situations to the collection of evidence of human foresight and planning for the future.

Book II, "The Social World in Trouble," likewise consists of fourteen chapters numbered to correspond to the chapters in Book I, but concerned not with the observation and analysis of situations but with the analysis of ideas and social values.

Book I is objective, descriptive, and analytical. Book II is opinionated, evaluative, and controversial. It attempts to establish a humanistic ethics as a basis of evaluation and then seeks to appraise typical social conditions and social situations in the United States and in the world today in the light of that ethical standard. The point of view, in short, is liberal, democratic, and personality-centered. But unlike the scientific point of view which must be accepted if the student is to make any use of Book I at all, the liberal, democratic, and personality-centered point of view of Book II need not be accepted at all. It need only be understood. This means that the specific purpose of Book II is not to solve problems or even to point the way to particular solutions but to force anybody who does read it to clear up his own thinking about three things: (1) social values in general; (2) his own social values in particular; and (3) the values at stake in actual social problems today. Whether the reader agrees with the ethical position of the author is not important; what is important is that he

knows why he agrees or disagrees and has thought through the theoretical and practical consequences of his own position.

Analytical Sociology is an outgrowth and development of the author's *Situational Analysis*, published in 1948, which announced in its Preface that its purpose was "to break a tradition—the tradition that the best way to begin the study of group phenomena is to *read* about them rather than to *look* at them." That is still the intention of Book I in this volume. The author still feels that to give a student "knowledge of acquaintance" rather than mere "knowledge about" is a vastly more effective method of teaching than the traditional introduction to sociology. But he also feels that his attempt to break with tradition in 1948 was feeble and incomplete. It was feeble in that it made merely a beginning of providing the concepts required for the analysis of social situations and did that in a context that did not approximate the objectivity advocated. It was incomplete in two senses: it left out all consideration of three basic aspects of human association, namely, population, stratification, and race; and it also omitted all consideration of the feeling aspect of association, the impact of social problems. The present volume is much more, therefore, than a mere rewrite of *Situational Analysis*. It is a further development of the ideas of that book to a more logical and, it is to be hoped, to a more useful stage of completion.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to point out my indebtedness to my late teachers Cooley, Hobhouse, and Malinowski and to the work of Thomas, Lewin, Bossard, Dewey, Freud, Chapin, Lundberg, and others. Sociological theory is building slowly by a process of intellectual synergy that combines the contributions of many different disciplines, yet it is important for sociologists to retain their orientation toward their own distinctive problem phenomenon, human association.

This volume is thus an attempt (1) to *see* our social world both as a conditioning environment and as a complex of associational processes, and (2) to *help* the student find his way about in the contemporary confusion of values.

LOWELL JUILLIARD CARR

Ann Arbor, Michigan
December, 1954

ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY

Introduction

1. THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO LIFE EXPERIENCE

Every science is at once an attitude toward the world, a point of view, a systematic body of verifiable knowledge, and a way of finding out.

As to attitude and point of view, we assume the uniformity of nature, the objectivity of truth, and the primacy of empirical evidence. The uniformity of nature means that under the same conditions the same things happen. Objectivity of truth means that the phenomenal world is a reality independent of the beliefs, hopes, or fears of any individual—all of which we find out not by intuition and speculation but by actual observation. No body of knowledge can be any more dependable than the method by which it has been produced.

Scientific method is a set of ideas and operations designed to reveal the composition, forms, structure, functions, and changes of certain highly selected problem phenomena and to determine (and if possible measure) relationships of problem phenomena with conditioning variables. But the scientific approach to life experience, as distinguished from a practical approach, seeks merely to understand, to know. The practical approach, on the other hand, seeks to make a difference in the world. Of course scientific knowledge can be used for practical purposes, but the scientist as scientist is interested only in finding out. Thus, the sociologist as scientist is interested only in finding out about his own unique kind of problem phenomena.

2. THE PROBLEM PHENOMENA OF SOCIOLOGY

The practitioners of every science carefully select a particular kind of problem phenomena for observation, abstract certain aspects of these phenomena for intensive analysis, and classify their phenomena

accordingly. But there is one crucial difference between the physical scientists and the so-called social scientists at this point. Physical scientists select their phenomena in terms of *perceptual* differences; social sciences, in terms of *conceptual* differences.

Astronomers and zoölogists study phenomena which are quite different perceptually. Chemists and geologists select problem phenomena perceptually different. The problem phenomena of the various physical sciences differ from science to science in tangible, perceptual qualities.

This is not true of the problem phenomena of the so-called social sciences. All social scientists are studying one broad class of perceptual phenomena, namely, human behavior. What distinguishes one social science from another is not the tangible, perceptual differences in the phenomena studied but the conceptual differences in the aspects of human behavior selected for observation and analysis. Thus, the cultural anthropologist selects the culture of self-subsisting population aggregates. The economist studies subsistence behavior, its forms, uniformities, changes, and so on. The political scientist studies power-and-control behavior, its forms, uniformities, changes, etc. The psychologist and the social psychologist concern themselves with individual behavior—the one as it appears under controlled conditions in the laboratory, the other as it appears under actual social conditions outside the laboratory, or as *between* individuals inside.¹

What, then, does the sociologist study?

Human association, human togetherness. The composition, forms, structure, functions, and changes of human interaction, communication, and togetherness in general: *association as a condition* and *association as a process or complex of processes.*

This is not a matter of culture, or of subsistence behavior, or of power-and-control behavior, or of individual behavior under whatever conditions. All these are necessarily involved in association, but no one of them nor all taken together constitutes association as such. It may be the task of the social philosopher to put history, anthropology, economics, political science, law, psychology, and psychiatry together, but it is certainly not the task of a descriptive-analytical sociologist. As a scientist, his job is to observe, classify, and analyze his own uniquely conceptualized aspect of human behavior, namely, *human*

¹ If history is regarded as a social science, the historian's problem phenomena are selected sequences of unique events, or the events occurring in selected periods of time. Selection is obviously the essence of any account of past events.

association. All other social scientists either take human association for granted or devote themselves to their own conceptualized aspects of it. Only the sociologist takes association *per se* as his problem phenomenon—association as an envioning *condition* of life experience in organizations, communities, and the like, and association as a *living process* of interaction, communication, and functioning interdependence.

3. THE TWOFOLD TASK OF UNDERSTANDING

Association is both an envioning condition into which we are born and in the midst of which we live and, as we have said, a living process in and through which we carry on our lives. To understand both aspects of association we must first be able to *see* it in units of actual life experience, which we shall call *situations*, and we must be able to *feel* it in terms of the *problems*, or complications, which it creates for us. Accordingly, the student of human association faces two inter-related tasks: (1) to observe and analyze the phenomena of human association *as a social world in being*; and (2) to describe and analyze that social world *as a social world in trouble*. The first is the task of the sociologist as scientist; the second is the task of any social scientist as citizen. Human association constitutes the problem phenomenon of sociologists; social problems are not the problem phenomena of any one social science as such—they are practical difficulties confronting any significant number of people who feel that social realities are out of line with their basic values. Hence, any study of social problems is necessarily a study of the relationships of human values to social realities. Such studies are as open to economists, political scientists, psychologists, and other social scientists as they are to sociologists, but it happens that we are trying to understand human association—the sociologist's particular problem phenomenon—and that, to understand, we must not only describe and analyze "what is there" but also *feel* the impact of these realities on human values. For this reason this study breaks into two parts: Book I is a handbook of concepts and operations requisite for the description and analysis of fourteen different aspects of human association, from the mere recognition of social situations to the phenomena of human adjustment to the future. This is a purely objective, observational study of American society as a social world in being. The only value important here is the value of truth.

Book II is quite different. It too consists of fourteen chapters, but

now each chapter instead of presenting concepts and operations with which the student can look at his social world for himself presents rather a problem, or group of problems, related to the particular aspect of the American social world dealt with in the corresponding chapter in Book I. Thus, while Chapter 1, Book I, presents the basic concepts necessary for describing and analyzing human association, Chapter 1, Book II, presents the *problem* of studying social problems from the scientific point of view. Chapter 2, Book I, gives the ideas and operations requisite for observing the processes by which an individual adjusts to situations. Chapter 2, Book II, discusses theoretical and practical *problems* of such adjustment. Chapter 3, Book I, outlines a *modus operandi* for analyzing in-presence situations. Chapter 3, Book II, discusses some theoretical and practical *problems* of in-presence association. And so on, and so on, to Chapter 14 of each book. The last chapter of Book I points toward the collection of evidence of human foresight and planning. The last chapter of Book II opens up the whole *problem* of the future of Western civilization in the light of the life-careers of other civilizations, the development of scientific warfare, and the gigantic world conflict now raging between the United States and Soviet Russia. Book I is an introduction to the scientific study of human association. Book II is a running commentary on the ethical and practical implications of the phenomena dealt with in Book I.

In Book I the author's opinions, in so far as they have been permitted to intrude at all, are irrelevant. So are the student's opinions. The only questions here are: What are the facts? and What is the scientific interpretation of the facts?

In Book II, on the other hand, the author sets up certain ethical criteria by which to evaluate social situations and then applies these criteria in chapter after chapter. Book II is opinionated and evaluative. In Book I the student's task is to establish the facts. In Book II his job is to reason about the facts *in the light of some standard of values*. Whether he adopts the same standard as the author is immaterial. What is material is that his standard be a reasonably defensible standard and that he be consistent in applying it.

Book I provides the tools for situational description and analysis.

Book II provides insistent challenges to discussion, to differences of opinion, to ethical and philosophical arguments.

The objective of Book I is to equip the student with some simple techniques for the description and analysis of social situations.

The objective of Book II is to sensitize the student to social problems and force him to examine his own presuppositions and social values; to force him to *equip himself* more adequately for facing the social problems of his age.

4. DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME

The student approaching the study of human association from the scientific point of view encounters two formidable difficulties at the outset: (1) himself and (2) the confusing hurly-burly of his problem phenomena.

Exactly the same kinds of difficulties confronted the physical scientists centuries ago. They had somehow to control the observer—i.e., to eliminate errors due to observer inaccuracy and bias—and bring order and meaning into the hurly-burly of nature. To control the observer they developed instruments of precision, objective measurements and attitudes of rigid personal detachment from the phenomena under observation. To bring order and meaning into the hurly-burly of nature they assumed a uniformity that they could not prove, guessed at relationships and meanings, checked their guesses against observed data, revised their guesses, and went on from there. The results are familiar to everyone: hydrogen bombs, jet planes, radar to the moon.

To apply this pattern of discovery to the study of social phenomena has thus far proved very difficult. The student of social phenomena can make little use of instruments of precision. The concepts by which he identifies his phenomena turn out to be far less precise than his methods of measurement and analysis. He can measure variations in something called attitudes to a fine decimal point, but can he be sure that Attitude A of Person X is the same “thing” as Attitude A expressed by Person Y? Mathematical analysis is available to him only as he can break down social phenomena—actually a flow of experience—into units that can be counted and tabulated. As for personal detachment from the phenomena themselves, social observers count themselves lucky even to approximate scientific detachment after years of rigid self-discipline. The control of the distorting effects of personal expectations (stereotypes) and of personal desires remains, therefore, one of the most troublesome problems for all neophytes in social science.

Added to all this is the enormous difficulty of structuring the phenomena of human association in terms concrete enough to be func-

tionally meaningful, yet abstract enough to have general significance. As we have indicated, Book I is devoted to this problem of structuring our associational world in terms such that concrete observations can be made to yield generalizations significant beyond the specific instance. On the difficulties inherent in the observer himself, meanwhile, a word or two more should be added before the student undertakes his tasks of observing for himself.

5. THE FOUR MONKEY-TRAPS AWAITING SITUATIONAL OBSERVERS

Any kind of scientific study requires the preparation of a record of data—in this case, a record of observations. As an ordinary person facing social situations you are a poor instrument to prepare a record unless you can avoid the four monkey-traps that beset the path of every would-be observer of his own social world. These are the four monkey-traps you must avoid: (1) *your own stereotyped expectations*; (2) *your concern for practical results, not mere information*; (3) *your aversion to objectivity*; and (4) *the inadequacy of your contacts with the world beyond your own personal experience*.

1. *You look at your social world through an invisible set of colored spectacles.* Every one of us is the product of the culture in which he has been reared. Later we shall note how many different processes go into the making of an adult person, and we shall find that one of them is acculturation, the taking on by the individual of the beliefs, customs, practices, values, and so on, prevalent in the society around him. Culture is the social heritage of language, material traits, customs, and so on, which a society develops and acquires. That you bear your father's name and not that of your mother's family, that you believe every effect has a cause, that you eat with a knife and fork and pay for your food with money, that a man or a woman is supposed to have only one sexual mate at a time and then only after a ceremony called marriage—these are matters of culture which you did not invent but have accepted as a matter of course. As we all know, man has been accumulating culture for at least 500,000 years. You were born into a preëxisting culture as you were born into a preëxisting associational life and, having assimilated the beliefs and presuppositions implicit in your family, community, regional, and national cultures, you tend naturally to see situations as your culture defines them for you. This is what we mean by saying that you look at your social world through a set of invisible colored spectacles. *Culture defines your world for you.* Before you can hope to become a dependable observer you must learn, therefore, to discount your culture. You must

learn to make allowance for the fact that your culture tells you "Negroes are inferior to whites," "Capital must control labor," "This is a man's world," and so on. If you cannot actually overcome your stereotypes, or dominant expectations, you must at least become aware that you have them.

2. You are also a poor instrument to prepare an objective record of social phenomena because in ordinary situations you *have a habit of wanting practical results, rather than mere objective information*. You want to catch a train, win an argument, make a date, get a job, uphold some cause, and so on. In most situations you want one specific outcome rather than some other outcome. Even at the movies you tend to identify yourself with the hero or the heroine and ardently hope the villain gets what's coming to him.

That attitude of wanting one thing to happen rather than another is not scientific detachment. In any situation in which your real values or preferences are involved you will find it very difficult to discount the distorting effect of this tendency of yours to take sides. But the preparation of an objective record of any situation demands just that—your own wants and wishes must be kept altogether out of the picture.

3. A third reason why you are a poor instrument to prepare an objective record is not only that you take sides but that you don't really want to do anything else; *you don't want to be objective*. In any situation involving another race, another social class, the other sex, or some idea that you vigorously approve or detest, you will want to cling tenaciously to your own stereotype (expectation) or desire. You will resist objectivity with every subterfuge, and rationalization you can think of. You will insist that the situation or problem is what you say it is because what you say it is conforms to your desire. "There just can't be another world war," for example, "because civilization couldn't stand it!" So what?

4. Finally, you are a poor instrument for the preparation of an objective record of any situation bigger than your immediate presence because *your contacts with such situations are bound to be more or less haphazard, incomplete, and subject to all kinds of selection and distortion* implicit in the processes of distance communication in our society. What contacts, for example, have you had with the latest international conference? With the political situation in any foreign country? Even with conditions in our own capital at Washington? Most of us have to take our definitions of situations beyond the horizon at second, fourth, or tenth hand, and we never know just how

much selection and distortion have gone into the process before the story reaches us. Even pictures never show what is behind the camera.

So if you are going to qualify as a good observer you must dodge those four monkey-traps: your own stereotypes, your practical desires, your aversion to objectivity, and the incompleteness of your contacts with any situation beyond your own immediate presence.

Then after you have looked at a given aspect of your social world and think you have it recorded with reasonable objectivity, you must dodge the same four monkey-traps when you turn to the problems that afflict your world. Science may have no answers for many of those problems, but at least a scientific approach to problems requires objectivity and a search for truth even when one's most basic values are at stake.

In the nature of the case you will find it much harder to be objective and truth-oriented in facing social problems than when your task is merely to prepare a record of observations. Problems exist only because of social values, and when social values are at stake, it is very difficult to prevent one's concern about practical results from getting in the way of scientific neutrality.

Book II is not scientifically neutral. It is not limited merely to presenting the facts about social problems or to a take-it-or-leave-it attitude toward theories of causation of such problems. It does what the scientist *as scientist* cannot do, namely, evaluate his world in terms of human happiness. Human happiness is irrelevant to a world of causal relationships. It is relevant only to human beings. But human beings find themselves in a world in which happiness is more readily attainable when its limiting conditions are understood than when they are not understood. Hence, even for the purpose of evaluating our social world, even for the purpose of "solving" our social problems, scientific understanding turns out to have some practical usefulness. A scientific approach to social problems is, therefore, desirable even though the problems themselves originate in unscientific judgments of what ought to be rather than in mere existential judgments of what is, and even though scientific understanding of the problems can never be more than the necessary and not the sufficient condition of their solution.

The task of Book II, in short, is to be as objective as possible in appraising the implications of the *values* revealed in the social world analyzed in Book I, despite the fact that the appraisal itself must run in terms of ethical instead of existential values: in terms of what ought to be and not merely what is.

BOOK I

THE SOCIAL WORLD IN BEING:
CONCEPTUAL TOOLS AND REQUISITE
OPERATIONS FOR OBSERVATIONAL ANALYSIS

Foreword on Operational Procedures

All scientific work depends upon the accumulation of data, the building up of a record of observations.

Two kinds of records make up the body of this course in observing associational phenomena: (1) a *notebook* of data collected specifically for fourteen observational assignments; and (2) a *file* of newspaper and periodical clippings (at least three a week) tracing the development of two kinds of distance situations—(a) U.S.-Soviet relations and (b) economic conditions in some one *region* of the U.S. or in some one *industry* such as agriculture, the steel industry, etc., throughout the semester.

The Notebook

The student may keep his *field notes* in any form he pleases, but for reporting each assignment he should have a *loose-leaf permanent notebook* of approximately 9 by 11 inches in which to file his final report on each assignment. This permanent notebook will constitute the bulk of the evidence of his work in the observational part of this course. When all fourteen assignments have been completed, the permanent notebook will be turned in to the instructor for criticism and grading.

Each assignment report should consist of two parts: (1) a Face Sheet giving the student's name, the assignment number, the date, and a statement of the purpose of the assignment and (2) the Body of the Report showing the relation of the assignment to the concept of the situation, the method by which the student carried out the assignment, the facts or proof sought, generalizations, and critical evaluations.


A suggested form for each assignment report is given below.

FACE SHEET—Page 1

Name	Assignment No.
Date completed	
Objective of this assignment: To prove	
.....	
Page 3 and following	

BODY OF THE REPORT

1. Schematic diagram showing relation of this assignment to the concept of the social situation. For a model diagram of a social situation, a diagram to be copied on page 2 of each report, see page 11. Indicate on your diagram how the assignment is related to the concept of the situation used as a tool of analysis: whether it concerns a situation as such, or some component of a situation (form of association, processes involved, etc.);



Schematic Diagram of Operational Concept of a Social Situation
(on Analogy with Radar Screen)

Showing Focus, Focal Field, Boundary of Inclusion-Exclusion, and two possible axes of measurement: Axis of Uncertainty or Unpredictability; and Axis of Conflict-Coöperation, and the Situational Field. Also, Components of Situation as inscribed Polygon: Persons; Form of Association; Processes; Setting; and Culture.

Explanation: On Axis of Uncertainty—O = chance predictability; +5 = perfect predictability (routine) due to plus-factors over and above chance expectancy, -5 = perfect unpredictability (chaos) due to minus-factors beneath expectancy (drought, lack of cooperation, etc.).

On Axis of Conflict-Coöperation—O = perfect coöperation; +5 = perfect noncoöperation, physical combat; -5 = perfect noncoöperation by withdrawal of effort.

Actual focus of real situation to be placed not at intersection of coördinates from two axes but on appropriate circle measuring distance from focus in proper quadrant showing direction of variation. Thus, focus of a conflict situation of partial unpredictability would go on the 2.5 circle *northwest* of theoretical focus. If unpredictability were due to partial withdrawal of coöperation, such as refusal to listen, etc., focus would go on 2.5 circle *southwest* of the theoretical focus. And so on. Additional degrees of deviation can be drawn into working diagram as circles within boundary of inclusion-exclusion.

Number of persons involved, form of association (group, public, etc.), processes (adjustment, readjustment), type of setting, and major culture traits can be indicated on sides of inscribed polygon.

whether it deals rather with the situational field or some component of that field (population, culture, etc.); and so on.

2. Method of carrying out assignment.

3. Data derived from method—the facts or proof sought.

(This constitutes the bulk of your report and should answer specifically the questions asked in each assignment.)

4. Generalizations from your data.

5. Critical evaluation of method and results.

The accompanying diagram visualizes some of the basic relationships involved in the concept of the social situation as a tool for the analysis of human association. While it is only a clumsy approximation to the complexity of the reality, the student should keep it in mind when preparing each report.

The File of Current-Event Clippings

To accumulate evidence of the way in which situations evolve through time, each student should begin in the first week to build up a file of clippings from newspapers and magazines (news weeklies and discussion magazines particularly) on two selected aspects of the world beyond the horizon: (1) relations between the U.S. and Soviet Russia and (2) economic events and conditions in some particular region of the U.S. or in some one industry. At least three clippings a week should be added to this file throughout the semester.

These clippings will form one source of data for the last three assignments in the course. Unless the clipping file is built up systematically and continuously the student will find himself handicapped when the time comes to work up the last three assignments dealing with social change, problem leadership, and social foresight.

Each clipping should be dated, identified as to source, and numbered.

The permanent notebook and the clipping file will constitute the objective evidence of the student's competence in building up a record of data.

Human Association: Description and Analysis

I-1:1. The Sociologist's Problem

The basic problem of sociology is the description and analysis of human association—its forms, phases, and conditioning variables.

Human association is both (1) an *enveloping condition* of our individual lives and (2) a *distinct kind of objective phenomena*, namely, *the interacting, communicating, and affecting-one-another relationships of human contemporaries*.¹

As an enveloping condition, association surrounds each of us at birth with a preëxisting group life and with an accumulated mass of visible and invisible discoveries and inventions—our social heritage, or *culture*. Each of us has been conceived in and through one form of association, has been born into another, and has grown up in a complicated matrix of associational forms ranging from the family to the world market and the international power-field.

As objective phenomena, interaction, communication, and the direct and indirect impacts of human beings on one another can be observed wherever we care to look. It is the intent of this book to make our looking somewhat more purposeful and systematic than it would otherwise be.

We shall begin by distinguishing from our own descriptive-analytical approach certain other ways of studying society, indicate briefly the role of organic association itself in evolution, and then take up the

¹ Past generations affect the present not through association as such but through one of its major products, namely, *culture*, through impacts on *biological transmission*—elimination of certain types, encouragement of others—and through *changes in the natural environment*—destruction of forests, exhaustion of water supplies, etc., etc.

six tasks that any scientist faces in describing and analyzing his problem phenomena.

I-1:2. Four Ways of Looking at Human Society

There are four points of view from which to approach any set of social phenomena. These are: (1) the speculative, or social philosophical, point of view; (2) the point of view of descriptive analysis; (3) the point of view of the social technologist; and finally, (4) the point of view of the person interested in actual social problem-solving.

1. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

A social philosophy is a body of theory concerning the ultimate realities and values of a society: its origins, evolution, probable future, and basic characteristics. Social philosophers seek answers to their questions about the nature of society, not by formulating specific hypotheses and then collecting empirical evidence to test them, but rather by using accumulated knowledge as the basis for certain premises and then arguing to logical conclusions. Thus, we know, for example, that men tend to act in terms of what John Dewey called the means-end schema, i.e., a frame of reference involving values, purposes, means, and conditions.² They also act in terms of a cause-and-effect frame of reference. The English philosopher Bradley struggled with the problem of how it is possible for the *causes* which have determined a man's behavior ever to become *becauses* in his mind to pull him on to some future act.³ Conceivably, a psychologist might have attempted to collect empirical evidence on which to base an answer. Bradley went at it philosophically, trying to reason it out from what he knew about the nature of the universe and of logical relationships.

Underlying the great social systems of the world are systems of ideas, values, and objectives which constitute the social philosophies of those societies. Leighton has analyzed some of the likenesses, differences, and implications involved in democracy, Fascism, and Communism.⁴ This is the type of problem attacked by social philosophers.

A number of historians and philosophers have also tried to reason out the future of civilization from their knowledge of history and from

² See John Dewey, *How We Think*, Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1933, chap. 5. Also F. S. Chapin, presidential address, American Sociological Society, 1935, in *American Sociological Review*, February, 1936, pp. 1-11.

³ See F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1893; 7th ed., 1920.

⁴ See Joseph A. Leighton, *Social Philosophies in Conflict*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937.

certain uniformities which they think they can discern in the historical record. Thus, Oswald Spengler, a German, produced an imposing volume of what another historian called "resounding nonsense" just after World War I under the title *The Decline of the West*. In this tome he argued that civilizations have natural life-histories like biological organisms—infancy, youth, maturity, old age—and that all symptoms indicated that our own civilization was now in its old age.

The most ambitious attempt by a sociologist in the direction of social philosophy is the work of Pitirim Sorokin. In *Social and Cultural Dynamics* he argues that three types of culture tend to succeed one another: Ideational, or mystic-religious, like the culture of the Middle Ages; Sensate, or materialistic, like our own; and an Idealistic, or mixed, type.⁵

Of the anthropologists A. L. Kroeber joins the philosophers in his *Configurations of Culture Growth*,⁶ and among the historians Arnold Toynbee is the latest and the most erudite to attempt to read the riddle of history. In his *A Study of History*, in ten volumes, he takes civilizations as the proper units of study for understanding man's great adventure.⁷ He then works out a scheme considerably more flexible than Spengler's but in no sense a scientific study of social changes. Like Spengler, he finds Western civilization facing an ominous "time of troubles" which in other civilizations heralded the beginning of the end if the "creative minority" failed in its task of leadership.

We shall have to return again to the philosophers of history in a final chapter when we face the question of the future of Western civilization, but in this book we shall confine ourselves to the much more limited problem of observing human association as it goes on around us. In Book II we face our world as a world in trouble.

2. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

All descriptive analysis of any kind of empirical phenomena presupposes a philosophical point of view and takes for granted certain philosophical concepts which it does not critically examine. Thus, the descriptive analysis of the phenomena of human association presupposes the point of view of any science: namely, that the world we live in can be known; that methods of observation and analysis can be

⁵ New York, American Book Company, 1937.

⁶ Berkeley, University of California Press, 1944.

⁷ New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. a one volume abridgment of Vols. I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, which summarizes Toynbee's basic ideas.

devised for producing verifiable knowledge about it; that on the whole it is a dependable world, a world of uniformities that can be counted on; and that these uniformities can be stated in terms of identifiable entities, relationships, processes, variables, and the like. What the philosophical implications of such concepts may be is the province of the philosopher, not of the descriptive scientist.

But while the descriptive scientist cannot escape having a philosophy which rationalizes his science, he does his best himself to avoid philosophizing, or speculating about, his phenomena and confines himself to posing questions, or hypotheses, which observation, not speculation, can answer: questions about the nature and adequacy of his samples of phenomena; of possible relationships between his problem phenomena (dependent variables) and conditioning phenomena (independent variables); of changes, trends, and processes. As we shall see, like any other scientist he faces at least six tasks which must be well performed if he is to answer his questions. Throughout his operations the only value which can be permitted to motivate his work is the value of truth.

So long as his primary objective is to describe and analyze "what is there," to find the truth, we say he is scientifically motivated. But when he becomes concerned with the practical consequences of his findings or seeks to use his discoveries for the purpose of affecting a practical situation in some way, his motivation has shifted from the scientific search for truth to the practical attempt to affect events. This practical attempt may take two forms: first, the development of *principles* of action and *skills* in applying such principles; and second, *actual attempts* at problem-solving, at applying his skills to life situations. The first of these we refer to as the technological approach; the second, as the problem-solving approach.

3. THE TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH

Technology is the body of techniques or skills useful for solving practical problems. Much practical technology is still based on tradition, on the accepted ways of doing a job as handed down in families, in skilled trades, and even to some extent in the professions. But since the rise of modern science, more and more of the skills of practical technology have involved the application of scientific principles or discoveries to specific technical problems. This has brought with it a shift in the process of training technicians from the old methods of apprenticeship to the newer methods of the technical and professional

schools. James Watt could acquire such training in engineering as he needed as an apprentice to an instrument-maker in London. Today to qualify as an engineer he would have to attend a college of engineering. In his day young men aspiring to become physicians served apprenticeships with practicing doctors. Today they attend medical school. Would-be lawyers in early America used to read law in the offices of practicing attorneys. Today they attend law schools and have to pass state examinations for admission to the bar.

The point is, whether skills are passed down by tradition or developed by special training, the acquisition of skill for dealing with practical situations is one way of approaching social phenomena. The actual application of such skills to practical situations, actual problem-solving, is still another.

4. PROBLEM-SOLVING

A fourth way of approaching social reality is actively to try to change it. A problem is a situation for dealing with which one's habits and traditional routines are no longer adequate; a situation to which one must not merely adjust, as to ordinary situations, but readjust.

Adjustment and readjustment are behavioral processes of individuals, but the objects of adjustment and readjustment may include not merely one's own behavior but relationships with others and any or all forms of association in which men live as well as any or all aspects of their culture from material things to ideas and cultural values. In other words, individuals may experience problems as arising (a) within themselves in physical illnesses, emotional conflicts, antagonistic purposes, etc.; (b) in the physical world outside, as in storms, food shortages, breakdowns of cultural protections in disasters, and the like; (c) in the world of symbols—language problems, mathematical problems, and so on; (d) in relationships with other persons; (e) in the failures or inadequacies of various forms of association; and (f) in the failures or inadequacies of specific culture traits or complexes such as institutions, material traits, cultural values, and so on.

As distinguished from descriptive analysis of social phenomena, problem-solving has a practical objective. It seeks either to maintain a given *status quo* or to change it. Scientific descriptive analysis as such seeks merely to understand.

In Book I we are trying to understand human association—to describe and analyze it as something given. In Book II we shall broaden

our approach to include the role of values in adjustment and readjustment, and some of the problems that result.

With this brief attempt to distinguish other ways of approaching human association, we are ready to ask what has been its role in organic evolution in general and in what respects human association differs from simpler forms of association.

I-1.3. Association in Evolution

Association with others of their own species is one of the useful dodges that living organisms hit upon ages ago to increase their own chances of survival.⁸ It is probably about a billion years older than man and undoubtedly had a good deal to do with his own emergence as man.

In a rudimentary form, association of a sort appears even on the level of single-celled protozoa like *Paramecium*. Single paramecia sometimes vary their primitive practice of reproducing through simple cell division by joining temporarily with another speck of living jelly to exchange nuclear material. But sexual reproduction, when it appears on a level at least above that of certain fish, necessarily implies some association, however temporary. As a matter of fact, association gradually seems to become a substitute for reproduction itself: the more parental care and group protection a species devotes to its young, the fewer young the species needs in order to survive. The female of the wasteful fish must produce millions of eggs a year. Wild mammals that protect their young, as do wolves, buffalo, and the like, get by with a score or less. The human female produces only about a dozen ova a year—and can still overbreed any environment except the original jungle!

Clearly, association has become an instrument of biological economy: It permits more and more energy to be released for functions other than mere replacement and enables more and more adult individuals to live out their natural life spans.

In evolutionary terms, five levels of association are discernible: (1) sexual; (2) parental; (3) gregarious; (4) communal; and (5) cultural.

1. SEXUAL ASSOCIATION

Biologists trace the beginnings of sexual differentiation back to the borderline between plants and animals. In *Paramecium* the conjugat-

⁸ We need not concern ourselves with association among members of unlike species. This can be mutually beneficial, as in commensal or symbiotic relationships, or harmful, as in parasitism.

PLATES 1-14




Plate 1. The Ascent of Man: Classification of Living Things Out of Which Modern Man Emerges as Homo Sapiens. The basic distinction between plants and animals appeared hundreds of millions of years ago. The first animals were single-celled creatures whose descendants gradually became more complex until some of them, presumably in flowing waters, mutated in the direction of backbones. From the backboneed animals came amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals, and among the mammals eventually the Java Ape Man, Pekin Man, and so on. Finally, 100,000 to 25,000 years ago, Homo Sapiens

Plate 2. Three Stages on the Biological Trail to Modern Man.

Top, left: *Pithecanthropus erectus*, the Java Ape Man, as reconstructed from skull-top, left thigh bone and two molar teeth found by Dr. Eugene Dubois, a Dutch Army surgeon, on the Bengawan River in Central Java in 1891. This particular Ape Man probably died in a freshet about 500,000 B.C. The bust shows an artist's conception of him. No living descendants.

Top, right: Neanderthal Man, from a restoration by J. R. McGregor. Note increasing skull capacity as compared with *Pithecanthropus erectus* and the heavy brow ridges characteristic of Neanderthal. This species, which was off the main line of human evolution and has no known descendants, occupied Europe during and after the last of the four great ice ages, circa 150,000 B.C. to 25,000 B.C. It was exterminated by Cro-Magnon, the first race of *Homo sapiens*, or true men, known to scientists. The first Neanderthal specimen was discovered near Dusseldorf, Germany, in 1856. Skeletons or portions of skeletons of many others have been found in more than twenty places in Europe. Neanderthal's relatively big brain was big mostly at the back—the frontal lobes lacked the full development characteristic of *Homo sapiens*. Neanderthal, although pre-human, did discover how to use fire. (Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History, New York City.)

Bottom: Crô-Magnon man, first race of true men so far discovered. He entered Europe about 25,000 years ago, lived partially in caves, and left amazing drawings of bison and other animals on cave roofs and walls in France and elsewhere. He was apparently replaced between 15,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C. by three other races that now dominate Europe: the Mediterraneans or narrow-headed brunettes; the Alpines, or broad-headed blondes; and the Nordics, or narrow-headed blondes. Elsewhere, meanwhile, the great Mongoloid and Negroid races evolved.



Plate 3. Stages on the Long Trail of Cultural Development: Java Ape-men Teasing the Giant Tortoise. Drawing by A. A. Jansson. Contemporary apes use sticks and stones as tools and weapons, so it is presumed that the Java ape-men did the same. This represents the very beginnings of a social heritage of material traits. Most authorities doubt that the ape-man had yet developed a language although it is probable that he was beginning to attach meanings to various grunts and other noises. Investigators have found that certain contemporary apes use a rudimentary language of a few "words."

Plate 4. Another Stage on the Long Trail of Cultural Development. Model Reconstruction of Swiss Lake Dwelling of the New Stone Age about 3000 B.C. Remains of these shelters were revealed by low water in the Swiss lakes during the nineteenth century. The lake dwellers planted wheat, fished, used dugout canoes, had pottery utensils, and built their homes on piles in the lakes as protection against human enemies. They also had domesticated animals, as shown by the dog on the shore watching proceedings on the causeway.



*Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History,
New York City.*

Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History, New York City.




Plate 5. Culture in North America Before Columbus. Alfred Louis Kroeber, in *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), has distinguished no less than fifteen different culture areas in North and South America, nine of them north of the Rio Grande. The fifteen are as follows: (1) Arctic or Eskimo (extreme northern Canada and fringes of Alaska); (2) Northwest or North Pacific Coast; (3) California or California-Great Basin; (4) Plateau (Columbia River and north for several hundred miles); (5) Mackenzie-Yukon; (6) Northeast or Northern Woodland; (7) Great Plains; (8) Southwest (from somewhat east of Rio Grande to Gulf of California and the Pacific); (9) Southeast or Southern Woodland; (10) Mexico; (11) Columbia or Chibcha; (12) Andean or Peruvian; (13) Patagonia; (14) Tropical Forest (almost all of South America east of the Andes and north of the Patagonian area); and (15) Antillean (Cuba, the islands of the Caribbean, and a few hundred miles of northern South American coast east of the Columbian area).

In Plates 5, 6, and 7 three distinctive Indian cultures of North America are shown. Plate 5 illustrates the life of the Eastern Woodland culture area as painted by A. A. Jansson under the direction of Clark Wissler. This shows the skin clothing worn by the people, the bark wigwams, the carrying device for the papoose on the tree in the foreground, the Indian mother grinding maize with her wooden mortar and pestle, the field of maize in the right background and the gathered ears and pumpkins in the foreground, the woven baskets, the woman weaving at her blanket loom, the young hunter with two turkeys brought down by his bow and arrow, and other details of an Indian encampment, including the innumerable dogs which many tribes used for food. The encampment is placed near a source of drinking water, in this case a lake, which is also useful for fishing and for transportation (note birch bark canoes).


This is a Stone Age culture, several thousand years more primitive than the elaborate civilizations which Cortez and Pizarro conquered in Mexico and Peru in the sixteenth century.




Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History, New York City.

Plate 6. Contemporary Stone Age in America. A recent Blackfoot camp, typical of the culture of the Great Plains. Traditionally the Plains tribes made their tepees of poles covered with buffalo hide. The buffalo was also the main source of food, clothing, "chips" for the camp fire, and so on. When the white man nearly exterminated the great buffalo herds in the 1880's the Plains tribes faced a crisis which forced them into more dependence on the white men and radically changed their way of life. The relative recency of this picture is attested by: (a) the horse, which did not enter Plains culture till some time after the Spanish introduced it in Mexico at the time of the conquest; and (b) the metal pail in which the women are apparently preparing a meal. Note the beadwork jacket worn by the woman at the far left and the characteristic braided hair-dos of the other two. When the Indians break camp some of the tepee poles will be used to form a travois which, dragged behind a horse or a dog, carries camp utensils on a platform or net slung between the two shafts. This particular picture does not show enough Indians or dogs to be quite typical of a Plains tribe in camp.

Plate 7. Cultural Adaptation to Nature: The Stone Age in the American Southwest. Pueblo Indians at work in an arid field outside their village. A painting by Arthur A. Jansson under the direction of Clark Wissler. This is a scene fairly typical of the life of Indians among the pueblos of New Mexico. The man sitting in the foreground is leaning against a post of the sun-shelter, the same post that anchors one end of the belt-loom which the woman is using. He holds a digging stick similar to the ones being used by the figures in the background to open holes for the planting of maize seeds in hills, as the woman at the right is doing. Note the pottery with characteristic tribal decorations burnt in. The water supply for the Pueblo village in the distance at the left comes from a spring in the gulch, center rear.



Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History, New York City.



Courtesy, American Museum of Natural History, New York City.

Plate 8. Spontaneous Grouping. High school students going home associate in more or less casual, face-to-face groups. Note that these groups are (1) small enough so that interaction is predominantly each-to-each. Also, that such association (2) is to last only a few minutes at most, (3) is more or less incidental to each individual's major purpose, which is simply to get home, and therefore, (4) since it is not itself an instrument of specific purpose, this kind of association (5) involves no division of labor and hence (6) no organization. This would be classified as a sociability situation.

Plate 9. Crowd Association. This is a simulated food riot situation at Rego Park, Queens Borough, New York City, September 25, 1943, in the process of being "controlled" by air raid wardens. The exercise was ordered by New York state civil defense authorities to prepare citizens and wardens for the possible consequences of atomic warfare. Everybody is much more cheerful in this picture than they are likely to be if a real food shortage follows an air raid in actual warfare. The point of our photograph is that as a crowd the thirteen or so members of this little mob (activated crowd) are associating shoulder to shoulder rather than face to face and have come together through an apparent convergence of purposes, namely, to get food from the store, and, failing that, to dramatize their protests. This is a conflict situation.



Pinney, from Monkmeier Press Photo Service.

Monkmeier Press Photo Service.



Plate 10. Typical Form of Association Called an Assemblage. Here are many of the 2500 UAW-CIO delegates from all over the United States and Canada who attended the sixth Education Conference of the UAW in Chicago, April, 1954. This is a typical *audience*. This type of association is spatially structured, each individual occupying a fixed location in the hall during the meeting. It is also socially structured in that there is a functional division of labor between the speakers and the listeners. Interaction is one to all (speaker to audience) and each to one (listeners to speaker), with some lateral interaction of each to those around him and to the audience as a whole. This is an educational situation.

Plate 11. The Pinnacle of an Organization: Officers of the United States Steel Corporation Pause in a Conference Situation to Have Their Pictures Taken. From left to right: Roger M. Blough, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors; Clifford F. Hood, President; Benjamin F. Fairless, Chairman of the Board; Enders M. Voorhees, Chairman of the Finance Committee; and Robert C. Tyson, Vice Chairman of the Finance Committee. Note that unlike the other forms of association illustrated, association of functionaries of an organization such as the United States Steel Corporation expresses (1) corporate selection of personnel, (2) organized purpose, (3) high division of labor, and (4) concentration of authority.




Courtesy, UAW-CIO, Solidarity House, Detroit.



Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Plate 12. One of the Typical Persistent Forms of Human Togetherness: Business Center of a Small Midwestern City at Night. The signs—Montgomery Ward, W. A. Drake, Insurance—Real Estate, City Drugs—refer to the *business organizations* providing specific services and commodities for the residents of this community and for the farmers living in the town's *service area* within a radius of several miles around it. (See Book I, Chapter 9.) This picture also illustrates many of the material traits of modern urban living: the automobile, the motion picture (first low building with marquee beyond Montgomery Ward store on left), sidewalks, paved streets, urban water supply (fire hydrant on curb, right center), the postal service (collection box beside hydrant), the electric light, the telephone (Bell sign in front of City Drug store), the hotel, brick building construction, and so forth.

Plate 13. An Assemblage That Visualizes One Aspect of the World Order: The Security Council of the United Nations in Session in the UN Headquarters in New York. The Security Council consists of representatives of eleven member states, five with permanent seats, the other six elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Permanent membership as of January 1, 1954, included Nationalist China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Non-permanent members were, until 1955, Colombia, Denmark, and Lebanon, and until 1956, Brazil, New Zealand, and Turkey. The Security Council has the function of maintaining international peace and security, and UN members agree to carry out its decisions. The Council may investigate any international dispute. On non-procedural matters Council decisions require an affirmative vote of seven members, including the votes of all five permanent members. One permanent member, in other words, can "veto" action. As of Autumn, 1954, the United Nations had a total membership of sixty nations.



Courtesy, General Motors Corporation.

Preindl from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.



ing cells are apparently alike: there is no physiological division of labor. In *Pandorina*, a water-living colony of sixteen cells, "sex distinction is foreshadowed by the slight difference in the size of the conjugating cells." In *Volvox*, a large hollow spherical colony of thousands of cells, "sexual dimorphism is complete"; i.e., certain cells become specialized for reproduction and the others die. Actual reproduction depends on the association (conjugation) of these specialized cells—"preferably," as Lull says, "the offspring of separate colonies."⁹

From this level up, reproduction increasingly involves some association between sexually differentiated organisms.¹⁰

2. PARENTAL ASSOCIATION

Without inquiring into parental relationships before the appearance of the first mammals 75,000,000 or more years ago, we can note at once that with the arrival of mammalian life the dependence of the young upon the nursing mother obviously required association. This has varied in duration in different species and has varied also in the degree of involvement of the male in protecting his mate and supporting her and her offspring. But, as we have already noted, as parental protection increases, the mortality of the young tends to decrease, a tendency further augmented by group protection. This, in turn, has evolved through gregariousness to communal living, and in the case of man to cultural association.

3. GREGARIOUS ASSOCIATION

Gregarious association such as we find in swarms, herds, flocks, etc., is association in which the individual members of a species habitually live in fairly close proximity to one another, aid one another in repelling enemies, and so on, but in which each continues to look after himself without any interdependence due to division of labor. Gregarious association, in short, is herd association—the kind of living together that characterized the great herds of buffalo on the western plains, 1830 to 1880, for example. Many species are gregarious. Only man and the social insects have developed association beyond this level.

⁹ Richard Swann Lull, *Organic Evolution*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1920. pp. 198–199. "Bisexual parentage is so widely prevalent, both in the plant and animal kingdoms, that it must subserve some very real need in organic economy. Weismann looked upon it mainly as a means of causing or increasing individual variation which . . . is a prime prerequisite to evolution" (p. 200).

¹⁰ An apparent exception occurs in certain species of fish among which the male fertilizes the female's eggs while merely swimming over the abandoned "nest."

4. COMMUNAL ASSOCIATION

The only organisms that have evolved a social division of labor are the social insects and man, but the insects have done it on quite a different biological basis than has man.

The insects, and particularly the ants, which are the dominant insect as man is the dominant mammal, have evolved as “instinct machines.” All the complex patterns of communal living among ants—patterns of nest-building, seed-gathering, slave-keeping, war-making, and so on—can be reproduced straight from the egg. No contact between parents and young is needed to enable young ants to recognize hereditary enemies, to build a nest exactly like the parental nest, to find identically the same kind of food, to carry on exactly the same kind of nest activities, and to live exactly the same kind of life from beginning to end. The entire pattern of community living among ants is ready-made, stamped into the ant’s brain by immemorial ages of hereditary transmission. Fossil ants from the Baltic amber 20,000,000 years old are exactly the same in bodily structure as living ants today. And since division of labor among ants—the basis of their complex community life—rests squarely on specialization of physical structure, we know that millions of years before man evolved, worker ants, warrior ants, and queen ants were carrying on their communal affairs just as their descendants are carrying on all over the world today.

The ant has become the dominant insect by evolving a particular combination of genes in the germ plasm that prescribes specific behavior for the ants of each generation somewhat as the pictures on a movie film prescribe the specific behavior of the characters on the screen. No matter how many times the film is run off the characters on the screen must always do the same things. In the same way, today’s ants are the creatures of their hereditary patterns, slaves of those original “germ films” selected out by successful adaptation 200,000 centuries ago.

Man, on the other hand, has survived and achieved dominance among the earth’s mammals by quite a different kind of hereditary mechanism. He, too, like the ant comes into the world with a complex basic pattern of genes in the germ plasm, but unlike the ant’s this basic pattern provides him with a brain that contains almost no ready-made patterns of *specific* behavior merely waiting to be run off. Man’s cerebral cortex is no mere biological film projector. It is more like a

radar detector and control center all in one, sensitized to pick up all sorts of impulses and then rearrange them in new patterns to meet changing conditions. In short, man has survived not by evolving a film-projector brain but by evolving a detector-control apparatus so incomplete and inefficient at the beginning in infancy that he has to start learning pronto and then keep right on learning in order to survive at all. The inborn hookups in the nervous system with which man is born give him no specific answers to any of his life problems—only impulses, or drives, to *find* answers. Like the young ant, the human infant gets hungry, right enough. His tissues burn up energy and that energy must be replenished. But whereas the young ant is ready almost at once to find its own food and distinguish food from non-food, the human infant would starve to death if unattended for even a few hours during its first few years of life. For many years he not only doesn't know what is good for him; he doesn't know how to get it. He has to *learn* to walk, *learn* to talk, *learn* how to relate himself to other human beings, and eventually he has to *learn* how to make a living. He has to *learn* a thousand and one specific ways of behaving as required by his particular society.

That society is not merely a communal nest like an ant society with all its ways of acting stamped into each individual's brain at the beginning and nothing except the nest itself transmitted from generation to generation; it is a *cultural* society whose specific ways of acting each must learn anew for himself from the accumulated social heritage passed down from generation to generation. In other words, human society is based not merely on division of labor but on an accumulation of learnings from the past. Man is the only species that has developed this form of association, *cultural association*.

Communal association made it possible for the social insects to provide more group protection, higher survival rates, and denser populations than did mere gregarious association. Cultural association adds still more refined division of labor, more flexible subforms of association, higher development of individual variations, and a flexibility of adjustment processes far beyond anything found on the communal ant level. In a million years, thanks to his ability to fund the experience of each generation and pass it on to the next as a kind of collective memory, or culture, man has climbed from the jungle to civilization. Twenty million years have not sufficed to raise the ant one iota above its ancestors of the Baltic amber.

side of Europe, and for many millenniums Europe remained a culturally backward area. For the full story of how culture has evolved—how hunting and fishing gradually gave way to settled modes of agriculture, town living, and eventually to successive cycles of cities—for all that you must go to the anthropologists and the archaeologists. The point at the moment is that even before true man had evolved, his progenitors and cousins had acquired wits enough to learn from experience and to begin accumulating the results of such learnings. They had discovered fire, which made it possible to move out of the tropics and spread even to the edge of the retreating glaciers. When man himself appeared with an even better brain the foundations had been laid. Without any further biological evolution of his physical and mental equipment man has come on up out of the Old Stone Age, through the New Stone Age, into the Age of Metals and on into the Age of Steam, Electricity, and the beginnings of the Atomic Age. There have been ups and downs in given areas—we must distinguish the accumulation of culture in general from the cultural history of Egypt or India or Greece or Yucatán. But for at least half a million years and perhaps longer man has been building on beyond communal association into a more complex, more interdependent, more dynamic, uniquely human type of association, the type we have chosen to call *cultural association*.

I-1:4. What Is Culture?

As we have just indicated, accumulated learnings from the past form the basis of this uniquely human type of association. These accumulated learnings we have called the social heritage, or culture.

Anthropologists find when they compare the cultures of different societies that all have certain characteristics in common. The unit of cultural analysis is the *culture trait*, or for some purposes the *culture complex*, or cluster of traits. Comparative studies show that the traits of different cultures serve the same basic human needs—physical needs for food, shelter, sleep, reproduction, elimination, and so on; social needs for communication, protection, coöperation, coördination, control; emotional needs for acceptance, response, recognition, adequacy, security. These needs are the same everywhere for the simple reason that man is everywhere one species.

Why the cultural differences, then? Because the conditions of survival have varied in different environments and the specific life tests

have varied in different historical contexts. Everywhere men get hungry, but in some societies the staple food is rice, in others wheat, and in a few primitive societies it has even been "long pig"—which is New Britainese for the cannibal's special delicacy. The point is, the needs everywhere are the same; the cultural means for meeting those needs vary widely from culture to culture.

The totality of culture traits in a given society is called the *culture base*. By and large, the culture base on which association proceeds today in the United States is enormously larger than was the culture base of Crô-Magnon man. It is this difference in the size of the culture base that makes association today so much more complex and so much more inclusive than it was in 25,000 B.C.

I-1:5. How Analyze Association?

In describing and analyzing any set of problem phenomena scientists seek to do six things: (1) describe units of their problem phenomena in selected samples; (2) classify them; (3) ascertain form and internal consistency; (4) break them down into components, or elements; (5) study them through time to observe orderly sequences, or phases; and (6) discover, and if possible measure, the relationships of their problem phenomena with conditioning, or independent, variables.

I. WHAT SHALL BE OUR UNIT SAMPLE?

Unit instances of human association, as everyone actually experiences it, may be called *situations*. We define a situation in I-1:6 below.

2. HOW CLASSIFY SITUATIONS?

At least three criteria may be used: (a) relationship to an observer—in-presence or out-of-presence (distant); (b) relationship to cultural expectations—routine or nonroutine; and (c) relationship to time—i.e., currently functional, or past (historical).

3. FORMS AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY

We shall find it useful to study association in terms of (a) the *forms*, or *persistent structures*, which it presents; and (b) *categories of classification* of human beings which so powerfully control and channel association.

We have noted that human association is both (a) an *active process*—interaction, communication, and so on—and (b) an *enviroming condition* of human togetherness. A unit experience of the active process we have called a situation, and this kind of phenomenon we shall define in more detail in a moment. As we shall see, every unit experience of active association, i.e., every focalized pattern of human relationships in active association, involves as one of its components the way in which human beings are actively relating themselves to one another—that is, the particular *form* that association takes in action—and it also involves not as a component but as an enviroming condition the way in which the particular individuals concerned are more or less permanently related. Thus, we have to distinguish *forms of active association* and *forms of relatively permanent togetherness*, although the two are constantly influencing each other and permanent togetherness is a togetherness of people in active association and some forms of active association are relatively permanent. The point is, both in active association and in human togetherness as an enviroming condition uniformities can be observed. These uniformities we call *forms of association*. Some appear and disappear in a few minutes or a few hours. Others persist for days, months, years. Y SSJ

The recurrent active forms include:

1. Groups.
2. Crowds.
3. Assemblages.

Persistent active forms, i.e., forms that continue from day to day, include:

4. Organizations.
5. Publics.
6. Social movements.

Persistent forms of togetherness include:

7. Local social systems.
8. The social order.
9. World markets.
10. The world order.

A group is two or more persons interacting in presence (of an observer), face to face, and predominantly each to each. It is believed that the number of persons who can interact as a group, i.e., face to face and predominantly each to each, cannot exceed twenty to fifty. As the number in a group increases either of two things happens: (a) the group breaks into a number of subgroups; or (b) interaction ceases to be each to each and becomes rather each to some or each to all.

Either a group becomes several groups or it tends toward crowd behavior.¹¹

A crowd is any number of individuals above a group, in presence, but typically in more or less random association, with such interaction as occurs tending toward each to some or each to all. There may or may not be a common focus of interest or attention. Examples would include an ordinary street throng, theatergoers streaming in or out, ticket holders hurrying all together to enter or leave a football stadium, and so on. When a crowd does have a common focus of interest or attention and becomes highly emotionalized and active, it is usually called a *mob*.

An assemblage is any number of persons in presence in structured relationships, organized by external influences but without an internal organization of its own. In other words, when the theater crowd gets inside the theater it becomes an assemblage, spatially structured and organized by the theater management as an *audience*, but without an organization of its own. Every college lecture class of any size also constitutes an assemblage, which is organized in the sense that its members have been selected in some way and have been spatially arranged facing the lecture platform. But this assemblage has no organization of its own, no corporate identity. It has no head, no division of labor as between its own members, no student with authority over the others. Its members may have similar purposes, as do members of some crowds, but they do not have a common purpose. Furthermore, like crowds, most assemblages as such have no history and only a very limited future.¹² In all these respects assemblages differ from organizations.

¹¹ The term *group* may, of course, be used, and has been so used by many sociologists, to refer not to a few individuals in face-to-face interaction but to any collectivity of individuals of whatever size and in whatever kind of interrelationship. Thus sociologists who so use the term might be called a "group of sociologists" although they may number several hundred and may never all have been together at one time in one place. The writer prefers to restrict the reference of the term *group* to that given in this section and use some other term such as *aggregate*, *collectivity*, or *plural* to refer to a multiplicity of individuals considered together without regard to the form of their association.

¹² A class in session constitutes an assemblage if fairly numerous; otherwise it may interact as a group. But the class itself is an organization in the sense that its members have been selected (not everybody can join), that there is division of labor as between students and instructor, and that it has been organized for a specific purpose—the purpose of the particular course. All organizations function through individuals who associate in various forms of groups and assemblages which may or may not be purposively organized to advance the purpose of the organization. Two football teams may be regarded as two organizations functioning on the field as two organized groups. A doubles

An organization is a form of association dominated by purpose. Organizations are formed to achieve specific purposes. They are formed in order to utilize human coöperation to achieve their purposes. This inevitably involves selection of personnel. Every organization is in some sense exclusive. Not every Tom, Dick, and Harry can walk into any household, business office, factory, school, or college and make himself at home. Anyone can attend any church service just as anyone can buy at any store, but attendance or buying does not make the given individual a member of the respective organization. For that something more is required. Every organization is always both selective and exclusive. It is also authoritative. That is, somebody must always have the power to designate objectives and coördinate coöperation. Otherwise, there are only ineffectiveness and incoördination. Division of labor is thus another characteristic of organizations. Some members do one kind of thing; others, other kinds of things. In short, an organization can be defined as *a form of association created to accomplish a specific purpose by coöordinating the activities of selected individuals toward a common end through division of labor under authoritative direction*. Examples of social organizations range all the way from temporary, informal organizations such as an *ad hoc* picnic party to permanent, highly formalized organizations such as General Motors, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the United States Army, and the United States government.

The public is a form of association created by distance communication. There are two kinds: (a) a communication public; and (b) an interest public. A communication public consists of everybody who has a common medium of distance communication: the radio public; the New York *Times* public, etc. An interest public consists of everyone who has a common interest served by distance communication through whatever medium: the shoe-buying public; the coffee-drinking public; and so on. Membership in a public is obviously nonselective and nonexclusive. Publics are structured by culture, not purposively organized.

A social movement is a form of association in which individuals at a distance participate because of a common interest and a common desire for action. Social movements are problem-generated, i.e., the

team in tennis is an example of organized coöperation at approximately its lowest associational level—two individuals only, coöperating against a similar team on the other side of the net.

interest and the desired action focus on some common problem that the participant individuals want solved. Hence, movements are instruments of collective readjustment. Individuals participate actively in person or vicariously through agents or representatives, subject, of course, to the social and political tolerances of any given society. In totalitarian police regimes social movements are usually repressed and are replaced by underground movements and conspiracies. Social movements may, of course, have all degrees of organization from none at all to closely integrated coteries and parties.

The persistent forms of togetherness—local social systems, the social order, world markets, and the world order—are all characterized by permanence, inclusiveness of the active forms, and relative dependence on geographical location. All the active forms of association are independent of geography. They can appear anywhere. Local social systems, the social order, world markets, and the world order, on the other hand, are all anchored to particular places, particular areas of the earth's surface. All require residence on the part of their participating personnel. In the nature of the case, most forms of active association necessarily imply that the people who form groups, organizations, or social movements must live somewhere, but where they live is incidental. It is no longer incidental in the persistent forms of togetherness. Where people live now becomes decisive. If you live in New York City you cannot at the same time be experiencing an equal degree of togetherness with the residents of Oakland, California. If you live in the American social order you cannot at the same time be living in the Soviet social order. If you participate in the kind of togetherness that makes up the world coffee market, you must live either in a producing country like Brazil or in a consuming country like the United States. You cannot live in both. And the world order is an order of world powers—and what that order means to you depends again on which one of the world powers you happen to live under. All these persistent forms of togetherness, then, are tied to geography in a way that is not true of the active forms of association. They are environing conditions in which and under which association as an active process actually goes on.

So much for the forms in which human association presents itself: forms of active processes and forms of persistent togetherness.

The second aspect of the internal consistency of our phenomena is an aspect not of the way men actually relate themselves in association but rather of the way men relate themselves *in thought*. We call the

most important of these ways of thinking about people *categories*, i.e., classifications of people based on evidences or beliefs about likenesses and differences. A category is a culture trait.

Cultural categories are important in association because the way people classify each other determines in large part not only some forms of association but the degree and quality of association itself. We interact, communicate, coöperate, and locate homes largely in terms of categorical classifications. There are no more fundamental controls of association, for example, than age, sex, class, and racial classifications. All are, of course, culture traits.

There are six main categories that control association:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Age categories. | 4. Occupational categories. |
| 2. Sex categories. | 5. Stratification categories. |
| 3. Racial categories. | 6. Coexistence categories. |

Except for the last, all of these are sufficiently self-explanatory for present purposes. The last—coexistence categories—give us such concepts as plurels, aggregates, populations. Most of the time, of course, it is coexistence that gives other categories significance. Only in coexistence can we associate.

In every situation, then, we shall find (a) forms of active association, (b) evidences of persistent forms of togetherness, and (c) categories of classification.

But these are not the only components of situations. A fourth major task of every scientist dealing with his problem phenomena is to break them down, if possible, into components or elements.

4. COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS OF SITUATIONS

Here we get into deep water.

It is easy enough to point out that if you think of human association merely as a set of processes of interaction and communication the ultimate unit seems to be something called a *contact*. A contact is simply a unit instance of interaction or communication—a unit instance of the recognized impact of one person on another, direct or indirect.

The trouble comes when you begin to think of human association not as a set of conscious processes but as a *web of interrelationships*, organized and maintained by conscious processes but far exceeding the average person's grasp of them. Even in an average city the economic interrelationships alone outrun the ordinary citizen's awareness

of them.¹³ On a national or world scale they are quite beyond him.¹⁴ Modern international relationships long proved too complicated for isolationists to understand.

Does a web of interrelationships, patterning and controlling vast chains of actual interactions and communications, constitute real association? Does the term *one world* mean anything for the student of human association? Are you, drinking your morning cup of coffee, actually associating with the Brazilian Indians who, in response to American demand, planted and harvested the crop that they ultimately shipped to New York—and to your breakfast table? Does exchange on a world market across intervening oceans constitute association?

The answer could make a difference in your views of the federal budget and the draft!

Certainly, if association is to mean what it means in ordinary speech, you are not associating with the Brazilians. And yet, strictly speaking, you are not out of association with them in the sense that your behavior (coffee drinking) along with that of millions of other Americans has had an influence on them, and their behavior, in turn, has an influence on you.

Obviously, we have here two very different references of the term *association*. If your speaking or writing to the Brazilian ambassador would be a unit instance of association, your drinking a cup of Brazilian coffee cannot be, in the same sense. *Association by contact* and *association by remote, indirect influence* are obviously two different things.

We shall have to keep alert to evidences of each, but we shall find it much easier to describe and analyze association by contact. What the ultimate associational unit of association by remote influence may be, if indeed there can be one, we cannot attempt to guess.

As for situations, as distinguished from association itself, five kinds

¹³ Example: During the depression of the 1930's many merchants in one small mid-western city were openly jubilant when faculty members of the local state university finally suffered a salary cut. Within six months some of the jubilators were bankrupt as a result of the consequent reduction of faculty buying. The economic interrelationships of local business and faculty income never seemed to have penetrated the business consciousness before.

¹⁴ As shown by the American businessman's reluctance to give up protective tariffs in spite of the fact that the United States ceased with World War I to be a debtor nation. A creditor nation must obviously buy goods and services from the rest of the world, or give its money away to keep trade going.

of components comprise them: (1) a setting—i.e., forces of nature such as gravitation, heat, light, the physical atmosphere, physical objects, etc.; (2) two or more persons; (3) associational structures—groups, crowds, assemblages, organizations, etc.; (4) culture traits and complexes; (5) associational processes—adjustment, readjustment.

Associational processes must be observed and described if we are to fulfill the scientist's fifth task, namely, the discovery of orderly sequences in his problem phenomena through time.

5. ASSOCIATIONAL SEQUENCES

We have already noted that situations can be classified as routine and nonroutine.

In a routine situation events tend to follow this pattern:

- a. Threshold condition—business-as-usual, the routine.
- b. Disturbance of routine. If this disturbance can be handled within the limits of "normal" habits and customs,
- c. Adjustive behavior on the part of those involved, which
- d. Restores the routine.

Nonroutine situations always develop out of routine ones. *It is one of the basic functions of culture to establish routines.* Whether a situation is to continue as routine or break with the cultural pattern is determined between Phases b and c above. For the nonroutine situation the pattern goes like this:

- a. Threshold condition—routine.
- b. Disturbance of routine *exceeding the limits of tolerance of existing adjustments.* Hence,
- c. A problem appears. Old habits and customs do not solve or remove the difficulty. This forces
- d. Readjustive behavior—attempts to work out a new level or kind of adjustment, one not specifically pre-patterned by culture. This phase may be short or long, simple or complex, depending on the nature and extent of the disturbance and the nature and complexity of the problem, as those involved define it. This phase passes into
- e. A new or different pattern of routine, or
- f. The defeat and retreat, or withdrawal, of those involved. The situation is accepted as beyond remedy. Attempts to explain or rationalize the result may follow, but the original routine has been destroyed and no acceptable substitute has been worked out.

6. DISCOVERY AND MEASUREMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS OF PROBLEM PHENOMENA TO CONDITIONING, OR INDEPENDENT, VARIABLES

Under what conditions do we find such and such forms of grouping? Of organization? Of social movements? And so on. What conditions determine or condition situational disturbances? What ones determine the reactions that ensue? Under what conditions do participants give up the attempt to restore a disturbed routine?

Questions of this sort are easier to ask than to answer. The difficulties will emerge clearly enough as we go on.

I-1.6. The Concept of the Social Situation

Ever since the work of W. I. Thomas in *The Unadjusted Girl* and *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* the importance of social situations for individual adjustment has been recognized by sociologists. For many years the literature of social work has also made much use of the idea. Perhaps the most outstanding use of the concept for sociological analysis has been made by Dr. James H. S. Bossard in *Family Situations: An Introduction to the Study of Child Behavior* (with Eleanor S. Boll) and *The Sociology of Child Development*.¹⁵ In psychology the Gestalt school and Kurt Lewin have made invaluable contributions, the latter through his development of field theory.

Since we are taking the concept of the situation as the key concept in this book, we must define it with some care.¹⁶ By *situation* we refer to (1) a focalized pattern (2) of human relationships and circumstances (3) which an observer (or one involved) (4) reacts to (5) as an adjustment challenge, something to be met or dealt with, a source of experience.

What do we mean by a focalized pattern?

A pattern with a focus.

¹⁵ The first published in Philadelphia by the University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943; the second in New York by Harper & Brothers, 1948, rev. ed., 1953.

¹⁶ The term *situation* can, of course, be used to refer to any "relative combination of circumstances at a moment" (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1949): "the situation in mathematical theory," "the situation in colloidal chemistry," and so on. Another reference of the term *situation* is to a crisis or turning point, especially in fiction or drama: "the situation when Hamlet encounters his father's ghost," "the situation in *Treasure Island* when Jim, hiding in the apple barrel, overhears the mutineers plotting to seize the ship," etc. We are using the term to refer to *any* combination of human relationships and circumstances, not merely to those combinations fraught with uncertainty and hazard. We shall call the generic reference simply *situations*; the special reference, *dramatic situations*.

But what is the focus of this particular kind of pattern, this pattern of human relationships and circumstances?

The focus is the center of interest or attention.

The relationships and circumstances, the reactions, and the nature of a pattern of relationships and circumstances as a source of experience, we shall consider later. Every situation comes into existence and develops in and through human behavior. The only aspect of human behavior that we need to examine at the moment in relation to our preliminary understanding of social situations is *conceptualizing behavior*, the way human beings use ideas to identify and define situations.

I-1:7. The Role of Concepts in Situational Experience

As objects of understanding and adjustment, situations are always *conceptual constructs*. They are not mere percepts. They are perceptions structured into socially significant meanings.¹⁷

But since all of us have experienced ordinary situations since birth and since such situations are ordinary precisely because they have been prestructured by our culture so as to present nothing unfamiliar, the mental build-up of the social significance of a breakfast table scene, a classroom situation, and so on, is usually so effortless and so instantaneous as to merge with simple perception. We imagine that we actually “see” these simple, familiar situations which we have been conditioned to “see.”

In fact, so ingrained is this habit of “seeing” what our culture has prepared us to expect that in many ordinary situations expectation actually dominates perception: we “see” what we expect to see. When expectation does dominate perception in this way, we have a unit instance of what Walter Lippmann long ago called a *stereotype*.

A classic example is given in Figure I-1.1. In the winter of 1923 the old *Literary Digest* published as a cover design in its issue of January 27 an artist’s drawing of a locomotive coming head-on at the reader

¹⁷ The Gestalt psychologists tell us that what an individual reacts to in a given environment is not a series of isolated or merely successive stimuli but some sort of structured pattern or configuration. This is true in purely physical environments, as well as in more complicated ones. As we have defined it, a situation is a pattern or configuration not merely of physical objects but of relationships and social meanings.

Incidentally, it should be obvious at this point that our title of Book I, “The Social World in Being,” must be understood as referring to the social world as given in and through the conceptual cooperation of each reacting subject. And this conceptual cooperation is decidedly more complex in “giving” a social world than in “giving” the bare objects of a physical world.



FIG. I-1.1. "Art Vindicated by Actuality. *The Literary Digest's* cover design for January 27 (on the reader's left) was criticized by many of our subscribers on the ground that it would be impossible for snow and ice to cling to a locomotive under full steam. A graphic answer to this contention is supplied by the accompanying photograph of the Empire State Express arriving in Syracuse on January 19, on its run from Buffalo to New York. We reproduce it from the *New York Central Lines Magazine*. Any further correspondence from the critics will be read with interest." (*The Literary Digest*, March 24, 1923.)

through a snowstorm. Snow mantled the pilot and various parts of the boiler despite the fact that the engine was obviously under full steam. Immediately, indignant readers began accusing the editors of "nature-faking." How could an engine under full steam have snow on the boiler?

The editorial answer is shown in the adjoining photograph of the New York Central's Empire State Express arriving in Syracuse, New York, on January 19 after a run through a snowstorm. The actuality dwarfed the artist's effort by a couple of snowdrifts!

The critics had merely failed to check their cultural expectations of what "ought" to happen to snow on a locomotive boiler against what actually does happen.

If our culture could so blind reasonably intelligent readers of a weekly magazine like the *Literary Digest* until they could not actually see snow on locomotive boilers in front of their noses, it is obvious that stereotypes must be reckoned with in the identification and definition of social situations. *Our culture stereotypes our world for us.* It tells us the world isn't flat, the sun doesn't move around the earth, dark-skinned peoples are "inferior" to white, and so on.

Yet this isn't so much of a scandal as it may seem. It is a great convenience. For each of us to have to start out each morning in the charming but dangerous innocence of a newborn babe with no expectations of any kind about anything would be an impossible assignment. Most of us would promptly break our necks on the first stairway and the rest of us would drown in the first bathtub. Those of us who have visited foreign countries know what a handicap ignorance of foreign customs imposes on the stranger. Cultural expectations enormously ease the burden of getting around in the world.

But as stereotypes they make the task of defining situations tricky business. This is true even in in-presence situations in which immediate observation can check expectations. But in the case of distant situations which the individual can seldom check in person the hazard grows enormously. Whittaker Chambers insists that it was the stubborn preconceptions of educated liberals all over the country which blocked acceptance of the most damning evidence against Hiss, a distinguished Harvard graduate who "simply couldn't have done a thing like that."¹⁸ For years one of the prevalent stereotypes of the later

¹⁸ Cf. *Witness*, New York, Random House, 1952, pp. 473, 476, 499, etc. Alger Hiss, a former important official in the State Department, was convicted in 1950 of perjury for denying any connection with a spy ring that had relayed secret government information to Moscow during his years in the State Department.

phases of the great Chinese Revolution pictured it as a struggle between "corrupt reactionaries," on one side, and "harmless agrarian reformers," on the other. The reactionaries may have been corrupt enough, despite the propaganda of the China Lobby which tried to "sell" Chiang Kai-shek as the world's outstanding liberal, but there is no doubt whatever about how "harmless" those "agrarian reformers" were. We found out about that in Korea! On the whole, it is hardly an overstatement to say that the American people, eight thousand miles from the scene, had considerable difficulty grasping the grim complexities of the Chinese Revolution.

Whether it is stereotypes that intervene or deliberate propaganda, there is always a veil of selection and personal interpretation of some kind between us and a faraway situation. The problem of how to offset or make allowance for that veil we shall leave for later consideration.

I-1:8. Recapitulation

1. Our problem is the analysis of cultural association,
2. In unit samples called *situations*.
3. These are focalized patterns of human relationships and circumstances which an observer or anyone involved in them reacts to as an adjustment challenge or source of experience.
4. Situations may be studied in the past as well as in the present. They occur in the presence of a particular observer or at a distance, and they either follow the cultural routine prescribed for such affairs or tend in greater or less degree to deviate from the routine.
5. In so far as they do deviate, they show a slightly different sequence of events.
6. In every situation an observer can find evidences of associational forms (groups, etc.) and categories of classification (age categories, sex categories, etc.).
7. As experienced, a situation is a conceptual construct.
8. Culture equips all of us with conceptual constructs (stereotypes) for ordinary situations.
9. For scientific purposes it is necessary for the student of social situations to alert himself to the possibility that his own stereotypes may introduce an element of error into his observations, and that propagandists may introduce distortions into definitions of distant situations.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 1

To demonstrate the observability of situations

NOTE: For this and for all later projects follow the notebook form given on pages 10–12.

1. Find the focus of interest or attention of two or more persons in presence (in your presence as an observer) during a day.
2. What pattern (or structure) of relationships and circumstances can you find involving them, around that focus?
3. Are they associating as a *group*—interacting each to each; as a *crowd* coacting rather than interacting and doing it without structured inter-relationships; as an *assemblage*—a structured crowd; or as an *organization* with a common purpose, selected personnel, authoritative functionaries, etc.?
4. What categories of classification seem to be operative—sex, age, race, occupation, stratification (inequality), etc.?
5. What determines, or sets the limits of, participation in this situation?
6. What was the threshold condition when your observations began?
7. What stages or phases of associational processes could you note during the period of your observations?
8. How did the situation end? What was its outcome—essentially the same pattern as at the start? Or something different?
9. What are your conclusions?

Supplementary Readings

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Situational Adjustment

I-2:1. The Problem of Situational Adjustment

Having learned to identify certain simple situations, we may next observe how the individuals involved in in-presence situations deal with them. How do persons ordinarily discover that there is a situation, how do they find out *what* it is, and what do they *do* about it then?

I-2:2. The Three Phases of Situational Adjustment

Adjustment to a situation—any situation—is a process of three rather distinct phases: (1) Gestalt awareness; (2) definition of the situation; (3) assumption of role.

Gestalt awareness is awareness that a combination or pattern of human relationships and circumstances exists or is forming.

Definition of the situation is the ascription of meaning to the combination or pattern. Frequently this is merely a matter of recognizing familiar cues by which to identify some culturally stereotyped situation such as a college class meeting, a church service, and so on. Less often it is a matter of recombining familiar cues to achieve a new synthesis of meaning.

Assumption of role is simply the selection of the “part” one is to play in the situation as defined.

For most culturally stereotyped situations these three phases are so telescoped together as to be virtually one reaction: one defines a classroom situation and assumes a role almost the instant one becomes aware of its existence. Awareness, definition, and assumption of role are so effortless and automatic in such cases as to be almost simul-

taneous. But in less stereotyped situations the three phases can easily be distinguished.

1. GESTALT AWARENESS

Suppose you hear an unusual commotion or see people running toward the next corner. Your attention has suddenly been focalized and you become aware that "something" is going on. A pattern of relationships and circumstances has formed with "something" at the center of it. You recognize a situation of some sort, but you cannot yet define it. So you move closer, or you make inquiries, and you find that a woman has fainted, or that a taxi driver has been fighting with a passenger. That gives you a superficial definition: another street crowd congregating around an accident or a breach of the peace. Now you can select a role: go on about your business or seek further information by which to define the situation more in detail. Making your choice, you complete your adjustment to that particular situation. You are now ready for the next one.

That situation was accidental. So far as you were concerned, it just happened. And your adjustment started with a focus of attention—the noise or the converging people—around which you swiftly built up a structure or pattern of relationships and circumstances which you presently defined as having some specific meaning: "another accident," "taxi rowdiness," etc.

Suppose we take a slightly different kind of situation, one that didn't just happen. Recall your experience at the first meeting of your class in sociology. Your class met because, as part of the curricular offerings of your college, that particular class had been specifically scheduled to meet in such and such a room at such and such a time, and you and a number of other students had elected the course and presently began to converge on that particular room at that particular time. In other words, all of you intended to be there and expected a class to meet. So you found the proper room and took a seat. Other students were already there or drifted in, and presently someone who looked like an instructor took his place at the desk. Your original focus of attention had been "the course," Sociology 1, to take which you presented yourself at the proper room. The arrangement of seats, the behavior of other students, the eventual arrival of the "instructor," all contributed to your Gestalt awareness that a "class" was in process of forming—your culture gave you that identifying concept ready-made; you knew what a "class" was—but until the instructor identi-

fied himself and announced that "This is a class in Sociology 1, open only to sophomores and upperclassmen" you could not complete your definition of the developing situation. You had identified it as *a* class, but until the announcement you could not be absolutely sure it was *your* class, the class you had elected. Your role, in short—the part you were to play—was unclear until you completed your definition of the situation. From that point on, you fell into the routine. You knew what to do—what role to play—and you did it. Your adjustment to that particular situation, the first meeting of your sociology class, was complete: you were one more student in Sociology 1.

Now as compared with your adjustment to our accidental street scene, your adjustment to the first meeting of Sociology 1 began earlier, involved more ideas and expectations and a more clearly defined role, but essentially it moved through exactly the same three phases: (a) Gestalt awareness, (b) definition of the situation, and (c) assumption of role. As contrasted with the street scene, the first meeting of the class had been prearranged long in advance, was more complexly structured, spatially, socially, and intellectually, than was the street scene, and carried with it a more definite orientation toward future meetings than did the accidental situation. In all this the first class meeting differed fundamentally from the accidental situation. The two *situations* differed, but the *processes* by which you adjusted to them did not. You dealt with both of them in the same way: by Gestalt awareness, definition of the situation, assumption of role. And you deal with all situations in that same way—Gestalt awareness, definition of the situation, assumption of role.

Awareness, definition, and role become more complex and difficult as situational involvements, the complexities of relationships, stretch out beyond the horizon. You find it vastly harder to adjust to a situation in Korea, or the Near East, or even in the soft-coal industry in Pennsylvania, than to the in-presence situations in your college classes. The socio-psychological processes of adjustment become more complex as the sociological complexities increase. But the socio-psychological processes themselves—awareness, definition, and assumption of role—remain the same.

2. DEFINITION OF A SITUATION

Usually the most difficult phase of situational adjustment to unfamiliar situations is the phase in which one determines what it is all about. This is certainly true for most of the large-scale economic and

international situations which affect us from beyond the horizon. There are so many variables involved in these situations and their interrelationships are so complex that it is usually quite impossible for the average person to put them all together for himself. If he is naïve enough, of course, he can always define such situations in terms of his cultural stereotypes—usually with some additions from the myths, or accepted rationalizations, current in his culture. This is the line of least resistance, the easy thing to do. Every culture develops not only specific expectations about the way things ought to go but theories and rationalizations about why they ought to go that way and how they have gone in the past. These theories and rationalizations are cultural myths, beliefs—usually with a good deal of emotional attachment—about the past, present, and future of some particular aspect of the culture. Few people ever stop to check up on how closely their cultural myths correspond to reality. As W. I. Thomas remarked years ago, “If a thing is regarded as real, it is real in its consequences.” Hence, most people behave as though their cultural myths actually do correspond to reality.

The Lynds, for example, in their great study of *Middletown* (Muncie, Indiana), found an overwhelming percentage of high-school seniors believing the good old American myth that “an individual’s success or failure depends absolutely on himself.” Yet the rate of promotion in Middletown factories at that very time was such that to have had a statistical chance at a foremanship the average workman would have had to live more than 400 years! And Middletown itself, like the rest of the United States, was on the verge of the debacle of the Great Depression which in ruining millions of individuals not only proved itself beyond the power of any individual to control but defied the power of the United States government as well. The myth was one thing, the reality was something else.¹

This is nearly always the case—the myth is one thing, the reality is something else.

For the observer of social situations this merely means that in describing the way people define distant situations he must watch for two things, not merely one: the *myth* in terms of which most people define such situations and the *reality* as competent observers believe it to exist.

¹ It is well to remember that, despite all the efforts of the New Deal, the United States had not emerged from the depression when World War II broke out in Europe and that even as late as Pearl Harbor there were still millions unemployed in this country. It was the deficit spending of wartime—mainly borrowed from the future—that primed the pump and brought back prosperity.

Even the definition of in-presence situations may be affected by cultural myths. Every institutional organization, such as a school, a university, a business enterprise, a government agency, tends to build up a myth of its own purposes and operations. Visit any corporate headquarters, prison, or government office and compare the official myth of the way things go on with the testimony of insiders. Officially, everything is rosy. There is never any disloyalty, office politics, corruption, or departure from standards of highest rectitude. Oh, there may be problems and difficulties, of course—every organization has its ups and downs, you know—but has the corporation been cheating the government on a war contract? Or is the high-school principal trying to get the superintendent's job? Do prison guards ever give special favors to influential inmates? Do politicians ever order public officials around? Perish the thought! Things like that are "the figments of some underpaid reporter's disordered imagination."

Really?

Not infrequently they simply highlight a gap between an official myth and the brutal facts of life. For there is always an official myth, and the real question is, "How wide is the gap, if any, between that myth and the reality?"²

As we have said, cultural myths and stereotypes, or expectations, complicate tremendously the task of defining situations, and the farther from a given individual's own vicinity or type of experience the situation is, the more complicated is the task of definition. When it is a task of defining not an in-presence situation or a situation in one's own local community but such a situation as the one in Korea after the North Korean attack in June, 1950, for example, or the international situation as the arms race quickened in the years immediately after that attack, situational definition taxes the capacities of experts. The definition of complex situations in any field—physical science, the industrial system, international relations—is still an art. It is an art to which various social scientists may on occasion make contributions but which they can rarely aspire to direct. When even responsible public officials could misjudge the imminence of war, as

² Hence, too often, the futility of taking naive college students on conducted tours of prisons, factories, housing projects, and the like. Unless they can get behind the official "front," the students may come away with a complete misimpression of what really goes on in the place. Yet it would be a mistake to think that official myths are always the products of defensiveness and deliberate fabrication. Frequently they are merely somewhat idealized accounts of what the organization's personnel—particularly the higher officers—would like to believe about their outfit. Many a top executive lets his enthusiasm instead of his reality sense construct his mental image of his organization. High morale can produce just as fancy a myth as can low morale.

Senator Borah did in the summer of 1939 and as President Roosevelt did on the eve of Pearl Harbor, it should be apparent that we still know very little indeed in any scientific sense about the art of defining complex distant situations.

So long as we are operating within the limits of habit and routine in a given culture not much art is required. But even within a given culture, when habit and routine have been disrupted, when natural forces break loose as in a Mississippi flood or in a North Sea hurricane such as that of February, 1953, or when great dislocations of social processes have occurred as in the Great Depression, we have no sure guides for appraising the present or estimating the future. It becomes all "a matter of judgment"—and under such conditions men differ as widely as the poles in their abilities to judge. Newspapers assure their readers that "the worst is over"—and the depression goes on for years. One small city daily in the Middle West did just that, pontificating every few days that "the turn has come," "conditions are improving," and so on. And persistently week after week for three whole years the wholesale price index continued to slide toward the cellar. The editorial definition of the situation and the objective data had almost no relationship to one another. Examples such as that document the extreme difficulty of situational definition under any or all of three conditions: (1) when the situation is complex and far extended; (2) when one's own feelings and desires strongly influence the definition; and (3) when there is no accepted standard of judgment by which to check one's definition.

Practically, the adjustive function of situational definition is to provide a guide to action. That is why a gunman, for example, orients his victim instantly with "This is a stick-up." He wants the prospective giver to realize at once what he is up against and to act accordingly. The word "stick-up" defines at once the proper role for the man at the muzzle of the gun.

So the definition of a situation is one's cue to action.

What sort of action?

3. ASSUMING A ROLE

One acts on one's definition of a situation by assuming a role.

The term *role* refers to the specific pattern of attitude and behavior provided by one's culture for each culturally defined situation.

Every culture develops a complex repertoire of social roles for all the routine situations that come up over and over in the lives of those

who live in that culture. Our society, for example, calls for one set of attitudes and behavior sequences on the part of the student in a normal classroom situation and for another set on the part of the instructor; for one set of attitudes and sequences on the part of the participating congregation in church and for another set on the part of the clergyman and his assistants; for one set of attitudes and sequences on the part of the members of a football team and for another set on the part of the spectators. Not only does no well-adjusted student try to act like the instructor in a classroom; neither student nor instructor tries to act like a minister or a quarterback. Thanks to our cultural indoctrination, each of us normally tries to adjust to any familiar situation by assuming the specific role that "fits" his functional relationship to that situation. If he is a student, he tries to act like a student in classroom situations, like a member of the congregation in church, like a player or a rooter at a football game. It is ordinarily regarded as an index of one's social maturity and social adjustment to be able to define a situation "properly" and then assume the proper, or culturally expected, role. To act out of role in a given situation, or to act as though the situation were in reality quite a different kind of situation—a wedding celebration instead of a funeral, for example—is to invite all sorts of comic or tragic consequences, but it is not normal behavior. It is not the kind of behavior that results in the long run in effective personal adjustment or in a well-ordered society.³

Both for one's own future, therefore, and for the functional adequacy of the social order it is a matter of some importance that people generally be able to define situations accurately enough to assume their proper roles and that such roles be suitable to the real situations they are facing. Whether he likes it or not, nobody can escape assuming some kind of role.

Facing any situation, you have only four choices—and you must choose:

³ One of the stand-bys of comedy and satire, as well as of tragedy, for that matter, is the depiction of individuals assuming the wrong roles in familiar situations, or misinterpreting a situation entirely. One hilarious one-act comedy turns entirely on just this—the inappropriate behavior of two hotel guests who refuse to recognize the obvious fact that the place is on fire. They insist on entertaining the firemen with Scotch and soda and conduct themselves generally like unhurried characters intent on a long and comfortable stay. In real life the consequences of misinterpreting a situation, as the British and French upper classes misinterpreted the rise of Hitler, may be anything but comic. Failure to assume his culturally defined role in marital situations, in business, in the armed services, and in other real-life situations may have tragic consequences for any individual who "misses the bus."

- a. To withdraw—dissociate yourself from the whole thing.
- b. To remain, but ignore what is going on.
- c. To act as a nonparticipant observer, an onlooker only.
- d. To participate—"join the crowd."

Even if you hesitate, you are assuming the role of a nonparticipant observer, since your very hesitation indicates that you are not ignoring what is going on, and yet you remain. Willy-nilly, once you are aware of a situation, in presence or out, you cannot escape the assumption of a role. You may assume the wrong role; you may act foolishly, hastily, stupidly, impulsively—but act you must.

It becomes of some importance, therefore, that young persons learn how to size up situations realistically and how to assume the most effective role in the circumstances. This would seem to be one of the prime objectives of the whole process of cultural indoctrination to which you have been exposed from infancy: the development of a repertoire of social roles and an informed judgment as to when to assume each. One of the major functions of social control—the whole array of pressures and inducements that sanction our cultural adjustment patterns—is revealed right here: it is to make sure that you and I adopt the "right" roles at the "right" times. In most ordinary situations it would never occur to either of us to do anything else. To do anything else would mark us off immediately as "queer" or as troublemakers. And if we got queer enough or made enough trouble in that way, we would be taken more or less firmly out of circulation. Mental hospitals and prisons are filled with characters who have assumed the wrong roles at the wrong times.

But under modern conditions the assumption of the proper role at the proper time may not be quite so easy as it used to be.

I-2:3. Role-Playing in Modern Society

Sometimes one has to choose one particular role from among a number of culturally sanctioned possibilities, or worse yet, one has to choose among distasteful alternatives, or even accept a role that he thoroughly detests. Culture itself generates confusions, and individuals in these days not infrequently develop ideas of their own about what they want to do regardless of cultural sanctions.

New situations produced by social changes such as the introduction of the automobile, for example, or the invention of the atomic bomb frequently force individuals to choose their own roles. In the nature of the case, culture cannot have defined a role for a situation that

never before existed. Thus, with the coming of the automobile, parents had to choose what role to play when a young man proposed an evening ride with daughter. Should they permit her to go alone or should they go along as chaperons? We all know the answer: the chaperon disappeared. Likewise the atomic bomb posed interesting questions for scientists and military men: Should they continue to work for the enhanced power of the United States, or should they turn educators and agitators to advance the cause of international control? In the months following Hiroshima some adopted one role and others adopted the other.

The point is, social changes produce new situations and new situations make a choice of alternative roles imperative. Sometimes one must work out an entirely new conception of his role.

A situation does not have to be culturally new, however, to force difficult choices. When two of your friends quarrel, for example—surely not a situation strange in our culture—what is your role going to be? Are you going to be a bystander, peacemaker, or partisan? You have to choose one of the three, and your culture gives you no clear lead as to which is culturally “right.”

Then there are innumerable cases of people who for various reasons develop emotional resistance to roles that culture prescribes for them in given situations. Women with deep-seated sexual inhibitions may recoil from the role of wife even after marriage. Men overprotected by their doting mothers during childhood and youth not infrequently find it impossible to act as heads of families on their own. Children on whom fond parents “project” their own thwarted ambitions may rebel against the medical career or the artistic triumph or the business success that the family wants them to achieve. In such cases the expected role is clearly enough defined, but the individual cannot bring himself to accept that particular pattern of attitude and behavior.

Thus, thanks to social changes or to emotional conflicts, the assumption of any positive role may be blocked—the individual simply drifts and temporizes. But since life situations seldom wait for the indecisive, such individuals become unadjusted. Others, because of ignorance, inadequate socialization, or imperfect personality integration (dominance of impulse), persistently assume the wrong roles in ordinary situations. These people are maladjusted.

Our difficulties are further increased by the multiplicity of possible roles in modern society. This multiplicity derives, of course, mainly from the modern division of labor.

I-2:4. Division of Labor and Social Roles

Any kind of social organization, from a picnic party to a corporation or a modern government, implies specialization of function. The organizers of the picnic party have to provide for eats, transportation, and a place. A modern government performs thousands of specialized functions. The beginnings of human specialization seem to have been coeval with the beginnings of organized society. A survey of thirty preliterate tribes finds an average of more than fifty specific cases of division of labor per tribe.⁴ This means that even on the simplest level of human society diversification of social roles has already appeared. Two-thirds of these roles were for men, one-third for women; and they ranged all the way from specific functions in witchcraft ceremonies to the proper way to prepare the family meal.

As one comes up the scale of social organization from the preliterate tribes to industrialized nations like the United States, the diversity and complexity of occupational roles expand enormously. Instead of an average of 50 diverse occupations per independent societal unit ranging from 700 to 3,000,000 in population, one finds that, among the 130,000,000 people of the United States in the 1930's the Works Progress Administration Occupational Classification code book listed over 20,000 specific occupations, each requiring its own specific design of attitudes and behavior.⁵ Thus in addition to specific roles for specific situations in families, schools, theaters, churches, railroad trains, and the like, one must include over 20,000 roles prescribed by culture for specific occupations from dairymaid and turret-lathe operator to public accountant and bank president.

The point is, for all kinds of culturally prepared-for situations there are appropriate social roles.

In this chapter we have been preparing to look at specific instances of situational adjustment in its three phases—Gestalt awareness, definition of the situation, assumption of role. What evidence can we find of the way in which human beings actually adjust to situations?

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 2

To demonstrate situational adjustment

⁴ Walter T. Watson, "A New Census and an Old Theory Division of Labor in the Preliterate World," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIV, January, 1929, pp 632-652

⁵ H. Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson, *Occupational Trends in the United States*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1940, p. 6.

1. Select a particular day during which you will make a point of noting the important situations that you become involved in.
2. At the end of that day select what seems to you to have been the most significant or interesting situation that you experienced.
3. Now describe in detail by recall each phase of your adjustment to that situation:
 - a. How and under what conditions did you become aware that a situation existed or was forming?
 - b. What focalized your attention? What was the focus of that situation?
 - c. Through what steps did you define that situation? How did it come to have a specific meaning for you?
 - d. Did you have any difficulty or confusion in defining it?
 - e. Did your definition of it change at any time?
 - f. What role did you assume and why?
 - g. What stereotypes and cultural myths can you recognize in your definition?
 - h. Formulate your conclusions.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

The question to be answered: What points of similarity and difference are there in adjusting to an in-presence situation as compared with a distant situation?

Suggested procedure:

1. Organize teams of observers and have each team run through a series of observations of in-presence situational adjustments—Gestalt awareness, definition, assumption of role—until each member is thoroughly familiar with the problem phenomena of the project.
2. Select some culturally standardized type of in-presence situation—a class meeting, a football game, etc.—and have each team member record his own situational adjustments, plus whatever observations he can make of his teammates' adjustments.
3. Select a comparable type of distant situation—a football game in another city, etc.—and let each team member adjust to that situation by means of a selected medium of contact—a radio broadcast, a newspaper description, etc.
4. Let each observer then analyze the various phases of his adjustments to the distant situation and compare them with his recorded adjustments to the similar in-presence situation.
5. Assemble results from all observers, tabulate, and analyze.
6. Each observer in dealing with each type of situation is to observe (a) his own adjustments and (b) those of his teammates, but all records are to

be made independently, of course, without cross-checking until all observations are completed.

PROJECT B

The question to be answered: What is the limen, or threshold, of Gestalt awareness? In-presence? At a distance?

PROJECT C

The question to be answered: How do personality factors enter into the definition of a situation?

PROJECT D

The question to be answered: How do class and racial factors enter into the definition of a situation?

PROJECT E

The question to be answered: How measure the degree of deviancy, or uncertainty, in social situations? I.e., How measure the correctness of an individual's estimate of "what is coming next" in given situations?

PROJECT F

The question to be answered: What determines an individual's role in "unorganized," i.e., free association, situations?

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Analysis of In-Presence Situations

I-3:1. What to Look For

There are five kinds of phenomena to be noted in the analysis of any in-presence situation:

1. The usual components of any situation: (a) people; (b) the form in which they are associating—group, crowd, etc.; (c) processes of adjustment and readjustment; (d) specific culture traits other than language; and (e) the setting.
2. The structure of the situation itself: (a) the focus; (b) the focal field; and (c) the boundary of inclusion-exclusion that encloses the situation.
3. The conditioning variables in the field around the situation, i.e., in the situational field.
4. The function or purpose served by the situation.
5. The pattern of relationships within the situation itself.

I-3:2. The Components of a Situation

We have already noted what these are—people, forms of association, processes, culture traits, and setting—and we need not comment on them further at this point. The student will learn more about them by actually distinguishing them for himself than by reading about them here.

I-3:3. Situational Structure

Every in-presence situation has a necessary structure apart from the form in which individuals associate. This structure consists of the

situational focus of interest or attention, the focal field, and the situational boundary of inclusion-exclusion.

The *focus* of interest or attention may be anything: a person, an idea, a dispute or conflict, a problem, anything. The one prerequisite is that it be a common focus for those involved in the situation.

This at once rules out all the various private or personal situations of those present. Each student in your sociology class, for example, is the center of his own individual life situation—his own peculiar combination of social relationships and circumstances. One student is in the midst of a love affair and is overdrawn at his bank. Another is going through a religious crisis and can't make up his mind whether to write home about it or not. A third is worrying about how to convince his parents that Business Ad. offers him more opportunities than does the law or medicine. Such individual situations are not what we are talking about here. The one situation that all these particular students have in common is the sociology classroom situation, usually focused on some problem or topic of discussion brought up by the instructor or by some member of the class. It is the focus of the situation common to all those present that is to be noted in analyzing the structure of any in-presence situation.

Outside of this focus, however, but still within the boundaries of the situation itself are the people, objects, ideas, etc., that make up the focal field.

The *focal field* in any given in-presence situation is simply everything *in* the situation that is *not* in the focus of interest or attention. In other words, in your sociology class during a discussion of primary groups, let us say, everything that isn't immediately involved in that subject is obviously part of the *focal field*: students, seats, the room, etc.

The *boundary of inclusion-exclusion* is both temporal and spatial.

Every in-presence situation has a beginning and an end in time. People come together and they separate. Sometimes these comings-together are organized and prearranged as in the meetings of your sociology class or the assemblages at football games. Sometimes they are accidental, as when you meet a friend on the street, or incidental, as when at the railroad station you find others also waiting for the train you intend to take. But whether prearranged, accidental, or incidental every in-presence situation has a beginning when two or more persons come into presence and an end when they separate. These beginnings and endings are temporal boundary points of inclusion-exclusion. They mark the situation's dimensions in time.

But every in-presence situation also has dimensions in space, a specified area within which it occurs. For prearranged meetings this area is usually physically segregated, i.e., walls and doors separate the group or assemblage from the rest of the world: the orchestra pit and the footlights separate the audience from the actors in a theater; school and college classes meet in particular rooms; and so on. In fact, it is part of our cultural technique for controlling situations to provide physical barriers of one sort or another between the participants and the rest of the world in order to control distractions. These physical barriers then constitute the boundary of inclusion-exclusion.

But physical barriers are not the only means by which we control situations. There are social and psychological barriers as well. Every time we have to show an admission card, buy a ticket, show a work badge, and so on, we are surmounting social barriers to a particular situation that has been arranged for behind those barriers. Every organization from one's own family to a school, a factory, an office, the United States Senate, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force—every organization of any kind operates behind social barriers of inclusion-exclusion. Hence, every situation within any organization is a situation within the organization's barriers of inclusion-exclusion, and these barriers may include private secretaries, security guards, and doormen as well as stone walls and barred gates.

Yet even when one has surmounted physical and social barriers there are still psychological barriers. Two persons talking in a hotel lobby may resent the intrusion of a stranger. Half a dozen convention delegates in a huddle can easily set up psychological barriers that discourage reporters and other outsiders. Certainly there are familiar psychological barriers around sweethearts who want to be alone.

The situational boundary of inclusion-exclusion may be physical, social, or psychological, or any combination of all three, or it may be nothing but distance itself, such as one finds isolating farmers talking in a field. The point is, every in-presence situation does have limits in time and limits in space and these limits become boundaries of inclusion-exclusion—including all the participants and excluding all the nonparticipants.

I-3:4. Conditioning Variables

The conditioning variables in the field around any in-presence situation are precisely the same kinds of factors as go into the making of a situation itself, namely, people, forms of association, processes, culture, and the setting. Despite the various devices noted above for

separating participants from nonparticipants, physically, socially, and psychologically, no in-presence situation occurs in a social vacuum. The individuals involved, the focus of attention, and the processes carried on within the boundaries of inclusion-exclusion always reflect to some degree the outside world, just as they often reflect one or more of the private life situations of the participants.

The term *conditioning variables* refers, then, to these outside factors as they are related to, or reflected in, the in-presence situation itself.

I-3:5. The Function or Purpose Served by the Situation

In-presence situations may serve as many different kinds of functions or purposes as does human association itself. As everyone knows, these range all the way from reproduction to disposal of the dead.

Most of the in-presence situations open to student observation can probably be classified under one of eight functional headings:

1. Transportation situations—people in presence with attention focused on some aspect of the problem of getting from one place to another.
2. Exchange and financial situations: buyer-seller situations—people in presence with attention focused on some aspect of the process of exchanging goods or services.
3. Work situations. A work situation is a situation in which attention is focused on a task culturally required for self-support. Psychologically, work is non-self-rewarding activity, but socially, work may be regarded as activity which the given culture accepts as contributing to self-maintenance. Usually work situations are organized and controlled and include expectations concerning rewards or penalties.
4. Educational situations. Students expend non-self-rewarding energy in classroom situations, lectures, seminars, study, and so on, so that *psychologically* many educational situations involve work, but the essence of an educational situation is that, whatever may be its focus, its purpose is essentially learning. When people come together primarily to learn or to contribute to the learning process, we have an in-presence educational situation.
5. Time-killing situations. These are “nothing-to-do” occasions: students lounging between classes, workmen at the noon hour between lunch and return to the job, and so on.

6. Congeniality and recreation situations: situations of self-rewarding activity—play, passive entertainment, etc. Time-killing situations often evolve into congeniality or recreation situations, and vice versa.
7. Social action situations: situations focused on some kind of collective action—football rallies, political meetings, committee meetings, etc.
8. Self-service, medical, and miscellaneous situations: breakfast at home, men shaving in a Pullman washroom, a visit to the doctor, etc.

This list by no means exhausts the possible functions served by situations. And it tends to oversimplify reality. Many situations do not fall neatly into any single classification: they serve a number of functions at once or change from one to another. The student will have to be alert to distinguish the function or functions served by the in-presence situations which he observes.

I-3:6. The Pattern of Situational Relationships

The pattern of relationships of persons, circumstances, and ideas is the essence of any situation.

For the observation of in-presence situations this pattern may be broken down into subpatterns of three kinds: (1) relationships in space, (2) social relationships, and (3) relationships of ideas.

1. RELATIONSHIPS IN SPACE

Routine situations are situations that have been prepared for in advance. Part of this advance preparation frequently consists in laying out specific patterns of physical objects to channel and control the movements and sometimes the relationships of persons. Thus, the design of a house obviously channels and controls the location and movements of the people who live in it. The layout of streets in a city channels and controls the movements of traffic. In a school the layout of seats and desks channels and controls the location and movements of teacher and pupils. The position of counters and showcases in a store demarcates areas open to customers and those reserved for the clerks. The arrangement of partitions and desks in an office not only controls the positions and movements of the office workers but usually expresses the social structure of the office as well—who gives orders to whom, how the paper work is to move, and so

on. Theaters are built with the areas designed for actors and those designed for the audience clearly demarcated.

Thus, not only does the prepared-in-advance physical setting of a situation help to channel location and movement; it aids in standardizing behavior and in separating or concentrating the personnel involved, and, as we have said, it not infrequently expresses routine social relationships (categories of classification).

2. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The physical pattern of a situation is obvious. Anybody can see how the seats are arranged in a classroom or in a theater; how desks are arranged in an office; how spectators and teams are spatially separated in a stadium; how machines are arranged in a factory; and so on. Physical relationships of this sort are easily noted.

But social relationships are harder to get at, especially the persistent relationships behind the superficial relationships of the moment. To understand social relationships in pattern we must look for at least six kinds of such relationships: (a) the pattern of roles; (b) specific rights, privileges, and obligations; (c) gradations of status or prestige; (d) distinctions of authority and power; (e) norms, or "rules of the game"; and (f) the specific purposes or objectives of those involved.

a. What specific *pattern of roles* appears in any given in-presence situation will depend on a number of factors such as the functional type of the situation, its relationship to social structure (to be noted later), and so on. In the congeniality-recreational types of situations which predominate among boys in a summer camp, particular cottages not infrequently develop a pattern of roles more or less approximating the following:

- (1) A leader, or initiator of activities.
- (2) A leader's stooge, or "Man Friday," who plays up to the leader by backing him, assisting him, and catering to him in various ways.
- (3) A goat, or object of petty persecution. One way of unifying such a group is to induce its members to gang up on some one boy who for any reason has attracted unfavorable attention and who is not himself formidable enough to discourage attack. The goat becomes the "lightning rod" for pressures that might otherwise be directed at the leader or at individual persecutors. To avoid such unpleasant attention and to aid in resolving the tensions of the group a fourth role often develops, namely, that of

- (4) A clown, or "funnyboy." The funnyboy in such situations performs much the same function as the jester at medieval courts in Europe: by making himself ridiculous, he helps to inflate the egos of the others and at the same time deflates hostilities.

The pattern of roles that develops in a summer-camp cottage is obviously a more or less spontaneous affair determined largely by the interplay of personalities. In a situation standardized by cultural organization, on the other hand, as in a school, a business concern, a household, and so on, the pattern of roles is prescribed by culture. Teacher-pupil, buyer-seller, parent-child are clearly defined pairs of roles, mutually interdependent.

Roles are patterns of behavior functionally related to a situation. They are the types of behavior required by the situation if it is to develop according to the usual cultural design. They are not mere peculiarities of individual behavior. They are ways of behaving that anybody in the same relation to the total situation would have to use. Thus, a classroom situation necessarily implies teacher and students. If you are going to buy something, there obviously must be a seller. If you are going to have a football game, you can hardly behave like a baseball catcher. And so on. Individual peculiarities may determine the quality of the teaching, selling, football playing, etc., but the role, the pattern of behavior itself, is prescribed by the situation.

What, then, in any in-presence situation under observation is the pattern of roles presented?

b. *Specific rights, privileges, and obligations* must be considered in trying to understand social relationships.

A right is a culturally recognized claim which is not necessarily invidious; which does not, in other words, necessarily imply a lack of right in someone else.

A privilege, on the other hand, is a right which is invidious; which does imply necessarily a lesser right in others not similarly privileged.

An obligation is a moral bond, a limitation of right or freedom.

In every culturally structured situation culture prescribes rights, privileges, obligations. If not specifically spelled out in the rules and regulations of the particular organization which standardizes the situation, these are provided for in general in the *mores*, the opinion-enforced ideas of right and wrong prevailing in the society. One has a right, for example, to the privacy of his own home. One has the privilege of owning or managing a business—a superior right not possessed

by millions of Americans and hence an invidious right, a privilege. One has the obligation to respect the rights of others.

Some rights, privileges, and obligations are provided for by law. Others are provided for by the rules of particular organizations, or, as we have said, by the mores. There is no law, for example, against interrupting your boss in a discussion, but it is usually wiser to wait your turn, if you get one. Of course, according to the mores, it is usually good manners not to interrupt anyone. In other words, the canons of polite society place certain obligations on anyone who values the opinion of people on those levels.

c. There will be *gradations of status or prestige*. We need not at the moment inquire too closely into the nature or the origin of social status and social prestige. As we shall see in later chapters, one of the highly important elements of every culture is a system of human classification, a way of thinking people together on the basis of various characteristics. The generic name for people who are thus thought together is *category*. A category is simply any number of individuals who are regarded as fundamentally alike in regard to some selected characteristic—age, sex, color, income, or what-have-you.

The important thing at the moment is not merely that we do thus categorize people but that we almost invariably attach different values or esteems to different categories. Because the family name descends in the male line, most parents, if they thought they could have but one child, would probably prefer a boy to a girl. The same parents, if they could determine the child's future, would almost certainly endow him with wealth and distinction rather than poverty and obscurity. If he is a white child, his parents will never think of trying to darken his skin to enable him to pass as a Negro. The category "Negro" is less esteemed in our culture than is the category "white race." Obviously, different categories of people stand on different levels of esteem or prestige.

Later we shall examine some of the gradations of esteem that make up our complex system of social stratification. But for present purposes the only question is, What different levels of esteem or prestige are represented in any given in-presence situation?

And since we are constantly judging people in terms of many different kinds of esteems, the answer to that question may not be too easy. We are constantly ranking people as better or worse skaters, dancers, runners, tennis players, companions, mathematicians, "dates," singers, friends, and so on. In other words, given three or

four students discussing the prospects of World War III, let us say, what relevant comparisons are there between them *in that situation* and how do they rank?

That is the problem of gradations of status in the pattern of social relationships in any in-presence situation.

d. *Distinctions of authority and power* must be looked for. Authority is the recognized right of an individual to make certain classes of decisions and to impose sanctions to enforce them. Authority is a function of organization. That is, organization necessarily means division of labor and thus the delegation to certain functionaries of the right to make certain classes of decisions on behalf of the organization. In an unorganized group, a group that merely happens to be together, no one can have authority in this sense. The individual who knows more than the others about Shakespeare or labor law or some other special subject may be able to speak with the "authority" of superior knowledge on his subject, but that is intellectual and not social authority. We are here concerned with social authority—the right to exercise power over others.

In any given in-presence situation who has social authority, who wields power?

e. *Norms, or rules of the game*, differ widely from situation to situation. The *kind* of situation (its orderliness, its origins, its structure, its function), the cultural values involved (classes, races, etc.), the adjustment patterns which control it—these and other variables determine what specific rules are expected to apply. What is O.K. in a fraternity card game might be sissy behavior in the Marines, and the rules under which one boxes in a college gym seldom govern a street fight on the water front. There are unwritten codes for cocktail parties and for slum brawls. Among upper- and middle-class families, "social racing" being what it is, a good deal of polite interaction consists of a kind of verbal fencing. It is part of the social equipment of the wife on these levels to display considerable dexterity in this business, and not infrequently more lurks beneath the surface of apparently idle give-and-take than meets the ear of the bemused male. The objective is to gain status, "save face," impress others. The razzing and kidding that goes on among young people from the school playground to the college campus is another and less subtle expression of the same kind of thing. Likewise, when Tallulah Bankhead once introduced a guest singer on her radio program with the remark, "Remember, dahling, you could be replaced with a juke box," age was not merely paying a

certain backhanded compliment to youth, but the unexpected transgression of the courtesy code added piquancy to the occasion.

So in every situation there is a code of what is regarded as fitting, appropriate, in keeping. Usually one takes it for granted. But the occasional lapses are worth noting.

f. The last specific component of the pattern of social relationships involved in the total pattern of relationships that constitutes an in-presence situation consists of the *specific goals or purposes of the participants*. What is each person participating in the situation really trying to do?

The answer to that question will test any student's insight into the inner mechanisms of human behavior. To approach a scientific answer we should have to have available a complete psychiatric analysis of each participant's personality, a complete inventory of his fears, hopes, defense mechanisms, and all the rest. In the nature of the case the ordinary observer can have no such clinical aids. He will simply have to do the best he can on the basis of common sense and such insight as he may have gained by practical experience.

Sometimes when the participants are coöperating toward a common objective the answer will be comparatively simple. Sometimes when there are evidences of fear, suspicion, jealousy, skepticism, coolness, or conflict the answer will be anything but simple. But to fill in the pattern of social relationships, an answer of some kind we must have.

3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF IDEAS

What ideas emerge in a given situation is closely related to the kind of situation it is: routine, nonroutine; its function; and so on—and the ideas in turn help to determine what kind it is. Most of the work of the world is done in prearranged situations, situations that come into being and take the form they do because of preëxisting purpose. The mental content of such situations is usually limited to the purpose in hand, i.e., to matters related to the current activities.

Organizations of various kinds ranging from households to corporations and governmental agencies structure most of the routine situations of our lives. Naturally it makes all the difference in the world (a) what kind of organization structures a given situation and (b) what is going on at the time, i.e., what kind of social processes are under way. Are we dealing with an *ad hoc* temporary thing such as a picnic party, or with an institutional organization such as a corporation or a government bureau? Is it a face-to-face organization such as

a family household or a continent-wide organization such as General Motors, the A.F. of L., or the A.T. and T.? Is it an organization that one enters or leaves freely at will like an ordinary business concern or is it an authoritative organization like an army which one can leave only when one's term of enlistment is up or the exigencies of the draft permit?

What is the basic function of the organization? To service intimate personal needs as does a domestic household? To make things to sell as does a factory? To provide goods for exchange like a store? To mobilize pecuniary resources, control credit, etc., like a bank? To administer public services like a government bureau? To provide recreational facilities and services like a bowling alley or a theater? To educate children like a school? To protect citizens against physical aggression like a police force or an army? What sort of organization is it?

Factors of this kind—the nature of the situation, the kind of social structure involved, the kind of social processes going on—usually condition the ideational content of a situation. For most organizations ideas are tools to serve organizational purposes. Men are not brought together in a factory, for example, to inquire into the theory of relativity or the relation of Plato to the origins of totalitarianism. They are brought together to produce goods and services. This is the basic reason why modes of thinking appropriate to, i.e., functional in, a factory situation are inappropriate to, i.e., nonfunctional in, a school or a university. Supposedly at least, schools exist to develop the thinking powers of pupils and universities exist to examine ideas. Ideas that may be functional enough in situations structured by one kind of organization may have no function at all in situations structured by another kind.

This is simply a special way of saying that the mental interplay that goes on in any situation will be channeled and slanted to a large extent by the kind of situation it is, i.e., by the way in which the various participants define it. A work situation calls for one kind of slanting and channeling, a play situation for another, a congeniality situation for a third, a classroom situation for a fourth, a time-killing situation for still a fifth, and so on. The topics that will be mentioned or talked about, the judgments that will be passed on these topics, the attitudes that will be expressed about them, and the personal alignments that will occur—who agrees with whom and who disagrees—all these things will to a certain extent at least, be affected by the nature of the

situation. Topics, judgments, attitudes, and alignments will in turn not infrequently affect the nature of the situation. They will hardly by themselves turn a work situation into a congeniality one or a classroom situation into a commercial work situation, since these matters are controlled by the organizations that structure the situations in the first place, but they may turn a work situation into a time-killer or a time-killer into a play situation. In any event, there is a certain amount of reciprocal influence between situation and mental interplay. Our problem is to note the *topics*, the *judgments*, the *attitudes*, and the *alignments* that occur in whatever in-presence situations we observe. How these are related to the situation as a whole and particularly to the social ordination structure of the situation becomes an especially interesting point to analyze.

So much, then, for the pattern of relationships in an in-presence situation. It is a pattern of relationships of three kinds: (1) in space, (2) in social ordination, and (3) in ideas. The total pattern is the complex of these three. And the total pattern is the situation.

I-3:7. Summary

We begin, then, by focusing attention on unit instances of two or more persons associating in presence. Our major interest is the situation—the relational pattern compounded of space relations, social relations, ideas, and purposes. But to understand the situation we must always keep it in perspective as part of a more inclusive complex, as the adjustment target, so to speak, of persons involved in a scene, a social structure, a social process, and culture. These aspects we shall have to note as they express themselves in the situation, as we are to note also the focal center, the focal field, the boundary of inclusion-exclusion, and the relational pattern.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 3

To analyze in-presence situations

Compare two or more in-presence situations of the same functional type, i.e., two educational situations, two or more work situations, etc., one of them highly predictable, the other less predictable. Your task is to show how, if at all, these situations differ in component elements and conditioning variables.

Operations required for the answer:

1. Make a retrospective record of all in-presence situations experienced during a selected day during certain hours.

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2. Rank these situations on a scale ranging from the most utterly routine at 1 to the most nonroutine (unpredictable) at 7.
3. Now select as near one extreme of the scale as possible one situation of a given functional type and as near the other extreme of the scale as possible another situation of the *same* functional type.
4. Using the conceptual tools discussed in this chapter, analyze each of these paired situations to answer the question posed above: How do these situations differ in respect to (a) component elements and (b) conditioning variables?
5. Discuss and formulate your conclusions.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Look up J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive*, Washington, Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1934, and construct a simple attraction-repulsion questionnaire for submission to a selected group, asking each person to indicate what individuals he or she would prefer as a partner or an associate for a specific purpose—study, shopping trip, date, etc.—and what ones he or she would prefer not to have as a partner or an associate.

Then construct a diagram visualizing these attractions and repulsions.

Discuss the result as Moreno's "social atom." Does the concept "social atom" have any usefulness in the analysis of situations?

PROJECT B

Analyze and compare two in-presence situations:

1. A situation characterized by primary association, i.e., by a few persons in association face to face, informally, free, unconstrained by special purpose, and associating as whole persons, not mere functionaries.
2. A situation characterized by nonprimary association, i.e., by a few persons in association face to face but in highly formal relations, constrained by special purpose, rigid etiquette, and dealing with one another not as whole persons but as functionaries.

Conclusions?

Supplementary Readings

Bales, Robert T., *Interaction Process Analysis*. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1950.

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Shils, Edward A., "The Study of the Primary Group," chap. 3 in Daniel Lerner, Harold D. Lasswell, and others (eds.), *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, pp. 44-69.

Variables Conditioning Situations: Population

I-4:1. Situations and the Situational Field

In our analysis of in-presence situations we noted that the variables in the situational field were of identically the same sort as the components of situations themselves: people, forms of association, associational processes, culture, and a setting. Before we move on to out-of-presence, or distant, situations, we must get a much clearer picture of these conditioning variables. The next seven chapters, therefore, direct observation toward these external variables: people, culture, forms of association, cultural adjustments to work and to external nature. In Chapter 11 we shall return to the analysis of situations, but situations now beyond the reach of direct observation by the individual student and existing for him, therefore, only in and through distant communication. How the individual conceptualizes these "invisible" situations, what forces are at work changing them, and how individuals, groups, organizations, and social systems readjust to changes—changes past and changes still to come—these form the subject matter of the concluding chapters of this book.

Our immediate concern now is with the variables conditioning situations, and we take up first the most fundamental human variable of all, namely, population. Population exists for us as a fact in and through the category of coexistence. It is human beings in coexistence that constitute a population.¹

¹ In our culture. Many primitive peoples regard the dead as still coexisting, i.e., as still members of the tribe. Catlin, the American artist who toured the Northern Great Plains in the 1830's sketching Indian types, tells of coming on an Indian mother in the tribal cemetery outside a Mandan village chewing dutifully on a buffalo hide in the midst of a circle of skulls and chatting happily with the spirit of her dead child! The

The study of population is a matter of interest not merely for sociologists and demographers but for governments, insurance companies, public utility companies, school boards, and all sorts of public and private enterprises that have to concern themselves with people in the mass. For ages governments have needed to know as comprehensively as possible the population resources of their domains. The Doomsday Book of William the Conqueror, enumerating the people and their possessions in the England of the eleventh century, will be recalled as a famous attempt to meet such a need. In fact, from very ancient times in Egypt, Persia, and elsewhere from reports of military commanders, for local taxgatherers, and so on, governments must have tried to piece together every so often some sort of estimate of the numbers and resources of subject populations.

Since the rise of science in the modern world scientific men have been trying to do this more accurately and systematically. All major governments now maintain staffs of experts who devote themselves to collecting, tabulating, and analyzing data on population. Most colleges and universities employ one or more faculty members who study such matters. In a number of countries there are special agencies, such as the Scripps Foundation for Population Study at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, that carry on continuous studies in this field.

But since one can only see a few people at a time, how does one "observe" a population spread out over a continent?

I-4:2. Types of Population Studies

Basically there are three ways to study population: (1) You can go out into the field and count people, one by one. (2) You can count or question them at a distance by means of questionnaires, telephone polls, radio polls, and the like. (3) Or you can sit in your own home, in a library, or in an office and utilize the published results of either or both of the other methods. Because of limitations of time, man power, and money, this third approach is the one we shall have to use.

Studies of population vary in purpose and scope. They may seek to ascertain the number and basic characteristics of the people of a given area as the United States Census does, a study of coexistence proper; or they may try to find out not mere facts of coexistence but attitudes and opinions, as a Gallup poll does.

Naga tribes in India and many other primitive peoples likewise regard the dead as still coexistent with the living. All sorts of beliefs and customs result from this extension of the category of coexistence—beliefs and customs that civilized observers frequently regard as peculiar.

As to scope, population studies can vary all the way from a complete *census*, or count of all the units in a given area, to the *sample*, or partial enumeration, to the *case study* or intensive analysis of one or more selected units.² The significance of a case study depends on the representativeness of the units selected. When one uses a variety of techniques to study a given area, or population aggregate, the result may be called a *survey*. Since the census, the sample, the case study, and the survey each has its own distinctive advantages and disadvantages it will be useful to consider each briefly.

I-4:3. The Census

Complete enumeration, while invaluable for developing a total picture of any large population, is expensive, complicated, and dependent on large-scale and carefully directed organization.

The idea is at least as old as the ancient Roman "census" from which, obviously, the name is derived. But the old Roman "census" was not an enumeration of the entire population but rather a continuous register of the adult male citizens and their property, maintained for purposes "of taxation, the distribution of military obligations, and the determination of political status."³ The ancient world had no interest in the mere scientific enumeration of population. Such interest first appeared in Italy and in England about the middle of the seventeenth century, but even a century later it still encountered so many administrative difficulties, when tried out on a national scale in Denmark and Norway, and so much popular resistance, in the first Spanish census of 1769, that many European scholars and practical statesmen at the time of the American Revolution regarded a general census of a large country as impracticable. In the face of such skepticism the framers of the American Constitution in 1787 nevertheless included a provision that, in order to apportion Congressional representation and direct taxes among the states, an "enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States and within every subsequent term of ten years."⁴ The first census was accordingly taken in 1790 and the seventeenth in

² The purpose of the study determines the nature of the units chosen. Until 1850, for example, the United States Census used the family as its unit, and in the Census of Manufacturers it uses the business enterprise as its unit.

³ Cf. Walter F. Willcox, "Census," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, p. 295

⁴ Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3.

1950.⁵ The first census gave the total population, male and female, white and colored, slave and free, and classified the white males into those above sixteen years of age and those below. The seventeenth, to conform to the proposed simultaneous censuses of twenty-two countries in the Western Hemisphere, not only counted and classified people but covered agriculture, livestock, forest resources, production, distribution of crops, trade in food products, nutrition, sanitation, shelter, standards of living and teaching, and for the United States included a sampling of personal incomes.

Despite the fact that the data for the federal census are collected by an army of carefully supervised census takers all over the country—in 1950 there were 150,000 of them—each armed with a schedule sheet of questions to be filled in for every person in the enumerator's district, certain inaccuracies are bound to creep into every enumeration. Enumerators differ in the thoroughness with which they cover their districts.⁶ They differ in the care with which they fill in their schedules. And most important of all, the information that they receive from their informants differs in reliability not only from informant to informant but from question to question. Information on the number of males and females in a house is likely to be more dependable than the occupational classification of the head of the house or his marital status. Some authorities estimate that there may be twice as many divorced persons in the United States as the census returns show. And as for age, there is a tendency for many informants, especially those of advanced years, to report age in terms of the nearest interval of five, i.e., 60 in place of 59 or 61, 65 rather than 64 or 66, and so on.

An enterprise as far-flung and complicated as that of counting every man, woman, and child in the United States from Bangor to San Diego and from Key West to Puget Sound obviously demands a high degree of coördination and standardization—a degree of coördination,

⁵ Although periodical enumerations of population were introduced into the colony of New France in 1665 and were started in Sweden in 1749, Willcox says "the periodic censuses of the United States have been preeminently responsible for introducing the practise into other countries." German authorities agree. See Willcox, *op. cit.*, p. 297. It is estimated that more than two thirds of the earth's population has now been enumerated.

⁶ The author's family, for example, living at the end of a dead end road outside of Ann Arbor, Michigan, was not included in either the 1930 or the 1940 census. Southern census takers not infrequently show less zeal to include all Negroes than they do to include all whites. The total error in enumeration of Negroes may run as high as 2 percent. Recent censuses have reduced the error relative to total whites to approximately 1 percent.

standardization, and expertness that only a continuing organization of specialists such as the Bureau of the Census can give.⁷ The Bureau of the Census has become, therefore, the main source of information concerning the number, distribution, characteristics, and so on, of the population of the United States. It is the one source that provides a continuous supply of statistical data in which and through which Americans can see themselves as a people.

I-4:4. The Sample

The advantage of sampling rather than completely enumerating a population is that for large groups sampling costs vastly less in time and money. The disadvantage is that in addition to all the factors of uncertainty involved in a complete enumeration sampling introduces more. In the first place, a sample must be large enough to make it reasonably certain that if you drew another in the same way from the same population the two samples would show approximately the same characteristics to the same degree. In other words, a sample must be big enough to reduce to reasonable limits what the statisticians call its standard deviation. Usually the lower limit of size from this point of view is not less than 100 units.

But merely to make sure that one sample will be pretty much like another sample is not enough. Both samples conceivably might not truly represent the total group at all. They might merely misrepresent it twice. For example, suppose you wanted to find out the economic status and educational level, let us say, of Negroes in a northern city. There are 2000 Negro homes in the city and you can't enumerate them all, so you pick out a sample. To lick the standard deviation hazard, you take a sample of 100 heads of families, one in every twenty. Because heads of families are presumably working in the daytime, you make your canvass in the evening and you conscientiously pick out from the city directory every twentieth name on streets known to be solidly Negro. That sounds like a random selection of your sample, and a sample by random selection surely ought to be representative. But is it? Suppose there are a lot of Negroes newly ar-

⁷ For the 1950 census the country was divided into 14 areas, which were then broken down into 500 supervisory districts, which in turn were cut up into 200,000 enumeration districts. For each of the 200,000 districts a map had to be provided showing boundary lines to include every house in every hamlet and rural area and yet prevent overlapping. Every enumerator had a list of 33 questions which every citizen was required by law to answer truthfully. The population count was due to be reported to the President by December 1 for transmission to Congress to form the basis for the apportionment of representatives as required by the Constitution.

rived from the South in that Negro section and suppose further—a condition that not infrequently obtains—that in competition with the northern, home-town Negroes the newcomers from the South have to take the lower-paid, dirtier, less desirable jobs. That means that a higher percentage of the newcomers than of the northern Negroes will have night jobs and will be absent when you call. Thus, your apparently random selection of your sample will actually load it with northern Negroes holding better jobs than the newcomers. Your sample, in short, will actually represent the older, better-established Negro population of the city, not the newly arrived, less well-adjusted Negro population. Your sample, in other words, will tend to give many Negroes a higher economic status and educational level than a truly representative sample would have shown. But by confining yourself to a solidly Negro street in the Negro section you have probably left unrepresented the oldest and best-established Negro population of all—the second- and third-generation northern Negroes who have managed to acquire a small competence and move out of the lower-class section altogether. In many northern cities there is more than one area of Negro settlement. So for the sake of ease in locating Negro heads of families you haven't sampled the entire Negro population at all—you have sampled (1) northern Negroes who (2) happened to have daytime jobs and who (3) haven't yet been able to move into a better Negro neighborhood! As concerns the entire Negro population of the city, your sample isn't representative at all!

This hypothetical example will serve to illustrate some of the pitfalls of population sampling. The whole problem lies in the field of statistics which every student should be familiar with before he tries to do any ambitious sampling himself. *Some systematic training in statistical method is a must for anyone seriously interested in the study of social situations and their background factors.*

But it is obvious that even without such training you must henceforth view with a very critical eye every *sample* of social phenomena which you encounter. Is it *big enough* to give grounds for believing that another sample of the same sort would give similar results? And is it *truly representative* of the really important characteristics of the parent population?

I-4:5. Case Studies

Our discussion of the dangers of sampling points straight to one of the most troublesome features of a very important method of study-

ing population, namely, the case study. Case studies can be important because a good case study tries to get at the developmental and causal factors behind the statistical unit. Case study is essentially the clinical method applied to individuals, agencies, or communities. You can make a case study of a person, of a particular family, of a particular organization, of a particular situation, or of a particular community. Whatever the unit is, a good case study tries to find out what makes it tick.

Statistical data are mainly descriptive. They tell you that such and such a population has so many people, so many males, so many females, so many under five, so many over sixty-five, so many gainfully employed, and so on. By the use of proper statistical techniques, analysis may even reveal how many males of given ages gainfully employed in various industries have completed how many years of schooling, and you may be able to measure the tendency for years of schooling, for example, to vary with different occupations. Correlation techniques enable statisticians to measure the tendencies of variables to vary together in the same direction from their own averages or in opposite directions. But to explain why such tendencies exist is a horse of a different color. In seventeen cities in the Detroit area, for example, in 1940 the percentage of gainfully employed males who worked in factories tended to vary *above* its own average as the median years of schooling of the population in those towns dropped *below* its own average to a degree measured by a correlation coefficient of $-.828$. In twenty-three cities in the Pittsburgh area the same thing appeared to a degree expressed by the coefficient $-.749$. These figures can be translated into a statistical prediction that, given such and such a degree of industrialization (i.e., percentage of gainfully employed males working in factories), such and such an average degree of schooling will prevail in a given community. Those are statistically verifiable facts. But they do not tell you why those relationships exist. They do not tell you what causal conditions created such relationships.

There are several ways in which you could seek an answer: you could *guess* at the causes, on the basis of what you know about the tendency of foreign-born workers to work in factories, to drop out of school early, etc. You could *gather more statistics* on percentages of foreign-born, percentages of non-English foreign-born, etc., put them all into a complicated formula *and determine by partial correlation techniques* precisely how much each such factor contributed to the final result. Or you could make a series of *case studies* of each city or each industrial population and find out how in the actual processes

of living factory employment affects years of schooling. In their famous study of *Middletown* (Muncie, Indiana) years ago, the Lynds, using data from the schools as well as testimony from workers' families, found that mainly for economic reasons children from working-class homes, homes of native-born as well as foreign-born workers, tended to leave school after the eighth grade in far greater relative numbers than did children from middle- and upper-class homes.⁸ And any number of studies have shown that until the G.I. Bill broke down the economic barriers college was mainly for the children of the middle and upper classes.⁹ Case studies, therefore, illuminate statistics.

But the problem always is, How typical are the cases? How typical of the factors behind the statistical picture? How typical of the causes in any situation?

Given satisfactory answers to such questions, case studies make important contributions to our knowledge of how individuals, families, communities actually behave and why. They are especially useful to make statistical studies meaningful in terms of human experience.

I-4:6. The Survey

The method that combines all other methods is the survey.

A survey is not a mere enumeration, or census, although it will certainly utilize whatever census data relate to its area of interest. It is not a mere sampling of a population for one or a few characteristics. Like the monumental study of conditions among wage workers in London, Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London*, published in seventeen volumes in the 1890's, a survey may be based on a sample of a selected population and may also utilize intensive case studies of individuals, families, and neighborhoods. In fact, like Booth's work, it may be actually a case study of a single city. But the survey method is neither census, sampling, nor case study alone. It is a method of using any and all methods to construct a total picture of the conditions, experiences, problems, etc., of an aggregate of people.¹⁰

⁸ Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1929, pp. 163-164, and 185-186

⁹ For example, in 1929-30 Clifford Woody and L. W. Keeler at the University of Michigan found that out of 5715 Michigan students attending the University of Michigan, Michigan State College, and all the other colleges in the state, including the normal schools, farmers, artisans, and the semiskilled classes that constituted over 80 percent of the population contributed 33 percent of the students while the clerical, business, and professional classes that constituted about 15 percent of the state contributed over 53 percent of the students. See C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell, and L. J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, p. 309.

¹⁰ The term *survey* is used in this book to refer to the most inclusive type of social study involving data from the field. In other words, social research, social investigation, social inquiry, social exploration, social discovery, and fact finding may all make use of

Pauline Young traces the beginnings of the survey method to John Howard (1726–90), an English prison reformer, who set out to buttress his demands for improvements in prison conditions by collecting statistical and other data directly from prisoners and from the prisons.¹¹ The force of Howard's detailed facts so impressed English statesmen that fact finding presently became routine in English administration.

Another early contributor to survey methods was Frederic LePlay (1806–82), a French engineer who combined the survey with social research to describe the living level of European workers about the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was Booth, however, who demonstrated the value of a comprehensive study of community life.

Early in the twentieth century Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, and other "muckrakers" applied the method to the exposure of municipal corruption, the abuses of monopoly, and the living conditions of tenement dwellers in the United States.

The modern emphasis on community surveys came, however, from the Pittsburgh Survey, started in 1909 and published in 1914 in six volumes. Since 1914 several thousand surveys of various kinds have been made in the United States, including such projects as the Missouri Crime Survey (1926), the Wickersham Commission Crime Survey (1931), the Pacific Race Relations Survey (1924–29), the California Unemployment Survey (1931–32), and the Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs—summarized in *Mastering a Metropolis*, by R. L. Duffus, 1930.¹²

Because of its inclusiveness, the survey method is one of the most useful methods of "observing" a population.

I-4:7. How Use the Results of Indirect Observation?

How research workers tabulate and analyze the raw data turned in by the census, sampling studies, case studies, and social surveys must

the survey method or utilize the results of past surveys but should not be confused with the survey as such. See Pauline Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939, pp. 55–83. Obviously social research has a still broader reference than the term *social survey*, which is used here to refer to an inclusive method of collecting data on a particular agency, area, or problem. The influence of Pareto on Italian Fascism, for example, might be a legitimate subject for scientific research but hardly for a social survey.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Allen Eaton and Shelby M. Harrison, *A Bibliography of Social Surveys*, cited by Young, p. 26, listed 154 general surveys and 2621 specialized surveys (such as the *Cleveland School Survey*, 1917) up to January 1, 1928.

be studied in more advanced courses. The immediate problem is to assemble data on the population backgrounds of the situations of your experience: data, in short, on the population of a selected town or city and of the United States.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 4

To identify population as a factor in the situational field

1. From census reports in the library or from the local city hall, ascertain the population of your local town or city at ten-year intervals from its first census to date. If there is a college in the place, find out from the registrar, or from its annual report, how the college enrollment has varied in similar ten-year periods during approximately the same time.
2. Graph the population of the United States at six census periods, beginning with 1790 and including 1860 and the four most recent periods. On the same graph show the variations in the population of your home state in the same periods. (Consult census data in statistical appendix of this book.)
3. Consult the latest *World Almanac* for estimates of world population by continents.
4. Think all this over and show the bearing of such a project on situational analysis.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

What do studies by Raymond Pearl, Warren Thompson, W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, and other demographers show concerning present growth trends in world population? Why are population experts worrying about present world population trends?

PROJECT B

Consult the *World Almanac* for easily accessible figures on replacement trends of different elements of the American population: whites, Negroes; rural, urban, etc.


What are some current estimates (see *Reader's Guide*, *New York Times Index*, and other bibliographical aids) of population growth in the United States, future total population, future total Negro population, total Indian population, etc.?

PROJECT C

What was the Malthusian theory?

Prepare a bibliography of ten to twenty titles of the most authoritative books on the general subject of population theory.

UNIVERSITY OF JODHPUR LIBRARY



Write a book review of one or two of the most significant books in your list. Such a review should not exceed 1200 to 1500 words and should do three things: (1) tell concisely what the author is saying—his major thesis, supporting evidence, etc.; (2) show how all this is related to the study of situations; and (3) give your own evaluation of the book.

Supplementary Readings

Carr-Saunders, A. M., *The Population Problem*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1922.

Hawley, Amos, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1950, "The Human Aggregate," pp. 77-174.

Smith, J. Russell, *North America*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1925.

Vance, Rupert B., *All These People: The Nation's Human Resources in the South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945.

Woytinsky, W. S. and E. S., *World Population and Production*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953.

Variables Conditioning Situations: Culture

I-5:1. The Origins of Culture

For the story of how man evolved wits enough to begin inventing and accumulating a social heritage—sticks and stones and fire and metals and eventually hydrogen bombs and the United Nations—for all that, you must go to the anthropologists. The slow climb from the Java ape man of 500,000 or 1,000,000 years ago to the Neanderthal of 50,000 B.C. and finally to true man, Crô-Magnon, who entered Europe as a Stone Age savage 15,000 to 25,000 years ago, we must leave to others to describe. We cannot even pause to glance at the rise and fall of civilizations, all this side of 6000 B.C.—the thirty whose life careers Arnold Toynbee analyzes in his monumental *A Study of History*.¹

¹ See the one-volume summary of his first six volumes, *A Study of History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. City living, out of which came the first civilizations, seems to have appeared first in the Nile Valley and in Mesopotamia a few thousand years after the "agricultural revolution" which gave man some control over his own food supply as against the vagaries of hunting and fishing and herding.

Of the thirty civilizations and near-civilizations which Toynbee studies, and ignoring the near civilizations which proved abortive, our philosopher of history defines the fate of the remaining twenty-six as follows: ". . . of these twenty-six, no less than sixteen are now dead and buried. The ten survivors are our own Western Society, the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Near East, its offshoot in Russia, the Islamic Society, the Hindu Society, the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, its offshoot in Japan, and the three arrested civilizations of the Polynesians, the Eskimos and the Nomads . . . of the living civilizations every one has already broken down and is in process of disintegration except our own."—*A Study of History*, pp. 244–245. (*Italics added.*)

As compared with the tens of thousands of years of man's precivilized existence, all the civilizations that have ever flourished and all their people occupy only a small fraction of racial time. It is probable, however, that they have included a large fraction of

Obviously culture has been a product of human association, but it is equally obvious that as culture has accumulated and as it has increased man's power over his own environment it has more and more transformed the nature of association itself. As Cooley long ago pointed out, culture has enabled man to overcome obstacles of time, distance, separateness, and expressiveness. Stone inscriptions overcome time. The steamship, the railroad, the airplane, and electro-communication overcome distance. Mass communication from printing to television has overcome separateness so that one can influence many, while all the nonverbal arts, from the tribal dance to painting, sculpture, and music, have combined to express the manifold aspects of human life. As a result twentieth-century man finds association a faster, wider, and probably more superficial type of experience than his ancestors a few centuries ago ever did.

The average peasant or villager in Norman England, for example, lived a life bounded by the horizon of his neighborhood. He knew nothing of what was going on in the world at large. He peopled the woods and streams with all sorts of spirits against whose malevolence the parish priest was expected to protect him, thought about little except his next meal and the narrowest personal gossip, and, unless he joined in some foreign war or in one of the eight Crusades to retrieve the Holy Sepulcher from the Infidel, never got more than ten or a dozen miles from home in his whole lifetime. He lived a leisurely, ignorant, primary-group, poverty-stricken existence of gross superstition, narrow parochialism, and recurrent decimations by smallpox, dysentery, typhoid, bubonic plague, or whatever other grim nastiness got loose. His life expectancy at birth did not exceed twenty or twenty-five years. A third or more of his children died in their first year.

Yet this culture ranked far above that of Crô-Magnon Man at the beginning, or even that of the now extinct Tasmanians, who had not

the 35,000,000,000 or more men, women, and children who at some time or other have populated the globe since B.C. 25,000.

Note that at this point Toynbee does not clearly distinguish Russian Soviet Society as embodying a new civilization distinct from what he calls the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in the Near East. He includes this Russian offshoot among the broken and disintegrating civilizations but he does not even mention what has taken its place—Soviet Russian Society. There is certainly no evidence that Soviet Society is broken or is disintegrating. If one agrees with the Webbs that Russian Soviet Society is actually a new civilization, distinct both from the old Czarist society and from Western civilization proper, then Toynbee's list of living civilizations must be revised and his statement that there is only one living civilization left, namely, Western civilization, must be revised with it. Leaving out what Toynbee calls the arrested civilizations—the Polynesians, the Eskimos, and the Steppe Nomads—the roster would then read like this: Western Society, Near Eastern Orthodox Christendom, Islamic Society, Hindu Society, Japanese Society, Soviet Russian Society, and Communist China—seven in all.

yet managed to invent the bow and arrow for themselves by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Today in the United States, by way of contrast, the average citizen lives in an urban place of more than 2500 population, reads a daily newspaper that reports a battle in Asia or a flurry on the New York Stock Exchange within a few minutes or hours of its occurrence, drives an automobile 8000 to 10,000 miles a year, and enjoys conveniences some of which were beyond the reach of anybody in the Western world for fifteen centuries after the fall of Rome and many of which, such as radio and television, have been available only within a single generation. He has a reasonable expectation of living well up toward seventy or beyond and can count on his children's outliving him.² In the 106 cities of 100,000 or more population and in large areas of most of the 381 between 25,000 and 100,000, primary face-to-face association has shrunk to the dimensions of the household, and even many of these are too crowded and too hurried to permit the leisurcly, all-inclusive kind of contacts that characterized the households of the Middle Ages and of pioneer and rural America. In the cities and in many rural areas inundated by city workers living in the country, neighborhoods have ceased to be areas of primary association and have become mere geographical localities whose inhabitants not only do not "neighbor" but frequently do not even know the folks next door. Even the spontaneous play groups of children, which for ages have provided much basic experience in primary association, have been profoundly affected by the cultural changes of the last century in America. Character-building agencies, supervised playgrounds, movies, television, a hundred other agencies and gadgets all attest the decline of spontaneity in the play world of the modern child. From the nursery where radio and video fill the air with the echoes of six-guns all the way to the motorized funeral cortege that whisks the deceased to his grave at thirty-five miles an hour modern culture is profoundly altering the forms, processes, and results of association.

Our problem, therefore, is to see this culture in action.

I-5:2. Analysis of Culture

Human beings have been accumulating culture, i.e., unit culture traits, for at least 500,000 years. At any given place or in any given

² Expectation of life of U.S. white males, from median age 30.8, in 1949: 40.03 more years; of U.S. white females, median age 31.1: 43.69 more years. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, p. 69.

Infant mortality rates, 1949: urban whites, 27.8 per 1000 live births, rural whites, 30.4, urban nonwhites, 46.0; rural nonwhites, 49.0. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

population aggregate this process of accumulation has never been continuous or even. Hence we must distinguish the uneven *cultural history of a particular people* (who like the ancient Greeks may reach a high level of civilization at one period and then lose their cultural leadership) from the *evolution of culture in general*. There have been over sixteen historical civilizations, but no one of them has managed to endure more than twelve to thirty centuries. Western civilization is in its eighth or ninth century and is very definitely facing what Toynbee found characteristic of all declining civilizations, namely, "a time of troubles." The great majority of the world's 2,500,000,000 people are living on a much simpler level than that attained in Western civilization. From the Stone Age Veddahs to the Atomic Age Americans, however, culture always contains certain fundamental elements. For convenience we may group these under five heads:

1. Language.
2. Material traits and objects (artifacts).
3. Adjustment patterns.
4. Values and ideals.
5. Interdependences of function.

1. LANGUAGE

Language is the great cultural instrument for the communication of meanings. We should note well, however, that communication is a broader process than the mere use of verbal symbols. Actually spoken language probably came late in man's biological development. Evidence from the animal world indicates that long before they could symbolize subject and predicate in words, man's ancestors were communicating by preverbal means, i.e., by tones of the voice, facial expressions, gestures. Animals communicate in this way today, and so do we. In fact, preverbal communication is still the easiest and quickest way to communicate emotional states such as anger or fear and to give direct impressions of personality. In certain occupations such as acting, personal salesmanship, and public speaking it seems actually to be the most essential element; an actor conveys far more by the tones of his voice, by his gestures and his facial expression and tempo of movement than he can possibly convey by mere words alone. Anybody can read lines; only an actor can put meaning into them.

As for nonverbal communication, a vast amount of the experience-sharing of modern life goes on by this means. If one stops to think what the arts of music, painting, photography, motion-picture making,

sculpture, dancing, architecture, and pageantry contribute to the intellectual, recreational, and control aspects of modern civilization he can begin to appreciate the force of that statement. Obviously what is communicated by such means is beyond the power of words to put across. No words can take the place of a great symphony or produce the psychological effect of the glittering pageantry of an imperial coronation.

So much for communication at the moment.

2. MATERIAL TRAITS AND OBJECTS (ARTIFACTS)

The second aspect of culture that one must keep in mind is the tangible, material, man-made environment in which we live. Material objects themselves such as houses, airplanes, and automobiles are not, of course, material culture traits as such. Houses, airplanes, automobiles, books, plowed fields, cultivated cereals, domesticated animals—all these are merely *signs* pointing to the existence of such traits. The traits themselves consist essentially of the attitudes and the know-how necessary for producing and using the material objects. This is easily understandable when we consider a hypothetical case. Conceivably an American bombing plane abandoned by its crew over a South Sea island might fall almost intact into the hands of a native tribe. Would the possession of such a plane by a Stone Age tribe mean that the airplane was now a material trait of the tribal culture? Obviously not. Without knowing how to build, repair, or fly such a contrivance the natives could hardly be said to possess such a material trait, regardless of the fact that one perfectly good bombing plane was reposing behind the chief's hut. That plane, like vestiges of other cultures, would be merely a sign that some culture somewhere at some time did include the attitudes and the skills necessary to reproduce it and make it work in a total life situation. So it is the attitudes and the skills along with the *cultural objects* that all together constitute the material culture.

3. ADJUSTMENT PATTERNS

This brings us to the third aspect of culture, namely, the *adjustment patterns* by which men provide common ways of acting in specific situations. A custom such as shaking hands obviously consists of at least three elements: (a) a pattern of specific behavior for a specific situation; (b) a matrix of situational expectations that such a pattern will be used; and (c) the necessary habit patterns in the behavior

systems of the participating individuals. Apart from the purely psychological factors involved (*habits*), most adjustment patterns are composed of two elements: *the pattern proper*, and *the external pressure or control device* associated with the pattern and intended to bring it into use in certain circumstances. Each of these elements may vary greatly in complexity and intensity of impact on the individual. Roughly, on this basis, adjustment patterns may be classified into four types:

a. *Non-enforced*, rather *simple patterns* of individual behavior, called *folkways* by Sumner.³ These are such obvious and simple ways of meeting common situations that nobody stops to question them or to exercise choice. The ordinary way of spending the night in the American culture is to sleep in a bed. But nobody compels you to sleep in a bed. You can sleep on the floor if you prefer. Usually it simply never occurs to you to make this choice—beds are obviously more comfortable than floors. The compulsion here is almost wholly internal rather than external—you are in the habit of sleeping in a bed.

When the expectations of your friends and others begin to enter the picture, as in the matter of shaking hands, for example, you are dealing with adjustment patterns slightly more compulsive than folkways. So as a second type we have

b. *Opinion-enforced patterns* of individual behavior called *mores*. Opinion pressure on an individual is usually based on cultural beliefs about group welfare. In this matter of shaking hands, for example, you follow it not merely because it is a matter of unquestioned habit like a folkway but definitely because you “are expected to.” Even when a man is introduced to a stranger as both are about to sit down to a meal—a most unhygienic time to shake hands—the force of mutual expectation and group opinion brings their hands together, nevertheless. Not to shake hands in such circumstances would create embarrassment, misunderstanding, possible hostility. For men in such circumstances there is no other culturally recognized gesture of social acceptance, so the pressure of group expectations outweighs sanitary inhibitions. You shake hands and take your chances with the germs. Where does any idea of group welfare come into this picture? In the assumption that such a gesture of mutual acceptance is a good thing for group solidarity. A few centuries ago when gentlemen went armed this was more than an assumption—gentlemen clasping hands could not at the same moment be clasping swords. What originally was ap-

³ See William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*, Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906.

parently a kind of safety-first device became transformed into a gesture of mutual acceptance, expected and required as a social ritual, one of the *mores*, violation of which stirs apprehension and disapproval.

This is a characteristic of the *mores*—violation is felt as a kind of personal affront or threat. This is not a rational matter. Just as one would resent a stranger's refusal to shake hands even on the most reasonable hygienic grounds, so many people, ignoring modern low death rates, still feel that birth control is "wicked," disapprove individual thievery *but* overlook stock-watering and sharp business practice, and find nothing inconsistent in worshiping a God before whom all men are equal in a church which puts a price mark on its pews and admits Negroes only as servants. Sumner long ago said, "The *mores* can make anything right"—cannibalism, wife-lending, exposure of infants, killing of the old, anything. And once we feel a particular way of acting to be "right," woe betide anybody who acts otherwise.

c. A third level of complexity and compulsiveness appears when the pattern is no longer merely one of individual behavior but *one that prescribes definite functional relationships, i.e., organization, and designates particular individuals to act on behalf of the organization*. These patterns, evolved or enacted to meet enduring needs, are called *institutions*. Institutional functionaries (officers), because of the cultural pattern and its acceptance by those around them, *function with authority*. Broadly speaking, authority is the right to make and enforce decisions, the origin and nature of the right in each institutional organization being a matter too complicated for us to examine here.

The point is, *institutions are patterns of organization and organization-oriented behavior enforced by individuals who are culturally regarded as having the right to make and enforce orders to carry out the pattern*. Institutions have evolved apparently to provide standardized ways of meeting basic human needs such as reproduction, hunger, shelter, mutual protection, transportation, exchange, and so on.

We have just said that institutions are patterns, or ideas, evolved or enacted for the purpose of satisfying recurrent basic needs by means of particular forms of association known as organizations. This follows Sumner's classic statement that an institution consists of an idea and a structure. The pattern is the idea; the organization, or organizations, compose the structure.

We have already noted that organizations constitute one of the basic forms of association. (See Chapter I-1:5.)

It is important at this point, however, to indicate some of the

characteristics of the particular kinds of organizations that are patterned by institutions. Like any social organization, an institutional organization is carried on by people who haven't come into organized relationships merely by chance. Every social organization is composed of a selected personnel. That means that no stray passer-by can walk into your home and make himself a member of your household at will and that you can't get into the New York Central Railroad organization or into Congress merely by helping yourself to a handy switch engine or to a seat in the Senate chamber. Every social organization, as we have said, is a system of exclusion as well as inclusion. It keeps out as well as takes in—and to get in you have to conform to the institutional pattern: to set up a family, you marry; to join a business organization, you “buy in” or get hired in; and to get into Congress as a member, you must be duly appointed or elected. Even to get into college you have to present the necessary “credits.” There are all sorts of selective processes by which organizations pick and choose. The result in any specific case is always a selected personnel.

As a matter of fact, a selected personnel is only one of at least seven characteristics of institutional organizations. These are:

1. *A selected personnel*, as we have noted.
2. *An institutional pattern, or design*, of purpose, relationships, roles, authority, etc., orienting individuals toward the cultural function of the organization. Chapin calls this the latent pattern. Everybody knows what a family is, what a business enterprise is for, and so on, but nobody bothers to spell it out.
3. *Specific attitudes and behavior patterns*, such as love, parental respect, etc., in the family; acquisitiveness, desire for efficiency, etc., in business; and so on.⁴
4. *Symbolic culture traits*, such as the marriage ring, the family name, and so on; the firm name, the letterhead, the business slogan, etc.
5. *Utilitarian culture traits*—the things the organization members have to use to carry on: household equipment, personal property, etc., in the family; buildings, offices, factories, machines, etc., for business organizations.
6. *Oral or written specifications formulating relationships*: the marriage license, family mores, etc.; incorporation papers, operating rules, and the like.

⁴ Characteristics 2 to 6, inclusive, were pointed out by Dr. F. Stuart Chapin in *Contemporary American Institutions*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1935, p. 16.

PLATES 15-19




Courtesy, University of Michigan News Service.

Plate 15. Typical In-Presence Situation in a College Chemistry Laboratory. A student examines evidences of chemical reaction in test tube, with laboratory assistant and instructor looking on. Other students are similarly engaged. The focus of attention here is a problem posed by the course in chemistry. Notice the notebook on the table. This method of teaching a physical science involves not only experimentation but actual observation by students of the problem phenomena of the science—in this case, chemical reactions. There should be no difficulty in classifying this situation as to functional type.

Plate 16. An In-Presence Situation with a Distant Objective. Members of the rebel air force in the "Conservative" Revolution of 1954 in Guatemala refueling a small Cessna 180 which was used to strafe government troops with Tommy-guns and blast them with 25-pound bombs. Thanks to the United States naval blockade of Russian arms shipments to Guatemala on the eve of this revolution, government anti-aircraft guns had no ammunition and the government itself had no opposing air force. The Guatemalan government had been infiltrated by Communist sympathizers and was regarded by the United States State Department as altogether too friendly with Soviet Russia to be a comfortable neighbor only a short flight from the Panama Canal. This is obviously an "action" situation.






POPULATION
PER SQUARE MILE

UNDER 2.0
2.0 TO 5.9
6.0 TO 17.9
18.0 TO 44.9
45.0 TO 89.9
90.0 AND OVER

Plate 17. United States Population Per Square Mile by Counties, 1950. (From 1950 United States Census of Population, U.S. Summary, p. xxvi.)

a 20th Century Fact



A Twentieth Century Fund report points out that the United States, with a population of 151.7 million in 1950, has a birth rate somewhere in the middle range of world rates. The rate for this country stood at 23.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1950 — higher than the rates for Austria (15.8), the United Kingdom and Western Germany (16.1 and 16.2 respectively) but lower than those for Canada (26.6), Japan (28.4), Chile (32.4) and Mexico (45.7).

Plate 18.



Plate 19. A Contrast of Material Traits, Institutions, and Values in the American Culture. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Cathedral, New York City, as seen from the R.C.A. (Radio Corporation of America) Building. The Cathedral is a material expression of the oldest institutional organization in the Western World, the Roman Catholic Church, which is dedicated to spiritual values and dates from the early years of the Christian era. Here it is surrounded and dwarfed by recently-built skyscrapers housing the offices of corporations and other business firms primarily concerned with economic values. The Radio Corporation of America carries on and controls far-reaching radio and television broadcasting operations, culturally undreamed of and technologically impossible when the Catholic Church was founded.

Elizabeth Hibbs from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

7. *An expectation of permanence.* When you organize a picnic party you do not ordinarily expect the party to go on and on day after day. A picnic party is purely an *ad hoc* organization. But when you set up a family, organize a business enterprise, incorporate a city, or bring into existence a national government you envisage a corporate future. You expect the organization to last. The divorce rate and the rate of business failures being what they are in America, certain kinds of social organizations not infrequently disappoint these expectations. But it is characteristic of *institutional* organizations in general that they are formed to continue indefinitely and that normally the members of every such organization orient their behavior to keep the organization going.

A further word is in order on Characteristic 7: Functionaries charged with responsibility for the efficiency of the organization set up procedures and social controls—rewards, punishments, etc.—designed to keep this expectation alive and active; designed, in short, to keep the members in line and functioning as members. And outside the organization society at large does the same thing; once you are married, all kinds of social controls from gossip and the opinions of your friends to the sanctions of the criminal law begin to operate to keep you functioning as a member of your family, *your* family and not any other family. In other words, *institutional organizations, once going, have a definite and strong tendency to persist as interaction systems.* This tendency is wholly due to the way in which individual human beings behave. No social organization or interaction system has any skeletal, muscular, or nervous system of its own; hence no family, business enterprise, or other particular social organization or interaction system can possibly *act* or *do* anything. All action is the action of individuals. But this does not change the fact that as the result of the actions of individuals particular institutional organizations, particular families, business enterprises, governments, armies, and the like, do tend to persist and can be observed to undergo changes—sometimes very unusual and profound changes—in order to keep on functioning as systems in new situations.

In physical science the force that hold the parts of an atom together is called the binding force. Social interaction systems, and particularly institutional organizations, also display a kind of cohesiveness, or binding force. No way has yet been devised for measuring this. As a matter of fact, we still do not know all the factors that make for cohesiveness

in an interaction system. It is too simple to attribute the entire thing merely to *esprit de corps*, or the tendency of individuals to identify themselves with the whole. *Esprit de corps* is probably only one factor among a number. For one thing, the effective functioning of any social organization is a powerful factor in making it hold together. When any organization—a family, a school, a government—is performing about what most participants regard as its proper function and is meeting their demands on it, they support it. When it is failing to meet these demands they begin to wonder whether a change in personnel or even a different organization altogether might not do the job better. At times during the Civil War, dissatisfaction with the Lincoln administration's conduct of the war aroused bitter criticism in the North; and until the capture of Atlanta and Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah this actually jeopardized Lincoln's reelection in 1864. Organization loyalty is thus a very pragmatic virtue: Get results, or else. Yet even when an organization such as Hitler's Reich is obviously failing, as most Germans could see by the fall of 1944, *internal discipline and drastic social control*, such as secret police, may hold it together when *esprit de corps* and *functional loyalty* have long since died out.

Then there is the factor of *the way in which participants regard the role of their own organization in the field in which it operates*. The Germans in 1944, for example, not only were afraid of Himmler; they were also afraid of the Russians and of the other United Nations.

Ideas concerning *the obligations of one's organization in a going society also play a part*. In planning their strike in 1946, which did not come off, maritime workers explicitly announced that they would keep in operation troop ships bringing G.I.'s home and relief ships carrying food to foreign nations. Other ships were to be tied up, but certain organizational obligations to the remainder of society were recognized. Similar ideas of societal obligations operate in all organizations.

No doubt other factors beyond *esprit de corps*, *functional loyalty*, *internal discipline*, *social controls*, and *societal obligations* also contribute to the cohesiveness of interaction systems.⁵ The important fact for us is that interaction systems function as systems, tend to persist as systems, and have to be accounted for in particular situations as sys-

⁵ For different ways of analyzing what holds organizations together see E. Wight Bakke, *Bonds of Organization*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950. See also Robert C. Angell, *The Integration of American Society*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1941.

tems. What people do in any given situation is thus not only an expression of the way in which they relate themselves to their conception of their own needs; it is also an expression of the way in which they relate themselves to interaction systems—to particular companies and regiments, to particular school organizations, to particular communities, to particular total societies.

But over and above the particular designs on which particular institutional organizations operate and over and above the various functionaries with authority to carry out these designs, i.e., to make appropriate decisions and get them executed—in addition to all these, every civilized society has developed complex codes of conduct sanctioned by the coercive power of the community or the state. These codes are the systems of legality, or systems of law, peculiar to each society.

d. The fourth level of complexity and compulsiveness of adjustment patterns is represented by the *law*. The term *law* is popularly used in many senses: we read about “natural law,” “international law,” “the laws of motion,” etc. Here we use the term to refer to *those patterns of conduct prescribed by public authority, interpreted, applied, and enforced by special functionaries, and backed by the physical power of the community or society acting through an organization called a government*. This means that law is an attribute of the institutional complex called the state. In tribal society there are customs and traditions, folkways and mores and institutions, but, there being no state, no laws. In the same way, there being no world state, international affairs are controlled by diplomatic usage, by treaties, by agreements (United Nations Charter), and by force. But the term *international law* refers merely to the code of principles of international intercourse drafted by philosophers and diplomats. It is not law in the sense that domestic law is law—enacted, enforceable, and binding.

The law is the great social agency for standardizing conduct in situations in which society cannot tolerate individual choice. As the law stands in American culture, you are not permitted to choose whether to drive on the right or left side, whether to support your wife and children or not to support them, whether to kill your neighbor or not to kill him. If you do choose, and choose wrongly, the law prescribes penalties, i.e., *sanctions*, and likewise prescribes definite procedures by which the sanctions are to be applied. To the lawyer, law is what is consistent with the principles of the system of law as developed through time. It is reason. To the laymen in America, it is usually

thought of as *will*, what the majority wants. Any system of law always expresses a certain crystallization of the relationships of economic and social interests—the outcome, in other words, of a *political process*. The essential difference between the legal and the political processes is this: *In the political process power is of the essence*—that party wins which has the power (money, votes, etc.) needed to win. *In the legal process power is theoretically an incidental*—that party wins which has the law and the facts on its side.

Actually the fact that power does influence the legal process on occasion means that (1) the political struggle has not yet crystallized into a stable pattern of power relationships; or (2) society has not been able to protect its courts from the powerful. Attempts to stop strikes by law, for example, merely lead to political struggles to control the arbitration tribunals or to repeal the laws. We have not yet evolved a stable pattern of capital-labor relationships. Attempts to penalize great lawbreaking corporations frequently bog down in endless litigation, delays, etc., as in the attempts in San Francisco between 1907 and 1910 to convict the officials of bribe-giving corporations seeking franchises and other special public favors. As in many other places at other times, the courts there were not immune to the machinations of the powerful.

Law has four distinctive characteristics, three of which mark it off from the rules of private organizations: (1) *politicality*, (2) *specificity*, (3) *uniformity*, and (4) *penal sanction*.

1. It is formulated by a political authority—the local, state, or federal government.
2. It relates to specific acts which it imposes or forbids.
3. It applies to everyone within a specified area.
4. Violations of the criminal law, at least, are punishable by public authority.

Specific as they may be, laws are thus at once more general, more inclusive, and more coercively enforceable than are the rules of any private institutional organizations. Sometimes they define the conditions under which the coercive power of the state can be used to support or protect the rights and privileges of individuals and of public and private institutional organizations (corporations, etc.). The law of contract, for example, defines the conditions under which one party may seek redress against another who has failed to live up to the terms of a voluntary agreement. Sometimes the law defines and punishes specific acts which the public will not tolerate. So-called organic laws,

or constitutions, set up specific institutional organizations such as courts, enforcement agencies, etc., through which the government functions: institutional organizations for enacting laws, interpreting laws, enforcing laws, administering laws. In short, the total legal system of a society defines and regulates the rights, privileges, and obligations of individuals and organizations in that society and thus structures the power relations of the society.

The law, then, must be viewed as the great standardizer of conduct, but a standardizer subject to the distorting pressures of incomplete political struggles and of selfish special interests.

So much for adjustment patterns in general—folkways, mores, institutions, and the law.

4. VALUES AND IDEALS

Mores, institutions, laws, all imply certain values and ideals. In our culture they imply that life is better than death, civilization better than barbarism, humane living better than brutalism. Values are the esteems which we attach to the valuables capable of satisfying desires. Symbolized, they become ideals. As they actually function they are frequently sentiments. A sentiment is an organization of emotions around an idea. Love, friendship, patriotism are examples of sentiments. Most social actions are motivated by sentiments.

As an expression of its values, every culture encourages certain ideals and discourages others. Feudalism, for example, encouraged and rewarded loyalty, courage, knightly virtues. Modern industrial capitalism puts a premium on commercial honesty, pecuniary shrewdness, acquisitiveness. Folks who openly question the beneficence of the legal concept of private property in the American culture find themselves unpopular, objects of suspicion and repression. As Sumner said, "There is a strain for consistency in the mores." Thus, in Soviet Russia advocates of private capitalism encounter even more vigorous and lethal repression than their Communist counterparts in America. Since there is more scope for the competition of ideals in a democratic culture, it is sometimes difficult to determine what values are actually common to a majority of Americans. A Swedish observer, after an intensive study of race relations in this country, concluded that although there is great cultural diversity here, Americans do nevertheless have a fundamental unity of ideals which he called the American Creed.

"These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human be-

ing, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice and a fair opportunity represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's early struggle for independence."^a

It was, he concluded, the wide gap between the ideal and the actuality in this country that constituted the real crux of the race question.

This gap between ideal and reality is not limited to race relations. Every organization, every institution, every social system tends to develop a set of ideas and ideals—in short, a mythology—which glamorizes its purposes and achievements. This can be observed all the way from your own family to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The important thing for sociological observers is not only to recognize this inevitable tendency but to make sure that in any comparisons like is always compared with like. Too many writers compare the nonunion myth—freedom of contract and all the rest of it—with union actuality—limitation of output, internal politics, etc. Vice versa, others compare the Soviet myth with the American actuality—"economic security for all" (regardless of political police and occasional purges) compared with American depressions (regardless of the continuing right to experiment with government). Such comparisons on different levels result only in endless confusion.

Differences in values and ideals within a group tend to weaken its capacity for unified action, as one saw in the United States Congress after V-J Day. Common values and ideals, on the other hand, strengthen such capacity. This is the basic importance of the American Creed.

5. INTERDEPENDENCES OF FUNCTIONS

Another integrating force in group life is interdependence of functions. This may be economic, such as the interdependence of buyer and seller, or interactive, as in the case of speaker and audience. Probably the simplest and most primitive example of multiple interdependence was provided by the family in tribal society. Parents cared for and protected children, children helped with the tasks of daily living, husband and wife shared sexual, economic, social, and ritual interdependence. Economic interdependence sometimes takes the form of division of labor. This is probably one of the most important factors in the development of invention and ultimately, of course, of the compli-

^a Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944, Vol. I, p. 4.

cated structure of the modern business economy. But there are many other kinds of interdependence, as we have suggested in the case of the primitive family. Except on farms, economic interdependence has ceased to be of prime importance in many modern families. A husband can hire most of the economic services that his wife performs, and a woman need not get married to earn economic support. The importance of parents to children, however, is probably as great as it ever was, and the interdependence of family members in social relationships inside and outside the home is still highly significant.

Increasing organizational and community interdependence is one of the outstanding characteristics of modern society. This was conclusively demonstrated by the great coal strike in 1946, when the idleness of a few hundred thousand men threatened to throw tens of millions of urban workers out of jobs. The lesson was driven home even more forcibly by the great railroad strike of that year, which challenged the capacity of government itself to govern.

Later we shall examine some of the patterns of interdependence in modern communities.

I-5:3. Adaptation to Physical Nature: The Setting

The scientific problem of the relation of man to physical nature belongs to the physical scientists and the geographers. The sociologist is interested only in the more or less obvious impacts of natural conditions and forces on human populations, on culture, and on situations. Natural factors such as climate, topography, natural resources (soil, plant life, animal life, minerals), and water supply condition human movements, food production, occupations, and other social activities, to say nothing of population density itself. Production of a surplus of food on the land is a precondition for the growth of cities. Where people live with reference to natural factors is called *location*. The cultural value of location, i.e., the relative time, money, and energy needed to get from one location to another, is called *position*. Buffalo, at the head of navigation on Lake Erie, has always been *located* approximately 291 air line miles northwest of New York. But with the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 its *position* changed. It was now vastly easier to reach than was Harrisburg, let us say, only half as far away. The differential, bringing the port of New York days nearer to the western settlers, robbed Philadelphia of its commercial leadership and made the port at the mouth of the Hudson the dominant urban center in the East.

Two other aspects of the physical world directly affect culture and cultural situations: (1) the *norm*, or level of normal activity, and (2) the *range of variation* of natural forces.

The physical equipment of a given culture and its ordinary social arrangements constitute an adaptation to the norm, or usual level of activity, which experience has shown to be characteristic of natural forces in a given locale. Thus in Florida houses are not built for zero temperatures, and in Canada house builders do not consider attic exhaust fans standard cooling equipment for summer. Throughout the country agricultural practices are adapted to a certain norm of temperature and rainfall. When this norm is dangerously low, as on the high plains of the West, any long-continued downward variation in rainfall will create a drought and eventually a dust bowl. This brings us to the problem of the range of variability of natural forces.

Cultural adaptations, material and otherwise, always constitute, as we have said, an adjustment to an environmental norm; but experience has shown that it is wise to make allowance for considerable variation. This is the *cultural range of tolerance*. Within this range the given cultural device—house, well, river levee, or what-have-you—continues to serve. Most of our material culture protects us against the impacts of raw nature. Houses, clothing, medicines, ships—all are devices that man uses to shelter himself, feed himself, protect himself, transport himself, and in general control the forces of nature for his own purposes.

The efficacy of all this depends on three factors: (1) the normal stability of nature; (2) the efficiency of the culture traits themselves; (3) the efficiency of the human operator.

So long as natural forces do not vary beyond the cultural range of tolerance, so long as the cultural protections themselves retain their operating efficiency, and so long as the human operator does his job, nothing happens. Things go on as usual. But when natural forces, as in a hurricane, surge above the limits of cultural tolerance or, as in a drought, fall below these limits, or when a culture trait itself fails, as when an airplane engine conks out, or when the human operator bungles his job—the railroad engineer running past a danger signal—when any one of these three things happens, nature goes on the loose. The ship is driven on the rocks, the house collapses, wells dry up, the plane crashes, the second section telescopes the first. Man becomes the victim of forces which he normally controls. We call this kind of occurrence a *disaster*. The term *disaster*, in other words, refers to the

social consequences of cultural failure to control natural forces. Ordinary usage limits the term to situations in which the social consequences reach a magnitude of some public importance, but this is purely arbitrary. In the essential sense, single individuals and individual families suffer disaster just as truly as larger aggregates.

It is unlikely that during this course you will be able to observe any disaster at first hand. But you will almost certainly hear or read about several during any ordinary week. Thousands of cultural failures of this kind occur in the United States every year. They kill tens of thousands of people and destroy many millions of dollars' worth of property.

I-5:4. Summary

Our problem, then, is to observe specific instances of the impact of culture on situations: cultural adaptation to external nature, the standardizing impact of the mores, institutions, institutional organizations, and finally laws. Two other major components of culture—values and functional interdependences—we may reserve for consideration elsewhere. Values we deal with in Book II and functional interdependences are implicit, at least, in the problems dealt with in the following chapter, on the cultural organization of work.

Our immediate task is the collection of evidence to demonstrate the existence of observable units of culture from language to functional interdependences; to show how culture manifests adjustments to the forces of nature; and to indicate how adjustment patterns such as mores, institutions, and laws affect situations.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 5

To demonstrate the tangible existence of culture

1. Choose a given area of a local community—a few blocks of a street near a college campus, the campus itself, etc.
2. Tour the selected area noting specific examples of language, material traits, adjustment patterns, values and ideals, and interdependences of function.
3. Note also whatever evidence you can find of local cultural adjustments to the forces of nature: adjustments for the local norms and for variations from the norms.
4. Include either from local testimony or from current news reports evidence either on the most recent local "disaster," i.e., escape of natural forces from control, or on some contemporary disaster elsewhere.

5. Show how your data bear on the problem of defining and interpreting situations.
6. Find and describe a specific instance of standardization due to the mores. (Note: If your example is one of some custom, choose some custom other than handshaking.)
7. Show how some institutional organization standardizes a situation. Be specific as to the institutional organization, the situation in question, and at least the more obvious means by which the result is achieved.
8. Find and describe some specific instance of standardization due to law. What law is operative and how?
9. Write up your conclusions, showing the bearing of culture on situations.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Read the portions of Sumner's *Folkways* defining and illustrating the concept of the mores and then make an intensive analysis of the mores of some particular community or distinctive area in the United States, with particular reference to such situations as those concerned with courtship and marriage, preparation for self-support, professional activities (of teachers, lawyers, physicians, etc.), and disposal of the dead.

PROJECT B

Make an intensive case study of some typical institutional organization and compare its actual operations with the current institutional myth in that particular field. Suitable organizations may range from particular households to factories, schools, colleges, churches, business organizations, and particular agencies of government. How will you proceed to establish the specific characteristics of an institutional myth?

PROJECT C

Prepare a bibliography on the sociology of law and write up a study of the contributions of Roscoe Pound and other theorists in this field. How would you relate Marxian ideas about law to other theories on the subject?

Supplementary Readings

- Haring, Douglas C., and Johnson, Mary E., *Order and Possibility in Social Life*. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1940.
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Variables Conditioning Situations: The Cultural Organization of Work

I-6:1. What Is Work?

Broadly considered, work is the price that all animals must pay for not being plants. Plants get their food energy standing still. Photosynthesis, which forms carbohydrates in the chlorophyll-containing tissues of the plant when exposed to light under the proper temperature and other conditions, is undoubtedly a chemical work-process, but the plant doesn't have to expend any of its own energy to get the benefit. The animal, on the other hand, does have to expend some of its own energy to capture more energy. That expenditure of its own energy by an organism in order to capture more energy is work.

As with all other biological activities, evolving culture introduces more and more complexity and indirectness into the work-energy sequence. Primitive man emulates the animal's direct pursuit and capture of food energy. Civilized man lives in a complex system of division of labor and roundabout coöperation. To get the ultimate energy reward for his work, civilized man must learn how to fit into this system: learn an occupation, or at least how to get a job; learn to apply himself with some persistence to the same kind of routine hour after hour, day after day; and learn how to translate a pay check into food, clothing, shelter, and the rest of the energy surrogates that make up a civilized standard of living. As we shall see over and over again, roundaboutness of satisfactions is the essence of civilized living. It characterizes work as well as other types of civilized activity.

I-6:2. The Evolution of Work

During a million years of cultural evolution man has developed five distinct levels of efficiency in energy capture and, with atomic energy

TABLE I-6.1. Some Characteristics of Human Activities: A Suggested Classification

Basis of Classification		Characteristics of Activity		
Type		Work	Nonwork	
Relationship to choice			Self-service Play Worship	Loafing Conflict ^a Crime ^a
		Voluntary	Nonvoluntary	
Relationship to association			Slavery Penal servitude Draft service	
How entered into?		Interactive	Solitary	
How ended?		By contract	Otherwise	
		At will of parties	By official action	
			Divorce Military discharge ^b Pardon, parole, completion of sentence, etc.	
How directly controlled?		Chain of command	Mutual acceptance	
		Employer-employee	Professional relationship Partnership household ^b	
Ultimate purpose		Profit	Nonprofit	
			Government service Professional service Family household ^b	
Scale of coöperation		Primary	Secondary	
		Farm Shop Household ^b Etc.	Factory Office	
Relation to technology		Machinery dominant	Machinery incidental	
		Factory Farm Mine	Stores Banks Etc.	Households Service industries (consumption) ^b
		Transport Communications Army, Navy, Air Force (nonproductive activity) ^b		

^a Conflict is here classed as nonwork not because it may not on occasion be used to capture more energy—the primary function of work—but because its *immediate* function is to reduce or subdue opposing energy. Conflict is a form of adjustive process in which two or more opponents direct their adjustive energies *at each other to subdue or eliminate the opposing energy*. Competition, on the other hand, is a form of adjustive process in which two or more opponents use their energies each to outdo the other. Commercialized conflict—boxing, etc.—may be a form of work. Not so crime. Above the biological level of the jungle where predation is the law of survival, organized human societies outlaw energy expenditure that merely victimizes others. Legitimate work involves mutuality—the worker expends energy to create utilities (means of want satisfaction) in order to receive utilities in return. Socially, the criminal is a throwback to the jungle, a predator who victimizes others and gives nothing in return. His energy expenditure (“work,” biologically considered) is not work as culturally defined in civilized society.

^b Members of households and of the armed forces work mainly for purposes of consumption rather than production. Other individuals and organizations mentioned work mainly for production or distribution.

at last available, now stands on the threshold of a possible sixth level, artificial photosynthesis.

1. THE COLLECTIONAL, OR MERE GATHERING, LEVEL

Pre-man must have started on this level, and a few tribes like the California Digger Indians still remained on it even as late as the nineteenth century.

2. THE HUNTING AND FISHING LEVEL

A step up from merely gathering what nature provides is the active pursuit of food—the hunting and fishing level on which lived most of the North American Indians at the time of Columbus. But it took about ten square miles of game land to support one Indian. When man learned to tame his “game” and tend the herds, he raised his food-getting efficiency another notch.

3. NOMADIC HERDING

On the level of the nomadic herdsmen, like the tribesmen of Attila and Genghis Khan, ten square miles would support a village, not merely one warrior. And with thousands of miles of grasslands in which to breed, nomads became a threat to more settled peoples, from China to the Danube. Nomads could invade and sometimes conquer more civilized peoples. They could not themselves ever produce civilization. For that, more settled and more efficient food-getting techniques were necessary.

4. THE SETTLED AGRICULTURE OF CEREAL GROWERS

Agriculture developed somewhere in the Near East about 12,000 or 15,000 years ago with the beginnings of the cultivation of certain grass seeds which we know now as wheat. Farther east the staple was rice, and in the New World, maize. Every civilization that has ever appeared has rested on this fourth stage of energy capture.

But planting seeds and cultivating plants is hard, sedentary, monotonous work. It lacks the thrill and dash of the hunt, and in the early days the masses of men seem never to have taken to it except under the lash of slavery. Slavery and (later under feudalism) serfdom broke the common man to routine work. His betters have always claimed leisure as a perquisite of privilege. The concept of leisure as an attribute of worker status is strictly a modern idea: a product of the mechanical revolution and the modern social conscience.

Yet under feudalism and in the agricultural and handicraft economy of western Europe down to the industrial revolution, work was relatively slow paced under the protections of age-old customs and the face-to-face relationships of near-equals. In the country, of course, the rhythms of nature set the pace. It was monotonous work and, thanks to primitive and clumsy tools, inefficient, but for those in England, for example, who were not driven off the land by the Enclosure Acts it was rather leisurely and gave the worker a recognized status in the local community. In the towns, as they gradually grew up after the Crusades, the young craftsman learned the mysteries of his calling as an apprentice working face to face with a master workman and his journeymen. Given health, luck, reasonable aptitude, and industry, most apprentices could look forward to a progression after seven years to the status of journeymen and then after a decent interval of a few more years to a shop of their own as master workmen in their own right. Even when the gradually enlarging market had led to the development of domestic industry which no longer promised ultimate independence for the average workman, he could still feel almost as free as his journeymen ancestors. To all intents and purposes the average domestic producer controlled the immediate essentials of his work. True, he was becoming more and more dependent on the merchant-factor for materials, tools, and a market, but on the eve of the mechanical revolution the average spinner or weaver in England had a skilled occupation, determined his own place of work, his hours of work, the rate at which he worked, and the continuity of his work. If he happened to want to turn from his loom for a while to dig in his garden or to join his fellows in a glass of ale at the nearest pub, no distant merchant-factor could bar his door. In fact, it was this very irresponsibility of the individual worker in those days that provided part of the motivation for the merchant-factor's search for a more effective way of controlling his work force.

Gras, the economic historian, distinguishes four major stages in the evolution of manufacture: (a) *Usufecture*—production for use, the use of the family itself or of the manor—is the stage that saw the beginning of specialization: the smith, the shoemaker, the armorer, and so on. (b) *Retail handicraft* is the level of the late village and the early town. At first production was to order only. Later the master workman began to produce in expectation of sales. In other words, as the town grew, exchange became customary, but production was still production directly for the consumer. In colonial Williamsburg, Virginia, in

the early eighteenth century, for example, a cabinetmaker would turn out a desk to order for the Royal Governor; later, desks for the local market. (c) In later town and early metropolitan economy (London about the time of William and Mary) production moved into another stage—*wholesale handicraft*—no longer producing directly for the consumer but for a middleman, a merchant. At first the producer, the master workman, was still independent. He lived in his own house, provided his own tools and raw materials, and, as has already been suggested, controlled the conditions of his work, the rate at which he worked, and so on. The middleman had no control over the rate of production or the quality of the product. Gradually, to extend his control and to make sure he could meet the sailing dates of ships, and so on, the middleman began to supply raw materials and eventually tools as well as orders for finished goods. So the wholesale handicraft stage entered its second or dependent phase: the small master workmen still worked in their own homes, but gradually they became more and more dependent on the merchant-factor. The merchant had a market to reach and competitors to outcompete. This means he was under constant pressure to standardize products and to introduce more regularity into the flow of finished goods. He tried to get more control over the small masters. (d) *Centralized manufacture*, the idea of bringing workers together in one place under constant supervision, can be traced as far back as the temple workshops of ancient Sumer, 3000 B.C. There were central workshops manned by slaves in ancient Greece and Rome. The father of the famous Greek orator, Demosthenes, ran a bedstead workshop with twenty slaves and an arms workshop with thirty-two slaves. There were similar workshops in ancient Rome.

The idea reappears in western Europe as early as A.D. 1286. In that year a Flanders merchant named Boinebroke had worked out a combination of small masters scattered about and a central workshop in which materials were finished for shipment. Incidentally, Boinebroke was not merely one of our earliest industrial magnates but also a civil magistrate in his town and he seems to have been cordially hated by everybody. When he died the good burghers promptly chased his two sons out of town.

But the idea of the central workshop as offering the merchant-factor better control of production gradually spread. By 1519, two years after the start of the Protestant Reformation and a full generation before the birth of Shakespeare, whose plays were to dramatize character as determining an individual's career, we find John Winchcombe, a rich clothier at Newbury, near London, employing no less than 940 men,

women, and children in a central workshop manufacturing woollen cloth. This was still a muscle-driven, hand-tool workshop, not a factory. But when we remember that four centuries after John Winchcombe the average factory in the United States still employed only fifty-nine workmen, that unusual workshop in the days of Henry VIII, with *fifteen times* as many employees, merits our respect.

It is impossible to set any one date at which the central workshop became the characteristic producing unit in the British economy. The technological usefulness of the idea varied by industries. In shipbuilding and ironmongering, for example, it offered more possibilities than in textiles. We find a transitional form between the central workshop and the factory organized in the year of the so-called Glorious Revolution, 1688, by Sir Ambrose Crowley, the son of a blacksmith, who certainly was ahead of his time in more ways than one. He had two plants in north England and a central office in London. By 1700 his workshop at Sunderland was using six water wheels for power—a foretaste of the oncoming factory—and was employing 1500 men. If he was two generations ahead of most English manufacturers in the use of power, he was about two centuries ahead of the manufacturers of the world in “human engineering.” His plant had an *arbitration board* composed of a chaplain, two representatives of the workers, and two representatives of management, and the board met weekly to handle grievances. The plant also had a *pension system*, *provision for medical care*, and a *system of small loans* for workers in difficulties. All that, a generation before George Washington was born and two full generations before James Watt was to make steam available as the prime mover of modern industry.

The factory as distinguished from the central workshop is usually dated from Richard Arkwright’s plant, organized in the same year that Watt took out his patent on the separate condenser—1769. Arkwright, a barber, had patented a power-driven spinning frame and he now brought into one combination the five elements that *make* the modern factory: (i) the manufacturing *purpose*; (ii) *machinery* (the spinning frame); (iii) extra-human power (a horse till 1771, then water wheels, and finally, in 1790, a Boulton and Watt steam engine); (iv) *hierarchically organized division of labor*; and (v) quasi-military *discipline* to hold the workers to their tasks.

Apparently, despite Crowley’s great workshop with its six water wheels, Arkwright’s combination of a disciplined, hierarchically organized labor force (like Crowley’s) with *power-driven machinery as the dominant means of production* (unlike Crowley’s) constituted the

first modern factory in the history of the world. The date was 1769, and that date marks the beginning of a new phase of civilization, a new level of energy-capture:

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With the coming of the factory, private business capitalism passed into its industrial phase and its technology became increasingly mechanistic and scientific. The great idea, the idea that was to transform practical living and lift the modern world out of all comparison with past ages, the idea glimpsed centuries before by Roger Bacon in his monkish cell and greeted by *his* contemporaries as a work of the Devil, was *the application of natural forces to the performance of human tasks*.

Once Arkwright and Watt—to name only the crucial two—had demonstrated that power-driven machines could accomplish human tasks in a factory, it became inevitable that the great idea would ultimately be applied to every field that human ingenuity could compass. It spread in two ways: (a) through *generalization* to four kinds of activities and (b) through *diffusion* of three kinds across the world.

a. Generalization of the power-machine idea:

To *production*, from textiles to other manufacturing industries: woodworking, ironworking, etc.

To *transportation* and *communication*: the steam coach (outlawed in England), the railroad, the steamboat, the telegraph, the telephone, the automobile, the airplane, the motion picture, television, etc.

To *nonmanufacturing productive processes*: mining, fishing, office work, agriculture, etc. (Artificial food production is still to come with all the impacts *that* will have.)

To *consumption*: home labor-savers—sewing machines, vacuum cleaners; amusement devices—bicycles, motor boats, television sets, etc. Eventually, to *warfare*.¹

¹ The mechanization of war closes a curious circle. Almost the first use of mechanical power for human purposes—the principle of the bow—must have been inspired by the needs of hunting, hunting men as well as game. Certainly the first practical use of the explosive energy of powder came in a primitive form of the internal-combustion engine, the gun, about 1300, and the gun was a European invention for war. (The Chinese had invented gunpowder centuries before and used it mainly for noisemaking and psychological effects.) Yet the mechanical revolution affected all other aspects of life before it revolutionized warfare: first, with the railroad in the American War Between the States, then with the armored ship, finally with the submarine, the tank, and the airplane and all the other weapons of World Wars I and II.

b. Diffusion of the power-machine idea:

Intracultural diffusion: first, to a few centers within Britain; then to the Continent and to America—In other words, intracultural diffusion within Western civilization.

Extracultural diffusion, imperialist expansion. The machine was first used outside Western civilization to exploit “backward areas”—develop mines, transport raw materials, etc. Eventually, industrial capital began to utilize cheap native labor by building factories in the colonies themselves, and the mechanical revolution itself migrated beyond Western culture. This led to a third kind of diffusion:

Countercultural diffusion. The backward areas began to come of age, demand industrial self-determination, freedom to develop their own industrial systems. This development reached its climax first in Russia. Since World War II it has appeared in China and India and in other areas. As the technology of atomic fission generalizes from bomb making to industrial uses and diffuses from the United States, Russia, Britain, Canada, and France to other countries, countercultural diffusion of the power-machine idea will probably continue. The mechanical revolution is still diffusing and we can only guess what the world will be like when that diffusion is completed.

When the farm has become obsolete as a source of food and there are no more backward areas . . .

I-6:3. Organization and Control of Work Situations

Economists have long since made everyone familiar with the major forms of economic activity; production, distribution, consumption. All of us know about markets, prices, currency, demand and supply, business enterprise, the corporation, the ultimate consumer. We have even heard of the national economy, world markets, business cycles. Our task now is not to analyze the way in which men seek to utilize scarce resources to produce, distribute, and consume goods and services—the task of the economist—but merely to describe and analyze some typical work situations as we find these organized and controlled by the mores, institutions, and laws of our culture.

What is a work situation?

A pattern of human relationships whose focus is a work task. We have already noted that, for the animal, work is the expenditure of energy for the capture of more energy but that culture has long since

complicated this primitive simplicity in two ways: (1) it has made the necessary expenditure of energy more routinized, more round-about, more coöperative, and (2) it has transformed the captured energy from mere food into all the things that are involved in the economics of social status. What the average workman today actually "captures" by his work is a level of living, not mere survival. Thus, *a work task in the modern scene is any culturally accepted task that contributes to gaining the wherewithal for establishing and maintaining the worker's level of living.* It may consist of writing a book, delivering a sermon, teaching school, keeping house, baby-sitting, tending a machine, supervising the machine-tender, directing company policy, selling bonds, commanding a regiment of soldiers. Work tasks, in other words, have become as various as the producing, distributing, consuming, and controlling activities of modern man. And by no means all of them, as in the armed forces and in the nation's 44,000,000 households, have any direct relationship to the exchange of goods and services in a market.

Broadly speaking, work situations are created by specific human purposes, are controlled by individuals acting in terms of the mores, institutions, and laws of the society, and are coöordinated by the patterns of relationship, values, and interdependences which *in toto* constitute the great matrix of the ongoing economic system. Under capitalism the unit for the organization and control of work for productive and distributive purposes is the *business enterprise*. Business enterprises consist of *farms* and urban *firms*. In 1950 there were 5,382,000 farms in the United States and just over 4,000,000 urban business firms, exclusive of firms in forestry, fishing, and professional service. There were probably several hundred thousand such firms, making the grand total of all economic enterprises in the United States in 1950 something between 9,500,000 and 10,000,000.

This total, however, while suggesting something of the spread of business enterprise in the population, does not picture accurately the distribution of power over work situations. Such power rests, of course, on the legal concept of private property and on the protections afforded by the existing system of legality. It expresses itself in business enterprises, and hence in work situations, as the power to hire and fire and to determine policy.

On the farms this is overwhelmingly in the hands of the owner or operator—3,000,000 full owners in 1950; 824,000 part-owners; 1,444,000 tenants; 23,000 managers. But in agriculture the business unit is

comparatively small: on the average, the United States farm is 215 acres worked by a farmer and his family and sometimes hired help. Farms vary widely in size from an average of 67 acres in North Carolina to 3800 in Arizona. But since only 15 percent of the population lives on farms, the problem of who controls the great bulk of the work situations in this country is a problem of urban enterprise.

And this in turn becomes the problem of the corporation. A corporation is a legal device which enables businessmen to mobilize immense amounts of capital while limiting the risk of the individual investor (part-owner) to the amount of his investment (unlike the liability assumed in individually owned and partnership enterprises, which involve all the assets of such entrepreneurs). In the eyes of the law a corporation is endowed with a kind of fictitious personality that can endure for generations regardless of the fortunes or lives of its personnel. Legally the corporation can be immortal.

Increasingly, urban business enterprise has become the enterprise of corporations. The 551,807 active corporations (1947) out of more than 4,000,000 urban business enterprises dominate the field in mining, manufacture, communications, construction, trade, transportation, banking, and finance. In manufacture—which in April, 1951, engaged nearly 16,000,000 persons, or over 28 percent of total civilian employment—individual employer and partnership factories outnumbered corporation-owned factories 122,743 to 118,138, but the 118,000 corporation factories employed 89 percent of all the 14,294,000 engaged in manufacture in 1947, and of the total of \$74,426,000,000 value added by manufacture, the corporation factories added 91 percent, the others only 9. Outside of agriculture and perhaps certain kinds of retail trade, *it is corporations that control the great bulk of the work situations in the American economy.*

Who controls the corporations?

In the first place, since John D. Rockefeller set the pattern in his organization of the Standard Oil Company three-quarters of a century ago, there has been a gradual drift toward increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer corporations. Between 1940 and 1947, for example, the number of manufacturing firms merged with others exceeded 2400, and at the end of that period 113 manufacturing corporations out of more than 75,000 (1945)—*one-tenth of 1 percent of all manufacturing corporations—held 40 percent of the total assets of all manufacturing firms.*²

² *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1952*, p. 756.

Corporations dominate the urban work picture and a few corporations dominate the corporate field.

Who owns these corporations?

*Between 3 and 4 percent of the families in the United States. "At least two-thirds of all corporation stock is in the hands of high-income families—those receiving \$10,000 or more a year. This group, about 3 percent of the total of 53.1 million families in the U.S., may actually own as much as four-fifths of all stock."*³

In urban enterprise, however, men do not actually work in corporations. They work in offices, factories, stores, banks, warehouses, and the like. The *right* and the *power* to organize and control work situations issue from the law of property and the corporation, but the actual association units in which the work is done are the offices, factories, stores, banks, warehouses, trains, ships, etc. Our job at the moment is to *observe* typical association units which structure work situations and to find out what we can about the economic and social forces behind the observable phenomena.

We shall limit observation to two typical association units which structure work situations, namely, the *factory* and the private family *household*. The factory is our typical unit of material production; the private family household, our typical unit of consumption.

I-6:4. The Factory

We have noted how the economic pressures of an enlarging market, opportunities opened by foreign conquest, improved transport, and so on, led Englishmen in the textile trades about the middle of the eighteenth century to cast about for new methods of increasing production and how Richard Arkwright was the man who solved the problem by uniting the new machines, inanimate power, a finer division of labor, and quasi-military discipline into something new under the sun—the *power-machine factory*. From textiles the idea of using

³ *U.S. News and World Report*, October 3, 1952, p. 100, summarizing the findings of a nation-wide survey for the Federal Reserve Board by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. The 53.1 million "families" noted in this quotation were really "spending units" which considerably exceeded the number of actual families in the United States. As of 1950 the Census enumerated 42,857,335 households, 35,006,330 married couples and 38,310,980 families. By April, 1952, the year of the study mentioned here, the Census estimates ran: households, 45,464,000; married couples, 36,510,000; and families, 40,442,000. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1953, pp. 51–55. Three per cent of 53.1 million spending units is 1.593 million, which would be 3.9 per cent of the 40.4 million *families* of the Census estimate of 1952. Thus, less than 4 per cent of the actual families in the United States own from two-thirds to four-fifths of all stock of American corporations.

power through machinery to do man's work spread to other manufacturing industries, to transportation, to communication, to agriculture; ultimately, to consumption itself, and to the ancient art of the most wasteful consumption of all, namely, warfare. The factory not only changed the nature of work and the status of wage workers; it destroyed the slow-moving, agricultural world that had persisted from Charlemagne to Napoleon. It destroyed much that was good for leisurely human development and substituted much that was bad, but it opened the way for higher standards of living, a greater social surplus, and a new kind of civilization which is still evolving. For the first time in human history a culture developed that offered high rewards for useful material inventions and institutionalized the persistent search for new scientific discoveries. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw Western man institutionalize social change itself as an integral part of his culture.⁴

If the patent office stimulated invention and the laboratory systematized discovery, it was the factory that started that flow of material goods which was to swell gradually until the invention of mass production in the Ford factory in Detroit about 1913 opened the floodgates of industrialism over the world's first continental market.

We have noted that when Arkwright combined machines, power, an organized work force, and quasi-military discipline for the purpose of material production he gave the world a new kind of work engine—the modern factory. And we have noted that many of its early social effects were not good. As we see them today, however, what are the distinctive characteristics of factory work situations as compared with (1) work situations on farms and (2) work situations in private homes?

I-6:5. Farm Work vs. Factory Work

In 1950 the census listed as gainfully employed in agriculture 7,138,000 men and women—not counting 500,000 members of farm families—on some 5,382,000 farms, or approximately 1.3 farm operators and employees per farm. Since, as we have already noted, the average United States farm covers 215 acres and since the average value of land and buildings approximates \$66.64 per acre, the *average* farmer is operating with a capital investment of \$14,327 in land and build-

⁴ The beginnings of the modern patent system go back to the reign of Edward III in medieval England; the beginnings of the scientific laboratory to the experiments of Galileo about 1600 or to those of Archimedes in B.C. 212.

ings and another \$5000 to \$8000 in tools and equipment: a grand total of about \$22,000.

As compared with a farm work force of 1.3 persons and a total capital investment of \$22,000, the *average* factory employs fifty-nine workers and, at a rough approximation, at least ten to thirty times the amount of capital required for the average farm.

In 1950 there were approximately a quarter of a million factories (247,307) in the United States; they employed at that time 14,369,000 persons, or 9.6 percent of the civilian population; and 81 percent of these employees were production workers. The rest were office and staff employees.

As in farming with its wide variations from the one-man farms of New England and the southern mountains to the great gang farms of the wheatlands and the cattle country, so in manufacture there are even greater contrasts between the 197,000 plants that employed less than fifty persons each to the 504 giants with 2500 or more each, all topped by the huge Rouge plant of the Ford Motor Company at Dearborn, Michigan, with its 70,000 employees. The concentration of man power and production is greater in manufacture than in agriculture. Agricultural experts estimated that about half of the nation's farmers were barely feeding themselves and that the agricultural surpluses were coming from 50 percent of the farms. Three-fifths of our farmers operated farms of less than 100 acres each, a grossly uneconomic size for modern agriculture with its expensive machinery and high unit costs of operation. Agriculture as an industry was carrying a sizable "overhead" of economic deadwood—entrepreneurs who in any other line of business would have been forced to close up shop and become productive in some other line. In agriculture, by accepting a subsistence level of living, they managed to hang on, actually contributing little or nothing to the economy. Farming, in short, was not merely an economic occupation; it was a way of life which great numbers of inefficient farmers clung to not because of its economic rewards but precisely because it was a way of life.

In contrast to all this, no industrial or commercial enterprise can stay in business on the same basis as the subsistence farmer who can get along without interest on his paltry investment and with almost no cash income at all.⁵ Even the smallest manufacturing plant—and

⁵ The urban analogue of the subsistence farmer is the "subsistence tradesman," who opens his store sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and gets by on the labor of his wife and children. But of the 1,606,000 single-unit retail stores in the United States, only 669,000, or 37.8 percent, had no paid employees in 1948 and not all of these 669,000 were operating on the subsistence level by any means.

80 percent of the 247,000 factories in the United States in 1950 employed less than fifty workers each, remember—even the smallest factory has to earn a lot more than merely the food its employees consume. It has to pay wages enough to cover employee living costs other than food, to say nothing of paying interest (on its own borrowings), insurance, up-keep, and so on. Reduced to a mere food-intake level, the ordinary industrial or commercial concern goes out of business. The subsistence farmer may hang on for years—till the new generation gives up and moves to town.

The 3,000,000 farms of less than 100 acres each—almost 60 percent of the total—while not all subsistence farms, account for approximately 42 percent of those gainfully employed in agriculture. In manufacturing, on the other hand, 82 percent of all factories—the ones employing fewer than fifty workers each—account for only 15 percent of all factory workers. In contrast to the dispersion in agriculture, which employs 58 percent of its workers on 40 percent of its farms, manufacturing employs 59 percent of its 15,000,000 workers in only 4 percent of its working units (1950).

Of the 62,000,000 civilians gainfully employed in 1953, one in every four worked in a factory, one in every nine on a farm. Percentagewise, out of 149,000,000 civilians of all ages in 1950, less than 5 percent worked on farms; 9.6 percent, in factories. By states, there is an inverse relationship between farm work and factory work: the higher the percentage of a state's population working on farms, the lower is likely to be the percentage working in factories, and vice versa. Yet considerable percentages, ranging up to 12 or 15 percent in the industrial states, list themselves as "farmers" but work part or full time in nearby factories. This, of course, is in addition to the rural nonfarm population, which supplies still higher percentages to the factories. The fact is that the industrial culture is permeating the countryside not only with its machines and factory-made gadgets of all kinds but also with opportunities for factory jobs.

But the opportunities vary widely by states, as Table I-6.2 shows, in terms of the percentage of factory workers in the 1950 civilian population and the average size of factory as of 1947. Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Michigan lead all the states in the percentage of total civilian population working in factories, with 15 to 18 percent of all men, women, and children so engaged, while the Dakotas and Nevada are the least industrialized, with less than 2 percent of their populations tending machines. On the whole, high industrialization means big factories; low industrialization, small factories. Indiana and Con-

TABLE I-6.2. States Ranked in Order of Percentage of Total Population Engaged in Factory Work, 1950, with Average Size of Factories by States, 1947

Rank	State	Population, Civilian, 1950	Factory Employees 1950	% Factory Workers 1950	Average Size Factory 1947
1.	Connecticut	2,001,000	365,982	18.3	101.2
2.	Rhode Island	774,000	133,479	17.3	66.3
3.	Michigan	6,361,000	1,011,074	15.9	98.4
4.	New Hampshire	531,000	80,424	15.1	66.5
5.	New Jersey	4,802,000	717,562	14.9	68.6
6.	Massachusetts	4,665,000	683,801	14.7	62.5
7.	Ohio	7,938,000	1,167,117	14.7	97.1
8.	Indiana	3,932,000	557,208	14.1	101.4
9.	Pennsylvania	10,480,000	1,413,271	13.5	85.7
10.	Illinois	8,672,000	1,154,365	13.3	74.1
11.	Delaware	318,000	40,928	12.8	71.5
12.	Wisconsin	3,433,000	421,787	12.3	59.6
13.	New York	14,801,000	1,736,754	11.7	37.1
14.	Maine	912,000	106,496	11.6	61.2
15.	Vermont	378,000	40,627	10.7	42.0
16.	North Carolina	4,014,000	402,631	10.3	71.5
	<i>U.S. Average</i>	<i>149,634,—</i>	<i>14,369,747</i>	<i>9.6</i>	<i>59.3</i>
17.	Maryland	2,306,000	219,876	9.5	80.9
18.	South Carolina	2,096,000	193,052	9.2	88.2
19.	Georgia	3,402,000	286,129	8.4	52.5
20.	Missouri	3,952,000	325,272	8.2	57.2
21.	Oregon	1,519,000	116,862	7.7	34.3
22.	California	10,413,000	733,891	7.0	37.6
23.	Washington	2,317,000	160,342	6.9	42.3
24.	Virginia	3,220,000	221,720	6.8	59.4
25.	Alabama	3,053,000	206,199	6.7	61.8
26.	Tennessee	3,281,000	221,800	6.7	66.1
27.	West Virginia	2,005,000	123,680	6.1	79.4
28.	Minnesota	2,981,000	179,977	6.0	37.2
29.	Iowa	2,621,000	146,332	5.6	47.3
30.	Kansas	1,887,000	87,304	4.6	38.3
31.	Louisiana	2,670,000	123,504	4.6	55.4
32.	Kentucky	2,913,000	136,313	4.6	57.7
33.	Texas	7,584,000	328,980	4.3	41.7
34.	Colorado	1,307,000	55,555	4.2	33.7
35.	Utah	687,000	28,277	4.1	31.7
36.	Arkansas	1,908,000	71,377	3.7	33.9
37.	Nebraska	1,322,000	47,766	3.7	35.0
38.	Mississippi	2,164,000	72,620	3.3	38.7
39.	Florida	2,729,000	87,478	3.2	27.9
40.	Montana	589,000	16,645	2.8	24.6
41.	Idaho	588,000	15,495	2.6	25.6
42.	Oklahoma	2,218,000	57,615	2.6	31.8
43.	Wyoming	282,000	7,082	2.4	21.8
44.	District of Columbia	796,000	17,118	2.1	41.6
45.	Arizona	742,000	14,692	1.9	26.0
46.	New Mexico	668,000	13,512	1.9	17.5
47.	South Dakota	650,000	10,000 (est.)	1.5	20.7
48.	Nevada	157,000	2,256	1.4	21.2
49.	North Dakota	620,000	7,520 (est.)	1.2	14.4

necticut lead with factories averaging over 101 employees, and North Dakota comes last with factories averaging less than 15. The Pearsonian correlation coefficient between the percentage of factory workers in the 1950 civilian population and the average size of factory in 1947 by states is $.816 \pm .0342$.

All this does not, however, complete the picture of the concentration of industrial power. In 1947 over 55 percent of the nation's factories and nearly 60 percent of its factory workers were concentrated in fifty-two standard metropolitan areas, most of them in New England, in the Central Atlantic states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania), in the North Central states (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin), and in the states along the Pacific coast. Out of more than 3000 counties, industrial power concentrated overwhelmingly in less than 200. It was this concentration that led one expert commission to warn the President in 1953 that the delivery on target by an enemy of not over 400 atomic bombs would so devastate the war-making power of the United States as to compel surrender. It is unnecessary to add that the delivery on target of far fewer hydrogen, vaporizing bombs would have the same effect.

At the same time, the Army's Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, gave it as his expert opinion that 70 percent of any force of attacking long-distance bombers would get through to target despite everything the Air Force and other defenders could do. The subsequent development of guided missiles cut such estimates, however, nearly to zero.⁶

The picture, then, as against agriculture is one of industrial centralization. A factory concentrates jobs. In the several square miles taken over near Ypsilanti, Michigan, in 1941 for the Willow Run bomber plant there had been at most twenty to thirty agricultural workers, including the farm operators. At the peak of bomber plant employment in June, 1943, there were 42,331 factory employees in the same area.⁷ Multiply this ratio of 30 to 42,000 by the number of factories in the farming space covered by an industrial city and you

⁶ Other experts regarded 70 percent as a minimum estimate. Bomber losses over Germany in World War II never exceeded 10 to 15 percent. The development of guided missiles—the Nike and other devices—tended to increase optimism concerning defense. But at the same time the range of long-distance rockets which would be impervious to such missiles was also increasing, and experts were predicting intercontinental rockets within another generation. It seemed inescapable that another all-out world war would devastate the cities of all major contestants.

⁷ See Lowell Juilliard Carr and James Edson Stermer, *Willow Run: A Study of Industrialization and Cultural Inadequacy*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952.

get a rough index of the tremendous difference between agricultural and industrial concentration of population in the same space. At Willow Run it was of the order of 1400 to 1.

So much for broad contrasts between agriculture and factory industry.

What now of the contrasts between actual work situations on farms and those in factories? The answer to that question will fill a share of the student's notebook report on this project. Let him remember how he analyzes any situation and then let him note particularly the outstanding characteristics of the work situations encountered on the farm and in a typical factory during the course of a typical working day. How is each situation organized? How controlled? What are the human-relation patterns observable in each? What is the relation of the worker to machines in each? What part does worker initiative, discipline, routine, and so on, play in each type of situation? Note especially (1) formal vs. informal relationships in the two situations;⁸ (2) the existence or nonexistence of competing centers of loyalty in the two: union vs. management, for example, in the factory (What is there, if anything, analogous to that conflict of interests on the farm?); (3) the structure and tempo of each type of situation: the relative "freedom" and slower tempo of the farm situations as contrasted with the faster pace, greater pressure, and constant supervision in the factory; (4) contrasting types of workers in the two situations—note differences in age, experience, occupational expectations, and so on.

When he has completed this comparison of farm work situations with factory work situations the student should compare factory work with domestic work.

I-6:6. Domestic Work

By domestic work we refer at this point to the work required to keep a household running—bedmaking, cooking, dishwashing, cleaning, etc. We do not refer to farm tasks or industrial tasks performed in the home.

The average farm in America is operated by a single family. All

⁸ Formal relations are those set up by the nature of the organization, by its functional and control requirements. Informal relationships are those that grow up within the formal relations. Thus the chain of command in a factory from the manager to the foreman and the workman at his machine is a chain of formal relationships, spelled out in the blueprint of organization. The sociability and other relationships within that blueprint, as men actually associate at work, are the informal relationships.

members of the family usually contribute work on the farm: chores, helping in the hayfield, driving a tractor, and so on. Many tasks incidental to farm work itself are performed by members of the household in the farmhouse: washing milk cans, preparing eggs for market, culling berries for sale, and so on. The average farm household participates actively in the work of the farm, lives like the burghers of the Middle Ages right with the job, and carries on many supplementary farm activities within the household itself. All this makes the running of a farm household somewhat harder and more complicated than the operation of an urban household. But it does not change the fact that domestic work itself in a farm household like domestic work in town is work done in the service of consumption in contrast to the farm work itself performed by farm households, which is primarily work done for production. It may be interesting to analyze the farm work performed by the members of farmers' families—unpaid labor for the most part performed by some 941,000 family workers in 1950—but this is over and above and distinct from domestic labor as such: the labor required to keep farm households operating as households.

In 1950 there were some 34,252,000 households operated by married couples. One-seventh of these, or about 5,000,000, were on farms; rural, nonfarm, married-couple households numbered 7,462,000; and urban married-couple households, 21,822,000. Rural households averaged 3.85 persons each; rural nonfarm, 3.41; and urban, 3.21, for a national average of 3.33.

We have compared factory work situations with two other kinds of productive work situations: prefactory manufacturing work situations and contemporary farm work situations. Now let us compare present-day domestic work situations with those of colonial days. Two differences immediately arouse attention: (1) Most of the productive work for domestic consumption that was performed in the colonial household has long since been transferred to the factory—and millions of domestic workers, women, have followed after it to factory jobs. (2) Much of the domestic work involved in consumption in the household is now being done by machines, or is at least being aided by machinery. The mechanization of consumption has reached a point which now requires several thousand dollars' worth of mechanical and electrical gadgets from toasters to deep-freeze outfits properly to equip a modern middle-class household.

The colonial housewife not only had to make soap, bake bread,

spin thread, weave, and sew—operations long since transferred to more efficient factories—but she also had to wash clothing by hand, scrub her floors by hand, wash dishes by hand, and do her own cooking over open log fires, and she had none of the mechanical aids that eager inventors have placed at the housewife's disposal since Mr. Singer perfected his sewing machine in the 1840's. She had no ice for the preservation of food during summer—the sawdust icehouse was not invented till early in the nineteenth century—and she had no electricity. The electrical-power industry was not born until after Thomas Edison invented his famous meter for measuring the electrical current, and that was about 1880. Another fifty years went by before electrical power reached most farm homes.

In the more rugged colonial days the housewife also had no central heat; until late in the eighteenth century there were usually only open fireplaces with which to moderate the indoor climate. To keep her family from congealing completely in wintry beds the progressive housewife of those halcyon days "ironed" the sheets with a handful of live coals carried in a brass container at the end of a stick—the bed warmer of the modern antique collector. Between her production activities and her household duties the colonial housewife usually put in a full day from dawn till soon after dark. Candles and whale-oil dips were not conducive to late hours. How conducive they may have been to a high birth rate is a matter of opinion, but the historical evidence is that usually—as a matter of course, religious conviction, and wifely duty—the colonial housewife topped her other labors by bearing her lord and master from five to fifteen children. From all of which it is, perhaps, not surprising that many of these ladies preceded their husbands to the cemetery by ten or thirty years, leaving their stricken spouses with the mournful duty of completing their allotted span with second and even third wives—an arithmetical detail that not only complicated the headstone situation in the local cemeteries here but must have complicated many nontheological matters in the Hereafter as well.

The industrial revolution and the mechanization of consumption have changed all that. Except on the farms, the majority of modern housewives in their households take no part in economic production, carry on most of the activities of housekeeping with the aid of electricity and machinery, bear no more than two to four children in an entire lifetime, and consistently outlive their toiling husbands by five to six years. Embittered batchelors sometimes complain that the

ladies never had it so good—a remark that might also apply to their married brethren if the growing popularity of marriage is any evidence.

The simple fact is, of course, that both husbands and wives have won a tremendous dividend of increasing leisure from industrialism, leisure which previous civilizations could offer to only a privileged few and which even our own culture begrudged to anybody a few generations back. In the ancient civilizations leisure rested on slave labor, on the deliberate debasement of human beings for the benefit of the privileged. Totalitarianism has reintroduced slavery for political purposes in the modern world, but the technological necessity of human degradation as a precondition of leisure has long since vanished. Thanks to industrialism, the average American housewife commands in her vacuum cleaner, her electric stove, her electric washer, her refrigerator, and the dozens of other gadgets that serve her the energy equivalent of from three to five slaves, and many of her mechanical servitors such as her refrigerator provide utilities that no army of slaves in former times could have provided at all. From a colonial drudgery of 100 or more hours a week, housekeeping has thus been reduced to a mechanized art requiring no more than thirty or thirty-five. As factory hours have come down from the old rural pattern of “sun to sun”—seventy-two or more hours a week—to the forty-hour week with Saturdays and Sundays free, so the housewife’s workday has shortened from sixteen hours a day to barely half of her husband’s, although she still works a seven-day week.⁹

Percentagewise, industrialism has probably done more for the housewife in the way of increased leisure and decreased nervous wear and tear than for the nominal head of the family. Average office and factory working hours have decreased in a century by about 45 percent; average working time of housewives, by about 65 to 72 percent. But in this same period the pace and monotony of factory work have gone up. All modern enterprise probably demands more nervous energy of its workers *per unit of time involved* than did the work of the 1850’s. On the other hand, the decrease in the average size of the American family from six or seven to less than four has decreased the amount of nervous energy required to run it. Other changes in American culture have imposed other strains on American women, but the

⁹ If there were factory workers who worked more than 72 hours a week, as many did before the great 12 hour day “reform” of the 1830’s and as steel workers did till the 12 hour day and the 7-day week were finally abolished in the 1920’s, there were also housewives who worked a 112 hour week—16 hours for 7 days—until almost yesterday.

household as such is probably less demanding today than it was a hundred years ago and certainly less demanding than it was in colonial days.

This does not mean, however, that the job of being a modern housewife has grown proportionately easier. There is undoubtedly less physical drudgery in housework as such. This has probably contributed to the fact that a higher percentage of wives now do their own. Proportionately there are fewer domestic servants of both sexes than ever before. If domestic servants were distributed one to a home, only 4 percent of all married-couple households could have a servant. If many of the 900,000 white families with incomes of \$10,000 or more a year (1949) employed more than one servant, there were also many of the 3,000,000 or so with \$5000 to \$10,000 incomes that managed to get part-time service not only from some of those who made domestic service their occupation but from high-school youngsters, wage-earning wives, and others not classed as servants. In other words, although only about 4 percent of all families made enough money to hire servants full time, almost one family in ten made enough to hire help for washday, for cleanup day, or for special occasions. In 1950 out of \$193,600,000,000 personal consumption expenditures by the nation's families, domestic service accounted for \$2,500,000,000 or 1.3 percent. In 1929 before the depression the percentage had been 1.9.

But with all due allowances for full-time servants, part-time help, baby-sitters, and so on, the vast bulk of the housework required to keep the nation's 36,000,000 married-couple households going is actually done by housewives themselves. It is easier and it doesn't take so long to do as did the housework in colonial homes or in Victorian days, but it still takes doing and doing in a context of other pressures that earlier generations knew nothing about.

I-6:7. The Value of Domestic Work


What contribution do housewives make to the American economy? Well, what contribution do husbands make as husbands? Nobody knows. Nobody buys and sells housewives any more than anybody buys and sells husbands, so there is no price tag on either. One unidentified economist a generation ago ventured an estimate that the *labor* of housewives in housekeeping was about equivalent in economic value to the output of the steel industry. But since this would amount to no more than \$233 a year per housewife, or 64 cents a day, if translated into terms of the 1950 output of all the metal industries,

PLATES 20-25



Hibbs from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Plate 20. The Farm as the Unit for the Organization of Agricultural Work. Barns on a Wisconsin dairy farm dwarf farmer's house behind trees (at extreme left). There are at least four points to be noted about this farm as the cultural unit for the organization of agricultural work: (1) agricultural tasks are scattered in space; (2) much of the work on a dairy farm must be oriented around the care and breeding of domestic animals—cows—hence, the silos and big barns for storing their food; (3) as shown by the farmer's house hidden by the trees at the left, farm work still retains the residential pattern common to all kinds of work in the Middle Ages—the worker lives with his work; and (4) the size of these barns implies not a single cow for the family's own subsistence but a herd of cows and this in turn implies commercial marketing of milk. The typical American farm, in other words, is a business unit in a market system, no longer merely a place where a family raises its own food. But it is still a family farm.




Watson from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Plate 21. The Work of Harvesting Wheat on a Typical Single Family Farm in the Midwest. Machinery has long since replaced the sickle and the scythe of Colonial days (hand labor), thus permitting all the operations of harvesting—cutting, gathering, threshing—to be done quickly at one time and place in a fraction of the man-hours required in Washington's day. Also, the modern combine is now powered by a tractor instead of by the motive power that drew Grandpa's binder during the nineteenth century. But note the comparatively small size of this wheat field. In other words, to harvest his few-score acres of wheat this farmer must invest almost \$1000 in harvesting machinery (counting the proportionate cost of the tractor chargeable to the wheat crop), and unless he uses his combine to harvest crops on other farms, the machine is not used to its full capacity. This, along with storage barns and so forth, is part of the higher overhead cost per bushel that Midwestern farmers on medium-sized farms have to pay as compared with the operators of the great 1000 to 100,000-acre gang farms of the Plains States where the grain is shipped direct from the field and overhead costs are spread over many more acres. (See Plate 22.)

Plate 22. The Work of Harvesting Wheat on a Great Gang Farm of Thousands of Acres near Perry, Kansas. Instead of using one small combine as on the single-family, medium-sized farms of the Midwest, the "big time" farmers of the Plains States use fleets of huge machines that move across the limitless expanses of grain like tanks on maneuvers. They move at about four miles an hour, each cutting a swath eight to ten feet wide. The trucks carry the grain straight to the local storage elevators or to railroad wheat cars, without unloading it in the farmer's storage bins, as in the Midwest, and then reloading it later for movement to the market. Unlike the harvest on the Midwestern farms, the grain on the big wheat empires is taken in, not by the farmer and his hired man, but by gangs of migrant farm laborers who move with the harvest from early summer in Oklahoma to late summer in the Dakotas, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.

Davis from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.











Plate 23. Mechanization of the American Home. In millions of middle class and upper class American homes a dozen slaves could not provide the services that scores of mechanical gadgets from deep freeze units to gas furnaces perform for the housewife. These have greatly eased the tasks of heating, lighting, washing, cleaning, ironing, and food preservation and preparation. About the only routine household chores not yet turned over to some mechanical servitors are table-setting and bed-making, which still must be done by hand. Mechanization has had two important results: (1) the average housewife now has vastly more leisure than did her grandmother; and (2) the average household has become slavishly dependent on some central power station, with all that that implies in time of disaster. (Courtesy, General Electric and Westinghouse.)





Courtesy, Ford Motor Company.

Plate 24. Concentration of Work in the Industrial Culture. One of the great factories of the world—the Ford Motor Company's Rouge Plant, Dearborn, Michigan, as seen from the air. This factory, which can turn iron ore and other raw materials into finished automobiles in less than four days from ore dock to shipping platform, concentrates from 70,000 to 80,000 workmen in two shifts five days a week in an area of a few hundred acres which in the agricultural culture of a century ago would have furnished jobs for hardly a dozen farm workers. Note shipping facilities—the ore boats unloading at the docks and the railroad tracks in the distance—linking this factory with the world markets for raw materials and for automobiles. Only a fraction of Ford's huge output of automobiles is actually finished here. The factory ships thousands of parts daily for assembly in the company's score or more of assembly plants scattered throughout the United States. In addition, as shown in Plate 53, Ford subsidiary companies operate manufacturing and assembly plants in many foreign countries, including Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and others.




Plate 25. Factory Work in the Industrial Culture. The end of an assembly line in a modern automobile plant. Workmen giving finished cars a final check-up at the Ford Motor Company's Rouge Plant. Note that the essential principle of mass production of automobiles, as of many other products, is to move the work to the workman rather than the workman to the work. Work is minutely subdivided so that each of the men has only a small number of operations to perform on each car. This is the basis of the charge that mass production is more monotonous than was work in the old time craftsman's shop. (*Courtesy, Ford Motor Company.*)

there must be something wrong with the original estimate. In 1950 even shirtmakers were averaging 23 cents *more per hour* than housewives were supposed to be producing *per day*—but it's a poor husband who would have imagined that exchanging one housewife for one shirtmaker would have netted him much of a bargain!

There has been some agitation among feminists for reducing housewives to the status of employees, paying them hourly wages, and organizing them into unions. The social complications implicit in this bright reform are positively dazzling, but to anyone who regards marriage as a free partnership rather than an employer-employee, union-vs.-management type of conflict this sounds dangerously like exchanging one's birthright for a mess of pottage. But purely to suggest a minimum limit of value for the services of housewives, if each of the 34,252,000 married women who were managing their own homes in 1950 had been paid \$1 an hour for a five-hour day, seven days a week, the total value of their services thus arrived at would have aggregated over \$62,300,000,000 for the year. That would have been more than one-fifth (21.7 percent) of the total gross product (\$286,200,000,000) of the entire economy in that year.¹⁰ But that would merely have paid these ladies for their work as housekeepers, not as wives. How much more does a wife contribute than a housekeeper? Since someone with an authority even older than that of Adam Smith has said that a good wife is *beyond price*, perhaps we had better leave it at that. Then, if we were to try to add to our total the economic value of motherhood, we might find marriage getting so expensive that it would have to be abolished to balance the budget!

Fortunately, society does not keep books that way. The services of housewives and mothers, like the domestic services of husbands and fathers, are never paid for out of the exchange values of the market. They are *added* to those values. In other words, a figure like \$286,200,000,000, which measures the monetary value of all goods and services produced for a market in the United States in one year (1950), does not begin to measure the social value of *all* the goods and services actually produced by 149,000,000 civilians in that year. It measures only the value of the marketable goods and services. Wives and mothers, like husbands and fathers, have no market value. They carry no price tags. They merely keep 34,000,000 households

¹⁰ Gross product data from *The Economic Almanac, 1951-1952*, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1951, p. 184. Source originally, Department of Commerce data.

C. Confusion

1. The home with too many bosses

D. Approaching balance

1. The democratic home

II. Family Patterns—4 types, 16 subtypes:

A. Size

1. The large family (since the U.S. average is slightly over 3 per family, we may take "large" as meaning 5 or more)
2. The one-child family

B. Structure and organization

1. The incomplete family
2. The coöperative family
3. The independent family

C. Activity

1. The nomadic family
2. The "joiner" family
3. The family of the intelligentsia
4. The "cliff-dweller" family
5. The community-benefactor family

D. Values and goals

1. The social-climber family
2. The materialistic family
3. The overly religious family
4. The scientific family
5. The superstitious family
6. The conventional family

III. External Factors—3 types, 16 subtypes:

A. Socioeconomic status

1. The inadequately financed home
2. The suddenly wealthy home
3. The large-inheritance home
4. The mother-supported family
5. The family marked by peculiar occupational characteristics: railroading, night workers, mining, etc.
6. The home of culture conflict
7. The disgraced home
8. The family in the public eye

B. Neighborhood

1. The farm family
2. The small-town family
3. The city family
4. The summer-resort family
5. The misfit-in-the-neighborhood family
6. The family in a substandard neighborhood

C. Health

1. The home of the invalid
2. The home of the defective (or abnormal)

On the whole, the Bossard and Boll classification, combined with some indication of approach to or departure from the cultural norm for the characteristic listed, probably offers the most useful tool available for classifying households. Each household observed by the student should be classified, therefore, in terms of (1) intra-family relationships, (2) the family pattern, and (3) external factors, with some indication in each case of the degree of approximation to or departure from the normally expected kind of household, the culturally desirable or most approved type of household.¹³

I-6:9. What Do Housewives Do? The Domestic Day

Possibly the best way to get an overall view of domestic work situations is to follow a typical housewife through a typical day. What does she do hour by hour from the time she gets up in the morning till she goes to bed at night? The details vary household to household, social class to social class, occupation to occupation. But there is a common pattern of household operations implicit in the nature of such an organization in our culture.

This pattern provides for four kinds of activities: (1) those involved in the daily routine; (2) those required for maintenance and repair; (3) those otherwise relating the household to the community—communication and contact; and (4) those required for emergencies or other unusual occasions.

1. THE DAILY ROUTINE

The daily routine consists of those activities that are required to enable the household's members to function according to their occupations, their respective family and community roles, and their social status. In a typical working-class household this will probably involve getting an early breakfast, packing the breadwinner's noonday lunch, getting the children off to school in winter (or off to the playground in summer), washing dishes, making up the beds, preparing lunch (or "dinner," if the family still adheres to the rural mores), washing dishes again, and eventually the same routine over again for the evening meal.

¹³ Note that "normally expected" can mean (1) the statistically most numerous, or modal, type or (2) the culturally desirable, the type most approved by the culture.

In a middle-class household the family will be up later, may have breakfast together, may or may not have lunch together, but will have a more elaborate evening meal, and will have more electrical gadgets than the blue-collar household to help get the work done. On the upper-class level, servants will do most of the routine work; the members of the family will dine out more frequently and will entertain occasionally as a matter of course.

But on whatever stratification level, every household has to carry through pretty much the same pattern of routine activities day after day, with or without the aid of paid domestic service: cooking and serving of meals, dishwashing, bedmaking, and getting off the outgoers to their daily destinations—work, school, social engagements, or what-have-you. Every household carries on some such daily routine, varying it somewhat on Sundays and on holidays but carrying it on nevertheless. To enable it to do this, other activities, of course, must also be provided for.

2. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS

Maintenance is a matter of marketing and shopping to replenish supplies. The housewife may shop in person, by telephone, or by proxy, but shop she must. Repairs range all the way from patching Junior's blue jeans to calling in a plumber to clean out the kitchen drain or arranging to have the house repainted. On the blue-collar level the household relies as far as possible on self-help—the housewife does her own sewing and patching and the man of the house takes care of the drains. At the other social extreme, the servants and the outside “experts” attend to these matters. The housewife simply issues orders.

On all social levels there is always laundry work to be done, ironing, cleaning, the disorder of living to be set to rights before the family moves in again after work or school or play. In the great majority of homes all this devolves upon the housewife herself, with such help as she can wangle out of members of her own family.

3. RELATING THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE COMMUNITY

On the blue-collar level the housewife answers the doorbell and stands off the bill collectors. Very often she has no telephone to bother with. She is as likely to have a television set as a bathtub.¹⁴ On

¹⁴ In 1953, 80 percent of all households in Detroit had television sets. Of all urban households in the United States in 1950, 78 percent had bathtubs.

all levels the so-called social obligations of the family constitute a major responsibility of the housewife. If one asked a random sample of Americans which member of a family or household the term "homemaker" referred to, the overwhelming response would be "the wife and mother." This means that usually the tone and social significance of a household are largely determined by the housewife. To the extent that a home is more than a household, the margin is usually the contribution of the wife. But unless the wife can run a reasonably successful household she will be handicapped in creating a home.¹⁵

As we have already noted, it is the home—parents and children functioning together under one roof—that provides status, transmits culture, and interprets experience for the child. Language habits, personal cleanliness habits, the social decencies, basic values, major aspirations, life goals—these are among the traits transmitted by the home. But day by day the child also learns what kind of playmates to shun, what kind to cultivate; whether school is merely a nuisance or an opportunity; what sex is and what to do about it. The silences and evasions are as significant as the explicit instructions; frequently more significant. What does one do in the face of a difficulty? Give up and seek protection? Run away? Attack? The climate of opinion and attitude—confidence, uncertainty, cynicism, hostility—the expectations, hopes, and fears that prevail in the home help to slant the inborn temperamental predispositions of the child one way or the other.

And since the average mother spends so much more time than does the average father in intimate association with the youngster, especially during his early, most impressionable years, it is the mother who so deeply influences the child for or against the father, for or against self-confidence, adequacy, or inadequacy. Yet in the nature of the case the total impact of the home on the child is the sum total of all the experiences it provides, not the impact of the mother alone. Hence the vital importance of the free coöperation of wife *and* husband, mother *and* father, in the actual making of a home. If ever

¹⁵ We have already defined a household substantially as the organized living arrangements of a group of people carrying on their domestic affairs together under one roof, a family plus guests and servants, if any, organized as a self-maintaining economic consumption unit. For present purposes the term *family* refers to all persons related by blood or marriage living together in the same domicile. The term *home* refers to the abiding place of an individual or a family with the sentimental or romantic connotations of security, affection, refuge from the world, privacy, intimacy, and so on. Compare the difference in meaning between such expressions as "I'm going home" and "I'm going back to my household."

there was a joint partnership that required the full participation of the partners, marriage is that partnership in the making of a home.

But no home can function in a social vacuum. In the more or less natural division of labor patterned by our culture it is the wife's job to relate the household—and the home, if she has succeeded in making it one—to the community in most of its consuming and social-status functions. In the middle class this means that it is the wife who sets the pace in "social racing" with other families. In upper-class households it is the wife again who controls most of the details of that conspicuous consumption required to demonstrate upper-class status. On all levels it is the wife and mother who most carefully evaluates her children's friends, and among the status-conscious families in the upper-income brackets it is the mother who must inculcate in her children long before the issue ever arises the proper standards of mate selection. When a *mésalliance* does occur it is nearly always the distaff side of the "superior" family that is hardest to placate. One expected so much more!

On all social levels, then, the housewife carries the burden of relating the household—and the home—to her social equals and the community.

But all households encounter nonroutine occasions and an occasional emergency.

4. READJUSTMENT TO THE NONROUTINE

The nonroutine may come as an unexpected guest or an explosion of a hot-water tank. It may be the sudden loss of one's cook or a daughter down with polio, the unexpected curtailment of family income or a fire. Whatever it is, the housewife is usually the one who has to make the first necessary household readjustments. She is the one who has to find the extra bed or call the plumber; hire a new cook pronto; take over as a temporary nurse; readjust the family budget; call the fire department. She has to be able, in other words, to meet the unexpected and keep her head, and yet, if she is to be successful as a wife as well as a housekeeper, she will almost invariably also have to keep her husband convinced that *he* is the head of the family and that she really relies on his superior wisdom and know-how!

The average household, then, (1) carries on a daily routine; (2) provides for maintenance and repairs; (3) keeps in touch in various ways with friends and the community, maintains status, transmits through the home the culture of the region, locality, class, and family;

and (4) readjusts to emergencies and nonroutine occasions. The major burden of actually doing all this falls on the housewife. Domestic work in more than 90 percent of the nation's homes is that kind of work. What the status of wife entails over and above all this is another story beyond the scope of our present inquiry. It will be enough for present purposes if the student gains a reasonably clear picture of what running a household means on different levels of American urban society.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 6

To find objective evidence of the way in which culture structures work situations (1) in a factory and (2) in a household

1. Select a reasonably typical factory of whatever size and a typical household for observation and analysis.
2. Describe the *organization* of each in detail—formal, informal, etc.
3. Describe and analyze some particular or typical work situation in each. Analyze these situations as you have analyzed others before.
4. By interviewing the proper people, obtain a log of a typical day (a) in a factory worker's life and (b) in the life of a typical housewife. (Note the social level of each interviewee.)
5. Note (a) the existence or nonexistence of a union in the factory and evidence of union influence, if any, and (b) duplication of services in the household of services offered by other agencies: restaurants, laundries, cleaning agencies, hotels, etc. What rationalizations or explanations can you find for the facts discovered under (a) and (b)?
6. Write up results for your notebook as usual.

(If no actual factory is easily accessible for observation, the student can do the next best thing—interview former factory workers who can be found in practically all American communities except the most isolated and primitive. For purposes of comparison with domestic work situations, the interviewee should be led to describe step by step a typical working day in a factory worker's life. The objective, of course, is to collect, not an interesting biography, but reliable data on work situations in factories.)

Suggestions for Further Research

1. What is leisure time?
2. How much of it do Americans have? When? Where? Under what conditions? On what different social levels?
3. Distinguish between leisure spent in (a) sociability, i.e., free or self-rewarding association with one or more other persons; (b) commercialized recreation; (c) self-directed, free activity such as hobbies, etc.; and (d) mixed types.

4. Keep a log of all your leisure-time activities for one day or one week. Note (a) passive or spectator-auditor types; (b) participant types in which you take part with others; (c) active, nonparticipant types.
5. What are the distinctive differences between work situations and leisure-time situations?
6. What cultural agencies in your community—schools, recreation programs, fraternal orders, bowling alleys, etc.—help to structure and provide for leisure time? Whose leisure time? When?
7. How many people in your community work at servicing the leisure time of other people? In what agencies? With what programs?

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Conditioning Variables: Stratification Categories

I-7:1. The Problem

Every society faces three persistent questions: (1) Who is to perform what functions in the society? (2) On what level of esteem or prestige? (3) With what rewards in the way of specific claims on the life satisfactions available in the society?

The social arrangements, beliefs, and practices which answer those three questions constitute the society's system of social stratification, its system of social inequality.

I-7:2. The Universality of Social Stratification

Every social system known to scientists manifests social stratification of some kind. Even animals show differences in social power and deference: the bull buffalo as against the rest of the herd; the leader of the wolf pack as against the others; the order of pecking among fowls—Bird A pecks Bird B, B pecks C, and so on, but never the reverse. In all human societies there are differences in functions and in *recognized claims to life satisfactions* as between the young and the mature, males and females. This is a kind of stratification somewhat analogous to that found in animal societies. But human societies develop division of labor that goes far beyond anything based on mere biological differences, and what is more, human beings develop hierarchies of values, or esteems, relative to one another and to the economic and social differences that emerge. As culture evolves and division of labor increases and as the results of increasing specialization accumulate, differences appear based on differences in function and in the degree of the control over the resulting products. Everywhere

prowess means prestige and everywhere control functions acquire greater prestige than non-control functions. Not only do great warriors, chiefs, medicine men command more deference than ordinary tribesmen but eventually greater deference comes to mean more food, horses, women. As Veblen long ago pointed out, prowess in whatever field wins respect, power, prestige, emulation. All this underlies the emergence of systems of differential social standing, different levels of function and consumption.

As we have said, all societies have such systems, but they vary widely in two important respects: (1) in the basis, or set of values deemed basic in the society, and (2) in the major processes by which social standing is determined for individuals.

In the Trobriand Islands near New Guinea social standing seems to depend mainly on (1) the family's supply of yams—which are not too hard to obtain in a tropical country—and (2) prowess in the *kula*, the quasi-magical *game* of exchanging shell necklaces for shell bracelets, and vice versa, via canoe expeditions among the islands across hundreds of miles of open ocean twice a year. *Kula* success, in turn, is believed to depend on one's prowess in magic, i.e., one's success in placating the spirits of the trees from which the canoes are made, in protecting the expedition from the terrible flying witches (storms), and in overcoming the counter-magic of one's opposite number in the bracelet-necklace transactions. Social standing, in other words, seems to depend largely on noneconomic and nonpolitical factors. Practically all adult males can compete.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, a generation after the revolution, social standing seemed to depend largely on political and military power at the top, and farther down, on the degree of co-operativeness with the regime. The ruling "class" consisted of a privileged party, the Communist, which was the only party legally permitted to exist and the only one able to appeal for popular support. Only Communists could occupy positions of high authority, and at the top of the Communist hierarchy stood a handful of party functionaries—the Politburo, later the Presidium—dominated by men who held the key positions and exercised dictatorial power. Communists, who formed what amounted to "the officer class" of Soviet civil society, constituted only about 3.5 percent in a population of 200,000,000. Non-Communists were permitted to rise, i.e., reach higher social standing, by competition in the service of the regime, but entrance into the Communist party itself was open only to a

comparative few who could meet the rigorous standards of selection. All in all, the stratification system, for a society whose rulers proclaimed that they had at last achieved the "classless society" foretold by Marx, presented a certain un-Marxian complexity, namely, at least nine or ten distinct levels of function, power, and privilege from the ten or twenty millions of forced laborers in the slave camps at the bottom of the stratification ladder all the way to the handful of dictatorial rulers at the top.¹

In contradistinction to this authoritarian and totalitarian stratification scheme, based primarily on political and military power, stratification in the United States depended more on economic and biological factors than did the system in Russia. Individual and family differences in the ownership and control of private property and in racial descent were the primary determinants of social standing in the United States, but at least half a dozen other kinds of values contributed in varying degrees to the final result. Family distinction, personal achievement, education, religion, political power, and ethnic background all got into the picture. By and large, a native-born, white, college-bred, well-to-do Protestant of distinguished ancestry (like Franklin D. Roosevelt) in a position of great power would rank at the top of the stratification hierarchy. A foreign-born, black, poverty-stricken, illiterate, voodoo worshiper on relief—or worse yet, in prison—would rank at the bottom. In between, one could find all manner

¹ How far the Russians had fallen short of producing a society without stratification differences may be judged from even a superficial comparison of the old czarist social structure with that of the Soviets. In prerevolutionary Russia the stratification system ranged from the Siberian exiles at the bottom—in no sense forced laborers or slaves—through the social levels of the village peasants—almost 90 percent of the population—the urban shopkeepers and businessmen, then the bureaucracy, then the great landowners (the hereditary nobility), and finally the royal family and the czar. In Soviet Russia at mid-century the social gradient ran from the ten or twenty millions of forced laborers at the bottom (1), to the disadvantaged workers and average peasants (2), then to the average workers (3), to well-to-do peasants (4), to white collar workers (5), to the working-class aristocracy (6), to the general intelligentsia (7), to the superior intelligentsia (8), to the ruling elite (9), heading up in the dictator or dictators at the top (10). (Adapted from Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1950, pp. 465–479.) Soviet Russia was a classless society only in the sense that social standing no longer had anything to do with private property power. But to confine the reference of the term *social class* to "property-power status" is to confine the term to the meaning given to it by Marxist propaganda. For any objective analysis of social stratification the term *social class* must refer to all the occupants of a particular level or status on the social gradient, regardless of what factors the level or status itself is based on. Incidentally, at mid century there was some evidence that the new ruling elite were beginning to develop some of the habits of the old czarist elite, namely, tendencies toward passing on to their children their own social advantages.

of combinations of ancestry, wealth, achievement, authority, education, and racial and ethnic characteristics. Other things equal, Catholics and Jews would usually rank below Protestants; foreign-born below native-born; wage earners below salaried workers; salaried workers below independent businessmen (although this might depend on relative incomes); little businessmen below big businessmen; tenant farmers below farm owners; farm laborers below tenant farmers; ordinary farmers and businessmen below professional men; the undistinguished in any given field below the distinguished; and so on. Negro descent classified an individual as lower caste, but within the Negro caste, as within the white, there were further gradations of social standing. Mixed-blood Negroes, for example, usually had higher prestige in the eyes of other Negroes than did pure-blooded Negroes. Among the whites in the South distinguished family ancestry not infrequently outweighed mere wealth or political power. In Hollywood and in various university centers distinguished achievement might carry almost as much prestige as a million dollars—although the million still proved more convincing at the bank. For a political office-seeker certain kinds of individual achievement could be an invaluable asset—as Dwight Eisenhower demonstrated in his campaign for the presidency in 1952. At the other extreme of respectability, the kind of achievement associated with the names of Al Capone and other similar notables, likewise carried a prestige of its own.

Social stratification, then, is a world-wide phenomenon, but the values involved and the processes by which individuals reach any particular level or status on the social gradient vary from society to society.

I-7:3. Why Stratification at All?

Why should individuals and families be differentiated and ranked in this way in their contributions to a society and in their claims to the life satisfactions provided by their culture? Why isn't everybody's social standing substantially the same as everybody else's? Aside from biological differences of age and sex, why isn't everybody treated as members of a normal family are treated—all being entitled to the same protections, the same level of support, the same rights and privileges?

This is equivalent to asking why we don't get primary-group behavior under secondary associative conditions. Why don't we con-

tinue to value the individual for what he is under conditions that are constantly forcing us to evaluate him for what he *does* or *has*?

Perhaps we can begin to approach some answers if we trace briefly the evolution of social stratification in this country.

We know that the first colonists brought with them the social ideas and values of the mother country. They knew all about Old World distinctions between gentlemen and the lower orders. We know also that the advent of Negroes on the seaboard, first as indentured servants, then as slaves, enormously strengthened social distinctions in the Colonies. But we also know that as the white settlers pushed into the wilderness old social cleavages among them tended to disappear. Survival on the frontier depended far more on a man's own personal qualities than on his inherited status or property. Everywhere the frontier developed the nearest approach to a completely unstratified society that modern history records. Hunting and fishing and Indian fighting required only the simplest division of labor so that whatever differences in standing did appear were based on personal stamina, courage, skill, rather than on the nature of one's social function. Europeans have long remarked that in America there is more willingness for men to meet as men rather than as occupants of particular social statuses. The frontier was the great equalizer, the great enemy of "artificial" social distinctions.

This was partly because of the primitive nature of the economy, the absence of elaborate gradations of function, and partly because association on the frontier was essentially face to face, simple, and forthright. Primary association characterized much of that kind of life, and primary association, as we have said, tends to develop a moral unity that is hostile to categorical distinctions. The person is experienced as a person, not as a functionary or as the occupant of some alien status.

But as the frontier passed away association changed its character. Villages and towns appeared. Storekeepers, lawyers, circuit riders, artisans, men of diverse occupations came in as division of labor began to diversify the prevailing uniformity of hunting, fishing, and subsistence farming. The regime of petty capitalism brought over by the colonists from England changed under the impacts of the industrial technology, first into an agrarian pre-Civil War economy sprinkled with some little merchandising and small-shop towns and later into a huge industrialized society oriented around great metro-

politan centers whose banks, insurance companies, and corporate central offices extended financial and directive control throughout the country. Thus, it came about that while the primary character of association gradually became overlaid by other, less immediate types, two other things also were going on: (1) In community after community, the more able, aggressive, and lucky individuals were forging ahead of the less able, less aggressive, less fortunate, and were beginning to transmit to their children whatever advantages they had been able to acquire; and (2) the various socioeconomic functions that had been diversifying during the years began to fall into some kind of rank order of power, prestige, and importance.

In the South, slavery created an impassable gulf between Negroes and whites, and on top of this cleavage the relatively few great slaveholders gradually differentiated into the hereditary ruling aristocracy of the section. In the North, stratification was for a long time less marked and class lines were more open. But here also individual differences and the funding of competitive advantages into family privileges went on apace.

In the beginnings of settlement there had been no technological possibility of producing enough so that all might enjoy comfort and leisure. Even in the settled European world that possibility did not then exist and, thanks to war and fragmented markets, still does not exist even today. It was not to dawn anywhere in the world until after the invention of mass production in the United States in the twentieth century, but even there its promise was immediately blighted by war and by the fragmentation of the world market. So, as had been man's lot throughout history, the practical question that faced the colonists and the citizens of the young republic was not, How shall we distribute plenty? but How shall we distribute scarcity? Gracious living could be the birthright of only a small minority.

Even for them it could not be achieved except by developing the resources of this new country. Labor power alone was not enough. There must be roundabout methods of production, waiting power, increased efficiency, machines, capital. Hence, with capital so urgently needed to develop resources, the control of capital—or, what amounted to the same thing, credit—began to rank higher in rewards, power, prestige under a regime of private property than did ordinary hand labor. The man of property began to wield more influence and sometimes to dress better than the ordinary farmer. Entrepreneurship, the ability to *use* capital, to “make jobs for people,” moved up in the

scale of values. And in a new society, with rights and privileges to be won and defended and special interests to seek governmental favor, men who could verbalize these matters—lawyers—naturally began to acquire more prestige than inarticulate shoemakers and storekeepers. Even the local editor—when he could pay his bills—controlled more attention than did the livery stable owner.

On the frontier personal qualities had differentiated the useful from the ne'er-do-wells. Now the increasing complexity of the economy began to build a ladder of opportunity, power, and prestige by which the ambitious could climb above the merely useful. Functions were falling into a hierarchy of value which placed power and control at the top and mere service and hard work, then vagabondage and criminality, at the bottom. Thus, what had been the egalitarian frontier grew gradually into the village and small-town social system of the Revolution and pre-Civil War days and then into the more deeply stratified system of modern metropolitan society.

This, of course, is an oversimplified account of what happened from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but at least it suggests some of the main factors in the transformation: (1) the economic development from a subsistence economy of petty capitalism through an agrarian phase, then gradually industrializing small towns, on to a mass production, urbanized economy of giant cities and highly centralized controls; (2) the concurrent decline of primary and the correlative rise of secondary forms of association; (3) the gradual development of a hierarchy of social values, ranking some occupations and functions higher than others; (4) technological scarcity narrowing the supply of comfort and leisure to a few and thus reinforcing other tendencies to skew the social system into the familiar pyramid of a few at the top, many at the bottom; (5) the role of individual differences in determining which individuals and which families should reach the top; and finally, (6) the growing tendency of the successful, i.e., those at the top, to start their children on a higher level than the one on which they themselves had started.

Stratification, then, seems to grow out of increasing division of labor on a secondary associative level, the development of a hierarchy of social values, technological scarcity, and the competitive struggle of individuals for differential advantages for themselves and their children.

The really crucial factor in all this seems to be the development of a hierarchy of values.

I-7:4. Why Do Men Develop Hierarchies of Values?

Hierarchies of values grow out of the biological nature of man, but the specific *content* of any particular hierarchy of values comes out of the particular culture in which it develops.

A value is simply another name for a specific preference.

It is psychologically impossible for a normal, healthy person *not* to have preferences. He cannot avoid preferring comfort to discomfort, a full stomach to an empty one, satisfaction to frustration. Apparently this mandate to make preferential choices is our heritage from biological evolution. Organisms that failed to develop the capacity to make choices, i.e., the capacity to prefer safety to peril, for example, simply failed to survive.

But here's the rub: Not all valuables can be equally valuable at any given moment. To a starving man, food has first preference, but to one who has just eaten a full meal, a hundred other things are more inviting. It follows that we are constantly forced to rank our values, to work out a rank order of preferences, which is what we refer to as a hierarchy of values. At any given moment some things are bound to be preferable to others.

But what those things are and how we rank them is a matter determined by the interaction between our biological drives and the total impacts of our culture, past and present. If a Christian martyr preferred death to the repudiation of his faith, it was not because of the mere biological necessity of making choices. It was obviously because he had been exposed to a certain cultural influence, the belief and practice of Christianity, which had conditioned him to rank even martyrdom above surrender. And every one of us displays the same kind of cultural conditioning in every act of choice.

Hence, if we find no elaborate system of social stratification on the frontier, it is not because frontiersmen had no preferences or no hierarchies of values but because their cultural conditioning had been such as to give them only a simple rank order of values which needed no elaborate system of social gradations in the face-to-face association of the time. Under the existing conditions of a near-primitive subsistence economy, no elaborate division of labor was possible and no steep gradation of social status was necessary.

The elaboration and the steepening of social gradations were to come later as the frontier passed into the farm-village economy of the

Revolution and early nineteenth century and as this economy in turn grew into the urban-industrial economy of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This brings us to the question of how to conceptualize our analysis of the existing stratification system in America.

I-7:5. Concepts of Observation and Analysis

To observe and analyze the existing American stratification system we shall have to use several different kinds of conceptual tools—at least five different kinds, in fact.

First, we shall have to use concepts which refer to the *elements of the system*—such ideas as *rank*, *social gradient*, *social status*, *caste*, *social class*, *social position*.

Second, we shall have to use concepts which refer to the *processes* by which individuals and families land where they do in the system—such ideas as *inheritance*, *competition*, *conflict*, *chance*, *ascription*.

Third, we shall have to use concepts which refer to *stratification behavior*, i.e., to behavior that grows out of or is conditioned by the stratification system. This will involve such ideas as *classification behavior*, *occupational and status behavior*, *job-conscious* or *occupation-conscious* behavior, and *class-conscious* behavior.

Fourth, we shall have to use concepts which refer to particular statuses and status conditions in the United States—such ideas as *agricultural classes*, *industrial classes*, *white-collar classes*, *professional classes*, *possessing classes*, and so on.

And finally, fifth, we shall have to use concepts which refer to the broader *problems* generated by stratification in the modern world—such ideas as *labor unrest*, *escapes and palliatives for unrest*, *unionism*, *revolutionary Utopias*, and so on.

In this chapter we shall concern ourselves merely with those conceptual tools and operations that the student will need for observing evidences of stratification and for informing himself about the characteristics of the American stratification system. This will involve use of the first four types of ideas listed above. In Book II, Chapter 7, we shall consider some of the problems generated by stratification in the modern world. In Book I we shall take values as given, i.e., as simply implicit in the system of stratification. In Book II, as in dealing with the problem aspect of all social phenomena, values will constitute the root of the problem and will, therefore, have to be faced explicitly.

I-7:6. The Elements of Any Stratification System

Every stratification system in the world involves psychological, interactional, and cultural factors.

The psychological factors are *human preferences*, i.e., judgments of value, and *hierarchies, or rank orders*, of preferences.

Interactions through the years tend to crystallize these rank orders into a *culturally sanctioned gradient* of various levels of power, prestige, privilege, opportunity, obligation, and so on—a gradient of various levels of *function* and *access to life satisfactions*. Each such level is called a *social status*. The occupants of each social status constitute a *social class*. This is a category of people, i.e., people who are classed together (thought together) because of some significant similarity—in this case their similarity of social status. The specific functions which an individual performs plus his social status determine his *social position*. Social position thus refers not merely to an individual's level of functioning and of access to life satisfactions but to all that, plus his specific functional relationships to particular social organizations.

Thus, on the basis of human preferences operating in and through interaction there grows up in every society during the course of generations a culturally structured system of graduated placement of every individual and every family which locates each individual and family in a rank order with reference to every other individual and family relative to social functions and resulting claims of access to the life satisfactions provided by the culture. How does this placement of individuals and families come about?

I-7:7. Processes Which Determine Placement on the Social Gradient

The world over there are four basic processes and one derivative process which determine placement on the social gradient. The four are (1) inheritance of status; (2) competition; (3) conflict; (4) chance. The derivative process is (5) ascription. Ascription is the process by which a society accords to *family members the status occupied by the head of the family*. One (or more) of the four basic processes places the head of the family in a given status. Ascription then places other family members in the same status.

With this in mind we need comment only briefly on the basic processes in order to observe them in the American scene.

I-7:8. Caste

Linguistically, the term *caste* comes from a Latin word, *castus*, meaning "pure." Socially, caste means either (1) determination of social status by inheritance or birth or (2) a particular social category of people whose social status has been determined by inheritance or birth.

Historically, the most extreme example of a society stratified in terms of the caste principle has been India during the last few centuries. There society was divided on five great levels of function, power, and privilege and thousands of lesser levels: the Brahman, or sacerdotal or priestly caste; the Kshatriya, or governing and military caste; the Vaisya, or mercantile and agricultural caste; the Sudra, or lowest caste; and finally, the outcasts, numbering millions, who were denied all social rights and were regarded as so degraded that even their shadows could defile a Brahman. No other society has ever carried the caste principle to such an extreme, but most societies above the primitive primary level have shown some evidence of this method of determining stratification.

What conditions determine the degree of caste in any given society?

As Cooley pointed out years ago, the processes that allocate status are affected by two sets of conditions: (1) The first is comprised of certain "human nature," or basic psychological, factors such as *parental affection*, the desire to pass on to one's children whatever social advantages a parent possesses, and *childish suggestibility*, the willingness of the child to accept whatever advantages the parent can give. These factors of affection and suggestibility seem to be practically universal. Yet caste reached its fullest development only in one civilization, India, and it varies enormously from society to society. The universal factors work out in actual caste, therefore, only under certain social conditions, the second set of conditioning variables noted by Cooley: (2) social conditions favoring caste. These include (a) *a low rate of social change*, which permits inheritance of function; (b) *a low level of education*, which limits the individual's "horizon of opportunity"; and (c) *highly visible differences in ethnic or racial characteristics* in the population, which make it easy to associate individuals with particular statuses. Where society changes slowly, where people are densely ignorant, and where status easily becomes associated with particular ethnic or racial characteristics—under those conditions the universal factors tend to make status dependent on birth.

It is easy for sons to follow in their father's footsteps—they know no better—and ethnic or racial characteristics easily become the mark of certain statuses. A society of this kind is stratified in terms of caste.

I-7:9. How Identify a Caste Situation?

The ideals proclaimed at the time of the American Revolution, promulgated in the Declaration of Independence, and embodied in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution asserted the rights of Americans to build for themselves a society in which individual merit (competition) rather than birth would determine status. Yet at the very time when these ideals were set forth Negroes were held in chattel slavery in the South, and most men of property and good breeding along the Atlantic seaboard regarded handicraftsmen and frontiersmen as unfit to govern themselves. In other words, even in its beginnings the United States already had caste attitudes and practices, many of them carried over as heritages from the Middle Ages in Europe. What is more, although slavery was formally abolished by the War Between the States, 1861–65, caste attitudes never were, and the later influx of millions of lower-class immigrants from non-English cultures abroad created ethnic differences which have severely strained American democratic traditions. Not only do caste attitudes and customs prevail as between whites and Negroes, especially in the South and to some extent also in the North, but poorer immigrants from the more divergent non-English cultures such as those of the Near East and Mexico, and non-Christians such as the Jews have all become the objects of such attitudes and customs.

By what specific indexes can one identify a situation in which caste attitudes and customs appear?

The answers to three specific questions determine the answer:

1. Is there a sentiment against intermarriage in this situation?
2. Is there reluctance to accept individuals on the basis of personal merits and characteristics rather than on the basis of descent (categorical classification)?
3. And finally, is the distribution of functions and occupations determined by descent rather than by competition, conflict, or chance?

When the answer to all three is Yes, as it was in India during the last few centuries, you may be quite sure that you have a caste situation to deal with.

How caste manifests itself in the South as between Negroes and whites and elsewhere between these categories and others, we shall

consider later. The test in every case is (1) attitudes toward intermarriage; (2) openness of competition; (3) relationship of occupation to descent.

I-7:10. Competition

By competition we refer to the process by which two or more rivals seek each to outdo the other (or others) in reaching a common "goal," or in completing a common task. It is to be distinguished from conflict by the fact that in competition the adjustive energies of the contestants are directed not at each other as in conflict but at the performance of a common undertaking.

The social function of competition seems to be selection. Competition, in other words, is a method for selecting from two or more possible performers the one who can outdo the others in a specific task. This means that, if competition is to select in terms of qualities or capacities relevant to the task, qualities or capacities irrelevant to the task must be ruled out. In other words, the contestants must be matched in specific characteristics or capacities, matched within reasonable limits, and protected against irrelevancies. It would prove nothing about the fighting ability of each man in his own class to match a professional heavyweight boxer with an amateur lightweight. And it would prove nothing, again, if after having been properly matched the contestants were then permitted to fight under different sets of rules—one permitted to hit below the belt, for example, the other not.

This is a crude illustration of the fact that if competition is to serve a selective function and determine the one contestant best able to perform a given task, three things are essential: (1) proper matching; (2) a code of behavior—the same for all contestants; (3) an impartial referee to enforce the code.

The point of all this is that in societies which have used competition as a device for selecting occupants of particular social statuses, i.e., as a means of social mobility or change of status, these minimum essentials have seldom been observed. This was particularly true in Europe and England during the commercial and industrial revolutions from 1200 to 1900 and in the United States during the first century and a half of the factory system in this country. Heavyweights (the wealthy) were often matched against flyweights (the poor), such rules as existed were frequently drawn deliberately to favor the heavyweights (property), and the referee (government) either paid

no attention to the contest at all or devoted himself to kicking the weaker contestant in the stomach. That such competition so loosely organized hardly selected out any qualities except strength and ruthlessness need not be overemphasized. Social machinery even today gives at best a poor approximation to scientific precision. A court hearing, for example, is a very clumsy instrument for bringing out the truth—as compared with a psychological laboratory or a clinic.² Yet courts are the best social machinery so far devised for ascertaining the guilt or innocence of lawbreakers! If after centuries of law enforcement our trial procedures are still so clumsy and inefficient, we need not wonder that generations had to pass before Western societies took any action to improve the selective efficiency of economic competition. Only since the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act about the same time have Americans actually begun to concern themselves with laying down more equitable rules and with providing an impartial referee. It took generations for the suspicion to arise that *unregulated* competition must necessarily be *unfair* competition and to discover that the old rules which had worked fairly well in an agricultural economy no longer worked equitably at all in an industrial society. New problems required new answers.

I-7:11. Conflict

By conflict we refer to an adjustive or readjustive process in which the adjustive energies of those involved are directed not at *outdoing* each other as in competition but *at* each other, directly or indirectly. Aimed at each other directly such energies may turn conflict into *combat*. Aimed at each other indirectly they may take the form of psychological warfare, propaganda, “dirty competition,” suits at law, etc. The word *conflict* itself comes from a Latin word, *confligere*, meaning “to strike against.” That is essentially what the parties to a conflict do—they “strike against” each other. This may not be actual physical striking, or combat. It may be and usually is much subtler than that. There are not only many ways in which two contending parties may strike against one another but many aspects of each other that may be struck against. When youngsters make faces at one another or call each other offensive names, they are striking against their

² Scientific experiments have shown how inaccurate is the testimony of witnesses even when the witnesses are trying to tell the truth about some event that happened before their eyes. When their intention is to distort or conceal, the approximation to the truth is even less dependable. A German proverb: “As undependable as an eyewitness.”

social selves, the conception which each has of himself. College students, razzing one another, do this more artfully, and women defending or striving for social status among themselves do it more artfully still. Conflict may range from the combat of the battlefield to the mudslinging of political campaigns or the verbal hostilities of literary controversies. Political campaigns are particularly instructive as illustrating the complexity of human behavior. The respective candidates in an American election campaign engage in a competitive contest for votes, but they are seldom content merely to present their own respective claims for electoral support. Usually they attack the other party and its candidate, the party record, the party platform, the qualifications of the opposing candidates. The candidates thus become engaged in a political conflict for a purely competitive purpose.

Exactly the same use of conflict is sometimes encountered in business. For a candy company and a tobacco company each to advertise the merits of its respective product is obviously merely competition. But when a few years ago a tobacco company came up with the slogan "Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet," a conflict ensued with the sugar interests which ended only when the tobacco people finally agreed to make less invidious appeals for customers.

Sometimes it is hard to draw the line between conflict proper and its half-twin *contravention*. Contravention is one-sided conflict, the mere blockage of an opponent who fails to hit back. When one runner in a race trips another, for example, and the victim takes it without argument, we have an example of contravention. In the nature of the case, full-blooded rivals seldom submit to contravention without going on to actual conflict if not combat. But it is obvious that the introduction of any one of these three—contravention, conflict, or combat—into what is supposed to be pure competition is a direct violation of the spirit and purpose of competitive striving. Much of what is called "unfair competition" is simply contravention, conflict, or combat injected into a competitive situation.

Yet a great deal of competition makes use of conflict or combat legitimately as the decisive factor in the ultimate selection sought. This is most obvious on the physical level in the prize ring and on the football field. In the one combat and in the other conflict is the means by which the rival contenders establish supremacy, the prize fighter striving to flatten his opponent and the football players striving to block, tackle, run, and pass their way to victory. But in each case the victory has a competitive purpose: to establish the victor as the best

in a given weight class or football conference. Wrestling is another kind of competitive combat. Field sports, and tennis, rowing, and baseball are much more purely competitive—the contestants try to outdo each other in a common enterprise.³

Conflict enters business rivalry legitimately in contests at law—suits to enforce contracts, collect damages, etc.—and illegitimately (under present laws) in many so-called unfair trade practices. Two generations or more ago competition was much more chaotic, and conflict played a prominent part in the success of not a few of the great captains of industry and of their corporations. The most striking example, perhaps, was the ruthless way in which the old Standard Oil Company bulled its way to dominance in its field by forcing railroads to give it rebates *even on its competitors' shipments*, by subsidizing politicians, by “softening” newspaper editors, and so on. A more subtle example was supplied by another great corporation at about the turn of the century which established a “morgue” composed of the inventions of hopeful rivals, all of whom had been forced out of business, and then exposed would-be new competitors to a “Cook’s tour” of these interesting exhibits as a prelude to negotiations for the rival invention—at about 10 cents on the dollar!

In politics conflict is the standard process by which rival candidates conduct their competition for votes. In 1952, for example, the Eisenhower-Stevenson campaign was regarded as “dull” and “ineffective” until each candidate began swinging at the rival party’s record and platform, and at his opponent’s promises for the future. Conflict joined over such issues as McCarthyism, the “Washington mess,” how to stop Russia, and so on.

All of which indicates various ways in which conflict and sometimes even combat may enter into the struggle for status. A prize fighter fights his way up. A corporation does likewise. And top governmental posts go to men who know how to make conflict pay off in the perennial competition for votes.

While the American tradition glorifies competition as the major determinant of status in our society, one must not let cultural myths obscure realities. Caste and conflict are co-determinants. True, they

³ Some contravention—blocking the plate, for example—and conflict—arguing with the umpire—do get into baseball, but most of the game consists in a competitive effort on the part of each team to get more runners across the plate than the other team can send around. The occasional conflicts between individual players are, strictly speaking, not part of the game, merely interesting interludes.

are no longer the major determinants as in the Middle Ages. Feudal society was a caste society and to change status—apart from the avenue for competitive advancement offered by the Roman Church—usually required unusual achievement in conflict or combat. Duke William of Normandy, for example, justified his claims to the English throne in terms of descent (caste), but he made them good by means of victory in combat. Many another ambitious soul of lesser standing moved upwards by the same means. Although competition is vastly more open in America today than it ever was in feudal Europe, we must still not write off conflict as a factor in social climbing.

Another factor that also still plays some part is chance.

I-7:12. Chance

By chance we refer to adventitious, more or less accidental, turns of fortune, good or bad. The discovery of oil on one's "back forty" or the death of a breadwinner may drastically change the economic condition of a family and, by the same token, its social status.

By and large, the trend of social development in Western civilization for several centuries has been to reduce the role of chance in the lives of people. For one thing, there are now fewer geographical frontiers to be opened up, and for another, the enormous advances of physical science have brought more and more of the vicissitudes of nature under rational control. In the old days of the Great Discoveries, with a whole New World awaiting appropriation, chance obviously played a large part in many careers. A single lucky voyage, the capture of a Spanish treasure ship, the foundering of a vessel in a storm, or the ravages of an Indian raid might make or break a man. Later the same kinds of adventitious factors determined the fate of many a New England sea captain, many a western fur trader, and the like. From the point of view of ordinary social processes, it was chance that gold was discovered on the lands of a man named Sutter in California in 1848 and not on somebody else's property. That Sutter himself by trying to enforce his perfectly lawful claim to most of El Dorado including the city of San Francisco overreached himself and eventually died penniless in Washington years later is beside the present point. It was chance—not foresight, competition, or inheritance, but chance alone that put a fortune within his grasp.

Today it is still possible to read occasionally of some poor farmer made rich overnight by an oil strike in his back yard, of fortunes lost

in a market slump, or of bankruptcy due to some unexpected turn of fate.⁴

But such sudden changes of fortune are far less typical than they were when science was still in its infancy and the principle of spreading risks through insurance had barely been invented. Today fewer babies die in infancy, i.e., fortuitous selection is less operative; more of us live to our seventh or eighth decade; and insurance protects millions of families from all kinds of risks ranging from childbirth to death. If the chance of becoming a millionaire is probably less than in Gold Rush days, the chance of being thrown into poverty by the untimely death of a parent or by the gyrations of the economic system is probably also somewhat less. The whole trend of Western civilization even to the relations between governments is toward the reduction of the role of the unpredictable in human affairs.

What all this foots up to is that, with chance less of a factor in the struggle for status than it used to be, with caste less powerful than it once was, and with "unfair competition" under more control than in the heyday of *laissez faire*, competition itself has become more determinative *relatively* than in the nineteenth century. But the trend does not run smoothly nor can its future course be charted with much precision. We shall return to this problem in Chapter 8.

I-7:13. Stratification Behavior

Stratification behavior is behavior oriented toward or conditioned by stratification. A number of different kinds can be distinguished, including (1) classification behavior; (2) occupational behavior; (3) job-conscious, or occupation-conscious, behavior; (4) class-conscious behavior.

1. CLASSIFICATION BEHAVIOR

Classification behavior is of two kinds: (a) the classification of one's associates, i.e., the selection of friends, neighbors, etc., on the basis of stratification values; and (b) the classification of one's self, i.e., identification with a particular social status in the stratification system.

a. For most of us most of the time the classification of our associates is practically automatic. Bankers tend to associate with bankers,

⁴ The sudden end of World War I, for example, caught one of the great Chicago packing companies with vast stocks of meat on hand, all acquired at wartime prices. The collapse of the market cost the company losses of a million dollars a day for a full year—and wiped out a fortune of more than \$300,000,000!

physicians with medical personnel, railroad men with railroad men, farmers with farmers. Culture has patterned association in such a way as to make that sort of thing the easiest thing to do. Off the job, like tends to seek like either because of propinquity (living side by side in the same block) or because of common interests. Since status so often expresses a given level of spending power, people from different statuses will have different ways of utilizing their leisure time. The dry-goods clerk can hardly belong to the country club and the ditchdigger will seldom belong to the same lodge as the dry-goods clerk.

Classification behavior chooses the neighborhood in which we live; one of the most tragic effects of the Great Depression was to force many white-collar families to raise their children in neighborhoods which they felt to be "beneath them" socially. It was mainly this first kind of classification behavior that Warner and his associates studied in Yankee City (Newburyport, Massachusetts).⁵ By finding out who got invited to whose weddings and who went to whose funerals, and so on, Warner was able to distinguish six distinct statuses in Yankee City: the upper upper status, to qualify for which an individual had to have inherited wealth; the lower upper, for which wealth alone was enough; the upper middle, which required not wealth but a very comfortable income and residence like the others in an appropriate section of town; the lower middle, the status level of the great bulk of the salaried personnel of the town; the upper lower, the status level of most wage earners; and finally, the lower lower, or Riverbrookers, the Clamdiggers, odd-job men, and the like, who barely eked out an existence by self-support. These status levels represented the way in which Yankee City people sorted themselves out in their day-to-day associations.⁶ In other words, they represented classification behavior such as you and I and all other Americans practice all the time. To what extent this kind of behavior squares with that other aspect of classification behavior, namely, the way the individual feels about his own placement on the social gradient, is another question.

⁵ See W. Lloyd Warner and others, *Yankee City Series*, Vols. I-V, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947.

⁶ Having no Negroes, Yankee City escaped the color caste problem, and being also without an organized underworld, it did not have to find a separate status for lower class predators. The confusions of the depression, putting even ministers, lawyers, physicians, and other middle-class persons on public relief, blurred the status of the unemployed. Traditionally rural America had tended to regard unemployment as a symbol of personal defect and to relegate individuals needing charity to the bottom of the social ladder. Something of this stigma was still felt by urban middle class people who exhausted every possible resource before seeking public aid during the depression of the 1930's.

b. A number of studies, notably one by Centers, have shown that the subjective side of classification behavior does not always jibe with the objective side.⁷ We may live in a working-class district and associate with wage earners but nevertheless *feel* middle class, while not a few high-status individuals such as certain young millionaires and various Hollywood celebrities gained some notoriety after World War II by identifying themselves with Communist fronts. It is a notable historical fact that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries practically all of the intellectual leaders of radical working-class movements came from upper- or middle-class backgrounds. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the cofounders of Communism, were born in middle-class homes. Neither ever worked as a wage earner a day in his life. The great philosophical anarchist, Prince Kropotkin, was a member of the Russian aristocracy, and the man who founded the Soviet regime, Nicolai Lenin, came from the family of a school inspector under the Czar, a member of the Russian middle class. In America the greatest Socialist leader of the turn-of-the-century generation, Eugene V. Debs, was the son of a grocery store keeper in Terre Haute, Indiana. He began his career as a labor leader by denouncing as "un-American" the railroad strikes of 1877!

Low-status people identifying upward and high-status people identifying downward thus demonstrate the fact that subjective self-classification does not always coincide with the objective facts of one's social status. Yet Marx was undoubtedly right in insisting that by and large and on the whole most people most of the time tend to identify themselves with their economic interests. Many wage earners hope to climb into the middle class, or at least to help their children make the grade, and a few millionaires with guilty consciences may subsidize radical causes, but the great majority of the occupants of lower statuses identify with those statuses and the great majority of the wealthy consistently support economic conservatism. Self-classification, *on the whole*, tends to agree with the objective facts.

2. OCCUPATIONAL-STATUS BEHAVIOR

This is the kind of behavior that distinguishes leisure-class from lower-status people—fox hunts, private yachts, luxury cruises, and so

⁷ Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949. This was not a study of class consciousness at all but a study of subjective classification of people on different levels of stratification.

on; the kind of behavior that identifies a businessman as a businessman, a professional man as a professional man, a wage worker as a wage worker. It is the kind of behavior patterned by occupational habits and in leisure time conditioned by the cultural expectations of what is appropriate to the status established by the occupation. Broadly speaking, it is the kind of behavior demanded by one's station in life. In some communities upper status means one's children must attend private rather than public schools, must go to a private preparatory or finishing school and then on to one of the socially approved colleges or universities in the East, or to study abroad. Marriage is expected to bring a proper alliance of economic interests, a gracious home life based on the command of domestic service, and leisure to enjoy the best that the culture has to offer. At the other extreme, in most communities lower status means substandard living in childhood, a job at sixteen, early marriage, and the cares of child rearing on meager income. In between these extremes the middle classes strive toward the country house and country club ideal with such concessions to Coketown realities as their incomes require.

3. JOB-CONSCIOUS, OR OCCUPATION-CONSCIOUS, BEHAVIOR

People aware of a common threat to their jobs or to their occupations tend to react defensively. Employers facing demands by their employees for higher wages, shorter hours, etc., employees facing pressure from employers for lower wages, longer hours, etc., and farmers facing economic pressures from railroads, banks, and urban business interests generally have all tended to react defensively. The National Association of Manufacturers, the American Federation of Labor and the C.I.O., the Grange, and similar organizations are all expressions of the occupation- or job-defensive behavior of employers, wage workers, or farmers. It is needless to add that most of the economic and political struggles of American history have been motivated by occupation consciousness. If, as James Harrington long ago pointed out, politics expresses economics, there is no great mystery about all this.

The point needs to be emphasized, however, that in so far as such struggles are motivated by occupation consciousness only they necessarily proceed on the basis of certain common agreements among the contestants. Not only have such contestants in America tacitly accepted the idea of majority rule and decision by peaceable balloting but they have also accepted the fundamentals of our stratification

system itself—private property and the wage system. It is only when a still broader kind of economic consciousness appears that such agreements are called into question.

4. CLASS-CONSCIOUS BEHAVIOR

Class-conscious behavior is behavior which expresses an awareness of the identity of interests of all occupants of a given social status. By definition all occupants of a given social status constitute a social class.

Historically, class-conscious behavior has been more characteristic of upper classes than of lower. No doubt this has been due to the fact that in the past upper-class people could associate more widely with their own kind than could lower classes. Able to take a broader view of the world, they were also able to appreciate more clearly their own position as beneficiaries of the system of differential privilege. So strong was this feeling of common interests among the upper classes during the Middle Ages that it extended across feudal boundaries: a Breton noble, for example, felt himself closer to an English aristocrat than to one of his own serfs, and this kind of class loyalty was prevalent all over Europe down to the French Revolution. Lower classes were not to reach even a mild degree of national class consciousness until feudalism had been in its grave for generations.

That the job consciousness of wage earners within national boundaries might be broadened into world-wide class consciousness and used as a weapon against the possessing classes of all societies is an idea that received its first significant expression in *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels in 1848. Marx went on to develop a complex theory of class conflict that envisaged the violent overthrow of existing governments by the class-conscious proletariat and the ultimate abolition of all classes in a society in which he believed coercive government itself would no longer be necessary (the “withering away” of the state). Some of the modern implications of this idea we shall touch upon in Book II, Chapter 7.

I-7:14. Indexes of Stratification

Since social status in the United States is *determined* by complicated interrelationships among half a dozen or more variables while at least a dozen others such as stratification behavior, size and location of residence, consumption habits, and the like, *express* it, and since an expression of status tends to reinforce, if not on occasion to induce, recognition of it, no neat little formula has yet been devised for iden-

tifying the precise limits of particular strata in any given community. Everywhere one can expect to find a general awareness that there *are* differences in wealth, power, and prestige among individuals and families in any sizable population aggregate, and that if one were to scale such differences certain individuals and families would rank at one end of the scale, certain others at the other end. There would be much less agreement concerning the ranks in between and which individuals and families should be assigned to which particular ranks. A great many people would be uncertain concerning their own rank, but the great majority would tend to identify themselves with others of similar occupational and income levels, although they might not be too sure just where such occupational and income levels belonged on the stratification gradient as a whole. Few people bother their heads about the stratification gradient as a whole although they are probably vaguely aware that some such thing exists.⁸

Our problem is to find evidences of social stratification in the United States—not mere differences in social status but differences indicative of a graduated scale of statuses. We are not trying to measure or explain these differences but merely to identify them.

We can use two kinds of indexes: (1) statistical indexes of differences found in various areas of the United States or in the country as a whole and (2) direct observation indexes accessible to us in a particular locality or area.

1. Statistical indexes relate mainly to three categories of persons: (a) racial categories, (b) income categories, and (c) occupational categories.

2. Direct observation indexes are mainly such visible evidences of differential function, power, standard of living, and prestige as can be noted by a careful observer in an ordinary community, such indexes as (a) residential characteristics—type, cost, location, etc., of dwellings; (b) ethnic characteristics; (c) religious differences—church attended, etc.; (d) consumption habits (other than residential)—make, size, age, cost of automobile, if any, etc.; (e) differential associations—

⁸ Hence the diverting quarrels among investigators of social stratification. As Lenski points out, "One group—primarily theorists—asserts that there are no social classes in American communities if social classes are defined as discrete groups perceived by the average individual. A second group—primarily men with a background in community research—insist that social classes are an indisputable reality observed by the ordinary citizen in the typical American community." Lenski's own study of a southern New England mill town indicates that "while a prestige status system exists in the town, local residents do not perceive this system as a series of discrete social classes. They see it instead, as a continuum." Gerhard E. Lenski, "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups?" *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1952, p. 139.

lodge memberships, country club memberships, union memberships, chamber of commerce memberships, etc.; (f) stratification behavior—occupation, job consciousness, etc.

The problem, therefore, becomes twofold: (1) to describe the American stratification system in terms of statistical indexes with particular reference to income and occupation, since racial categories are largely caste categories and as such will be considered in Chapter 8; and (2) to describe the local stratification system in a selected area or community in terms of residential, ethnic, religious, consumption, and other indexes.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 7

To identify evidences of social stratification

NOTE: It may be desirable to conduct this project as a team enterprise, several students working together as a team on each particular section of the project.

Materials and equipment needed:

- a. For statistical indexes, consult tables in the statistical appendix.
- b. For direct observation, i.e., for field notes, 1 pack of ordinary filing cards, preferably 5 x 3 inches; 1 fountain pen or pencil; street or road map of the area to be covered.

Operations: A. Collection of statistical data

1. Determine from statistical sources the size of the civilian labor force in the United States in 1950.
2. What percentage of this consisted of women? Farm owners? Farm workers?
3. What percentage of the adult population was engaged in keeping house?
4. Rank occupations in terms of median income, percentage under \$2000 income per year, percentage over \$10,000.
5. Note the incomes of the lowest 40 percent of income receivers.
6. Relate to the problem of stratification the data reported by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center on the distribution of corporate stock ownership in the United States (Section I-6:3, p. 101).

Operations: B. Local observation and testimony

1. Select a local study area.
2. Have two or more local real-estate dealers identify and describe briefly (a) the best, i.e., most expensive, residential localities in your study area; (b) medium or middle-class localities; and (c) the poorest, or lower-lower-class localities. Mark these on your map and confirm descriptions from the field.
3. What social stigmata do local residents (real-estate dealers, etc.) as-

sociate with each area—delinquency rates, quality of public services, paving, schools, etc.?

4. Obtain from the county agricultural agent or the county clerk information on the location of the most fertile land in the county and the most infertile. From dealers in farm real estate obtain estimates of average value per acre of land in these two kinds of areas, ethnic characteristics of population in each area, etc. Make a rough map of distribution of ethnic categories in the county.
5. Attend a locally identified “upper-class church” and one locally identified as a “lower-class church”—white race only. Compare characteristics of the members of the congregation, the nature of the services, type of sermon, behavior of congregation, etc.
6. Analyze the status membership of
 - a. The Chamber of Commerce.
 - b. The local Farm Bureau or similar organization.
 - c. The strongest local labor union.
 - d. The local country club.
 - e. A fraternal organization.
7. Visit the nearest local equivalent of the big-city “skid row” and note what you find.
8. Observe typical stratification behavior of businessmen, professional men, white-collar workers, wage workers, farmers.

Operations: C. For final Notebook report

1. What evidence, if any, can you find for Warner’s six statuses: upper upper, lower upper, upper middle, lower middle, upper lower, lower lower?
2. What can you say, if anything, concerning differences between the social stratification system in the open country and the system in the town or city?
3. If lower lower is the status of respectable, low-paid workers at the bottom of the ladder of self-support, what status would you assign to the population of skid row? (Remember always to compare only members of the same race.)
4. Broadly speaking, what *difference* does it make what social status an individual occupies in your study area?

Operations: D. Write up your conclusions

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Read any of a number of recent studies of stratification in different places in the United States and compare with such observations as you can make of your own local community.

For New England:

W. Lloyd Warner and associates, *Yankee City Series* (studies of Newburyport, Mass.). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.

For the Middle West:

Robert T. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown and Middletown in Transition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1929 and 1939.

W. Lloyd Warner and associates, *Democracy in Jonesville*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1949.

For the South:

John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

A. W. Davis and B. B. and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

PROJECT B

Read C. Wright Mills' *White Collar*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951.

Write a critique of the book, showing its bearing on the problem of stratification.

PROJECT C

Submit the following question to a suitable sample of individuals of various occupational and income levels: Should employees of a company who refuse to join a union which has been approved by a majority of the company's workers be required to contribute the usual union dues to the support of the union despite their refusal to join up?

Tabulate results in relation to occupation and income levels of families represented by respondents.

Interpret results in terms of occupation consciousness.

Supplementary Readings

Bendix, Reinhard, and Lipset, Seymour Morton, *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification*. Clencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953.

Centers, Richard, *The Psychology of Social Class*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Mills, C. Wright, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Warner, W. Lloyd, and Lunt, Paul S., *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, Vol. I, *Yankee City Series*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

Conditioning Variables: Racial Categories

I-8:1. The Problem

Our problem is to find objective evidence of two things: (1) the nature of racial categories and (2) what differences, if any, such categories make in the associative experiences of Americans.

We are not going to try to observe race relations. Race relations are functions of values and as such are proper subjects for discussion in Book II, Chapter 8. Our observational problem calls merely for an understanding of the nature of racial categories and for some ideas concerning the kinds of indexes that may disclose the way such categories channel and control association.

Everyone knows, of course, that there is no more complicated and delicate field of inquiry in the United States than this. It is complicated by the fact that to understand racial categories (1) one must bring together the results of at least three distinct lines of historical study—the expansion of Europe since the 1400's, the Negro in America, and the intellectual history of the concept of race—and then in addition (2) one must take account of the findings of anthropology, genetics, and sociology. It is delicate in the sense that for historical reasons race relations have crystallized into caste relations which not only contradict the American Creed but also create conditions of white privilege and Negro disadvantage which involve intense emotional attitudes among members of each race. For observational purposes, we are in no way concerned with evaluating such conditions or with trying to uphold them or change them. Our sole objective is to understand racial categories and to see some of their objective expres-

sions and effects. In Book II, Chapter 8, we shall raise questions of values.

I-8:2. What Is a Racial Category?

The term *race* refers to two quite different orders of phenomena: (1) to a classification of *persons*, i.e., to a *category of human beings* who are regarded as all alike in a few distinctive traits which have been biologically inherited from remote ancestors individually unknown, and (2) to a *distinctive combination of genes in the germ plasm*, which combination produces the distinctively "all-alike" individuals just referred to.

I-8:3. Race as a Category of Human Beings

In the first sense, race as a category of human beings, the problem is primarily one for the physical anthropologist. But this science is a creation of the last century. In other words, when European white men first came into contact with masses of darker-skinned peoples, as a result of the Great Voyages of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was as yet no science of human classification in existence. There was not even a common-sense tradition of such classification.

The ancient Romans and the peoples of medieval Europe had never paid much attention to the physical differences among peoples. In ancient Rome citizenship had been more important than skin color—and Roman citizenship had presently been opened to men of any color. In the Middle Ages what mattered was the color of one's religion, not one's skin.

So when the Great Voyages suddenly threw Europeans into contact with masses of darker-skinned peoples in Africa, the New World, and the Orient, the conquerors had only the practical needs of the moment on which to base their distinctions. What they needed was some obvious characteristic to distinguish the sheep from the goats, the dominant whites from the subordinate natives. Skin color served the purpose admirably.

Not only was there no science of anthropology; there was also no science of genetics, and no science of culture. Nobody knew anything about the biological mechanisms of heredity and nobody had ever become conscious of the social heritage as such. But everybody could see that black people had black children and white people had white children. And the whites could give orders to the blacks. In the nature of the case, it was fatally easy to attribute white dominance to innate

white superiority. That the powder which propelled the bullets by which the gun-bearing whites subdued the darker bow-and-arrow peoples had itself been invented by Mongolians, and that the arts of navigation by which the whites now reached the New World and the coasts of Africa and the Orient constituted part of the heritage from the ancient Mediterranean civilizations—all this and more never troubled the adventurers who were expanding European dominance to the ends of the earth. Hundreds of thousands of African blacks were presently working for white masters in the West Indies and in the English colonies in North America. To be white was to rule; to be dark-skinned was to be ruled. Four hundred years ago it seemed as simple as that.

Thus, the idea of race as a decisive social category was born—race as a decisive, all-alikeness of men of distinctive skin color—centuries before men knew anything about the complex mechanisms of heredity or the cumulative nature of culture.

We cannot here attempt even to summarize all the revisions in traditional ideas about race that have been necessitated by the discoveries of biologists and anthropologists during the last century. For one thing, it has become clear that modern man is a product of a twofold evolutionary process: On the one hand, he has evolved physically from smaller-brained prehuman ancestors; and on the other hand, coeval with this physical evolution, there has been an accumulation and diversification of culture. Starting from a parent, big-brained stock somewhere in central Asia or north Africa, human groups wandered off apparently into different environments which acted selectively through the ages to weed out certain characteristics and favor others. Thus, in the course of tens of thousands of years, through isolation, mutation, and selection the one human species became differentiated into varieties distinguished by such external characteristics as degrees of skin pigmentation, heavy pigmentation conceivably having given mutants in that direction a survival advantage under conditions of intense sunlight.

Primitive isolation, mutation, and selection were not the only forces at work, however, in producing the characteristics of present-day populations. On the great continents at least primitive isolation was succeeded by folk contacts and the intermingling of many different strains. Thus, no matter what populations the anthropologists today study, they always find a great hodgepodge of traits: the supposedly distinctive traits of any one human variety keep appearing in a sup-

posedly different variety. No matter what trait is studied, human populations insist on distributing themselves along a continuum, and when any two populations are compared there is always more difference within each than there is between the means of the two populations. In other words, there is far more overlapping of racial populations than there is racial uniqueness. Many Negroes in the United States are found to be whiter than many whites, and practically all scores made by members of one race on I.Q. or other scales can always be matched by scores from the other race. This means that what seemed to common sense in the days of the expansion of Europe to be a self-evident fact, namely, the all-alikeness of racial varieties each to its own kind, turns out under scientific scrutiny to be anything but all-alikeness. Individual differences mark all varieties of mankind. What is even more important for present purposes, the variations in each variety around its own central tendency so largely overlap similar variations around the central tendencies of other varieties that *scientists can find no such thing as a biological color line*. The common-sense notion of the all-alike distinctive differences of one human variety from another stands on about the same scientific level as the old common-sense notion of the flatness of the earth. Both ideas may have served well enough when nobody knew any better, but both are sadly out of date today.

So much for race as people who are distinctively alike and distinctively all different from the people of other races. No sizable population in Europe or America today is physically all-alike, and the traits of every population overlap the traits of every other population.

I-8:4. Race as a Distinctive Mechanism of Inheritance

In the second sense of race—as a distinctive combination of genes in the germ plasm—the geneticists have been unable until recently to identify any distinctively *racial* mechanisms whatever. Ironically enough, the first such racial mechanisms that they *have* discovered have nothing whatever to do with the external characteristics which common sense has so insistently regarded as racially identifying. *The only genetically known racial mechanisms determine blood type, not skin color!* In other words, the only *genetic* “races” that scientists are yet able to identify are people who are alike in blood type—O, A, B, AB. As one leading geneticist puts it, “Serological factors (blood types) are almost the only human characteristics of which we know the exact mechanism of inheritance, and . . . only the use of charac-

ters inherited in a known manner will satisfy our criteria for a satisfactory classification of races."¹ (Italics added.)

Not only are blood types useless as indexes for separating the sheep from the goats for purposes of social control and the allocation of privileges; every sizable population tested shows a considerable scatter of nearly all types, and peoples of the same outward or skin-color "race" may turn out to have quite different blood-type distributions.

Nobody can tell from the outside what blood type any individual belongs to, including himself. Obviously, therefore, a blood-type classification of human beings, no matter how genetically sound, can have no use as an index of social status. It is quite probable that as genetic research goes on, scores if not hundreds of other mechanisms of common inheritance will be discovered, so that within a generation or two we may find great numbers of persons of proved common descent whose common-sense "racial" classifications will be quite different. Common-sense "race" and scientific race will have parted company completely. Even now they no longer refer to the same things. After all, common-sense "race" is based on a mere handful of characteristics which *seem* to be derived from common ancestors but which *in toto* amount to only an infinitesimal fraction of all the thousands of inherited characteristics which make up the individual. Skin color, head shape, facial formation, and the characteristics of the hair have been selected out and used precisely because they are superficial and therefore obvious. As we have said before, what the conquering whites needed after the Great Voyages was an obvious, inescapable index by which to identify the conquered. Skin color, head shape, and so on, were precisely the kinds of traits needed. So common sense has used them as indicative of common descent without worrying about the genetic origins of some thousands of less obvious traits.

Not only is genetically determined race useless as an index of social status; it scrambles present common-sense classifications all up. In relative percentages of Types O, A, B, and AB, for example, the Flat-head Indians of Montana are actually closer to the English of London than they are to their neighbors, the Ute Indians of Montana; the Germans of Berlin are closer to the Turks of Istanbul than they are to Londoners; and the Congo Pygmies are closer to the Chinese than the Chinese are to the Japanese! These facts appear in Table I-8.1.

Obviously, serological races as determined by exact blood tests do

¹ William C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1950, p. 267.

not conform to the common-sense conception of race any more closely than do the racial overlappings described by the anthropologists. Scientific classifications of human varieties fail to fit the common-sense, all-alike social dichotomy of mankind into white and colored. The biological facts are vastly more complicated than such a simple, practical concept as the color line can comprehend.

TABLE I-8.1. Comparative Percentages of Given Blood Types Found in Different Sample Populations of Various "Races"

Item	Population Sampled	Number in Sample	Blood Type				Differences a-b, etc.				
			O	A	B	AB	Item	O	A	B	AB
a	Ute Indians, Montana	138	97.4	2.6	0	0	a-b	45.9	-39.6	-4.7	-1.6
b	Flatheads, Montana	258	51.5	42.2	4.7	1.6	b-c	3.6	-.2	-3.6	.2
c	Englishmen, London	422	47.9	42.4	8.3	1.4					
d	Germans, Berlin	39,174	36.5	42.5	14.5	6.5	d-e	2.7	-.1	-.3	-2.3
e	Turks, Istanbul	500	33.8	42.6	14.8	8.8	d-c	-1.4	.1	6.2	5.1
f	Pygmies, Congo	1,032	30.6	30.3	29.1	10.0	f-g	-3.6	-.5	1.4	2.7
g	Chinese, Huang-Ho	2,127	34.2	30.8	27.7	7.3	g-h	4.1	-7.6	5.8	-2.4
h	Japanese, Tokyo	29,799	30.1	38.4	21.9	9.7					

Data selected from Table 23, "Frequencies of Blood Groups O, A, B, and AB in Typical Populations," in William C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1950, pp. 223-225. Dr. Boyd's "isogenes" or lines connecting blood groups with Gene A run through every continent except South America and are particularly dense in Australia. His "isogenes" for blood groups with Gene B skirt Australia, ignore North America, and are present only in question marks in South America. See pp. 228-229.

This means that the common-sense concept of race, having parted company with the facts, is no longer a tool of understanding at all. It is, in fact, one of the major ways of misunderstanding the facts of human variation.

But this does not mean that the color-line concept of race has lost its practical usefulness. The concept of the earth as flat had to be given up if Europe was to expand overseas. The needs of enterprise forced man to accept as fact evidence that contradicted the testimony of his own senses. No such practical need—unless one counts the need of

winning Asia and Africa against Communism—is pressing Americans to revise their common-sense stereotype of race. In the form of the color line, the common-sense stereotype still functions effectively as an instrument not of understanding but of social control. It provides an easy and obvious basis on which to allocate privilege and handicap. This, in fact, seems to have been its major function since white men and colored men—Indians and Negroes—first came into contact on this continent.²

I-8:5. The Negro in America

Despite the reported presence of a Negro among Columbus' sailors and of others a few years later in Coronado's exploring party in New Mexico in the early 1500's, the African Negro entered American history several generations later. One hot August day in 1619 a Dutch sea captain cast anchor off the struggling little English settlement of Jamestown, Virginia, and offered "20 naggars" for sale. What he had every intention of doing was to sell his "20 naggars" into slavery, as he might easily have done at any port in the Spanish sugar islands to the south. But unlike the Spanish sugar planters in the West Indies, the English settlers in Virginia had no such institution as slavery. The nearest they could come to it, by way of reimbursing the enterprising Dutch sea captain, was indentured servitude. Indentured servitude was familiar enough in England as a way of binding for seven years some poor boy or girl to work out for a master the cost of the servant's apprenticeship training or the cost of transportation to the New World. So the Jamestown settlers, who desperately needed workers, took the "20 naggars" in as indentured servants, each bound for seven years to work off for his master whatever price the master had paid to the Dutch sea captain for thoughtfully having bought him from native slave raiders in Africa and then having managed to keep him alive on the long voyage to America.

As indentured servants the twenty found themselves in exactly the same social status as poor white men and women who were working

² Race relations constituted practically the first human problem the invading colonists encountered when they landed in America in the early 1600's. But since the "Indian problem" has become mainly one for a minor department of the federal government, and Indians constitute less than two-tenths of 1 percent of the population, we confine this project to whites and Negroes. Negroes constitute about 9 percent of the population, or relatively about forty five times as large a population element in America as the Indians whose ancestors "owned" it all. It is estimated that when Columbus reached the West Indies in 1492 there were probably 800,000 Indians in what is now continental United States. In a total population April 1, 1950, of 150,697,000, identifiable Indians numbered approximately one-third of a million.

off the costs of their passage from England. They were housed in the same way and allowed to associate on the same level. Within a few years, as more and more blacks were brought in, white and black indentured servants began to intermarry.

But the blacks suffered under fatal handicaps from the start. They were not Englishmen who merely happened to be black. They were ignorant savages who could not speak the language and knew nothing of their rights as indentured servants under English law. They had been kidnaped from their native inland villages in Africa by black slave raiders from the coast tribes; had been sold to slave captains like our Dutch friend for a few bolts of cheap cloth each, or a piece of iron, or a jug of whiskey; and then, branded and chained between decks, men and women together in a stinking slave ship that could be smelled five miles downwind, had endured the terrible selective tortures of heat, thirst, filth, and disease on the long, slow voyage to the New World. Only the toughest and most docile survived.

They landed in a hard world in a brutal age. The colonists, clinging precariously to a toehold along the coast, needed labor and needed it desperately. And there was nothing in the mores of the mother country to teach them forbearance toward the lower classes. Thousands of white boys and girls were being kidnaped every year in England at that very time for transportation to America. In the most advanced countries of Europe poverty-hardened parents were not above surgically disfiguring the faces of their own children to provide grotesque little entertainers for the rich. The seventeenth century, which saw Englishmen chop off the head of a king to teach royalty moderation at home, was not a time when men who could not stand up for themselves might expect favors or even fair play three thousand miles away on the edge of the American wilderness.

Yet for a while, until the white colonists began to realize the possibilities before them, some of these black indentured servants in Virginia did fare reasonably well. Many of them were actually set free at the end of their seven years, and some of these free blacks even acquired land and black indentured servants of their own. There is no record that these black masters particularly surpassed the whites in kindness to their own black servants. In fact, one Negro indentured servant had to sue his black master to win his release at the end of *his* seven years!

But the needs of white survival plus the inability of the ignorant blacks to act together could have only one result.

It began gradually, almost imperceptibly.³ Hardly a decade after the first blacks had arrived, three indentured servants in Virginia ran away: a Dutchman, an Englishman, and a Negro. Recaptured, all three were treated with that majestic impartiality of the law which three centuries later was to move Anatole France to remark that the rich as well as the poor are forbidden to sleep on park benches and under bridges: in short, all three were given twenty lashes each. But for the Negro alone was reserved the distinction of receiving a further sentence of servitude for life. Then came another "straw in the wind": a law requiring that as a protection against Indians all settlers must equip themselves with firearms. All, that is, *except Negroes*.

By the 1650's the pleasant and profitable white inability to count to seven had extended even to New England, where, indeed, Massachusetts led the way toward "putting the Negro in his place": it decreed that Negro servants were in fact servants for life. A year or so later the self-righteous Puritan colony made the children of life servants themselves life servants—in other words, *slaves*. Thus, within a generation the transformation had been wrought. Chattel slavery, which was to become the "peculiar institution" of the South, now replaced black indentured servitude.

Of course custom did not harden into law at the same rate in all the colonies. But by the middle of the eighteenth century black chattel slavery was firmly established from Massachusetts to Georgia.

It is unnecessary to trace the fortunes of chattel slavery in America—how the institution languished in the North less because of the superior moral virtues associated with cold winters than because northern hard-scrabble farmers couldn't make any money out of it; how the invention of the cotton gin by a Connecticut schoolteacher during a southern vacation revived a dying institution and saddled cotton-gang slavery firmly on the South for another two generations; how eventually the struggle for the control of the government at Washington by slaveowners and northern industrialists issued in the War Between the States and the abolition of slavery by the victorious North. Nor need we recount the particular villainies of the Reconstruction period—how northern bayonets supported carpetbag state governments that virtually looted the southern states; how northern capitalists forged the structure of railroad rates and public and private

³ For details of the origins and evolution of slavery in America consult Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery*, New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1918. Dr. Phillips, a Southerner by birth, taught history at the University of Michigan and at Yale during the second and third decades of this century.

credit that kept the South in economic bondage to the North for two more generations; how carpetbaggers from the North and southern scalawags together, misleading and misusing the ignorant ex-slaves, dominated and exploited the conquered provinces; and how all this together embittered race relations till it became the most explosive social issue of the South. The common heritage of slavery plus the vengefulness and corruption of Reconstruction issued in the southern racial caste system that now divides the South.

In the North, where Negroes were comparatively rare until the migrations during and after World War I, culture provided few positive patterns of racial accommodation. There were, indeed, equal rights laws in a few northern states, passed in a flurry of resentment against a Supreme Court decision in the 1880's that had knocked out similar federal legislation, but enforcement had long since lapsed. When southern field hands began moving north it was the racial attitudes of the South rather than the negative tolerances of the North that now came to the front. Even as industrialization began diffusing southward with the southward movement of New England cotton mills toward cheaper labor markets, the northward trek of Negroes for industrial jobs caused a diffusion of southern caste attitudes to the North.

The result at mid-century was a confusion of attitudes in the North and an increase of strain and tension between the races both North and South. In the South the old caste system was under increasing pressure on the economic front. In the North the old negative tolerance for a race that wasn't there was under pressure from the diffusing southern attitude of intolerance of the social claims of a race that obviously was there.

Meanwhile, before we look more closely at racial categories in America, it is important to appraise another complicating factor—the cult of racism that grew up during the last century.

I-8:6. The Pseudo Science of Racism

Between 1853 and 1855 a French aristocrat, Count de Gobineau, published *An Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* which started a backfire against the democratizing influences of the French Revolution that has not yet burned out. This essay appeared at a time when the new science of biology was just beginning to attract wide attention. De Gobineau purported to find in biology comforting evidence that civilization is the unique product of one race, the so-called Ary-

ans, who, he seemed to think, consisted of the peoples of northwestern Europe. Actually, of course, there was no such thing as an Aryan race and never had been. The term *Aryan* refers only to the languages of a certain linguistic family, a purely cultural product and not a race at all. Later writers, forced by the facts of life to give up the noble Aryans, shifted the reference of the Hero Race to the Teutons, the Germans, or the Nordics, as the case might be. These, it seemed, were the great creators of history, the unique builders, the conquerors, the makers of the modern world.

All of which amounts to one of the most unhistorical historical myths ever created. Anthropologists have long since demonstrated that civilization is anything but a unity produced by any one people. It is a cumulative hodge-podge to which peoples from all over the world have contributed: iron from North Africa; the mathematical zero symbol from India via the Arabs; potatoes from South America; canoes from the North American Indians; gunpowder from the Chinese; log cabins from Sweden; and so on, and so on. Against a backdrop of twenty-odd civilizations spanning sixty or more centuries, the Teutons, Germans, or Nordics who barge into history as barbarians twenty centuries ago stand now on much the same level in claiming unique authorship of civilization as the contemporary Soviet Russians who modestly admit their own unique priority in inventing everything from the use of fire to colored toilet paper!

But the myth of the Great Race appealed too powerfully to aristocratic temperaments to be dispelled by scientific facts. Richard Wagner, for example, reacting apparently against his own probably baseless fear of clandestine Jewish blood in his veins, became convinced that the Germans were the Hero Race of history and proceeded to write some of the most powerful nationalistic propaganda that the world has ever seen—or heard—his great folk operas exalting primitive Teutonism. Then in the 1890's came a book by an Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who had married Wagner's daughter and settled in Bayreuth, the Wagnerian shrine: *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*.⁴ This devoted Volume I to proving the surpassing excellence of the Germanic peoples, the Hero Race of history, and Volume II to proving the surpassing wickedness of the Jews, the Devil Race of history. Kaiser Wilhelm II thought so highly of this opus that he distributed bales of autographed copies to his friends and advanced Chamberlain to the status of a kind of Pooh-Bah of

⁴ American edition, New York, John Lane Company, 1910.

German letters. As such, the recreant Englishman later, in the early 1920's, hailed an ex-postcard painter named Hitler, an obscure beer-hall ranter at the moment, as the "future savior of Germany"—a feat of clairvoyance that entitles him to more respect than all the autographed copies of *The Foundations*.

Meanwhile, in America Madison Grant had taken up the theme in *The Passing of the Great Race*, and Lothrop Stoddard, Henry F. Osborne, and a few others joined in bemoaning the decline of the Nordics, whose greatness, it seemed, consisted of everything except ability to meet Darwin's simple test of biological fitness, namely, ability to leave enough progeny to continue the stock under existing conditions!

One racist genius even "discovered" that Jesus of Nazareth was really a Nordic. Lacking conclusive historical evidence of this not-so-obvious fact, the investigator established his point by showing that since "only Nordics are creative," there could be no other conclusion! This method of establishing doubtful points entitles devotees of racism to rank with initiates of those other great intellectual contributions—astrology, dianetics, and voodooism!

With Hitler's policy of genocide, racism, however, ceased to be funny. In the extermination of 6,000,000 Jews and the deliberate kidnapping of tens of thousands of blond infants by the Nazis in conquered countries during World War II—to keep up the supply of Nordics (Hitler himself being an Alpine!)—racism reached the pathological. Buchenwald stands as a byword for the nether depths of human depravity.

Yet racism, weakening though it is under the impacts of modern science, economic pressures, liberalism, and the needs of democratic propaganda in Asia and Africa, is likely to linger in the American scene for a long time to come. It is too deeply embedded in white mores both North and South and serves white needs too neatly to be easily uprooted. In the South all forms of association from the playground to the cemetery are predicated on it, and in the North it motivates informal segregation practices and sabotages equal rights laws. Psychologically and socially it serves three important purposes in the white culture: (1) It provides the simplest available rationalization for the prevailing gap between the American belief in equality of opportunity and human dignity, on the one hand, and the brutal facts of white advantage and Negro disadvantage, on the other—in short, it eases the white man's conscience; (2) for the poor white in the South

and for the frustrated machine hand in the North it acts as the cheapest ego inflater on the market—one cannot be wholly insignificant if someone else is more so; and (3) finally, it arms unscrupulous employers both North and South with an infallible weapon for fighting unions. “You want to work with niggers?” has stopped many a union drive dead in its tracks—and has left the black man no alternative but to scab on his white competitor. Whether as mere folk belief or masquerading as pseudo science, racism is too much a part of the mores and too useful to too many whites to fade easily or quickly from the scene. The caste heritage of slavery lingers on.

I-8:7. Highlights of Racial Stratification in the United States

Table I-8.2 summarizes some of the most marked contrasts between Negroes and whites in the United States.

In 1950 Negroes constituted about 9.8 percent of the American people, less than half as many *relatively* as at the time of the first census in 1790. Population experts estimate that they will never exceed 20 to 25 millions in a total United States population that may reach 200 millions by 1975.

Of the 15,000,000 Negroes in the United States in 1950, two-thirds, or 10,000,000, lived in fourteen southern states and the District of Columbia and constituted 22.2 percent of the population of that section. In scores of counties, however, particularly in Alabama and Mississippi—in the latter of which they constituted 45 percent of the state population—Negroes outnumbered whites 8 or 9 to 1. Georgia and North Carolina each counted more than 1,000,000 Negroes, who made up 30.8 percent of the Peach State and 25.7 percent of North Carolina. The great majority of southern Negroes were field hands or one-mule tenant farmers, many of them destined within the next decade or two to be displaced by the flame weeder and the mechanical cotton picker and thus forced to seek jobs in southern and northern cities, as several millions already had done during the great migrations of World War I and World War II.

On the average, as Table I-8.2 shows, Negroes live shorter lives than do the whites and lose more of their babies during their first year of life. Far more of them are ignorant field hands, poverty-stricken tenant farmers, or unskilled urban workers. They receive less schooling than the whites and what little most of them get is of inferior quality. Their per capita wealth, estimated at less than \$5 in 1865, is still only a fraction of the white average, and their per capita incomes are much lower

TABLE I-8.2. Highlights of White-Negro Contrasts in the United States, 1790-1950

Characteristic	White	Negro
Population		
1790	3,172,006	757,208
1950	135,215,000	15,043,598
Distribution of population, 1920 and 1940		
17 southern states and D.C.		
1920 percentage of total U.S.	25.4	85.0
1950 percentage of total	26.7	77.0
31 other states		
1920 percentage of total U.S.	74.6	15.0
1950 percentage of total	73.3	23.0
Life expectancy, 1939-1941, in years		
Males	62.8	52.2
Females	67.3	55.5
Infant mortality (deaths under one year per 1000 live births)		
United States, 1948	29.9	46.5 ^a
Median years of schooling completed by persons 25 years old and over		
United States, 1940	Native white 8.8	
	Foreign-born white 7.3	5.7
Most backward states		
South Carolina	8.7	3.9
Mississippi	8.9	3.9
Median income, age 25-64, 1940		
Males	\$1217.00	\$520.00
Average days school attendance per pupil enrolled, 1948, in 17 southern states and D.C.	153.4	143.1
In most backward state, Mississippi	150.0	117.8
Racial percentages of 56,432 prisoners received by state and federal prisons, 1946, excluding Mississippi	67.0	33.0
Racial percentage of 2831 prisoners executed by civil authorities, 1930-1948	44.8	54.0
(Other races 1.2)		

^a U.S. rate for "nonwhites," mostly Negroes. Total Indians, 1940, 333,969. Chinese, Japanese, and others than Indians and Negroes, 254,918. Total colored non-Negro, 588,887. The highest state rate for infant deaths under one year of age among nonwhites was in rural Maine: 181.8 per 1000 live births; next highest, rural nonwhites in New Mexico: 175.7. Both peak rates among Indians rather than Negroes. Highest nonwhite rate in a southern state, 56.1 in urban South Carolina. The South Carolina rural nonwhite rate, 48.6; the white rates, 30.1 urban and 33.8 rural.

From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, appropriate tables.

and much more uncertain than are white incomes. It is a commonplace in northern industry that Negroes are "the last ones hired and the first ones fired." These are the objective facts indexing some of the impacts of racial categories on human association in the United States.

The question here is not to evaluate these facts but to observe whatever evidence we can find, direct or indirect, of these impacts.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 8

To show the incidence of racial categories on situations and on conditioning variables

For students in southern states:

1. Show how in some particular community racial categories affect
 - a. Distribution of population and quality of housing.
 - b. Distribution of employment—what kinds of jobs are associated with each race?
 - c. Property ownership, distribution of wealth.
 - d. Political control.
 - e. Education.
 - f. Specific situations in the community.

For students in the North, the East, or the West:

In communities with an appreciable Negro population:

1. Show how racial categories affect, or are involved in, the same six aspects of local life as indicated for southern communities.

In communities with no appreciable Negro population:

1. Prepare a report on race and racism in recent scientific literature. Consult *Reader's Guide*, *Psychological Abstracts*, indexes of *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, *Social Forces*, *The American Anthropologist*, etc. Or
2. Write a review in 2000 to 3000 words of Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, showing evidence bearing on the same six aspects of community life as indicated above for students in southern states. Or as an alternative, do the same for Drake and Cayton's *Black Metropolis*.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Read William C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1950. (Available also in pocket-book edition.)

Show in some detail the implications of this conception of race for the popular conception of race as all-alike people of distinctive skin color. How would you harmonize the two?

PROJECT B

Instead of concerning yourself with skin color, classify the next 100 persons you meet in terms of eye color. That is, start thinking of eye-color "races." Tabulate your results and interpret in terms of the race concept.

Eye color is obviously inherited. Why not use it as a basis of human classification and control association accordingly?

Supplementary Readings

Boyd, William C., *Genetics and the Races of Man*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1950.

Myrdal, Gunnar, *An American Dilemma*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

Phillips, Ulrich B., *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime*. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1918.

Conditioning Variables: Permanent Forms of Association— Local Social Systems

I-9:1. The Problem

Each of us lives in some local social system.

The word *system* comes from the Greek, *synistanai*, meaning “to place together.” As Webster puts it, a system is an “assemblage of objects united by some form of regular interaction or interdependence; an organic or organized whole.” So by local social system we refer to an “*assemblage*” or *aggregation of individuals and institutional organizations located in an identifiable geographical locality and functioning in various degrees of interdependence as a permanent organized unit of the social order.*

The problem is to analyze a typical local social system so as to bring out its distinctive characteristics as a system and show how it forms the locus or place in which all the other associational forms and conditioning variables which we have been studying up to this point actually operate.

We distinguish four degrees of magnitude and complexity among local social systems:

1. The neighborhood.
2. The local community.
3. The metropolitan center, or metropolitan aggregation of sub-communities.
4. The metropolitan region, or area of community interdependences around the center.

In this chapter we shall consider the neighborhood and the local

community, reserving the metropolitan center and the metropolitan region for Chapter 10.

I-9:2. The Neighborhood

The smallest and simplest distinguishable local social system in American society is the neighborhood. A neighborhood is a residence-subsistence aggregate of a number of families in an identifiable local area whose members tend to associate spontaneously and without specific plan or organization, and to feel a certain sense of identification with the locality. At its simplest, under frontier rural conditions in this country, the neighborhood was also a primary group. In Cooley's original sense, a primary group is a small group of people in more or less permanent association who know one another by their first names, who meet face to face day after day in the normal course of living, and who associate freely without the constraint of special purpose or definite organization. In preliterate cultures and in early rural America the family, the children's play group, and the neighborhood were the clearest examples, the family here being regarded as a free association group and not as an organized group or as an institution.¹

In the last 500,000 years most of the human race have lived most of their lives under primary conditions. Cooley regarded the primary group as the great spontaneous generator of moral unity—loyalty, kindness to members, and respect for the unwritten “rules of the game.” Whatever may have been true in the past, the fact confronts us today that over large areas of American life primary group relations have almost disappeared. Lasting, intimate, face-to-face, unspecialized, free association finds hard going in a complex, highly specialized culture in which the residents of many rural neighborhoods no longer confine their friendships to the vicinity and many urban residents do not even know the people next door. Unconstrained, full, and free association with the people in one's immediate locality is no longer the norm of association even for great numbers of American farmers, to say nothing of urban workmen, businessmen, and other city dwellers. This means that the neighborhood as a primary group has disappeared except in the rural backwoods.

In urban life families still struggle to live as primary groups despite clubs, union meetings, business engagements, bridge, the movies, the radio, television, and the automobile. Perhaps children in their spon-

¹ A father playing with his children is in a primary relationship. The moment he asserts authority he steps back into his role as the head of an institutional organization.

taneous play groups come closer to the original pattern than any others, and it is certain that in the social contacts which they establish at school and in these play groups at home they do more to keep neighborhood feeling alive than does any other single factor in modern culture.

We need to distinguish, then, the primary group, or highly personalized neighborhood, from the secondary, or impersonal, neighborhood.

A primary group neighborhood as it existed in Mark Twain's youth before the Civil War had three definite characteristics which one does not find in the modern impersonal neighborhood: It was a *gossip area*; it was *the area in which a person spent his leisure time*; and it was *the area within which mutual aid took the form of neighboring*. Gossip is the interactive expression of narrow, personality-centered intellectual interests. Local sociability is an expression of limited motility and of poverty of organized leisure-time outlets. Neighboring is direct mutual aid, an expression of simple, unspecialized economic relationships. In short, in preindustrial America a primary group neighborhood was a small aggregate of families living in a distinguishable area within which exchange of intimate opinions, leisure-time contacts, and mutual aid were all spontaneous and unorganized.

Many rural neighborhoods still retain these characteristics. But many others have long since seen newcomers take the place of old families, and the Grange and other organizations preempt the time and energies of neighbors. They have seen the automobile widen the circle of association and habitual contact far beyond the limits of vicinage. And they have seen other technological changes decrease the mutual interdependence of neighbors and increase rural dependence on the mail-order catalogue, the village bakery, and the farm-implement industry.

As population grows, as diverse population elements move in, as outside competition attracts more and more of one's leisure time, and as institutional organizations—lodges, stores, etc.—provide more and more of the services once provided by mutual aid, a local area gradually loses its primary characteristics and eventually even the characteristics of spontaneity, lack of organization, and sense of identification which mark it as a distinct neighborhood. Psychologically, economically, socially, and politically the area changes tone. It seldom changes all at once. But gradually exchange of opinion loses its delightful intimacy and eventually stops altogether. The area ceases to be a gossip area as attention turns more and more to broader collective interests.

Local sociability gets pushed further and further into the background by a wider range of friendships and a more selective basis of association. Instead of borrowing sugar from the folks down the road or exchanging help in the haying season, now you go to the store for your groceries, and pay with money for any additional labor that you may need in a crisis. Politically, a sense of local independence looking toward future self-government begins to develop. After ceasing to be a primary group, your neighborhood has presently ceased to be an area of neighbors. It has become a mere locality whose lingering name of neighborhood slurs over the fact that it is no longer an area of simple friendships, undifferentiated functions, and naïve identifications. Just when any particular phase of this transition supervenes may be difficult to determine. But that such a transition does take place may be verified in neighborhood after neighborhood all over the United States.

Four major forces transform the neighborhood: *population concentration* (increasing density); *centralization* (urbanization); *social and economic specialization* (division of labor); and *social and economic interdependence of institutional organizations*. In the end these turn many neighborhoods into *local communities*.

I-9:3. The Local Community

The term *community* is a beautiful example of the difficulty of trying to develop careful scientific thinking about social phenomena while still using the language of everyday. Ordinary usage applies the term *community* to any residence-subsistence aggregate of organisms from a "community of plants" to the human "world community." One reads of a "community of monks," the "rural community," the "urban community," the "ecological community," the "spiritual and moral community," and so on. Obviously what such usage seeks to do is to emphasize *common* life conditions and characteristics. Our present concern, however, is not merely with common life conditions and characteristics but with distinctive *differences* as well. We must have names for *degrees of difference* in common life conditions and characteristics. To call every residence-subsistence unit whose members have anything in common a community is obviously to give up the task of analysis. Why not call everything the human race and be done with it!

For our purposes, by the term *community* we shall refer to a *local social system within a total society, in an identifiable area and charac-*

terized by relatively complex interdependence of institutional organizations. In this sense the term cannot be applied to a single monastery as a community of monks, or to the world community. We can, however, speak of a *local* community, a *metropolitan* community, and a *metropolitan regional* community. We can also direct attention to the *ecological* or *functional* community, if we so desire, or concern ourselves with the *normative* community, the community of common values and ideals.

In this assignment we center attention on the local community. The metropolitan and metropolitan regional communities will occupy our attention in Chapter 10.

I-9:4. Origin and Significance of the Local Community

The local community is a residence-subsistence aggregate with complex interdependence of institutional organizations within a specific local area. In this sense there are rural communities and urban communities. Using a purely objective criterion, the census classifies all identifiable aggregates of people below 2500 as rural, and 2500 and above as urban.

In both, *the distinctive characteristic of the community is that a constellation of institutional organizations has grown up around a particular center of specialized function.* In the beginning this may have been a blockhouse, a trading post, a crossroads store, a blacksmith shop, a factory, or anything of the kind. The point is, given this center of functional organization, the exact location of which is usually determined by such factors as water supply, strategic position, transportation, and the like, other men find it convenient and profitable to settle near by. A centralization of functions and therefore of population begins. Centralization is the ecologist's term for the process (or the result) by which the position of interrelated social and economic functions tends toward a minimum of intervening distance consistent with mutual efficiency. Given a blockhouse in a pioneer settlement, for example, it is obviously more efficient in terms of protection, etc., other things being equal, to build a meeting house near by than to build it ten miles away. With the fort and the meeting house together, it is likewise more efficient, other things being equal, for a storekeeper to locate near them than to go off by himself into the wilderness. When a blacksmith comes along it makes more sense for him to set up his forge near the fort, the meeting house, and the trading post than to go off to the edges of the settlement. By the operation of ordinary com-

mon-sense motives for maximizing advantages and minimizing disadvantages, men responsible for social and economic functions of this kind seek positions of optimum opportunity. The result is the tendency for all kinds of social and economic functions which are not tied to dispersed locations by the nature of the task to draw together in particular centers. This tendency has been at work for ages; but with the coming of the commercial revolution in western Europe from about 1300 on, the rise of capitalism, and eventually, in the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution it received an enormous impetus. This manifested itself during the nineteenth century in the tremendous growth of cities in every industrialized nation from Germany to Japan. The United States shared in this transformation. At the first census in 1790, less than 5 percent of the population lived in places of 2500 or more and there were only 33 places classed as urban. In 1950, 59 percent of the population by the old definition was urban and there were over 120 times as many urban places. Five of these exceeded a million each and 41 exceeded a quarter of a million. There were 235 places of 50,000 or more. In all, urban and rural places of all sizes considerably exceeded 17,000 and there were several thousands of unincorporated places under 2500 each. The distribution of population in terms of these communities in 1950 and by percentages in 1950 and 1910 was as follows:

Size of Community	Number of Places, 1950	Total Population, 1950 (old definition)	Percentage of Population	
			1950	1910
Rural territory	13,235 (under 2,500)	61,769,897	41.0	54.3
Urban territory	4,023	88,927,464	59.0	45.7
Places 1,000,000 or more	5	17,404,450	11.5	9.2
Places of 500,000 to 1,000,000	13	9,186,945	6.1	3.3
Places of 250,000 to 500,000	23	8,241,560	5.5	4.3
Places of 100,000 to 250,000	66	9,614,111	6.4	5.3
Places of 50,000 to 100,000	128	9,073,363	6.0	4.5
Places of 25,000 to 50,000	271	9,495,862	6.3	4.4
Places of 10,000 to 25,000	814	12,467,229	8.3	6.0
Places of 5,000 to 10,000	1,133	7,878,675	5.2	4.6
Places of 2,500 to 5,000	1,570	5,565,269	3.7	4.1

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1953*, pp. 26-27.

Even in 1937, four years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the National Resources Committee found almost half of the nation's people living in or close to cities of over 100,000, so that a high degree of urbanization characterized the life of more than half of all Americans

even then. Already most Americans were tied into the metropolitan (big city) network by automobiles, surfaced roads, urban newspapers, the radio, and the interdependences of metropolitan dominance over railroads, banks, manufacture, insurance, and wholesale distribution. The growth of air traffic and the coming of television during the 1940's further extended this dominance. What the increasing dominance of a few great centers means we shall try to see more in detail in the next chapter. Meanwhile, at this point we focus attention on the local community.

I-9:5. The Local Urban Community

Local urban communities in America are usually marked by seven distinctive characteristics: (1) symbols of continuous identity; (2) centralization of population; (3) nonagricultural occupations; (4) separation of residence from occupation; (5) permanent patterns of motility; (6) definite ecological patterns of development into diverse areas of advantage and disadvantage; and (7) local self-government.

1. SYMBOLS OF CONTINUOUS IDENTITY

These symbols include a name, a community tradition, legal autonomy, the right to control common local affairs.

2. CENTRALIZATION OF POPULATION

Population density per square mile is many times greater than that of a purely agricultural population. The average urban place in the United States had a population (1950) of 22,020 (old definition). Population density in the United States averages over 50 per square mile of land area. On good farming land it runs from 20 to 60 per square mile in the open country. Urban densities vary greatly, depending on real-estate developments; but in general they run from 16 to more than 2000 *times* the density of agricultural communities. Dearborn, Michigan, for example, had a density per square mile of 2533 in 1940; Detroit, 11,650; Washington, D.C., 11,000; New York City, 23,200 (Manhattan alone, by day, 145,000). (By way of comparison, the center of Hiroshima on August 1, 1945, had 46,000 per square mile—a comparison worth thinking about in the light of expert opinion that the best effective defense against atomic bombs is *decentralization*.)

3. NONAGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS

Practically all cities reported a sprinkling of actual farmers among their occupational classifications in 1940 and 1950. Boston, for ex-

ample, reported 388 engaged in agriculture; Detroit, 799. But Boston's 388 farmers constituted only one-tenth of 1 percent of her 270,000 employed in all kinds of industry; Detroit's 799 only a little more—twelve-hundredths of 1 percent out of 625,000. Agriculture, in other words, is not what one would call a typical occupation in urban communities. Manufacturing, trade, and service industries predominate within corporate limits. The important characteristic of these industries is that they *concentrate jobs*, bring many people together in a relatively limited space. Hence the higher density of urban populations.

4. RESIDENCE DIVORCED FROM OCCUPATION

Farmers live with their work. So did the masters and craftsmen of medieval days and the workers during the period of domestic industry. The industrial revolution changed all that. While in big cities at least there is still a sprinkling of small storekeepers, minor craftsmen like shoe repairmen, etc., who live under the same roof with their occupations, the prevailing urban pattern is for residence to be sharply separated from office, store, and factory. A man may live in a factory district, but he does not live in the factory. Millions, therefore, have to travel back and forth to their work. Hence the to-and-fro shuttle of workers morning and evening—and the resulting headaches of traffic congestion. Traffic, of course, moves according to another characteristic culture trait of local social systems:

5. PATTERNS OF MOTILITY—THE HIGHWAY GRID

Unlike rural neighborhoods, in which farmers and their families live widely dispersed, each family with its own work under its own roof or at its own doorstep, urban communities have to provide for the movement to and from their jobs, and to and from the markets, of large proportions of their own populations. Hence, dating from the 1830's, the rapid development of intra-community transport systems—horse-cars, elevated railroads, cable cars, electric lines, subways, bus lines, and doubtless in the near future helicopter services. The tremendous role of the individually owned automobile in this spectacle of inrush and outrush of population twice a day in a great city can be seen at its worst on the great traffic arteries feeding New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Detroit, and hundreds of smaller places. In 1933, for example, McKenzie found a traffic volume moving on five Detroit trunk-line routes approximating each day within five miles of

the city hall *one-fifth* of the city's population, and fifteen miles out still a number equal to about one-tenth of the city's total.² Probably those proportions are higher today, since Detroit's traffic problem seems to have grown faster than its population (population increase, 1930-50, 281,000, or just under 18 percent). New York's problem of its shuttle population is, of course, well known: More than one-third of the city's daytime population moves in and out every working day. Distances traveled to work vary greatly in different communities, being greater in the large cities than in the smaller. But on the eve of World War II, over 7 percent of Detroit's industrial workers traveled fifteen miles or more to their jobs, and 21 percent more than ten miles.³ The average haul for the 42,000 employees of the great Willow Run bomber plant at the peak of its employment in June, 1943, was twenty-seven miles one way!⁴

It is obvious that urban patterns of motility must provide for the movement of vast numbers of people every 24 hours.

Meanwhile, how do urban populations distribute themselves in space within their communities?

6. THE URBAN ECOLOGICAL PATTERN

With city residence separated from work—sometimes by many miles—the very same psychological and social forces that produced the community in the first place continue to operate, namely, the individual's desire to maximize opportunities and minimize handicaps. This results in a tendency for factories to locate along transportation routes—rivers, harbors, railroads—and for stores, banks, etc., to locate near one another. People with low incomes, i.e., with a restricted range of residential choices, have to settle nearer to their work and under less desirable living conditions than do people with wider

² Based on data from R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933, p. 87, as cited in Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*, New York, Ronald Press Company, 1950, p. 256. Approximately 170,000 vehicles were counted every twenty-four hours at the five-mile circle on the five principal trunk-line routes and 80,000 at the fifteen-mile circle. Detroit's population in 1933 was between 1,568,000 (1930) and 1,623,000 (1940). Unlike New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, Detroit has a comparatively small population movement each day by suburban railway service; hence, a higher percentage of Detroiters move by bus and private automobile. Each vehicle counted in 1933 can be assumed to have carried at least two persons. Forty miles out, the five trunk-line highways were carrying a total of over 30,000 vehicles per day.

³ Hawley, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁴ Lowell Juilliard Carr and James Edson Stermer, *Willow Run: A Study of Industrialization and Cultural Inadequacy*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952. Unpublished field notes on estimates by union gas rationing committee.

ranges of residential choices. The same kinds of jobs draw together; the same kinds of residential conditions grow up together. Left to free competition, i.e., without the intervention of community planning, all this results in a distribution of functions and of living arrangements which in city after city tends to approximate the famous concentric-circle, target pattern made familiar by the Chicago school of sociologists in the late 1920's.




FIG. I-9.1. Abstract Pattern of Ecological Distribution of Disadvantage and Privilege in Typical American City Under Laissez-Faire Culture. (Adapted from Chicago model.)

Overall and disregarding for the moment the various epicentral patterns that develop within the master pattern, this target pattern approximates five concentric zones, as shown in Figure I-9.1.

At the center, for the very same common-sense reasons for maximizing opportunities and minimizing handicaps that produce communities in the first place, one finds business and control agencies clustering together. This is the *business center*—the area of highest interactive activity and highest real-estate values per front foot.

Around the business center for the same reasons that have produced the center itself one finds a *zone of deterioration*, or transition. This is sometimes called the *blighted area*. What has blighted it is the fact that as the business center grew, surrounding residents who had any liberty of residential choice moved away from the encroaching noise,

bustle, and confusion. At the same time small businesses and often shady businesses that could outbid working men moved in. The zone which the city's larger businesses were not yet ready to appropriate became a prey to little businesses and shady businesses—poolrooms, cheap rooming houses, houses of prostitution, skid row, the flotsam and jetsam of the community. So around every major business center in every competitively built American city one finds this zone of deterioration and transition.

One also finds the beginnings of such zones around the smaller business centers that tend to develop in every sizable city within the major pattern. These minor centers tend to appear wherever there is a permanent reason for people to congregate—in factory districts, at important junction points in the city's transportation network, and so on. Around each minor center as it develops the same blighting process goes to work.

The result, of course, is to thrust workers' homes outward from the center beyond the major zone of deterioration and outward from each of the minor zones. Ordinary workers are not the most powerful bidders for residential advantages. They can always be outbid by the middle and upper classes. The middle class in turn can always be outbid by the wealthy. The result is for workers' homes to arrange themselves outside the zone of deterioration, the middle class to go still farther out, and the wealthy to select the most advantageous locations wherever they may be—usually on hills, as on Mount Royal in Montreal, or in choice suburbs such as those in Westchester and other outlying counties near New York or along the "main line" west of Philadelphia.

Naturally, as the community perimeter grows by the ratio of π times the diameter, the smallest social class in the community, the wealthy, cannot occupy the entire circumference. For the same reasons that have produced the clustering of businesses, cheap rooming houses, workingmen's homes, and middle-class families the wealthy also tend to cluster. The result is that at many of the relatively less desirable points on the community's perimeter the way is open for enterprising real-estate men to develop cheap subdivisions for workingmen seeking to escape high rents and overcrowding. Hence, around the perimeter of many rapidly growing cities we have the spectacle of exclusive suburbs, on the one hand, and partially organized fringe settlements of garage homes, basement dwellings, and the like, on the other.

Throughout any ordinary community, in short, and throughout the

entire country for that matter, there are *areas of advantage*—exclusive suburbs, upper-income residential areas, and so on—and *areas of disadvantage*—slums, river bottoms, factory districts, in the city, and areas of poor land, cut-over tracts, and the like, in the country. The target pattern of functional and residential distribution gives us a rough overall picture in cities that have grown under free competition. But within that pattern as well as outside there is a major distinction to be made between *areas of advantage*, areas that cost more and are worth more to live in, and *areas of disadvantage*, areas of second, third, or fourth best, in which nobody within a given range of competition lives if he can possibly help it. It is important to look for both kinds of phenomena: (a) the ecological pattern and (b) the evaluative phenomena of advantage and disadvantage. Both appear in every city, and advantage and disadvantage are to be found outside as well.

Finally, in our enumeration of urban characteristics one final trait should be noted:

7. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local government for cities is a power delegated by the state government by means of a charter of incorporation. This charter determines the form of the city government, its powers, and the method by which the charter itself can be changed. Under such a charter local functionaries carry on the governmental business of the community, levy taxes, enforce state laws, local ordinances, etc. At mid-century, however, practically all state legislatures still held a tight rein on local municipal governments, limiting their right to issue bonds, to manage their own affairs, sometimes even to control their own police departments. Police chiefs in Boston and St. Louis were appointed, for example, by the governors of Massachusetts and Missouri, not by their respective mayors. On one occasion the city of Chicago had to beg permission from the Illinois legislature even to sell peanuts on its own municipal pier! For years indignant urban leaders have denounced this condition as “government by acreage” (i.e., farmers), but under outmoded state constitutions rural minorities still continue to limit the self-government of urban majorities in such states as New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and others.

I-9:6. The Local Urban Community as a Service Center

Every local urban community is the locus of business and social organizations (and sometimes of governmental organizations as well)

which supply goods and services to farmers and villagers outside the municipality and in turn consume, directly or indirectly, goods and services produced by residents of this hinterland. Various studies have shown that every local community tends to develop its own trading area within which this exchange of goods and services goes on. At the same time, of course, under modern conditions each community is linked to other communities by a similar functional interdependence. How this intercommunity interdependence builds up a hierarchy of dominance from the crossroads store to the metropolitan community we shall examine in Chapter 10. For the moment the important point to have in mind is that every local community functions as a center of economic and other services for the people of a rather definite and specific area, conveniently labeled the *community trading area*. By determining toward which centers rural residents are oriented for various goods and services such as automobile purchases, groceries, high school, banking, clothing, farm implements; for milk shipments, shipments of grain, hay, etc.; for weekly and daily newspapers, radio programs, library services, and the like, it is possible to map community trading areas, as Galpin did years ago in Wisconsin, and others have done elsewhere. Community trading areas exist as patterns of coöperation almost as definite as the local communities themselves. The functions of the local community, then, include services to the people in the trading area. But since no one local community produces all the goods and services needed in its trading area, *another function is to act as "middleman" between its trading area and the larger centers of supply, the metropolitan and submetropolitan centers which dominate many local communities and local community trading areas.*

These broader relationships form the subject matter of our next chapter.

I-9:7. The Local Social System as a System

Our task at this point is to find evidence of the systematic character of local social systems: the interdependent, mutually conditioning activities that go on within local social systems—activities that not only meet the needs of individuals and of organizations within the system but also serve to maintain the system, keep people oriented to it as a system, and keep it going as a system.

These can probably be seen most easily in a simple rural neighborhood, where there are not even any public functionaries charged with responsibility for enforcing common patterns and maintaining existing

interdependences. But rural neighborhoods persist as neighborhoods. The student should answer the question, Why do they persist? and then go on to more complex social systems—communities and metropolitan centers.

One problem is to find tangible proof of the network of interdependences that links each family into the local system: jobs, school enrollments, church memberships, consumption habits, etc. How is the local social system organized? What units of association must one place in the picture? What is the relative role of private organization and government in the totality? What recent changes have impinged on any given local social system and what readjustments are under way?

Questions of this kind should be answered in the field.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 9

To find objective evidence of (a) the distinctive characteristics of a local social system and (b) its systematic character

1. Procure a map of your college community or of some other selected town or city.
2. With this map as a basis, find specific evidences of the seven characteristics listed above (I-9:5).
3. Note particularly to what extent, where, and how the local ecological pattern departs from the ideal model of the Chicago school: epicenters, etc.
4. Indicate areas of advantage and of disadvantage.
5. Relate your findings on step 4 to your data on stratification (Chapter 7).
6. Now find some specific evidences of organized interdependences in that community.
7. What are your conclusions?

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Go to the publications of local pioneer societies, letters of early travelers, etc., and build up a detailed picture of life in a pioneer neighborhood. Then compare it in detail with modern life in the same general geographic locality. Compare specific *situations*, *social structures*, *social processes* in terms of cultural differences in communication and transportation, material traits, adjustment patterns (mores, institutions, laws), values and ideals, functional interdependences.

PROJECT B

Write a comparison of the treatment of the community in this chapter with the more detailed analysis in Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1950.

PROJECT C

Show in detail the relationships between a series of actual in-presence, or at least local, situations and some local social system (your home town or your college community). That is, show how the various characteristics of a local social system impinge on actual situations and to what extent there is any reciprocal impact.

Supplementary Readings

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Conditioning Variables: Metropolitan Systems and Areas of Dominance

I-10:1. The Problem

We have seen that local residence-subsistence social systems differ in scope and complexity. The neighborhood of interdependent households is the smallest and simplest of such units. When neighborhoods have acquired constellations of service, control, and other institutional organizations over and above the interdependent households, we call them communities, and we note that each community is the center of an *area* of influence and interdependence. This is the community's *trading area*.

As a community grows, however, i.e., as more and more economic, governmental, and other functions come to be performed in it, its trading area widens and presently begins to include not merely neighborhoods but other communities as well. Such *larger communities* may be said to exert a certain *dominance* over their areas of influence and interdependence. The progression from the nucleated neighborhood, i.e., the neighborhood with a crossroads store, school, church, or Grange hall as its focus of association, to the village, then the country town, then the county seat or small city, and so on to New York City, Chicago, or any of the 168 metropolitan centers enumerated by the 1950 census, is a progression in the range, variety, complexity, and directive efficacy of the functions performed in each center. As a system of association and interdependence, the social order is thus a vast web of relationships—economic, governmental, educational, religious, military, and so on—centering in and controlled

from several-odd thousands of population clusters, or communities, scattered about the country but all heading up in a comparatively few great cities at the top, the metropolitan centers, which dominate and control the hundreds of subcenters and the thousands of communities dependent on these subcenters and the hundreds of thousands of neighborhoods dependent in turn on the communities, and so on down to the millions of separate households.

Our problem is to see something of the way in which this hierarchical pattern of control has developed and something of the nature of metropolitan centers themselves and of their metropolitan regions. The whole subject is much too complicated for us to do more with it than merely to indicate some of the relationships involved.

I-10:2. The Rise of the Metropolitan Community

Big cities are no modern phenomenon. Some of the cities of the ancient world numbered hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, and imperial Rome may have housed upward of a million. But the functions whose clustering drew large numbers of people into the crowded and insanitary confines of these ancient cities were usually more political and military than economic; and in so far as they were economic at all, they were largely commercial and exploitive. A large part of the population of such cities consisted of slaves. An ancient "metropolis" was a mother of cities, i.e., colonies, and an aggregate of consumers rather than a directing center of subsidiary economic functions. The artisans who worked in such cities produced mainly consumer goods, although naturally some production of simple kinds of capital goods such as houses, galleys, and so on, had to go on also.

The distinctive function of the great modern city is its role in organizing and controlling high-energy industrial production through central offices and intricate financial devices which funnel savings into investments. The corporation plus modern communication technology, plus modern banking, has made it possible to centralize the control of larger and larger proportions of a society's economic activities in a few great cities. The beginnings of this process can be traced to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, when the London merchants began to organize business on a wider and wider scale eventually embracing all England and a large part of the world. The London trading area, in short, increased from that of a purely local community twenty to fifty miles in radius to that of a metropolitan community dominating distant production and exchange.

The role of British military victories in all this, victories that blocked Spain, Holland, and France from the major colonial prizes and opened the world to British businessmen, we need not dwell upon. We should not forget, however, that politics and economics go hand in hand.

Ignoring the political side of it, the economic historian Gras traces four phases in the process by which the modern metropolitan economy has developed:¹

1. ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET

Merchants who sell to merchants—wholesalers—appeared and began to specialize. An institution known as the exchange grew up, and presently there were specialized exchanges, one for cotton, one for coffee, and so on. Joint-stock companies were organized, concentrating commerce and extending the range of operations. Warehouses provided storage. Use of credit and advertising grew. All this was well under way in England in 1600.

2. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Since production costs are less in the hinterland than in the metropolitan center, industry (even as early as 1620 in England) began to move to villages and towns. These in turn developed industries of their own, and after the coming of power machinery and the modern factory many became satellite communities that specialized in manufacture, which, however, was controlled from the metropolis. This took place in England between 1760 and 1830, and in the United States from about 1830 on.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

The expanding needs of the market and the growth of manufactures together put increasing pressure on inventors to improve transportation. Better roads, canals, and eventually the steamship and the railroad knit different communities together. As transportation costs fell, it became possible to extend the reach for raw materials on one hand and the haul of finished products on the other. The market expanded, the big city grew bigger. So arose the demand for mechanical transport within the city itself. By the 1880's the pressure for space in the business center called for vertical transport as well—the elevator.

¹ See N. S. B. Gras, *An Introduction to Economic History*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1922.

This together with structural steel made possible the modern skyscraper and the still greater congestion of population at the center. As technology produced the automobile and the airplane, development of transportation continued. Every metropolitan center is now surrounded by a network of surfaced highways, railroads, air lines; and every great city in America is struggling with the problem of traffic congestion within its own limits. The largest seem to have passed the point of diminishing returns—congestion costs are going up.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION

This is the latest phase to appear in both England and America, and it is the one that has developed most rapidly. Gras dates this phase from about 1890 in England. The turn of the century would probably mark its definite appearance in the United States. Of course stock exchanges and banks are centuries old; the Bank of England dates from 1694. But the dominant role of the investment banker in mobilizing the capital of the hinterland, the important role of insurance companies in this field, and the crucial role of the great banks as the dynamos and switchboards of capitalist enterprise all reached a new level in the metropolitan economy about the end of the nineteenth century—the stage of finance capitalism.

The net result of all this is that the old low-energy, rural village economy whose citizens adopted the Constitution of the United States has been completely transformed and replaced by a high-energy, industrialized economy, dominated and controlled from a comparatively few metropolitan centers.² What are these centers like?

I-10:3. The Metropolitan Community as a Center of Dominance

The typical metropolitan community of 100,000 or more people in our culture is a multi-community aggregate in which are exercised the controlling and directing functions of complex social and economic organizations operating in an extensive hinterland of interdependent local communities and local trading areas.

² It should not be overlooked, however, that since the reforms introduced by the New Deal, and since the tremendous wartime expansion of the national debt has made debt-financing a definite part of the economic picture, finance capitalism now operates with government controlling security issues, stabilizing employment, and in other ways trying to introduce social welfare objectives into the economy. Perhaps we would be justified in adding a fifth phase to the four listed by Gras: a phase of *mixed economy*, business-government partnership, or *government interventionism*.

Its own primary trading area of department-store deliveries and the like may extend thirty to sixty miles into the hinterland, but beyond that its demands for raw materials for its factories and its directives for organizing the market and controlling the flow of goods and services reach out for hundreds of miles farther. New York's financial interests span the continent; Detroit's central offices control the operations of factories, the movements of trains, the affairs of chain stores, insurance agencies, and the like, hundreds of miles away. If the local community is to be regarded as a service center for a trading area, the metropolitan community must be regarded as a *service center for interdependent local communities*. For news, credit, specialized professional and recreational services, and the knitting together of the varied economic and social activities of many local communities the metropolitan community serves as the center of coordination and dominance.

A picture of these relationships in the newspaper field is given in the accompanying map³ of local and metropolitan circulation areas of daily newspapers in Michigan in 1931—a picture whose main outlines have changed little in the intervening years. Each local community with a daily paper dominated a certain area, usually somewhat larger than its primary trading area. But papers from the metropolitan centers of Chicago, Detroit, and Toledo circulated throughout the state and tended to establish definite areas of dominance as against rivals from competing metropolitan centers.

There were 351 rural incorporated places (under 2500) and 125 urban places (2500 and over) in Michigan in 1940. In these 476 places, ranging from Lisbon in Kent and Ottawa counties with 51 people, up to Detroit with over 1,600,000, there were published 375 weekly newspapers and 67 dailies. The weeklies published in the village centers circulated mainly in the village trading areas. They contained personals from the various neighborhoods, a few items of local news, features and some general news articles purchased in ready-to-print form from some city agency such as the Western Newspaper Union, and of course local and national advertising. Essentially they formed an impersonal medium for furthering exchange within the trading area and keeping their readers oriented toward the local village community.

³ From C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell, and L. J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, p. 262. The main outlines of this picture have changed little in the intervening years because transportation and communication facilities still maintain the basic patterns of the 1930's.



FIG. I-10.1. Area of Metropolitan Newspaper Dominance; Local Daily Circulation Areas, and Michigan Areas Dominated by Toledo and Chicago. Metropolitan Detroit shadows most of Michigan. (Adapted from *Introductory Sociology*, by Cooley, Angell, and Carr, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933; based on A.B.C. reports, 1930-31.)

On a larger scale this is what the town and city dailies do for the urban communities, plus performing the added function of defining distant situations more promptly and in greater detail than the weeklies can. Village weeklies, county-seat dailies, and metropolitan dailies

form a kind of hierarchy of increasing impersonality and scope of coverage. Personals and local items reach the village paper from volunteers or are supplied by the editor himself. The editor frequently serves as the village correspondent for the county-seat daily, and some member of the daily's staff often looks after the interests of one or more of the nearest metropolitan papers. County-seat daily and metropolitan daily are linked with the rest of the world by the wires of the Associated Press, the United Press, or some other special news agency that serves hundreds of other papers throughout the country. The headquarters and divisional offices of these wire services, like the studios of the great radio and television chains, are of course located in metropolitan cities. Thus for its definition of current distant situations the American public is dependent on reporters, editors, announcers, and commentators working in the metropolitan centers.

Definitely the American press, radio, and television, like the banks, the great industrial corporations, the movies, and the department stores, are urban minded. Only the state legislatures representing acreage rather than population, and the southern and midwestern Congressmen, reflect the mind of the farmer—a mind, by the way, that has not yet assimilated all the realities of an urban civilization.

I-10:4. The Metropolitan Center and Population Changes

At mid-century continental United States contained 107 metropolitan centers of 100,000 or more population each. Altogether they housed more than 44,000,000 people, or nearly 30 percent of the total. This compares with 50 such cities in 1910 with 22 percent of the population. Although the nation had grown by 63 percent in forty years, the number of big cities over 100,000 had more than doubled and their population had increased by more than 115 percent.

Such figures provide a rough index of the increasing centralization of economic and control functions in our culture during the last generation.

The trend is by no means confined to the top metropolitan centers, the ones over 100,000. Most of *their* gains came before 1930, i.e., before the Great Depression and World War II. Since 1930 the top five, the big fellows of more than 1,000,000 each, have been growing less rapidly than the rest of the country: between 1930 and 1940, only 5.6 percent as against the national growth of 7.2 percent; and between 1940 and 1950, only 8.7 percent as against the nation's 13.8

percent. Likewise, the "younger" centers, i.e., those between 100,000 and 1,000,000, gained only 3.8 percent between 1930 and 1940 and 12.1 percent between 1940 and 1950. During the war decade the "younger" centers grew faster than the top five, but still not at the rate of the nation as a whole.

Obviously something happened to our population distribution between 1910 and 1950. Roughly speaking, from 1910 to 1920, the decade of the First World War, in the general rush of population to the cities the "younger" metropolitan centers were growing up. They grew faster during this decade than did the top five. In the booming twenties the rush swung to the top five, which shot ahead at three times the national average (48 percent as against the national 16 percent) and at more than double the rate even of the lesser centers, which gained 22.9 percent. But from 1930 on, the depression, the spread of surfaced highways, and the diffusion of the closed car all combined to turn population toward the smaller cities and the urban hinterlands. All urban places below 100,000 grew several times as fast during the not-so-booming thirties as did the metropolitan centers.

Actually, of course, suburbanism and hinterland living have been on the climb since the diffusion of the surfaced road and the closed car in the 1920's. Even by 1930, of the total of over 54,000,000 people in 96 metropolitan regions, 17,000,000, or 31 percent, were living outside of the central cities. If anything, the depression and the growing congestion in the centers hastened this trend during the following decades. The tremendous population shifts during the war years followed the same trend. All over the country the hinterlands of the great centers grew faster than the centers themselves.

After the Russians perfected their own hydrogen bomb, fear of possible bombings in a future war stimulated still further the drift toward the hinterlands, and the government urged manufacturers to divert future industrial expansion from coastal areas and big cities toward the open spaces.

Even during World War II the great bulk of the 17,000,000 people who changed counties preferred the hinterlands to the congested centers. In the Detroit-Willow Run area, for example—reasonably typical of 137 areas studied by the census—the four counties included in the area (Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw, and Wayne) gained slightly more than 200,000, or 8.2 percent, from 1940 to 1944. But Detroit city proper during this period gained only 30,453, or 1.9 per-

cent. All of Wayne County, as a matter of fact, gained only 5.1 percent, as against 18.5 for Oakland, 22.5 for Macomb, and 31.8 for Washtenaw, the seat of the Willow Run bomber plant.

The great cities in America seem definitely to have entered a phase of population dispersion, or at least of peripheral concentration, a trend which readjustments to the threat of the atomic bomb will probably accentuate. The 1950 census returns showed this trend very clearly.

I-10:5. Structure of the Metropolitan Regional Community

The metropolitan center presents essentially the same target pattern that we found characteristic of urban communities generally in our culture. In fact, it is in the great cities especially that we find the deteriorated areas at their worst, and it is in these vast aggregates of humanity that the sharpest contrasts appear between different social strata, different ethnic and racial groups, different areas of advantage and disadvantage. The problems of urban living—poverty, crime, the slum, race hatred, and all the rest—have assumed their bitterest and most depressing forms and have attracted the widest attention in the great cities.

The ecological pattern of cities, the target pattern, has been familiar to sociology students since the twenties, when it was first defined by Burgess of Chicago. Less attention has been given to the structure of the metropolitan region around the metropolitan center. We know, of course, that a region consists of the central community itself, of a number of satellite centers more or less dependent on the major center, of various village communities and local trading areas linked functionally with the subcenters and with the metropolis itself, and of a more or less interstitial rural population carrying on agricultural operations which in their specialization show a marked influence of the nearby metropolis. Market gardening, dairying, and similar specialized activities flourish in the metropolitan hinterland.

Broadly speaking, the pattern of population distribution and culture in the metropolitan regional community is distinguished by six characteristics:

1. CENTRALIZATION

The concentration of control and other functions, and hence of the operating personnel, in the central city during working hours is called centralization. But as we have already indicated, thanks to the auto-

mobile and the modern highway network, more and more of the operating personnel of a great city actually live outside the center. And the higher their income bracket, the more pronounced is this tendency. Hence a second marked characteristic of metropolitan regional communities:

2. SUBURBANISM

This refers to the tendency of a considerable percentage of the metropolitan work force to live in *population clusters* outside the central city. Until the coming of the closed automobile and the all-weather surfaced highway this clustering perforce took place along the railways and interurban lines entering the metropolis, and in the nineteenth century railway policy relative to suburban service had a good deal to do with the form the pattern took. Thus, the railways serving New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston early developed commuters' services. The railways serving Detroit, on the other hand, stubbornly resisted demands for such service. In consequence, the older metropolitan centers are surrounded by commuters' suburbs; Detroit only by automobile suburbs. One of the most highly suburbanized areas in the country surrounds Boston.

3. RURBANISM

From the early days of Sears, Roebuck (founded in 1889) and the beginnings of rural free delivery in the late 1890's, rural living has been slowly approximating the comfort and convenience of city living. First, farmers began to adopt city traits such as baker's bread, telephones, furnaces, power pumps, electric lights—although rural electrification lagged till stimulated by the T.V.A. and government prodding in the 1930's. The mail-order houses and the national magazines carried city styles to the remotest farmhouse. Then with the coming of the closed car and the surfaced road network widely extended during the 1920's city workers began moving into the country. Electric power and the septic tank made it possible for them to have basic urban conveniences. City stores extended their deliveries. Rural dwellers, farmers as well as fugitive city folks, used more and more baker's bread, branded canned goods, daily newspapers. Radio and then television linked the rural home with the metropolitan center more closely. By 1950 one had to go many miles from the ordinary city to find any considerable number of rural people still living like the isolated ruralities of Hamlin Garland's *Middle Border* of the

1880's-1890's. The diffusion of urban traits by transfer to the farmers and by carriage on the part of rural-urban workers had produced a sort of hybrid culture neither purely urban nor purely rural, a culture known as *rurbanism*. This was the culture that now prevailed in the hinterlands of our metropolitan centers. With more and more urban workers settling in the country under the decentralizing influences of the automobile, surfaced roads, rural electrification, and the overhanging threat of atomic warfare, rurbanism at mid-century was definitely on the rise.

Between the suburbs around a metropolitan center the rurban population is never uniformly distributed. It shows three distinct kinds of departure from uniformity: a tendency to cluster around points of vantage such as convenient crossroads, cheap subdivisions, etc.; a tendency to settle more thickly along main highways than in between; and a tendency to thin out in density of settlement as one goes away from the major center. We call these three tendencies epicentral clustering, radial alignment, and peripheral fading—all characteristics of the urban hinterland.

4. EPICENTRICAL CLUSTERING

Villages and towns, as one finds them at any given time, are merely the grown-up expressions of this tendency. But the tendency itself appears far below the community level of organization. By the same principle of maximizing advantages and minimizing disadvantages that we noted motivating all population centralization from the first pioneer settlements on down, city workers moving into the open country find it desirable to settle near points of vantage. A cheap subdivision, as compared with restricted areas or with farm land that is not open at all, is a point of vantage. As builders provide the dwellings, workers find it advantageous to settle there. A cluster of homes results.

Or a farmer opens his back yard or adjoining meadow to trailers. His pump supplies the water. Primitive arrangements serve sanitary needs. Subject to state or local health regulations, there is presently a cluster of trailer homes.

All over a growing metropolitan hinterland the same process goes on. When separate clusters get big enough or when several eventually grow together, local authorities frequently find themselves facing a little population aggregate whose members may be getting big ideas about incorporating as a self-governing community. Epicentral clus-

tering inevitably appears in any metropolitan hinterland with a growing population.

5. RADIAL ALIGNMENT

Because of exactly the same conditions that produce clustering, ease of transportation to and from the city tends to attract new settlers to the vicinity of the main highways. This can be observed around any great city.

Around Detroit in 1940, for example, the 33 townships cut by five radial highways out of the city averaged 8047 per township. At the same relative distances from Woodward and the Detroit River, 34 townships not cut by the radial highways averaged 2520—not quite 30 percent of the density of the radial townships.

Radial alignment, then, is a definite characteristic of the population pattern around a great city.

6. PERIPHERAL FADING

Population around a great city tends to decline in density per square mile as one recedes from the major center till one enters the hinterland of some competing center. Drawing our data again from the Detroit regional community in 1940—although the general pattern held true in any metropolitan region during the mid-years of the century—we find that without making allowance for suburbanism and epicentral clustering along the way, 67 townships in 7 zones at 6-mile intervals north and west of Detroit declined from 9582 per township at the 16-mile zone to 1450 per township at the 52-mile zone. Eliminating such suburban communities as Pontiac, Ypsilanti, Ann Arbor, Dearborn, etc., would increase the decline, for the suburbs tend to be thicker closer in than farther out.

Obviously, increasing distance from the big city means closer and closer approximation to the rural open country of the farmer until one crosses the boundary line of another urban center. In the Detroit hinterland beyond the 52-mile zone to the westward the influence of the Jackson hinterland began to appear. To the south the rival metropolitan center, Toledo, likewise began to build up density south of Monroe.

To spread population density in contour on a flat map of the United States, then, would substitute metropolitan centers as “mountains” and leave the limits of their hinterlands as sloping “valleys.” The thinly settled Appalachians and Cumberlands would flatten

down and the crowded coastal cities such as New York and Philadelphia and the even flatter lake cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland would stand up like mountain peaks. It is probable that as decentralization proceeds in future decades the slope of declining population density from the crowded center to the rural hinterland will decrease. Whether the centers actually lose population or not, it is probable that the "valleys" of the hinterlands will gradually fill up. Rurbanism and the atomic bomb together seem to be filling up the "basins."

So much, then, for metropolitan centers and metropolitan regions. They express a new kind of cultural-functional interdependence unknown in the ancient world. Beginning in the seventeenth century in England and vastly diffused and intensified by the industrial revolution and all the technological changes that have followed since, the metropolitan web has spread across the Western world. At mid-century it was the dominating pattern of economic-cultural organization structuring human association in the United States.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 10

To assemble evidence of the characteristics of metropolitan centers and their areas of dominance

1. Your problem is to visualize the structure of population distribution—and correlative cultural factors such as highways, etc.—in a typical metropolitan region in the United States.
2. If possible, this should be done for the nearest metropolitan region with which you are familiar. But to do that would require teamwork by a number of students working together to assemble the necessary data: first, the base map showing villages, towns, and cities and the highways and railways; second, data from the census showing the population of each civic unit in the region—townships, villages, towns, cities; third, data from the census of your particular state showing the area of each of these units in square miles. From all of this you could then construct charts showing centralization, suburbanism, rurbanism, radial alignment, epicentral clustering, and peripheral fading.
3. If that seems to be too big a task for the man power and time available, the student can use the data given in Appendix II on the Detroit region as the basis for constructing his own charts and graphs.
4. Whichever project is actually worked through, what bearing do the resulting patterns have on the analysis of situational fields in general? What conclusions can you draw about interdependence within the

metropolitan region? (To aid in answering this last question, draw in newspaper offices, radio and TV stations, and indicate existence of telephone networks and rural free delivery routes—without attempting to map all details.)

5. List some of the evidence showing various kinds of interdependence in the region: common currency; area of newspaper circulation; radio station coverage; New York Stock Exchange listings—and local stock listings (implying what?); central offices of typical large-scale corporations—insurance companies, railroads, etc.; governmental agencies, etc.
6. What are your conclusions?

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Select some metropolitan center and trace its historical development from its first settlement. Show in particular how and when economic and other controls first began to extend beyond the local trading area to include other local social systems. What factors seemed to be associated with this extension? In what particular fields of activity (government, transportation, newspaper publishing, insurance, banking, manufacture, religious organization, etc.) has this tendency toward dominance from the center developed most fully? In what fields has it developed least? So far as possible, see whether there is any parallel in this particular development to match the pattern sketched by Gras for the development of London. (See N. S. B. Gras, *An Introduction to Economic History*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1922.)

PROJECT B

Select some particular metropolitan region and make an intensive study from all available sources—the census, local newspapers, radio coverage, various chambers of commerce, etc.—of the pattern of dominance or control that exists in the region in different lines of activity: the telephone company, branch banking, the insurance field, department-store deliveries, dissemination of news, transportation, religious organization, manufacture in the two leading industries, fraternal organizations, and so on. Starting with a base map of the region, show the various interrelationships of local social systems with the central city.

Supplementary Readings

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Situations Beyond the Horizon

I-11:1. The Problem

The definition of distant situations is in large part a function of the agencies of communication and diffusion. Hence, skill in the analysis of distant situations necessarily involves the ability to discount the refracting effect of these agencies and a knowledge of some of the barriers between us and the world "out there." But modern agencies of communication and diffusion are the products of a long process of historical development.

I-11:2. The Cultural Evolution of Communication and Diffusion

We need not at this point repeat the story of the evolution of symbols from the preverbal animal level to the alphabet, nor the long history of nonverbal means such as painting, music, and dancing. What we are primarily concerned with, after all, is *the widening of man's social world* by means of inventions that have enabled him to (1) preserve symbols through time, (2) transport or transmit them through space, (3) diffuse them to many people at once, (4) increase their capacity to simulate the distant reality, and (5) appraise the probable impact upon ourselves of forces that originate "out there" (telescope, microscope, radar, etc.).

1. HOW PRESERVE SYMBOLS THROUGH TIME?

The spoken word dies as it is spoken. Even the memory of it fades. Primitive man partially overcomes this by memory training which stores the traditions of the past in the memories of the old men. But

even the most capacious memory can store only a comparatively simple tradition. To rise above barbarism a society must devise some means of record better than that.

The beginnings seem to have been such devices as notches cut in sticks as among some of the Plains Indians, and rude pictures on skins, on rocks, etc. The civilized Inca used knots in thongs or cords for bookkeeping and to jog the memories of their messengers. In time, in China and elsewhere each picture shrank to a line or two; eventually, to lines that symbolized sounds instead of pictures; and finally, a millennium or so before Christ, some Semitic people around the eastern Mediterranean, possibly the Phoenicians, hit on the idea of using specific marks, or letters, to symbolize basic consonants—the elements of the first alphabet. The Greeks added the vowels and with vowel symbols *writing* had evolved to solve the problem of preserving communication through time.

The modern age has added devices like photography and motion pictures for preserving visual records of form and motion and with the phonograph and the tape recorder now perpetuates the speaking voice itself. But for material on which to preserve writing, nothing has yet been found superior to the stones used by primitive man and the ancient Egyptians.

2. HOW PROJECT SYMBOLS ACROSS DISTANCE?

The beginnings of attempts to overcome distance can be traced to such things as the smoke signals of the American Indians and to African tribal drums. Scouts and messengers could on occasion bring back reports from beyond the horizon, but until the nineteenth century practically all communication moved only at the speed at which man could transport himself—the speed of a foot runner, a horse, a sailing ship. The idea of improving the speed of transport by improving rough trails ahead of time seems to have originated in the Mesopotamian valley in 2000 or 3000 B.C., about the time that horses were introduced from Central Asia and conquerors began to feel the need of moving war chariots more rapidly. Not until the rise of the Roman Empire, however, did roads become a prominent part of any culture. Forty-eight thousand miles of magnificent, slave-built highways four feet thick attested the importance which the Roman emperors placed on facilitating the movement of trade and the legions. Along those highways moved the merchants, the couriers, the proconsuls, and the

legions which for three centuries held Roman Britain in one polity with far-off Syria. Along those highways in Italy itself also moved the messengers who delivered to the rural villas of wealthy Roman senators the copies of the *Daily Acts* of the Senate which the dictator Cæsar first began posting in the Forum and which enterprising Romans then had gangs of slaves copy for distribution to rural subscribers.

With the disintegration of the great slave empire after the fifth century and with the return of the Western world to the tribal and neighborhood level, this vast network of highways fell into disuse. For a thousand years the general picture of western Europe was one of immobility and stagnation rather than movement. War parties, pilgrims, couriers, mendicant monks, minstrels, and some of the nobility moved about, but most of the population lived in isolated neighborhoods that lagged days, weeks, or even months behind each other in social time. Events in the capitals might not be known on the distant feudal estates for months. As late as the early part of the seventeenth century in England the death of Queen Elizabeth was not known in Bridgewater, a few score miles from London, till James I had been weeks on his throne and the court had ceased to wear mourning.

In the New World the difficulties of transportation and communication in the Colonies were even greater. There were few roads until after the Revolution, those that did exist were little better than Indian trails, and except along the coast, where one might go by sailing ship, most travelers either used canoes on the creeks and rivers or rode horseback. There were no bridges and in the North people did most of their visiting and moving about in the winter after the ice had bridged the rivers. It was the year in which the Revolution finally ended officially, 1783, before the first stagecoach began to make regular runs between New York and Boston, 234 miles, and the trip took eight to ten days. So slow and difficult was population movement overland that President Jefferson estimated in 1803 that it might take a thousand years fully to settle the region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi! Distances which seem insignificant today required days or weeks to traverse. When Washington and his Continentals holed up at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-78 the eighteen snowy miles that separated him from the British in Philadelphia constituted a military obstacle which Sir William Howe considered insurmount-

able.¹ When Washington died at Mount Vernon, December 14, 1799, he was five days by horseback from New York, a distance that a telephone call now spans in five seconds. Yet even by eighteenth-century standards he was practically a New York suburbanite! New Orleans, where a young backwoodsman named Andrew Jackson was presently to win a battle in the War of 1812 two weeks *after* peace had been signed at Ghent, was a full month away from the mouth of the Hudson, which, of course, was another month or two away from Europe. St. Louis was five weeks from New York, and Fort Dearborn, now Chicago, was six. On the west coast of America, the Spanish missions in California simply didn't exist for most New Yorkers. They were nearly 11,000 miles and six to eight months away around Cape Horn. Half a century later in the gold rush days they would still be six months away beyond the Sioux, the Pawnees, and the Paiutes.

Even the midwestern frontier when Andrew Jackson was President in the 1830's lay weeks away from the eastern seaboard. De Tocqueville's trip to the banks of the Saginaw, the uttermost limit of white settlement in Michigan in 1832, required over two weeks from New York by way of the new Erie Canal and Lake Erie to Cadillac's old post at Detroit, then three long days of hard riding along Indian trails through the wilderness. The wilderness began a short mile from the Detroit river.

Yet the frontier settlements were only a few degrees more isolated and locality-bounded than were the towns and villages along the slowly extending turnpikes and postal routes east of the Alleghenies. It was still a world of oxcarts, packsaddles, covered wagons, and stagecoaches, a world far closer in its communicative technology to the world of Charlemagne than to the world of today.

What broke the iron ring of distance was the application of the steam engine to transportation on the rivers (after 1816) and to transport on land (after 1831). With the railroad came the first technological need of some communicative device that could outpace transportation.² The electric telegraph was the answer (1844). The

¹ Whether Howe was as keen for crushing the Revolution as the British ministry desired has been questioned by modern historians. He let Washington escape after the Battle of Long Island and again on Manhattan, and wasted the winter of 1777-78 enjoying himself in Philadelphia. But *eighteen miles of snow-covered roads still constituted enough of an obstacle in those days to lend a semblance of reality to his reluctance to attack the starving remnants of Washington's army at Valley Forge.*

² The first technological need, perhaps. But Napoleon had used a system of semaphore stations to transmit official messages from hill to hill across France two decades before the first railroad was built.

railroad widened commodity and labor markets to the seaports. The telegraph widened the reach of men's minds. For the first time in human history individuals hundreds of miles apart could now react to the same events at almost the same time. Mentally, for the first time the people of a nation could actually be contemporaries.

But like the telephone, which came along a generation later (1876), the telegraph was only a point-to-point device. Man had at last overcome distance, but had he not in the meantime invented devices for overcoming dispersion, point-to-point communication would have served only government and a few businessmen.

3. DEVICES FOR OVERCOMING DISPERSION IN SPACE

If point-to-point communication is to bring masses of people into the same mental world at the same time its messages must either be duplicated and distributed by the tens of thousands or they must be made known in some other way to great numbers at the same time.

Man faced this need on a small scale in his primitive tribes as he faces it today on a gigantic scale on a global level. Preliterates met it with tribal assemblies, "talking drums," stentorian orators. The adjective recalls the beginnings of "broadcasting": Stentor, the loud-voiced herald of *The Iliad*! By a slight stretch of the imagination one can also see the dim beginnings of television broadcasts in Indian smoke signals!

The point is, from the primitive level up, men have needed ways of blanketing dispersed masses of people with the same communicative stimuli at the same time. They used all sorts of makeshifts before the printing press and electricity solved the problem. During the Middle Ages it was customary to make public announcements at the church doors on Sundays. In medieval communities the town crier was a familiar figure. In early America the night watch in the little towns performed the same functions. Arthur Train tells us that when his grandfather was born in 1783 the night watchman in the seaport cities, crying the hours of the night as they made their rounds, usually added information on the weather and on the state of public order: "Twelve o'clock and a cloudy night. All's well."

Accordingly, on the night of October 23, 1781, the good burghers of Philadelphia got their first news of a momentous event four days before at Yorktown: "Two o'clock and Cornwallis is taken!"

But the night watchmen were, of course, not alone as agents of diffusion. Even more effective were the coffee houses and taverns

which posted printed bulletins and newspapers for the literate to read to the commonalty; also the postmasters, the town gossips, and in the early days the handwritten newsletters to which, as in Caesar's time, the affluent might subscribe.

It was, in fact, the pressure of demand from eager subscribers that had forced John Campbell, the Boston postmaster, and his brother Duncan, in April, 1704, to apply to their newsletter a mighty engine of diffusion which Caesar had lacked—the printing press.³ They thus became the publishers of the first successful newspaper in America, *The Boston Newsletter*. Similar sheets had been appearing in London for several years, and an English publisher in exile, Benjamin Harris, had in fact preceded the Campbells by some fourteen years in publishing the first newspaper on this continent, the *Boston Publick Occurrences Both Forreign and Domestick*, September 25, 1690. But *Publick Occurrences* encountered the same kind of difficulty that had exiled Harris from England—the righteous wrath of government. The Massachusetts governor and his Council promptly suppressed this untoward public challenge to the privacy of public business on the ground that the paper “contained Reflections of a very high nature” as well as “sundry doubtful and uncertain Reports.” The Campbells fared better. *The Boston Newsletter* continued regular publication until it was caught in the turmoil of the Revolution and suppressed by the patriots after the siege of Boston. At the start it consisted of a single sheet, 6¼ by 10½ inches, “printed on both sides in the manner of its English contemporaries.”⁴ By 1775 when the patriots suppressed it, there were forty-seven other sheets issuing from the fifty printing presses in the thirteen Colonies, and one of them was an evening paper, Philadelphia's *Pennsylvania Evening Post*. A few years later, June 17, 1783, the *Post*'s editor, Benjamin Towne, Revolutionary turncoat, brought out the first American daily, *The Pennsylvania Evening Post and Daily Advertiser*. By the time George Washington took the oath as first President in 1789 there were eight dailies in New

³ Movable type printing was invented in Germany or Holland about the middle of the fifteenth century. Outside of the clergy, most people were still illiterate, however, and it was not until the Reformation put a premium on the ability to read the Bible that literacy began to spread. In the early 1700's when the first newspapers were beginning to appear in the Colonies, Boston probably contained a higher percentage of literates than any other colonial city. But even by the time of the Revolution, taking the thirteen Colonies as a whole, it is probable that not over one-half of the 1,000,000 or so adult white males could read and a much smaller proportion of white women. It was not until well down in the nineteenth century when the agitation had begun for free public schools that reading by women generally began to be accepted as desirable.

⁴ Alfred McClung Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937, p. 21.

York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina; seventy weeklies, ten semi-weeklies, and three triweeklies in the new nation.⁵ A handful of these non-dailies were published in French for settlers in Louisiana and refugees in Philadelphia from the French Revolution and from San Domingo. A few papers were also appearing in German. One hundred and sixty-three years later there were 1773 English-language dailies, 543 Sunday papers, 8892 weeklies or non-dailies, and several hundred foreign-language publications.

In the meantime, other means of diffusion had also been invented: movies, the radio, television; and supplementing and reinterpreting all of these there were 203 periodicals of general interest and 4407 periodicals appealing to special interests—951 for religious publics; 489 industrial, engineering, and technical; 472 for the merchandising trades; and so on.⁶ There were also 4592 commercial broadcasting stations, including 109 television stations, and 86,942 stations broadcasting for aircraft, industrial, marine, and land transportation, and governmental purposes. In 1952 it was estimated that over 40,000,000 homes had radio sets and 21,000,000 had television—92 percent and 42 percent of all homes in the United States. Almost complete coverage by both radio and television was probably only a few years away. For 50,000,000 families and 24,000,000 single persons over fourteen the nation's 1773 dailies circulated over 54,000,000 copies, an average of 30,467 per publication; 543 Sunday papers, over 46,000,000, or 85,229 each; 8892 nondailies, 17,269,183, or an average of 1942 each; and the 4610 periodicals, the astronomical number of 384,628,000, or 83,433 each.⁷

Assuming 60,000,000 mass communication buying units, there were, if evenly distributed, more than two distance contact mediums per day per buying unit in the United States:

Daily newspaper copies	.90
Radios	.76
TV sets	.35
	<hr/> 2.01

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 711–717.

⁶ The motion picture, as a medium of mass diffusion, for three reasons need not be considered here: (1) It has developed mainly as an entertainment device rather than a device for diffusing current news, newsreels to the contrary notwithstanding; (2) it requires its audiences to seek it out in theaters instead of seeking individuals out on the streets or in their homes; and (3) when the movie film is used to seek out its audience as in telecasts of past athletic events, and so on, it utilizes television to do the job. Motion pictures are important in the total picture of mass communications, but not as purveyors of current events. They slant and color attitudes and stereotypes rather than current information.

⁷ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 467.

Not to speak of 25,000,000 radios in automobiles, an estimated 7,000,000 sets in business places and institutions, and the daily pro rata units of the 17,000,000 weeklies and the 384,000,000 magazines!

As compared with the audiences and publics that could be reached by the medieval herald, the town crier, the common gossip, the coffee house, the scribbled bulletin, and the written newsletter, electro-machine diffusion blanketed millions in place of scores or hundreds. Diffusion efficiency had risen by some multiple of the order of 50,000 to 1.

Yet even these tremendous figures did not measure the whole gain of the modern world over the Middle Ages. Modern communication not only moves thousands of times faster and reaches thousands of times more people in the same time unit than did the communications of six centuries ago; it conveys far more of the distant event, far more of the fullness of the remote experience, than did the old word-of-mouth or written messages.

4. DEVICES THAT INCREASE EXPRESSIVENESS

Expressiveness is the capacity of a medium of communication to transmit the entirety of a distant event, condition, or experience—capacity to reproduce the thing itself. Until the nineteenth century man had no distance devices more expressive than words, drawings, and paintings. But words are mere symbols which can call up ideas, not actual sense impressions of the reality. Drawings and paintings create sense impressions, but no one at a distance can check on their accuracy, and until methods were devised in the nineteenth century for transferring pictures to the printed page, drawings, sketches, and paintings had limited diffusion value.

With the advances of chemistry early in the 1800's came the invention of photography—the fixation of visual scenes on chemically treated plates and their reproduction in picture form. By the end of the century the motion picture had been invented and audiences could now see distant scenes in motion. Other inventions permitted the taking of colored pictures, colored movies, motion pictures in three dimensions.

In 1876 Alexander Graham Bell's telephone transmitted the speaking voice. In the 1920's came the talking movie.

Meanwhile, an entire radio industry had been developing from the applications of the thermionic vacuum tube which made radio broadcasting possible. But even as the first sound tracks were revolutioniz-

ing the art of motion-picture making and radio broadcasting was still in its first decade, inventors were busy with the problem of distant seeing—television. Television became a commercial reality in the United States after World War II, and when the communication engineers discovered how to link broadcasting stations in coast-to-coast networks, television receivers spread with great rapidity. In 1950, for example, as against a 95.6 percent saturation of American homes with radio sets, only 12.3 reported television sets.⁸ Three years later 80 percent of all homes in Detroit had television sets and upper-income-bracket homes claimed a near saturation of 92 percent. Even homes with less than \$2000 a year income were covered 40 percent by television.⁹ In 1953, also, came the first telecasts in color.

All of this, from the first rude daguerreotypes to the latest television set, constituted a tremendous gain in the expressiveness of distance communication. True, nobody had yet improved on the verbal expressiveness of Shakespeare, but as against the limited audience of the Globe theater, Shakespearcan plays could now be telecast to tens of millions of homes at once. Within a few years of mid-century colored television was to be a commercial commonplace and stereoscopic television in color would undoubtedly soon follow.

Where could we go from there? What are the limits of human communication? Can man ever abolish distance so that anyone anywhere in the world can instantly be present completely to all the senses of anyone else anywhere? So far our distance devices affect only two senses, sight and hearing. Taste, touch, smell, and kinesthetic sensations cannot be transmitted. Moreover, our distance devices are not only highly selective as to the kinds of stimuli they can transmit; they are selective also as to the number of persons who can communicate at one time. In 1951, for example, only 792,000 out of 110,000,000 adults were licensed for radio or television sending. That amounted to only 7 out of every 1000 Americans. Inventors still had a long way to go before the other 993 could send as well as receive.

Actually, instead of increasing freedom of individual communication at a distance the trend was toward *increasing concentration of control over distance devices*. In other words, mass diffusion was showing the same tendencies toward concentration that had been visible in the rest of the economy since the 1880's. In 1954 not over 1300

⁸ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1952, p. 741.

⁹ Data from the Detroit Area Project, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, mimeographed report, "Television Ownership in the Detroit Metropolitan Area," Special Report No. 2, June 25, 1953.

men controlled the 1773 daily newspapers and 543 Sunday papers, and the trend was downward. There were 827 fewer dailies than in 1909, the peak year of newspaper diversity in the United States. While the 56 chains with 296 papers did not match the 65 with 342 in 1932, concentration went forward in another way—in the growing number of one-newspaper cities, cities without competing dailies. Out of 1262 cities of 10,000 or over, only 117, or 9.2 percent, still had competing dailies in 1946.¹⁰ Ten states had no competing dailies anywhere in any of their cities. One company dominated 3000 weeklies, and almost nine-tenths of all the 8892 weeklies in 1952 received their general news from one concern, most of it preselected, predigested, preedited. One-third of the regular radio stations were interlocked with newspapers. Four networks controlled most of the best broadcasting time—even before World War II it amounted to 95 percent of all night broadcasting time. Ernst claimed that, in 1946, 144 advertisers supplied 97 percent of all network income and that in over 100 urban areas “the only newspaper left owns the only radio station.”

It took a Supreme Court decision to unscramble 2800 key movie theaters from the control of five movie companies, but 90 percent of all raw film still came from only two concerns.

In 1942, 99, or less than 8 percent of more than 1200 subscribers to the Associated Press, controlled that great news-gathering organization by holding over 50 percent of voting bonds originally issued for office furniture! The Hearst papers controlled the International News Service and its picture and feature subsidiaries. The United Press, the third great news-gathering agency in the United States, unlike the Associated Press, which limited its news services to its own restricted membership, sold news over the counter to anyone. Founded in 1907 by E. W. Scripps, the United Press was still dominated by the Scripps-Howard chain of papers.

As Alfred McClung Lee pointed out before World War II, the progress of invention offered the possibility of still further concentration of news control: “R.C.A. in 1935 announced a relatively inexpensive radio receiver that printed 36-page newspapers in quarter-page size in private homes.” Radio, in other words, might eventually by-pass the newspaper press altogether! Or, using facsimile transmission to transmit full pages to printing plants, one great urban daily might some day aspire to blanket the United States with its first truly

¹⁰ Morris L. Ernst, *The First Freedom*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946, pp. xii–xiii.

"national daily," edited in one center and "delivered" throughout the nation the next morning.

In 1954 there was no sign either in the trend of invention or in the trend of economic pressures that distance communication was moving toward freer and freer contact, individual with individual. On the contrary, there was every indication that it was moving toward still further concentration of control of the average American's contacts with the world "out there." Some of the individual and social problems raised by these tendencies we shall consider in Chapter 11 of Book II. For the moment, all this is simply data to be kept in mind in analyzing the process of defining distant situations.

So far, we have traced the evolution of communication in terms of invention and current trends toward concentration of control. But to understand the role of these various diffusion agencies—the newspaper, the radio, television, the newsreel, etc.—in building up our conceptual constructs of the world "out there" we need also to know something of (1) the *cultural machinery of reportage* as it actually operates, (2) the *barriers* which it must overcome, and (3) the *skills and insights* which we ourselves must use to make the most of it. We shall take these up in order.

I-11:3. The Cultural Machinery of Reportage

Like any culture complex, the machinery of reportage operates on the basis of (1) a structure; (2) a technology, or combination of technologies; and (3) a spirit, or prevailing climate of opinion.

1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MASS DIFFUSION INDUSTRIES

Two kinds of structures are distinguishable in the mass diffusion industries: (a) *control structures* and (b) *operative structures*.

The unit *control structure* of distant reportage in mass diffusion is the *business enterprise*. The business enterprise owns and operates the operative structure—the actual newspaper, radio station, television station, or news service. A business enterprise in this field, as in any other in the economy, may be an individual entrepreneur, a partnership, or a corporation. Individuals and partners bear the entire responsibility and risks of their businesses and all their attachable assets are subject to seizure to satisfy their debts in case of failure. The same men, however, chartered by the state as a corporation, are liable only for the amount which they have actually invested in the business, and if they

have sold stock in the corporation, they have the use of capital supplied by other investors on the same terms. The corporation, in other words, is a legal device (a) for limiting the liabilities of its owners and (b) for mobilizing and using more capital than any one or two individuals usually can supply.

Legally, a corporation is a juristic "person" constituted by one or more natural persons for purposes set forth in its charter, or articles of incorporation, and is considered to have an existence independent of its constituent personnel. So long as it remains solvent, it is thus "immortal," immune from the vicissitudes of individual mortality. For such obvious reasons the corporation has become the dominant form of business enterprise in our economy and, with the possible exception of the weekly publishing field, it is the dominant form of controlling structure in the mass diffusion industries. The basic purpose of a corporation, as of all business enterprises, is to make a profit out of its operations.

The corporate form of ownership of newspapers and broadcasting stations has tended, on the whole, to broaden their economic base (increase the amount of capital available) and thus stabilize their financial operations. But, as in other kinds of manufacturing, the corporation and advancing technology together have tremendously increased the role of capital in mass diffusion enterprises. It is no longer possible to start a daily newspaper or even a solvent weekly on an idea and "a shirttail full of type." A big city daily, apart from an Associated Press franchise which alone may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, requires millions merely to make a start and usually other millions before it can hope to build up a circulation commanding adequate advertising revenue. Small radio stations, like small papers, require much less—once the Federal Communications Commission has granted a license and assigned a specific wave-length—but even these need tens of thousands of dollars' worth of equipment. Television stations are much more expensive, and because of the technological limitations on broadcasting bands, licenses are harder to get. Small weeklies can still be picked up for a few thousand dollars—plus credit at the bank—but the day of the impecunious little man in the field of mass diffusion is definitely over. The mass diffusion field, like the fields of transportation, mass marketing, mass production, and the like, is dominated by capital, corporate capital. Like executives in other corporate enterprises, newspaper and broadcasting

and television station managers are under a never ending pressure to make money.

They have only two or three sources from which to get it: advertising, subventions, and, for the newspapers, readers. Advertisers pay 100 percent of the bills for radio and television stations and from 80 to 90 percent of the newspaper's bills. The number and purchasing power of a newspaper's readers determine, of course, what its circulation is worth to the advertiser. But no matter what it is worth, the advertiser still pays 80 to 90 percent of the costs, the readers only 10 to 20 percent. This means that every time you and I buy a newspaper we accept a subsidy from advertisers amounting to 8 or 9 cents for every 1 that we pay. We don't even pay for the paper on which the news is printed. Only as targets for the advertiser do we have any economic importance to the publisher. We no longer pay for the product we get.

Agencies of news diffusion obviously cannot possibly report everything that happens in the world. They have to select. They have also discovered that the agency that interprets news with selective emphasis can attract more readers or listeners than one that gives everything it selects equal space, equal headlines, etc. Dead-sameness of reporting has long since given way to differential emphasis. Selection and differential emphasis naturally tone or shade the picture of the world "out there" that any newspaper, any radio or television newscast conveys. The slanting or toning of individual news stories or news reports does the same thing. The net result is to control (a) the direction of public attention, (b) the content of the public mind, and (c) the emotional slant or toning of that content. In other words, *control of an agency of news diffusion means at least partial control of public opinion and hence social and economic power.*

Because of this power both newspapers and radio and television stations have an additional source of revenue to supplement the advertiser and (for the newspaper) the reader. This additional source is subventions. Subventions are gifts—gifts with strings to them. In 1906–10, for example, when law-enforcement agencies in San Francisco were trying to send to prison certain prominent businessmen who had bribed seventeen out of the nineteen members of the governing body of the city, the Board of Supervisors, with \$167,000 for various franchise rights, certain San Francisco banks provided a subvention of \$175,000 for a string of rural weeklies in California to sup-

port the graft defendants and denounce the prosecution. When the special prosecutor, Francis Heney, was defeated for state's attorney in 1909 on the issue of continuing the prosecution, and his successful rival dismissed the graft indictments, the weeklies folded up without repaying the trustful banks.¹¹

It is sometimes difficult to draw the line between subventions and legitimate business advertising. Back in the not-so-gay nineties when the old Standard Oil Company found itself the target of most of the rural editors in Ohio it wasted no time trying to bribe or buy off the editors: it simply placed long-term advertising contracts with all the important rural papers, agreeing in every case to pay by the month. Within six months, as the rural editors fell into the habit of discounting their Standard accounts at the bank in advance, the tone of the rural press changed completely. Nobody had asked one single editor to alter his editorial attitude toward Standard Oil. But it was simply not in the business mores of the United States for a businessman to criticize a good customer. Simply by becoming a good customer of the rural editors Standard Oil made it impossible for them to go on denouncing it as an economic octopus. The Standard shut them up by joining the charmed circle of good customers.

William Allen White, famous Kansas editor, once remarked that the American newspaper had ceased to be a tribune of the people by becoming an 8 percent investment: the editor didn't take orders from other businessmen—he merely joined the same country club!

Thus, there is no great mystery about the condition stigmatized by the Democratic presidential candidate in 1952 as a "two-party nation with a one-party press." By and large, daily newspapers are business enterprises first and tribunes of the people, educational agencies, and whatever else a long way second.¹²

So much for the machinery of reportage in relation to business control.

The *operative structure* consists of the actual operating organizations that get out the newspapers and put on the radio and television programs. Personnel and policies are, of course, determined by the executives of the business enterprises which own or control them. But a structure of legal rights such as a corporation is one thing while a

¹¹ See Franklin Hichborn, *The System as Uncovered by the San Francisco Graft Prosecution*, San Francisco, Press of the James H. Barry Company, 1915.

¹² What the predominantly business bias of the commercial press in the United States means for fidelity of reporting, the future of democracy, etc., we shall consider in Book II, Chapter 11.

structure of operating functions is something else. Just as the General Motors Corporation should be distinguished from any one or all of its 115 operating plants in the United States, so the corporations that control the major mass diffusion agencies should be distinguished from the actual newspaper and broadcasting organizations. This is perhaps easier in the case of the fifty-odd newspaper chains in the United States than in the case of some small city daily whose corporate officers often function also in the actual production of newspapers. But the distinction is worth making in either case.

The first thing to note about every operative organization in the mass diffusion field is that it is set up on essentially the same pattern as every other *action* organization, every other production unit, in the manufacturing field. This pattern has three outstanding characteristics: (a) *functional departmentalization*—advertising, editorial, printing, circulation, maintenance; programing, broadcasting, engineering; and so on; (b) a *pyramid of authority*—office boys, reporters, copyreaders, subeditors, department heads, edition editors, managing editor, and so on; and (c) a *chain of command*, “channels” through which policies are interpreted, orders come down, and supervision is carried out. This is the century-old pattern for any action organization, any organization that exists primarily to get things done. Its original model from the days of ancient Egypt or earlier must have been the army. By centuries of trial and error men have managed to get it through their heads that when you bring men together to *do* things, to make things happen in some kind of coöperation, coöperation will be more effective and you will get more done if you break the total task into functional bits, put all of it in charge of one man, and give him authority to make his will effective by means of delegated authority transmitted from top to bottom by explicit channels of control. Centuries of experience have shown that that is the most effective pattern of coöperation by which to build pyramids, win battles, turn out automobiles—and to produce newspapers, and radio and television broadcasts.

The operative structure of the mass diffusion agencies, then, like their control structure, is essentially the same as the operative structure of any other manufacturing organization. But the fact that they are manufacturing salable units of opinions, information, and entertainment instead of salable units of automobiles or breakfast food raises questions which we shall have to consider in a context of values in Book II, Chapter 11.

2. TECHNOLOGIES OF DISTANCE REPORTAGE

Three kinds of technology are important in the reporting of distant situations: (a) How identify news? (b) How find news? (c) How serve news up to the public?

a. How does one identify news? Not everything that happens beyond the horizon in any given unit of time can possibly be reported by the existing machinery of reportage or by any other that is conceivable. Even if it could be, nobody could possibly attend to all of it or make head or tail out of it if he did. The men who provide the reports which the wires and the air waves transmit are forced not merely by the limitations of their transmitting mediums but by the limitations of the human mind itself to *select* certain aspects of the world "out there" and ignore the rest. What standards of judgment guide their selections? How do they define this highly perishable, intangible stuff called news? What factors control the toning and emphasis given to the news, once it has been identified?

At once we encounter the fact that news is defined by the technical traditions of the mass diffusion industries, not by the inspired guesses of separate individuals on their own. Every reporter, commentator, and newsreel or television cameraman serves an unofficial apprenticeship learning what his superiors in his organization will accept as news. And they in turn were inducted into the tradition in the same way. The tradition itself is the cumulative result of myriads of trial-and-error guesses since the days of John Campbell concerning what will interest John Q. Public. In the beginning, when communication was slow and difficult and when there were burning public issues to be discussed, the early editors found their publics eager to read opinions. They gave them plenty and not much else. Later, as the nineteenth century wore along and the railroad and the telegraph began to knit the nation into a network of interlocking markets and as foreign affairs began to intrude on the domestic scene, Horace Greeley and James Gordon Bennett demonstrated that information, "facts," would sell even better than editorial opinions. Dana's old New York *Sun* demonstrated that the news served up with some literary *flair* would sell also. And then Pulitzer and Hearst at the turn of the century proved the circulation value of crusading—and the latter developed his famous formula for circulation-building on sex, sensationalism, and entertainment. But crusading for anything more conflict-arousing than new municipal airports turned out to be too risky for multi-million-dollar

business enterprises. Gradually it became apparent that what the public liked to read was mainly three kinds of material: (1) *the important*—information relevant to day-to-day affairs; (2) *the unusual*—the curious or bizarre happenings that broke with ordinary routines; and (3) *the emotion-arousing*—features, comics, human-interest stories, crime news, and the like. Broadly speaking, then, that is what the technical tradition of the mass diffusion industries defines news to be—*the important, the unusual, and the emotion-arousing*—with two important qualifications: the important, the unusual, and the emotion-arousing is news *if and when it is new, and if and in so far as it pertains to the particular public reached by the medium in question.*

This means that every event that reaches the “antennae” or listening posts of the mass diffusion industries in the world “out there” must run the gantlet of five questions: (1) Is it *new*? (2) Is it *important*? (3) Is it *unusual*? (4) Is it *emotion-arousing*? and (5) Would our *particular public* be interested in it? Take the case of a trainload of cattle that froze to death, stalled in a Michigan blizzard a few years ago. That was of no great importance, but it was unusual, it tended to arouse pity, and it fell within the interest range of Detroit papers. But unfortunately the rural correspondent who had that news to report, instead of using the telegraph or the telephone, both of which were working despite the storm, leisurely *mailed* in her story. It finally reached her Detroit editor *eight days after the thing had happened.* By that time about 800 other and more important news events had occurred in Michigan, so the bovine tragedy no longer rated more than two lines on an inside page.

Nothing is more perishable than news. This is partly because one's competitors may destroy its newness by disseminating their own versions of it first, and partly because the pressure of competing news events is so terrific that any given spot news event begins to shrivel in value the moment it happens. This does not mean that there would have been no news market for an authentic story on the condition of the cattle industry in Michigan even weeks after that unfortunate trainload perished in the blizzard. Spot news is one thing and background news is something else. And when an event in which people are intensely interested is not divulged until months or years afterwards the revelation may itself be spot news of the highest value. Witness the Army report made public in October, 1953, revealing the fate of Americans taken captive in Korea two or three years before. That story got banner headlines on page 1.

What is news, then, is defined by the technical tradition of the mass diffusion industries in terms designed to interest the people who buy the papers or tune in on a given station's broadcasts. Whether the news that the newspapers publish and the radio and television broadcast is what the public wants or merely what it takes because it doesn't know any better is a question we leave for Chapter 11 of Book II.

b. How is news found? News collectors for the mass diffusion industries rely heavily on agencies of public record as their sources of news and as sources of tips on where to look for news on their own. The police department of the average American city is the nerve center of news collection in the community. Not only do the police record all crimes reported to them, but they record all disappearances reported, lost children, suicides, traffic accidents, and so on. They are also alerted for every fire. Throughout the city policemen thus act as unpaid news reporters twenty-four hours a day. In conjunction with the courts, the executive and administrative offices of the city and the county, and whatever state and federal offices may be maintained in the municipality, the law-enforcement agencies form an invaluable source of news records and tips on news and are not infrequently originators of news itself in the form of promotions, interviews, internal squabbles, and the like. Pre-censor out of the average American daily newspaper the news it has received directly or indirectly from public agencies of record, including the weather bureau, and a good share of its news columns will be blank. Then if nonpublic agencies of record such as the stock exchange, the commodity markets, and so on are also eliminated not much but the comics and the columnists will be left—and a good chunk of the columnists will have to come out too if they are confined merely to what they themselves turned up without the help of public or private agencies of record. Willy-nilly the great mass diffusion agencies in the United States are cashing in every day on the routine work of about 200,000 policemen and sheriffs, and other hundreds of thousands of firemen, city, county, state, and federal officials, and uncounted thousands of clerks, registrars, and other minor employees in public and private offices. This is no scandalous or antisocial condition. It is merely a fact. An overwhelming proportion of the news of the day is "found" in the first instance not by the news agencies themselves but by the tens of thousands of public and private officials whose business it is to record the transactions of their fellow men. What the newsmen do is to maintain contact with these official and quasi-official places of record and select out for their

own use, i.e., for mass diffusion, a few of all the events and transactions that get recorded. They select, as we have seen, in terms of what their technical tradition teaches them is news. And they prepare their reports and publish or broadcast them in terms of techniques for attracting and holding attention.

c. How should news be presented to the public? Since news forms so small a part of radio and television programs while it occupies half or more of the average newspaper, our problem is the techniques by which a newspaper attracts, holds, and enhances public interest in its wares.

The editor has five means at his disposal for manipulating public attention: (1) selection; (2) allotment of space; (3) placement; (4) headlining; and (5) toning. The student can verify this by making a list of all news stories in a newspaper and then arranging them in a composite scale summing up the *rankings* of each item on selection, column inches, placement in the paper, size of headline, and type of toning or slanting given each item.

Selection is the hardest component to grade because the lay reader *never knows what might have been selected instead*. All he knows is what the paper lays before him. What actually gets printed every day is only a fraction of the news reports which reach the editor's desk and those news reports in turn constitute only a fraction of what might have been reported. One way to grade selection is to compare different newspapers of markedly different points of view. Take one of the papers nominated by newspaper publishers as among the top ten in the United States and use that as a standard by which to rate the selection exercised by the editors of a rival paper in the same city.¹³

But to get an overview of the processes by which publishers and editors in general manipulate public attention by all five of the devices named—selection, spacing, placement, headlining, and toning—one must read the evidence gathered in various empirical studies of the press and the testimony of publishers, editors, and reporters themselves. Two of the best empirical studies are "A Test of the News," Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, special supplement to the *New Republic*, August 4, 1920, showing the distorted view of the Bolshevik

¹³ Edward L. Bernays, public relations counsel, asked 1773 newspaper publishers in the United States to name the papers which they considered among the top ten in this country. They chose the *New York Times*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, the *Kansas City Star*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *Washington Post*, the *Baltimore Sun*, and the *Milwaukee Journal*. See *Editor and Publisher*, May 17, 1952.

Revolution in Russia given by the selection and handling of news about Russia in the *New York Times* during 1917-18-19; and *Public Opinion and the Steel Strike, Supplementary Reports of the Investigators to the Commission of Inquiry*.¹⁴ This demonstrated how unfair had been the reporting of the steel strike of 1919 by the seven Pittsburgh English dailies which were controlled by the steel companies, and how the news agencies, relying on the Pittsburgh papers for their reports, had misled the American public into thinking that the steel strike against low wages, the seven-day week, and the twelve-hour day was a Bolshevik uprising threatening American institutions! As a result of such press misrepresentation union papers formed their own news agency, the Federated Press.

Men who have exposed the economic forces dominating American journalism and have revealed instance after instance of news suppression, news distortion, or outright propaganda include Will Irwin, Oswald Garrison Villard, Upton Sinclair, William Allen White, Fremont Older, and George Seldes.

Seldes claims, for example, that "in my years of printing an honor roll of the great and good, I have never been able to name more than one per cent of the American press, seventeen to twenty individual dailies. Doubters may make one small but important test of venality: challenge your newspaper to publish the daily fraud orders of the Federal Trade Commission, naming the big advertisers who violate the laws, sometimes persuading you to buy bad food and bad medicine. . . . Freedom of the press exists, but for the owner, not the reader."¹⁵

This, of course, is an evaluation which belongs in Book II, Chapter 11. It is cited here simply to illustrate the type of opinion that many critics of the press have reached concerning the manipulation of public attention by publishers and editors. It is indicative of a fact noted above, namely, that although newspapers are private business enterprises organized to make money, they are regarded by their customers, the reading public, as accountable to a code of ethics not imposed on other businessmen when *dealing with customers who do not pay for what they get!* This brings us to another aspect of the machinery of distance reportage, namely,

¹⁴ The Interchurch World Movement, Bishop Francis J. McConnell, chairman. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1921.

¹⁵ George Seldes, *Tell the Truth and Run*, New York, Greenberg: Publisher, 1953, pp. 273-274.

3. THE SURROUNDING CLIMATE OF OPINION

Newspapers enjoy a privileged position among business enterprises in America. In the first place, unlike certain food processors, for example, their products are free from governmental inspection before they reach the market. The First Amendment to the Constitution, which also controls in the states, forbids the enactment of laws "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." In the second place, American legal doctrine bars redress to any individual harmed by a newspaper product (news), *if the story is true*, or if it originated in a judicially recognized (privileged) official source such as a speech in Congress or a court record. In the third place, no other industry has been subsidized directly by the government for so long a time with so little tangible return to the taxpayer. Since the establishment of the postal system, newspapers and magazines have been carried at rates below the cost of the service. Subsidies to farmers, shipping interests, and others result in tangible returns: crops, soil conservation, ships, good roads, etc. But the United States pays out money for carrying press products below cost, not for so many newspapers or magazines or even so many articles on public affairs but in effect to contribute to the solvency of businessmen, most of whom now are already in the upper tax brackets anyway and could very well afford to pay their own circulation costs.

In the fourth place, no other industry enjoys by force of custom the privilege of invading individual privacy so persistently and extensively. Even salesmen do not stop people on the street or force their way into private homes.

And finally, no other industry profits so directly from the unpaid cooperation of hundreds of thousands of policemen and other public servants in providing its basic raw materials. Other industries have to pay for their raw materials. Newspapers get the basic stuff by which they attract customers free for nothing from the servants of the public.

All of which means, as we have said, that newspapers enjoy a privileged position among the nation's business enterprises, a privileged position sanctioned by law, custom, and public opinion. If newspaper critics are to be believed, newspapers, like other possessors of privilege from ancient Egypt down, do not always use their privileges merely to perform the functions for which presumably the privileges exist. They are accused of using them for their own profit and to the detriment of

the public, on occasion. But evaluations of this sort belong in Book II, Chapter 11.

It is interesting to note another aspect of mass diffusion privilege and that is the technological advantage which mass diffusion agencies necessarily enjoy in being able to contribute directly to the climate of opinion in which they operate. Unlike breakfast foods, automobiles, and stocks and bonds, news constitutes the stuff of which opinions are made. The newspaper and the radio and television newscasts provide the pictures of the world "out there" to which the public adjusts its behavior. Hence, the Commission on the Freedom of the Press pointed out in its April, 1947, report that the agencies of mass diffusion "can advance the progress of civilization or they can thwart it. They can debase and vulgarize mankind. They can endanger the peace of the world."¹⁶ No conclusion concerning the power of other business enterprises could be put in words like that. It is the privilege of the mass diffusion agencies, thanks to the technological nature of mass diffusion itself, to be able to affect powerfully and directly the climate of opinion in which they operate.

So much, then, for the machinery of reportage as it operates in our society: its structure, its technology, and the climate of opinion surrounding it.

What now of the barriers which it must overcome to make you and me aware of situations beyond the horizon?

I-11:4. Barriers to the World Out There

Between the ordinary newspaper reader, radio listener, or television viewer, on the one hand, and the world beyond the horizon, on the other, stand at least six kinds of obstacles or barriers:

1. Limitations on access to news at the source.
2. Uncertainties of symbolization.
3. Restrictions on transmission of intelligence.
4. Refraction or even manipulation by the diffusing agency.
5. Psychological limitations of the public.
6. Restrictions on discussion.

I. LIMITATIONS OF ACCESS

Limitations of access to news at the source are based on ideas of privacy, exclusiveness, or secrecy. All three of these ideas necessarily imply the deliberate limitation of social contacts by someone who for

¹⁶ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 283.




FIG. 1-11.1. Barriers, in Diagrammatic Outline, and Effect on Communication. How steps in distance communication transform the picture of the culture, the persons and the processes of a Situation (0) till the resulting composite idea of the Discussion Public (6) contains only some of the original elements and those considerably changed. Setting and form of association have vanished completely.

the time being at least regards such contacts as undesirable. But the nature of the limitation differs in the three cases.¹⁷

Privacy asserts the individual's claim to an area of interests and life activities free from the scrutiny of others. Exclusiveness is a form of in-group, out-group dichotomy—a way of asserting one's right to choose friends and associates to suit himself and to exclude others from the charmed circle. Secrecy is the deliberate concealment of something for whatever motive.

Most people make no secret of their private affairs but simply carry them on in the quiet conviction that they are nobody else's business. They also exercise the right given by our culture to exclude strangers and uninvited guests from their homes and from various in-group activities to which outsiders do not belong. Illicit love affairs and certain items of personal income they may on occasion try to conceal.

What is private, what is confidential within the limits of exclusiveness, and what is secret vary from time to time and from culture to culture. As Lippmann pointed out, during the Middle Ages in western Europe a man's diseases were largely private, but his religion was a matter of the utmost public concern. Today in the United States this order is reversed: many diseases are reportable to public authorities while one's religion as such is one's own affair. Traditionally, in the United States what one reads and with what law-abiding individuals one associates have been private matters. But in 1953 an Air Force hearing board recommended the cancellation of a reserve lieutenant's commission because (a) his father read a Communist foreign-language newspaper and (b) his sister had attended Communist meetings. The loyalty of the lieutenant himself was not questioned.¹⁸ The Communist threat was lowering old tolerances.

Most boards of directors and even some public bodies conduct business of high public importance on a private or confidential basis. The policies of great billion-dollar corporations such as General Motors or United States Steel, for example, hit hundreds of thousands of homes harder in the pocketbook than do most of the actions of most state governments. Yet their governing bodies regard themselves as conducting private businesses and usually exclude reporters from their meetings. Even the board of regents of a great midwestern state university conducted its public business behind closed doors for a gen-

¹⁷ For a fuller discussion of psychological and social barriers the student is referred to Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922.

¹⁸ The Secretary of the Air Force disregarded the hearing board's recommendation and refused to cancel the young man's reserve commission.

eration or more. Then when the newspapers in their state began demanding that their official meetings be opened to the public, the regents refused on the ground that discussions of university policies and personnel could not be held in public without damage to the university and its professors.

This incident points up an interesting question: What are the practical limits to the values of publicity?

Undoubtedly the privileges accorded the American press rest largely on the public belief that those privileges are necessary to enable it to act as a watchdog of government; to enable it to keep the public informed on how tax money is being spent and public policy formulated. But should the public share in the details of administration of its various agencies?

In the case in point, there was no suggestion that the state university was badly managed, no suggestion that the board of regents was doing a poor job or that it was concealing scandal. The newspapers simply demanded that the regents open their meetings to the public because they were conducting public business. And there were open threats of using newspaper "influence" to induce the legislature through its power over university appropriations to force the regents to let the bars down.

Were the newspapers in this instance doing a public service by pressing this demand? Or were they misusing the power of publicity?

Consider some of the situations in which publicity adds nothing to, and frequently detracts from, the effectiveness of public or quasi-public bodies. One of these is any situation in which such bodies have to carry on delicate negotiations concerning highly involved or highly emotional questions. Political experience has long since demonstrated that the public is quite incapable of deciding technical questions. Once the question of whether or not to build a bridge has been decided, the public cannot usefully debate the details of design. That is a matter for technically trained engineers and nobody else. In a labor dispute, negotiations between management and the union cannot usefully be conducted publicly in the courthouse square, or by way of radio or television. "Open covenants openly arrived at" was one of the most misleading slogans to come out of World War I. How can statesmen possibly *negotiate* in a show window or in front of a television camera? Publicity in such cases simply freezes each negotiator in his most popular position and destroys all power of maneuver, all possibility of compromise. It is high time modern publics were made

more realistically aware of their own limitations. They can approve or veto broad policies. They cannot decide on technical details and they cannot actively participate in delicate negotiations concerning involved or emotion-arousing questions. *They cannot participate in the administration of any specialized agency.* They can only approve or disapprove results.

Yet if too much publicity of the wrong things at the wrong time can sabotage public business, how about too much secrecy, too much concealment? Many atomic scientists, for example, insisted in the years after Hiroshima that government policy restricting publication of atomic discoveries was delaying the advance of atomic science in the Western world. They were not urging the release of secret formulas, many of which were presently stolen by Fuchs and his fellow spies anyway, but greater freedom for the exchange of scientific information not immediately relevant to the bomb. What they wanted, in effect, was a return to the freedom of scientific communication that had existed before World War II. But unfortunately, freedom of communication in the modern world is a function of order and tranquillity—and the world after Hiroshima was neither orderly nor tranquil.

All organizations have certain information which their functionaries regard as private or confidential. Those engaged in competition or conflict for existence also necessarily have certain things to keep secret. The international scene being what it is, for example, an arena of conflict among gigantic power systems, no government can avoid trying to conceal certain policies, military devices, and so on, from actual or prospective enemies. This means security measures against spies and saboteurs.

And this, in turn, means not only restrictions on access at the source but also restrictions on the transmission of intelligence—in other words, censorship. But before we face up to that obstacle there is another of a more subtle kind and that is the process of symbolization by which any reporter (or photographer) of a distant event or situation seeks to describe or interpret that event or situation.

2. THE UNCERTAINTIES OF SYMBOLIZATION

We have already noted that our agencies of mass diffusion rely heavily on agencies of record for their news. We could also have emphasized a further fact: the news that comes through such agencies of record is vastly more verifiable, i.e., dependable in that sense, than is

news gathered apart from such agencies. Election returns are more dependable indexes of an election outcome than are the predictions of opinion pollsters. And the stock exchange is a better register of economic conditions than are the opinions of Tom, Dick, and Harry throughout the country.

In other words, the standardized symbols in which agencies of record denote an event or a situation are usually more dependable (verifiable) than are the unstandardized symbols which even technically trained observers use in trying to convey their definitions of events and situations which are not matters of standard record. This simply means that, when observers have to deal with events or situations for which culture has *not already provided* a standardized definition, the definitions which emerge are likely to vary with the observer. Everybody can agree reasonably well in defining simple, routine events and situations—which are seldom news—and they can even agree pretty well in defining simple, obvious breaks with the routine: deaths, fires, windstorms, and the like. The trouble comes when it is necessary to appraise the deeper implications of obvious events or situations, to evaluate human intentions, and to make some sort of synthesis of phenomena scattered in space, time, and social relevance. Facing a new Soviet note, unrest in North Africa, political confusion in the Near East, how does the correspondent define the situation? Any definitions available from any governmental agency are themselves part of the situations to be defined! And yet some sort of definition must be given.

Was Chiang Kai-shek a “great democrat” or “a stool pigeon for Chinese reaction”? We need not ask whether his opponents were “simple agrarian reformers” or authentic Communists. The “simple agrarian reformer” stereotype befuddled American opinion for a number of very crucial years. It was, of course, disseminated by deliberate propaganda. And that, of course, brings us to an exceedingly important kind of barrier to the truth about distant situations and events—the deliberate manipulation of news and opinion for the benefit of particular individuals, interests, or governments. In so far as propaganda has become a problem in itself, we reserve consideration of it for Book II, Chapter 11. But in so far as it has become a fact, an additional barrier between the public and the world “out there,” we note its existence here.

By propaganda we refer to any and all means used by anyone to put over on a public (or on important public or quasi-public agencies) a

specific conclusion, attitude, or point of view advantageous to the propagandist. Note that propagandists use any and all means, truth as well as half-truth and outright falsehood, and propaganda of the deed as well as propaganda of the word.

Historically, propaganda is probably as old as human conflict. The first savage who painted his face to terrify his enemy was making propaganda of a sort. But the first literary appearance of the *idea*, not the word, seems to have been in Plato's *Republic*, in which the great Greek philosopher, having decided that his ideal state should be constituted of rulers, defenders, and workers, advised his readers that perhaps the most effective way in which to induce the members of these three orders to keep their proper places was to teach them from infancy that each was made of different stuff: the rulers of gold, the defenders of silver, the workers of iron. The word first appeared in 1623 when Pope Urban VIII established a "College of the Propaganda" to spread religious "truth" among Protestants and other unbelievers. It was not until the outbreak of World War I, however, and the attempts of the German and British governments to influence American public opinion that Americans suddenly became aware of propaganda as a mysterious and sinister threat. The term has carried a connotation of evil ever since, but actually propaganda as such is as neutral morally as a pistol. A pistol may be used for murder or for legitimate self-defense. Propaganda may be used to confuse and weaken a prospective victim of aggression, as Hitler used it against France, or it may be used to help defeat an aggressor, as the United States used it to help break down German morale in World War I.¹⁹ But there is no doubt at all that, whatever may be the moral standing of the purposes for which it is used, propaganda itself has emerged in the modern world *as a powerful weapon of social and military conflict*. This means that whenever there is such a conflict in progress one must expect propaganda and must do one's best to guard against it. In every strike situa-

¹⁹ By distributing post cards to be mailed home to relatives by German soldiers *after their surrender*, describing good treatment, good food, etc.; by publicizing the exact number of American soldiers rushed to Europe to bolster sagging Allied lines, following Ludendorff's attacks in the spring of 1918; and so on. With German reserves approaching exhaustion, the news that over 300,000 Americans were arriving *each month* was calculated to depress German morale and probably did. Both this and the post cards are examples of truth used for propaganda purposes. Both sides suppressed information unfavorable to themselves for the same reason. Although France and Russia share historical responsibility for creating the critical situation in which the German government felt compelled to start hostilities in 1914, the term *aggressor* is applied to Germany here because (a) German troops were the first to violate a frontier and (b) having rejected "peace without annexations in 1916," the German government in 1918 was striking desperately for a decision before the weight of American reserves could be brought to bear on the western front.

tion, in every struggle of rival interests for economic advantage, in every situation of international tension propaganda will inevitably be found. How to make allowance for this fact we shall consider in Book II, Chapter 11.

To the other uncertainties of symbolizing distant events and situations, then, must be added the deliberate manipulation of symbols for special purposes. But such manipulation may not be limited to the mere manipulation of symbols. Propaganda frequently goes hand in hand with censorship. And censorship, like propaganda, may affect the communicative and diffusion processes at any point from the original source of the news itself to the final processes of discussion and critical evaluation. At the moment, our concern is with the third stage in the progress of a communication toward its public.

3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSMISSION

Restrictions on the transmission of intelligence may apply at any stage between the original source of information and the public itself. Censorship, in other words, may be a form of secrecy at the source, limiting access in the first place. Or it may close the channels of transmission, sealing telephone, telegraph, and radio stations. It may permit messages to be sent, but only after submission to an official empowered to strike out any part or all of a dispatch. Or, recognizing that the mails or secret diplomatic pouches may still constitute channels for evading the censor's bluepencil, restrictions on transmission may take the form of the expulsion of correspondents who persist in sending out news unfavorable to a given regime.

Totalitarian governments have used all four of these methods, and totalitarian theory makes them an integral part of the process of governing in the interests of an elite. Democratic theory, on the contrary, repudiates such methods. But despite democratic theory, instances have occurred in America in which privileged individuals, corporations, or political machines have used one or more of these methods to defend their privileges.²⁰

On the whole, however, the climate of opinion in America has been

²⁰ Obstacles to the transmission of news have been reported many times from strike-ridden coal fields, one-industry towns, politically corrupt cities. Jake Lingle, a Chicago *Tribune* reporter, was murdered because he knew too much about the criminal gangs in Chicago. Don Mellett, editor of a Canton, Ohio, newspaper was murdered to silence the paper's exposure of corruption in the local police department. Censorship of news in the United States, however, is exercised rarely by violence or by actual restrictions on the transmission of news but more frequently by *limitations of access*, by the *cultural values* of a pecuniary culture which preselect what to report and what to ignore, and by the *policies* of the agencies of diffusion, which determine what to do with the news once it has reached the agencies.

opposed to the most obvious forms of news censorship. It does recognize the desirability of limiting access at the source where privacy, exclusiveness, or the protection of trade or government secrets is involved. But it opposes restrictions on transmission of news and, despite the pauperized condition of the daily newspaper reader, frowns on any obvious tampering with the news by the agencies of diffusion. Yet these agencies cannot escape slanting the news one way or the other by their inescapable function of selection and by their predetermined policies.

4. NEWS REFRACTION BY DIFFUSION AGENCIES

By refraction one refers to the deflection of a beam of light from its previous course. As we have already pointed out in Section I-11:3, the mass diffusion agencies cannot avoid deflecting a news story, and more especially the entire stream of news stories from day to day, by the very processes of selection and differential emphasis which they have to employ. The only question is deflection from what?

Obviously a news story is not a simple stream of stimuli moving in a straight line and needing no interpretation beyond simple perception. Nor, in the important cases, is the original event or situation a culturally defined thing or object that all competent observers would describe in identical words with identical meanings with an identical total effect. The bigger the event or situation in its total implications, in fact, the more likely are different observers to disagree about what those implications are. Thus, there is no straight line or agreed-upon base from which to measure the deflections of a given news story or the deflections of a particular view of the world as conveyed by the total impression made by a given agency at a given time.

What is the sense, then, of talking about mass diffusion refraction?

There is this kind of sense in it: Every day's news as presented by any mass diffusion agency is only one picture, out of nobody knows how many possible pictures that might have been presented; only one fly's-eye glimpse of the world as against the lizard's-eye or eagle's-eye glimpse that might have been given us. Prove it any day you please by comparing page for page, headline for headline, the *New York Daily Mirror* with the *New York Times*, both with the *Christian Science Monitor*, all with any issue of the railway Brotherhoods' journal, *Labor*, and all again with a Negro newspaper, such as the *Pittsburgh Defender*. Of course there will be characteristics in common, but by and large such a comparison will give you five different views of the

one social world we live in, five different refractions of what is going on.

Which one is "true"? Which one is the least deflected from reality?

Define truth and reality before you try to answer those questions. Remember, Walter Lippmann said years ago that the function of a news story is not to tell the truth. The truth is always too complicated to be told in a few words against an oncoming deadline. The function of a news story is merely to *signalize* the truth, to notify the world that this way there is a truth to be found, if anybody cares to look further. And remember, also, that when one talks about social reality he is talking about something that seems to be about as complicated as physical reality. Yet who in the face of electrons, mesons, deuterons, and the rest of the physicist's abstractions can be so naïve as to believe today that physical reality is merely what meets the eye? Like the physicist's physical reality, social reality seems to have different levels of abstraction—which means that what is social reality for you may not be social reality for me unless we can both agree on one single level of abstraction and stick to it together. So when a school board turns over to the American Legion a school building no longer needed for school purposes in a certain ward, what is truth and what is reality? The complexities of that particular deal we shall return to in Section I-11.6 below. There was more to it than meets the eye on the surface. Any newspaper that told only what the board did was not telling the "truth" although it told scrupulously exactly what happened and if it stopped there, it was holding up to its community a picture of social reality considerably deflected from social actualities.

"But," someone may object, "you have been talking only about newspapers and news agencies. What about other mass diffusion agencies that don't rely on words, agencies that show you the thing itself—television, for example?"

What television picture can be understood without words? And what television pictures can portray the totality of an event and not some selected portions of it? No television camera can show you what is going on behind it, and you must rely on the good judgment and good faith of those who control the instrument to sample the phenomena in front of its fairly and without bias. In Book II, Chapter 3 we note how the televising of MacArthur Day in Chicago failed precisely at this point. From the television pictures alone an observer at a distance would have concluded that popular enthusiasm was *universal* and *sustained*. Actually, to observers scattered in the

welcoming crowds, it appeared neither universal nor sustained. There were great numbers who did not applaud at all, and most of those who did, applauded only for a brief time.

So long as mass diffusion agencies must select what they shall diffuse and what they shall ignore or play down, just so long will mass diffusion refraction in communication be inescapable. Somehow the public must learn to make allowance for this obstacle as for the others. This brings us to one of the most basic obstacles of all, the psychological limitations of the public itself.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC

If no other obstacles to communication existed, if distant events and situations could be instantly presented to the public without selection, interpretation, censorship, or refraction of any kind, the public would still be unable to react to them as you and I react to in-presence situations because of the limitations of the human mind itself. These limitations range all the way from differences among individuals in intelligence, education, experience, and interests to the fact that we are all stereotyped by our culture and have only so many hours a day in which to live. In-presence situations come at us one by one, since that is a peculiarity of human consciousness. We experience life as a succession of events, not as a simultaneity of everything at once. But the mass diffusion agencies throw the world at us in one big glob—a thousand things happening at the same time. In the nature of the case, we can attend to only a few of the thousand: a spy hunt; a trial of kidnapers, the football or baseball scores, the weather, the stock market, the latest Russian note, the current smash-up on Highway 40, the newest divorce case. Beyond that, we have a kind of dim awareness of captains, kings, and ongoing tumult. We can't possibly attend to everything and we can't possibly attend to distant situations as we can attend to those in which we are immediately involved in presence.

So the first psychological limitation that acts as a barrier to distant communication is the obvious ceiling on individual attention. Only one or two or half a dozen distant situations can surmount the competition of the job, one's family, one's hobbies, and the dead weight of just plain ordinary mental laziness.

The ones that do break through immediately encounter another limitation: the individual's habits of thinking—his persistent habit of defining situations in terms of his own culturally patterned expectations instead of in terms of what is actually there. A stereotype, as we

have noted, is an experience in which expectation dominates perception. We have already noted the importance of stereotypes in Book I, Chapter 8, so we need do no more at this point than emphasize the distorting function that stereotypes perform in relating the individual to the news of distant scenes. Take the magic term *truce in Korea*, for example, the mere *implied* promise of which in the presidential campaign of 1952 was one of the factors that swept Dwight Eisenhower into the White House. The American stereotype of a truce is a military standstill, a complete cessation of military activity. Now read Joseph Alsop's dispatch from Hong Kong in November, 1953, on how far the actual Korean truce—as one reporter saw it—differed from the American stereotype of a truce, i.e., from the kind of thing he had expected to find:

The Korean truce has also been worse than a fraud. This reporter, who thought the truce was justified though painful when he came out here, is now convinced (along with almost every sensible man in the Far East) that the truce was the worst error of American policy in many years.

The truce has given the Communists a letup when the strain of the war had brought them almost to the breaking point. Before long, it will set free in Asia the powerful Communist forces now in Korea which no other Asian country can match.

Later it will give them the happy opportunity of building immeasurably more powerful forces for which there is no counterweight whatever anywhere in the Far East. Far from preparing such a counterweight, meanwhile, we are slowing down our defense effort in the sacred name of economy.²¹

Whether the Korean truce of 1953 was good or bad American policy at the time is a matter of opinion and not the present point. The point is that the actuality was a thing quite different from the common stereotype which Alsop had carried with him to the Far East.

But perhaps the most striking example in history of the difficulties of overcoming a stereotype was the persistent indifference of American newspapers to the flights of the Wright brothers between the Kittyhawk experiments in December, 1903, and the official tests at Fort Meyer in September, 1908.²² The first heavier-than-air flight in

²¹ *Detroit Free Press*, November 10, 1953, pp. 1-2.

²² For details of the amazing indifference of the American press to the arrival of the airplane, see Fred C. Kelly, *The Wright Brothers, A Biography Authorized by Orville Wright*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1943, pp. 103-232. The details given here are taken from that source.

human history at Kittyhawk, North Carolina, December 17, 1903, did not go unreported. The telegraph operator who transmitted Orville Wright's message to his father in Dayton, Ohio, tipped off a reporter for the Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot*, who in turn queried twenty-one other newspapers, including the Dayton *Journal* in the Wrights' home town. Only five ordered the story and only three, including the *Virginian-Pilot*, printed it. The Norfolk paper and the Cincinnati *Enquirer* were the only papers to give it front-page prominence. The Dayton *Journal*, although queried from Norfolk and supplied with the story by Lorin Wright, a brother of the fliers, failed even to mention it. The comment of the *Journal's* telegraph editor, Frank Tunison, when told of the history-making fifty-nine-second flight at Kittyhawk, was: "Fifty-seven seconds, hey?" (two-second error in the dispatch) "If it had been fifty-seven *minutes* it might have been a news item."

Next afternoon the Dayton papers published a rehash of the *Enquirer* story and one of them headed it "Dayton Boys Emulate Great Santos Dumont"—who had flown only in a lighter-than-air, dirigible *balloon*! From then on till the flights at Fort Myer in 1908, nearly five years later, the attitude of newspaper editors all over the country, including those in Dayton, was either that the Wrights hadn't done it at all, or if they had, so what? Santos Dumont had already shown them how! For years, with the Wrights flying nearly every week summer after summer around a cow pasture a few miles from Dayton beside a busy interurban line to Springfield in full view of hundreds of passengers, not a word of their breath-taking achievements appeared in any Dayton paper or in any newspaper anywhere else!

Even the managing editor of the Dayton *Journal*, Luther Beard, who also taught school at Fairfield, two miles from the Huffman cow pasture, and passed the field every school day by interurban and on one occasion stopped off to watch a thirty-eight-minute flight around the field in 1905—even this *eyewitness* to the spectacular things the Wrights were doing failed to see their news value. Santos Dumont had circled the Eiffel Tower; the Wrights were merely circling Huffman's cow pasture!

The only publication in the United States to herald the dawn of the new age was a little magazine, *Gleanings in Bee Culture*, published by A. I. Root of Medina, Ohio, who watched many of the cow-pasture flights in 1904 and 1905 and sent clippings of his own articles on them to the editor of the *Scientific American*—who properly paid no attention to them! On January 13, 1906, the *Scientific American* under

"The Wright Aeroplane and Its Fabled Performances" made fun of a letter from the Wright brothers published in a Paris automobile journal, describing their long flights of September and October, 1905, and concluded: "If such sensational and tremendously important experiments are being conducted . . . the enterprising American reporter" would have broadcast the news of them long ago! *Not until December 15, 1906*, did the *Scientific American* indicate an awareness that something was really happening: "In all the history of invention, there is probably no parallel to the unostentatious manner in which the Wright brothers of Dayton, Ohio, ushered into the world their epoch-making invention of the first successful aeroplane flying machine."

But it was not until twenty months later, and then only after the first airplane crash in history had put Orville Wright in a hospital and had killed an Army passenger-observer, Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge, during test trials at Fort Myer for a government contract,—only then did the Wright brothers' airplane finally hit the front pages all over the country. Not until then did the newspaper editors of America realize that the Wright brothers had actually *done* the "impossible." Not until then, September 3, 1908, nearly *five years after* the first flight at Kittyhawk, did the age-old stereotype finally break down. And even then it took a *tragic accident* to force acceptance of the airplane as a reality. Yet Wilbur Wright had been flying in Paris for all the world to see *more than a month before Orville and Lieutenant Selfridge crashed at Fort Myer!*

Such is the power of a major barrier to communication—a cultural stereotype.

A final barrier consists of limitations on discussion—limitations on the processes of comparing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas.

6. RESTRICTIONS ON DISCUSSION

Restrictions on discussion in the United States are of two kinds: (a) those implicit in the culture and in current patterns of social relationships and (b) those deliberately imposed by individuals, "vested interests," private organizations, or government.

a. Some restrictions are implicit in culture and in social relationships. Many characteristics of American culture and social relationships work toward restricting the exchange, analysis, and evaluation of ideas. These include the decline of primary face-to-face discussion groups—the passing of the cracker-barrel forums of rural days; increas-

ing economic interdependence and consequent decreasing mental independence; fear of the Red smear for any kind of nonconformity; popular disinterest in ideas as such—discussion magazines circulate less than 1 percent of the copies that the great mass circulation journals sell; and the high cost of good books and the reluctance of American publishers to make paper-backed cheap editions a standard form of book publication, as in France. Discussion by way of drama is limited to a few cities only.

b. Some restrictions are deliberately imposed. Although the “right of the people peaceably to assemble” is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, in actual fact the “right” of assembly often encounters either the need of a municipal license for a public meeting or access to private property suitable for a meeting. Both may be denied. Discussion by way of the press, by radio, or by television depends, of course, on the policies of the respective diffusion agencies. There are some topics that are almost undiscussable in the average American mass diffusion medium. These include the price level of the local community; the political power of the churches, especially the power of the Roman Catholic Church; the sex code; Marxism; atheism; etc.

Restrictions on discussion constitute a social problem of some importance and as such will be considered again in Book II, Chapter 11.

We have now sketched the machinery of reportage that puts us in touch with the world “out there” and have indicated some of the major barriers that it must overcome. We still have to consider some of the skills and insights that the ordinary individual must possess to make the most of all this.

I-11.5. The Problem of Understanding Distant Situations

Our need, for adjustment purposes, always is to understand situations and situational fields beyond the horizon, but what usually attracts the reporter’s attention and the attention of ourselves as readers, listeners, or viewers is *events*. The usual problem, therefore, is to get behind events to the situations and situational fields out of which they have emerged. In a play or a novel the connections are spelled out for us. We can see for ourselves why the *Dead End* kids behave as they do; why Macbeth murders Duncan; why the mutinous officers take command of the *Caine*.

But life itself seldom comes so neatly packaged. We have to fill in

the backgrounds for ourselves. And we have to do it against the selection and slanting of an event-minded press, radio, and television, against the special-interest propagandists, against the inherent trickery of language, against the distortions of our own expectations and desires, and against the dead weight of our own mental laziness. Small wonder that A.F. of L. strikes become Red menaces and that one Negro girl joining a white sorority in Vermont becomes a threat to white supremacy in Mississippi!

Actually, of course, the skills and insight required for defining distant situations and situational fields with some approach to objectivity and comprehensiveness cannot be acquired in a few hours a week in one course. They can be acquired only by years of conscious effort to get behind the superficial "first reports," years of discipline in objective thinking, years of learning how to seek out the dependable sources of information, and years of testing and comparing evidence. To define complicated situations such as a great coal strike or a Soviet diplomatic offensive may require detailed studies by specialists in many fields. And to understand the way things are moving in an entire culture will certainly take hundreds of special studies such as were brought together, for example, in *Recent Social Trends*, the monumental report of President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, published in 1933. Even to understand one community requires months or years of work such as the Lynds and their co-workers put into *Middletown* and Warner and Lunt and their staff put into their *Yankee City Series*. The hard fact seems to be that there are no easy answers. The best that we can hope for from Tom, Dick, and Harry, probably, is that eventually the schools will get two out of three, perhaps, to the point of being able to discriminate between the quacks and the legitimate practitioners. And the job of the scientific mind, with a critical attitude toward human relations, is obviously to function as the middleman between the experts and Tom, Dick, and Harry. This means, of course, that the scientifically trained must themselves be able to find their own way around. For most social situations they will be unable to wait for the experts and the research committees. Events keep happening all the time—in our own communities, in Washington, on the other side of the world. Somehow, willy-nilly, we have to estimate their meaning and adjust ourselves accordingly until the experts and the research committees can rush to the rescue. What are the elementary steps in this process and what aids would common sense suggest?

I-11:6. The School Board Goes Patriotic

Tonight, let us say, you read in your local paper in any one of a hundred cities the welcome news that the school board, which up to now has distinguished itself chiefly by underpaying its teachers and letting coal contracts to its friends, has suddenly turned over to the American Legion for the use of veterans an abandoned school building in the slum ward of your city. Free, for nothing, they just turned it over, like that! This shows that there is still some patriotism left even in the most cynical politicians, doesn't it?

Or does it?

Do you stop to ask what possible alternative uses of that old building the board's action neatly blocks? Does it occur to you that the slum ward is the Negro ward? And have you run across the rumor that the Negroes over there were all set to ask the city to turn that old building over to them for a Negro community house? Does it occur to you that there is a better building, now only partially used, out in the swank Sixth ward (where they don't have so many children) that might have been given to the veterans with even better grace than the one in the slum? In short, do you tumble to the real significance of the board's action? Instead of patriotism, your distinguished public servants have displayed merely a rather shabby willingness to use the veterans to cover up their own evasion of civic responsibility to the Negro residents of that slum ward. Instead of producing an act worthy of the flag which they regard so highly, they have merely again draped the Stars and Stripes over that standard American political product, the good old run-around. And the beauty of it is, of course, that they are perfectly safe in their hypocrisy—given the mores of your white community, your newspaper will know better than to stir up a lot of trouble, don't you think? After all, the veterans do need the building, don't they?

I-11:7. How to Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth

How can Joe Doakes, reading his paper in the evening with his shoes off, protect himself against that kind of malarky? If that can happen in his own home town—and make no mistake, it *has* happened—even about so simple an event as a record vote of an official board, what are the possibilities of misunderstanding when the C.I.O. goes on strike or the Soviet Union starts shoving again in Asia?

Well, let's face it. There isn't much Joe can do by himself. We have

already seen that the number of one-newspaper towns in the United States is increasing, that control of both newspapers and radio and television stations is approaching an ominous degree of centralization. In ten states there are no cities with competing dailies. Fourteen companies with eighteen papers control about one-quarter of our total daily circulation. Absentee owners control one-fourth of our daily circulation. Four radio and television networks . . . and so on and so on. If you want more gruesome details on what Joe is up against, read *The First Freedom* by Morris L. Ernst.²³ Joe is not going to get much help from the steadily centralizing news industry.

But for the average intelligent American who is not content to be intellectually spoon-fed there is still a glimmer of hope. Such a person seeking an objective approach to situations will know better than to rely solely on his local newspaper or on a single radio or television network for his view of the world. He will also realize that the defense which a good many less intelligent Joes have adopted—refusal to believe any news they don't like “because it's all propaganda”—is not an effective defense at all. At the end of World War II there were apparently many Americans, including one distinguished university president, who actually believed that General Eisenhower and the American press had dreamed up Buchenwald and Auschwitz just to make us hate Germans and sell papers! But merely to make oneself a sucker for any propaganda that says the truth itself is propaganda is hardly the most efficient way to relate oneself to the real world. Auschwitz and Buchenwald were real horrors. To call everything from beyond the horizon propaganda is just as foolish as to read only one newspaper and believe everything in it. By misrepresentation and overstatement in the past, newspapers, advertisers, and public relations experts have, indeed, developed a dangerous negativism in many people that makes them unable to recognize *authoritative* (i.e., verifiable) evidence when they see it. But the function of intelligence is still to “test all things and hold fast that which is true.”

The first step is to test the report itself in every way we know. Where does it come from? Who sponsors it? If it comes over the wires of one of the great press associations, the Associated Press or the United Press, we must remember that press associations like individual papers have policies, and that policies which affect the news published by hundreds of papers are vastly more important than those affecting only the news published by one. A similar observation ap-

²³ New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946.

plies, of course, to the great newspaper chains in this country—the Hearst chain, the Scripps-Howard chain, the Gannett chain, the Knight chain, and the rest. In 1940, 56 chains controlled 296 papers. Newspapers and press associations are integral parts of a private capitalist economy—just as newspapers in Russia are integral parts of a Communistic economy—so that on any issues involving capital versus labor, the United States versus the Soviet Union, property rights versus human rights, and so on, allowance must be made for the intentional or unintentional bias of the culture.

Beyond the question of who sponsors a report there is the question of how objective it is, how complete, how related to background conditions. What conflicts does it describe or imply? How is it related to existing class, race, sex, and economic conditions? And finally, what is your own reaction, approval or disapproval? How much should your own reactions be discounted in your final judgment?

All of which still leaves you helpless if you don't know anything about the situational field in question and if the reporter has been skillful enough to state, as facts, plausible circumstances and events which you cannot verify for yourself. The school board turning an abandoned building over to the American Legion seems virtuous enough—unless you happen to know conditions in the Negro ward and about the plans for a Negro community center. In other words, *there is no substitute for background*. If you don't have it you must get it before you can protect yourself.

Obviously the simplest way to seek it is to compare evidence from different sources. Multiply sources of information and check one against another. This means that you read any one paper—and listen to any news by radio or TV—only tentatively, withholding judgment on controversial issues until more evidence is in. The real issues you will follow not only in newspapers and by radio and TV but in magazines and books. There is no other way to a free mind in a world of contending propagandists and opinion manipulators.

I-11:8. Recapitulation

How do people become aware of and define situations beyond the horizon? Through agencies of communication and mass diffusion.

These agencies have been evolved by a fourfold cultural evolution: the invention of means for preserving communicative symbols through time—particularly writing; means for projecting symbols across space—in modern terms, the telegraph, the telephone, radio, television;

means for overcoming population dispersion, i.e., for diffusing—printing, the radio receiver, and the television set; and means for transmitting the fullness of an experience—photographs, the stereoscopic motion picture in color, colored television, eventually stereoscopic colored television.

These devices, however, have not given us free individual mass communication at a distance but distance communication channeled through communicative and diffusion devices that have come more and more under the control of fewer and fewer individuals.

To understand how we adjust to distant situations, therefore, we must understand the cultural machinery of reportage—the structure, technology, and spirit of the diffusion agencies; the barriers between the reader, listener, or televiewer and the world “out there”; and the skills and insight required by the recipient of intelligence from a distance in order to make the most of it.

The next task is to check on this analysis by actual observation.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 11

To demonstrate the processes involved in defining distant situations

1. Select two contemporary situations at a distance, i.e., outside of your college community.
2. One of these should be as highly controversial as possible—a situation about which there are wide differences of opinion. The other should be strictly routine, noncontroversial—a situation which would be defined by practically everyone in the same way.
3. On your controversial situation collect as much “evidence”—newspaper articles, magazine stories, etc.—as you can showing all points of view.
4. Compare the two situations. What are the factors that account for the difficulty of common agreement in the one as compared with the other? What is the focus of each situation? How is each related to the past? What is going on in the controversial situation that you do not find in the noncontroversial? Why? Etc.
5. What do you conclude concerning the problem of defining distance situations?

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Go back into the files of contemporary newspapers at the time of the great steel strike of 1919. Also consult files of *The New Republic* and *The*

Nation at the same time and on the same subject, namely, the definition of the steel strike situation that was presented to the public at that time by the Associated Press dispatches in the daily press and by the special writers in the two discussion magazines.

Then when you have constructed a reasonably clear definition of the strike situation as presented to the public in 1919–20, compare that definition with the one that emerged from the investigations of the Interchurch World Movement in *Report on the Steel Strike of 1919* by the Commission of Inquiry of the Movement, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920.

Explain the discrepancies, if any, and show how the problem is related to the one discussed in this chapter.

PROJECT B

Go through the files of *Foreign Affairs* from 1945 to 1952 and abstract all articles in which the international situation *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia is defined. Show to what extent these definitions accorded with later facts (engulfment of eastern Europe by Communism, Korean War, etc.). Analyze methods used by various writers to define the international situation, i.e., by arrays of statistical data on Russian strength, interpretations of the ideology of Russian leaders, attempts to fathom Russian intentions, etc., etc.

PROJECT C

Do the same thing in various periodicals between 1933 and 1939 with reference to attempts by Americans to define the international situation after the rise of Hitler to power in Germany. What differing interpretations emerged and what variables seemed to be associated with each type of interpretation? What methods were used by the writers? Etc.

Supplementary Readings

Commager, Henry Steele, "So You Think It's All Propaganda!" *Nation*, April 20, 1946.

DeVoto, Bernard, *The Year of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1943, pp. 328–329.

Ernst, Morris L., *The First Freedom*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

Hughes, E. C., "The Lindbergh Case," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1936, pp. 32–54.

Lee, Alfred McClung, *The Daily Newspaper in America*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

Situational Dynamics: Social Change

I-12:1. The Problem

Up to this point we have been taking situational dynamics for granted. We have mentioned social changes, of course—population growth, changes in culture (the industrial revolution, etc.), transformations in local social systems from the colonial neighborhood to the modern metropolitan center—but always we have been regarding phenomena of this kind as results, outcomes, before-and-after comparisons. We have not attempted to examine the processes that produced them.

That is one way of studying social change, merely to note before-and-after differences, but it is not a very helpful way if one wishes to understand social dynamics. So our problem now is to get a picture of social change not as a series of before-and-after contrasts but as a process, or series of processes, going on in actual situations.

I-12:2. The Cultural Setting

We know, of course, that the American social system does not stand still. In the 160 years between 1790 and 1950 total population multiplied by more than 38. During the same time there were a score or more of depressions and booms of varying sizes. In those 160 years the United States fought six sizable foreign wars, culminating up to mid-century in World War II, maintained national unity in a devastating war between the states, and beat down the Indian tribes in a whole series of Indian wars ranging from Wayne's campaign that ended at Fallen Timbers (1794) to the massacre of the Sioux at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in December, 1890. All in all, more than 1,000,-


parlor had to fold up because it was outside of town and nobody could get enough gas to commute for a hairdo. All over the United States, preparations for war, and then the imperative demands of war itself, moved in and pushed old routines into the discard. Husbands and fathers had to join the armed forces; wives and mothers had to find jobs as riveters and punch-press operators. Mr. Stedman's troubles turned out to be merely the preliminary ripples of a sea of troubles rolling over America.

In the process of readjusting to that sea of troubles, 17,000,000 American civilians moved out of their home counties. What happened at Willow Run—the covering up of drainage outlets and the mad scramble for a place to live as thousands of newcomers moved in—was only a drop in a very large national bucket of war disturbances and social readjustments.

I-12:4. The Dynamic Pattern

Disturbance—problem—struggle to readjust: the pattern repeated itself all over the Willow Run area as it did all over the United States. The problems seemed endless because the disturbances were endless. At Willow Run surface drainage water suddenly became a problem for the local health authorities. Newcomers all over the area were putting down wells—ten, fifteen, twenty feet deep. The health department dropped purple dye into a few selected outdoor toilets and a few hours later pumped purple water out of neighboring wells. Without asking questions, squatters on vacant land between Ypsilanti and the factory helped themselves to drinking water from a farmer's irrigation faucets—and curled up with dysentery. The water had been pumped into an irrigation tank from a roadside ditch! Meanwhile, before he had recovered any of his \$800, Mr. Stedman as a school trustee faced the problem of what to do with 150 percent more children since midwinter. The government had helped to enlarge the little rural school. The building had six rooms now. It needed fourteen. Reluctantly, the trustees voted half-day sessions, and wrote more letters to Washington. Then with no grape money in sight, with the school on half-day shifts, and with everybody at Willow Run almost literally holding his breath for the expected typhoid outbreak—which never came, by the way—Washington announced that construction was about to start on a great new wartime community of temporary housing near by. "That's the postwar ghost town that will turn this

PLATES 27-40



Courtesy, University of Michigan News Service.

Plate 27. The Culture Complex That Has Remade the World. Science checks on its own A-bombs. Dr. W. Wayne Meinke, Instructor in Chemistry at the University of Michigan, is shown putting a sample of melted snow into a Geiger counter to measure its radioactivity after evidence of "fission products" from atomic explosions in Nevada had been found on the campus in Ann Arbor, Michigan, over 2000 miles from the blast. By chemically concentrating the atomic materials in the snow, Dr. Meinke discovered traces of rare earth compounds, barium and iodine, traceable to the atomic explosion.





Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Plate 28. News by Television. John Cameron Swayze makes a few last-minute changes before going on the air with the news on his nightly broadcast on a national television network. One feature of this program, as of a number like it, consists of switch-ins of tele-camera reports of news events from the preceding twenty-four hours—glimpses of forest fires burning, statesmen arriving and departing from the Washington airport, the President at work or at play, scenes on a picket line during a strike, flood disasters in Europe, and so on.

Plate 29. Glimpse of a TV Studio in Action. A rehearsal of the opera *Salomé* in television studios in New York City. Note the two cameras in position for angle-shots of the action "on stage" and the director at the right with his hand raised about to stop the scene. The long bar extending over the cameras carries a microphone that picks up the dialogue.

Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.






Courtesy, General Motors

Plate 30. One of Millions of Disturbances of the Old Horse-and-Buggy Routine Early in This Century. A new devil-wagon forcing Dobbin off a country road in the first decade of the Motor Age. The unflattering name of the new contraption appeared in rural weeklies catering to irritated customers like the gentleman in the buckboard. The picture itself obviously dates from the time before 1910 or thereabouts when the early autos still had no windshields (first introduced in Europe), and the drivers, like our buckboard friend, still operated from the right side. This highway, firm enough in summer, is also innocent of any of the impact of the Good Roads Movement, which, beginning in the first decade of the century, was not to affect country roads for many years. As late as World War I horses in many parts of rural America still displayed as much nervousness as this one at the approach of the still unfamiliar devil-wagon.

Plate 31. An Incident from the Somewhat Soggy "Good Old Days" Is in Marked Contrast to the Unromantic Present Illustrated by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Scene in Plate 32. Even village and small town streets in 1907 turned into treacherous sloughs of mud every spring. The Pierce-Arrow, bogged down in our picture, was one of the best cars on the market, but it was no match for bucolic America after a rainstorm in those halcyon times when, even in settled communities, concrete was reserved mainly for sidewalks. The scene shown in Plate 32 was beyond imagination in 1907.


Courtesy, General Motors





Courtesy, Penna. Turnpike Commission.

Plate 32. Normal Traffic on the Pennsylvania Turnpike in the Foothills of the Alleghenies. The Pennsylvania Turnpike was the pioneer of America's expanding network of superhighways, and in 1953 collected \$23,000,000 in tolls from more than 12,000,000 pleasure and commercial vehicles using its 327 miles of divided four-lane, limited access concrete highway between Philadelphia and the Ohio border. Since the first section was opened in October, 1940, more than 65,000,000 motorists and commercial users have paid over \$100,000,000 in tolls to use a highway that cost \$211,500,000 to build. When completed by connections with the New Jersey Turnpike and throughways in New York, the Pennsylvania system of turnpikes will total 750 miles. Meanwhile, 28 other states are already building similar highways or planning to do so. In 1954, 840 miles of toll roads were in operation; more than 1000 miles more were under construction, including New York's 535-mile Thruway from New York City to Buffalo; and 2400 miles in other states had been authorized. Toll road links with the Pennsylvania Turnpike across Ohio and Indiana to Chicago were to be opened in a few years and coast-to-coast toll roads were a possibility of the not-distant future.




S.C.S. from Monkmeier Press Photo Service.

Plate 33. Example of a Diffused-Progressive Disaster—A Susquehanna River Flood Inundates the Main Street of Sunbury, Pennsylvania, May, 1946. This is a picture of the main street of a city of 15,000 two days after the peak of the flood had passed. There were still several feet of water in the street and flood damage in stores and homes ran into many hundreds of thousands of dollars. Note the rowboats and the outboard motor cruising down the street.

Plate 34. Diffused-Progressive Disaster—Aftermath of New England Hurricane in August, 1954. One of the hundreds of trees blown down by Hurricane Carol blocking the highway on the outskirts of East Hampton, New York. So bad was the snarl-up of traffic and power lines and the widespread destruction of summer homes on Cape Cod that Massachusetts national guardsmen were called out by the governor to prevent looting and to bar sightseers from the area. When winds exceed what the United States Weather Bureau calls a whole gale, 55 to 72 miles an hour, and rise above the hurricane limit of 73 or more miles an hour, as these great storms of 1954 did along the Atlantic coast, nature's violence rapidly passes the limits of tolerance of most frame houses, barns, and other buildings in the path of such storms. Yet hurricanes (called typhoons in the Orient), while more widely destructive, do not pack the concentrated punch of a southern or mid-western tornado in whose whirling funnel the wind may reach a velocity of more than 400 miles an hour. The United States averages over 100 tornadoes a year, and in 1952 on one day alone, March 21, such storms in Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee killed 236 persons and injured 1000.

Wide World Photos.






Plate 35. Diffused-Progressive Disaster—Hurricane Carol Topples Steeple of Historic Old North Church, Boston, August 31, 1954, as It Flattens Trees and Summer Cottages in Many Parts of New England. This was not the belfry from which lanterns signaled Paul Revere that the British were marching on Lexington, April 18, 1775, but it was one that had replaced the original after another hurricane had demolished that in 1804, after it had stood for 81 years. Hurricane Carol was the third vicious storm of the 1954 season to overwhelm cultural protections along the Atlantic seaboard, and it and its successors, particularly Hurricane Hazel, in October, killed scores of people and caused tens of millions of dollars worth of damage from South Carolina to the Bay of Fundy.

Wide World Photos.

Plate 36. Example of a Focalized Sudden Disaster. Out of control because of a failure of the air brakes—supposedly tampered with when the train stopped at Baltimore—a Pennsylvania Railroad express train came smashing through the gates in the Washington, D.C., Union Station, January 15, 1953, and fell through the floor of the concourse just short of the crowded waiting room. The electric engine lies in the immediate foreground. Forty-one persons were injured. Frantic whistling by the engineer alerted station employees to clear the concourse.

Wide World Photos.





Plate 37. Top: Disaster Due to Human Failure. The wreckage of two Long Island Railroad commuter trains at Rockville Center, New York, February 18, 1950, after a collision that killed 32 persons and injured 100. One train passed a stop signal on a makeshift siding and crashed head-on into the train that was to have passed it. An even more disastrous wreck on the same railroad occurred near Richmond Hill, Queens Borough, New York City, November 22 of that same year, when an eastbound express slammed into the rear of a stalled commuter train, killing 79 and injuring hundreds. These two wrecks on the Long Island accounted for 110 of the 180 passengers killed on all American railroads in 1950 while carrying 488,000,000 passengers 31,790,000,000 passenger-miles. In other words, on an average, American railroads in 1950 carried their passengers the equivalent of 666 trips around the earth between each fatal accident.




Wide World Photos.



Wide World Photos.

Plate 38. Center: Diffused-Sudden Disaster—Store Fronts Damaged by Earthquake in Torrance, California, November 14, 1941. The quake was felt in most of the Los Angeles area but there were no reports of deaths or injuries. Damage in Torrance was estimated at \$1,000,000. Thousands of earthquakes of greater or lesser violence occur every year in the world, most of them too small or too remote to be reported except by scientific instruments like the seismograph. Throughout history, however, earthquakes, particularly in earthquake areas like the Japanese Islands and the Mediterranean, have been deadly. In 1755, 60,000 died in an earthquake and tidal wave in Lisbon, Portugal, and thousands more were killed in other cities around the Mediterranean. Japan suffers a serious earthquake disaster every few years. In America the earthquake that started the San Francisco fire, April 18, 1906, ranks with our greatest disasters: dead, 452; damage, \$350,000,000. Almost at the same time another earthquake across the Pacific killed thousands on Formosa.




Wide World Photos.

Plate 39. Bottom: Another Example of Focalized-Sudden Disaster. The smoldering remains of a National Airlines plane in which seven persons died, out of 22 passengers and a crew of three, when brakes failed to hold on an ice-sheathed runway of the Philadelphia International Airport, January 14, 1951. The plane skidded, smashed through a picket fence, and burst into flame. This was a regularly scheduled flight. In 1951, 38 domestic airlines flying 1121 planes carried 22,652,179 revenue passengers 10,566,182,000 passenger miles. There were 45 accidents during the year that killed 170 passengers, or one passenger per 2,500,000 revenue miles flown.

Plate 39. Bottom: Another Example of Focalized-Sudden Disaster. The smoldering remains of a National Airlines plane in which seven persons died, out of 22 passengers and a crew of three, when brakes failed to hold on an ice-sheathed runway of the Philadelphia International Airport, January 14, 1951. The plane skidded, smashed through a picket fence, and burst into flame. This was a regularly scheduled flight. In 1951, 38 domestic airlines flying 1121 planes carried 22,652,179 revenue passengers 10,566,182,000 passenger miles. There were 45 accidents during the year that killed 170 passengers, or one passenger per 2,500,000 revenue miles flown.



Plate 40. Before and After: An Example of Two Aspects of Social Readjustment—Social Problem-Solving (Inadequate Housing) and Social Planning. The photograph on the top shows a Negro alley slum in Tampa, Florida, before it was transformed by a 534-dwelling Federal Public Housing project into the lovely residential street at bottom. This project was completed in September, 1940. (F.P.H.A. from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.)



neighborhood into a slum," wailed Mr. Stedman, as he wrote more letters of protest and wired his Congressman.

Things were happening fast around Willow Run in those days. Into one little 400-acre tract around Spencer School, one mile north of the factory, for example, a tract that had needed 118 years since first settlement in the 1820's to accumulate all of its 94 families by April, 1941, 218 families came catapulting *in less than eighteen months*. In some months the monthly rate of influx exceeded the average of the preceding century by 200 times.

No loosely integrated rural neighborhood could assimilate more than three times its own prewar population in less than a year and a half and still recognize itself at the end. Before their startled eyes Mr. Stedman and his unbelieving neighbors saw their quiet, respectable, semirural neighborhood of conservative Republicans change into a chaotic, helter-skelter industrial conglomerate, crawling with Democratic hillbillies and trailer-camp strangers from the ends of the continent. The newcomers overflowed existing housing, transportation, sanitary facilities. They jammed the roads with their cars. With their persons they jammed the buses and the Ypsilanti stores and movies. The countryside for miles around spawned trailer camps, shantytowns, unplanned atrocities of this and that.

Public and private agencies worked overtime to meet the health, educational, and welfare needs of tens of thousands of newcomers, most of whom had no sense of identification with the locality at all and possessed only the vaguest idea of where to turn for help in an emergency. Months too late, the federal government finally went ahead with its answer to the area's housing needs—"Bomber City," or Willow Village, two miles north of the plant. In September, 1943, when the Village school system finally opened its doors the first casualty was little Spencer School—"consolidated" into the Village system. Mr. Stedman and his neighbors suddenly found themselves spectators in their own community; control had slipped into the hands of the federal government and the thousands of newcomers in the Village.

From the day bomber plant construction started in April, 1941, till the 8685th B-24 rolled through the big east doors on June 28, 1945, Willow Run lay under the harrow of Social Change. Incident by incident, event by event, it all added up to more turmoil, strife, and struggle than the locality had seen since the advent of the first white

settlers at Ypsilanti in 1823. Willow Run had never seen anything like it, and the folks who lived through it hoped they would never have to see anything like it again.

Willow Run was wartime industrialization hitting a peacetime urban neighborhood. It was Social Change in high gear.

But essentially the same sort of thing in low gear—slower, less concentrated, far less chaotic—is happening all the time. American society has a built-in dynamic that war merely accelerates beyond the speed limit. What is this dynamic? Why and how are traditional routines constantly being disturbed in American life?

I-12.5. Where Do Disturbances Come From?

The dynamic variables in human life are external nature and human beings themselves. These are the generators of energy, the ultimate sources of all disturbances of cultural routines.

But the disturbances which they generate can appear in any of the five component elements of a specific situation or in the relational patterns of the situation itself. A situation, remember, has been defined as a focalized pattern of human relationships and circumstances made up of (1) a setting, i.e., objects and forces of external nature in a particular location; (2) two or more persons; (3) specific culture traits and complexes—language, material traits and cultural objects, adjustment patterns, ideas, values, and beliefs, and functional interdependences; (4) associational forms, or social structures—groups, crowds, assemblages, organizations, etc.; and (5) associational processes—interaction, communication, adjustment, readjustment. And a situation develops and evolves in a situational field or situational environment, which in turn is composed of exactly the same kinds of component elements.

External nature acting within or without a given situation, and human beings acting within or without a situation, impinge on, disturb, or disrupt the relational pattern by *changing* (1) natural objects or forces directly, as in a storm, flood, or other disaster; (2) the number, distribution, or ethnic characteristics of a population; (3) the content of culture; (4) the forms of association; (5) associational processes; and/or (6) the meaning of the situation as a whole.

Frequently a disturbance in one of these sets of variables will set going chain reactions of adjustments and readjustments (associational processes) that ultimately involve several others. At Willow Run, for example, a disturbance in the content of culture (the building of the

bomber plant) induced an influx of job-seekers (a change in the number, distribution, and characteristics of the local population), which in turn disturbed associational forms and associational processes (adjustments) in the area, creating individual and organizational problems for the resident population and setting off innumerable cycles of adjustment-readjustment, each of which acted as a further disturbance of relational patterns in the area. Once started, the disturbances, dislocations, and readjustments kept snowballing up as long as the influx continued. Then when the plant closed, in June, 1945, the sudden contraction of job opportunities (shrinkage of culture content and associational processes) started new cycles of adjustment-readjustment as families moved away, local business dwindled, and remaining workers sought new jobs. The dislocations now came not from expansion of job opportunities, population, and local facilities but from their contraction, but they were dislocations (problems) just the same.

The processes by which people carry on the ordinary activities of living in households, business organizations, and so on—the associational processes and situational adjustments—we may refer to collectively as the *functional processes* of a society. For each individual they constitute a more or less routine *structure of living* to which he is adjusted and which he strives to maintain as a way of life. Disturbances in functional processes and in individual structures of living are prolific sources of problems, as we shall see later.

I-12:6. Disturbances in External Nature

It will help in observing disturbances of natural forces—whether these are accidental or otherwise—to remember that natural forces vary in two dimensions, namely, in time and in space.

Hence we have four kinds of disturbances of natural forces:

1. FOCALIZED-INSTANTANEOUS DISTURBANCES

A fall of rock which blocks a mine shaft and traps a work party is a focalized-instantaneous variation from the usual balance of forces in that mine. It happens in a limited area in an instant of time. Likewise a bolt of lightning that knocks out a power line is a focalized-instantaneous variation. The consequences may be widespread, but the flash itself is focalized and instantaneous. Probably the sudden localized release of explosive forces by criminal intent, as in the dynamiting of the Bath, Michigan, school in 1927 by an insane ex-trustee, should likewise be classified as a focalized-instantaneous disturbance.

2. DIFFUSED-INSTANTANEOUS DISTURBANCES

Earthquakes are perhaps the best examples of this type of natural disturbance. While not actually instantaneous, the earth-shaking usually lasts only a few seconds or minutes at most and is felt over a considerable area. Great explosions² that extend their effects beyond a narrowly restricted area would also be of this type—Hiroshima, for example.

3. FOCALIZED-PROGRESSIVE DISTURBANCES

Any unusual variation of natural forces confined to a small area and developing over an appreciable time would be classified as focalized-progressive. Many failures of cultural protections are of this kind, for example, a shipwreck, a hotel fire, a hospital epidemic, etc.

4. DIFFUSED-PROGRESSIVE DISTURBANCES

Most of the great natural disasters, apart from earthquakes, are due to diffused-progressive variations in natural forces. Volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, heat waves, crop failures, epidemics, and so on, are examples. The Galveston hurricane of 1900, the Ohio Valley floods of 1913, the great dust-bowl droughts of the 1930's, the Missouri Valley floods of 1952, the great drought of 1953—all were diffused-progressive disturbances.

I-12:7. Changes in Unit Traits as Sources of Disturbance

The culture traits of a given area during a given period of time may vary in almost innumerable ways, but the variations that act as disturbances within a given space-time segment are usually changes in the *number, variety, meaning, or functional efficiency* of unit traits. Since we shall take up functional disturbances later, we confine ourselves at this point to disturbances due to changes in the number, variety, or meaning of unit traits.

Changes of this kind in a given area are usually due to the intrusion

² The explosion of a munitions ship in Halifax Harbor following a collision and fire on the morning of December 6, 1917, raises a fine point in classification. The collision, as a result of which certain chemicals on the deck of the munitions ship caught fire, occurred because of the misinterpretation of signals by the respective captains. From the point of view of the ship captains, it was focalized and progressive—the explosion itself did not occur until nearly half an hour after the fatal sequence of misunderstanding—collision—fire—had begun. Obviously here, as always, in classifying a disturbance we must be clear as to the point of view from which we regard it and we must stick to that point of view throughout.

of new traits from some other area or, not infrequently, from some other society.

Thus Christianity originated in Palestine and spread throughout the Western world. America was discovered by an Italian on behalf of the Spanish monarchy. It took three years for the news of the discovery to reach England. News in those days traveled haphazardly and without hurry. The industrial revolution started in England, crossed the ocean to America between 1789 and 1814, and eventually reached India and Australia. Evolution was announced by Darwin and Wallace in England in 1859 and by 1925 had penetrated even to Dayton, Tennessee, where the state tried to imprison a teacher who mentioned it in his classes.

The process by which material traits, ideas, moods, and so on, spread is called *diffusion*.

Within the society of origin this is termed primary diffusion; when it occurs between different societies, it is called secondary diffusion. Curiously enough, most of the anthropological and sociological literature dealing with diffusion concentrates on secondary diffusion.

In general, diffusion seems to go on in two somewhat distinct but related ways: (1) by the actual *carriage* of traits from one place to another and (2) by the *transfer* of traits from one person to another.

Willow Run in-migrants from Kentucky and Tennessee, for example, brought with them not only their distinctive ways of speech but also their cultural attitudes toward Negroes and toward social restraints—the beaverboard walls of nearly every washroom in the Willow Run Lodge were soon riddled with fist holes punched through by southern guests demonstrating their manly vigor! These traits they *carried* into the area.

But the bomber plant itself arrived by a process of transfer. In other words, the idea of building a factory to make bombers was not new in the American culture of 1941–42, but it was new at Willow Run. It was transferred from Washington officials to Mr. Ford, and from him to various architects, engineers, construction officials, and operating executives.

Most of the diffusion in our society probably goes on by transfer. New slang words, new popular songs, new scientific ideas, new popular moods—all these pass from one to another. Frequently carriage and transfer work together. When Dotty Picturepuss steps out of the air liner and into the feature pages of the newspapers with a brand-new hairdo, she has obviously carried the darn thing with her; but when

half a million high-school brats rush to imitate the picture in the paper, we have another example of transfer.

Mass communication, modern advertising, a considerable share of modern merchandising effort in general—all these constitute a formidable battery furthering diffusion. Distinguish sharply here between *diffusion*, the spreading of new traits, and *distribution*, the “spreading,” or supplying, of old ones. When Sir Walter Raleigh carried tobacco to England, he was diffusing tobacco as a culture trait. But when a habitual smoker buys cigarettes at the drugstore today, he is merely participating in distribution.

I-12:8. Special Cases of Diffusion

Suppose, however, that you are buying cigarettes for the first time. What is distribution for the dealer is now diffusion for you. As a youth taking up the cigarette habit, you present a unit case of generational diffusion, the spread of a trait from one generation to another. Much of what is called formal education and a good deal of the educating that goes on outside of schools is generational diffusion—the transfer of the behavior patterns (and frequently of the prejudices) of the old to the young. Most generational diffusion is from the older to the younger generation. But occasionally some oldsters, especially those who cherish the illusion of youth, take over some minor traits such as slang words, etc., from the younger generation.

Something analogous to generational diffusion also occurs between men and women and between social classes. After World War I, for example, cigarette smoking began to spread widely among women. Since this had always been severely condemned in middle-class America as unladylike, it was obviously a case of the transfer of a male trait to women. Other mannish traits, from economic independence and athleticism to sexual laxity, have also been taken over in varying degrees by the erstwhile weaker sex. On the other hand, many men in upper- and middle-class circles in civilian life before the war seemed to have taken over some of the feminine concern about personal appearance and refinement of speech and action.

These cases of sexual diffusion seem to be matters of culture over a considerable period of time and should not be confused with individual personality aberrations such as homosexuality and the like. Cultural complications also enter into many of these personality difficulties, but that is a different problem from the transfer of culture traits on a mass scale from one sex to the other.

Traits also transfer from one social class to another. The most familiar example is the progressive social degradation of a new fashion in women's dresses. A fashion in dress is a way of achieving the distinctiveness associated with upper-class status. To achieve distinctiveness in their own set, the women who make dressing a fine art take up the new ideas of a fashionable designer. Alert distributors of women's fashions promptly diffuse the new designs to the smart shops of the bigger cities, and these in turn diffuse them to the "carriage trade." But cheaper imitators immediately pirate the new fashion and diffuse it to the middle-class levels of Keokuk and Shreveport. Within a few weeks still cheaper imitations appear in the dollar stores and in the purlieu of Celery Center and Red Gulch. This completes the cycle. Diffusion having spread the distinctive new fashion so widely that it is no longer distinctive, the top dressers have to come out with something different—and the whole process starts over again.

Traits representative of status—that is, prestige traits—tend, like fashions in dress, to diffuse from the top down. Traits carrying little or no implication of status, such as slang words, jazz music, and the like, may diffuse in the opposite direction.

If, as the late Professor Park contended, one accepts a new trait because of conscious or unconscious feelings of inferiority without it, the motivations for diffusion are clear.

But there is more to it than individual psychology.

I-12:9. The Machinery of Diffusion

Diffusion as a more or less natural process by which multitudes of individuals discriminate, select, and accept new traits, freely and without outside pressure, is one thing. But diffusion as it actually goes on under the drumfire of mass communication—a constant barrage of newspaper, radio and television advertising, high-pressure salesmanship, propaganda, and organized national drives for the Relief of the Eskimos and the Abolition of the Atom—is something else again. True, most of the publicity and sales pressure that the average American is exposed to has little to do with diffusion. Most of it is straight-out distribution pressure or publicity for the Ten Commandments. But enough of it does introduce new products or pound home new ideas to make organized diffusion a complicating factor in modern life. Whether we like it or not—and many people don't like it at all—we live in a world that refuses to let the individual make calm, detached, rational choices on the basis of the evidence. New bug-killer

or new way of preventing war, no matter—sloganeers and executive secretaries go after you with full-page ads and national hookups. As the Lynds found in Middletown, tremendous national organizations gang up on Mr. and Mrs. John Q. Public twelve or sixteen hours a day, to ram home new ways of cooking, new ways of keeping clean, new ways of living. In every trade and profession likewise, trade magazines and professional journals bring the “state of the art” up to date with every issue. The only things that aren’t brought up to date are the moral, political, and legalistic methods of social control, most of which date from the Middle Ages or earlier. Organized diffusion, therefore, in helping to spread new material traits, new technologies, new and better ways of using physical power, while it ignores or underemphasizes scientific methods of social readjustment, builds up a bigger and better backlog of more disturbances and more maladjustments. This is a problem which we shall have to examine in the next project. For the moment we still have to answer the question of where all the new gadgets and new ideas come from in the first place.

I-12:10. Innovation—Creation, Invention, Discovery

As compared with the processes of diffusion actually perceivable by your eyes or ears in any newspaper, radio newscast, television program, movie, automobile salesroom, college lecture room, and so on, innovation is a comparatively inconspicuous process. It is going on, more or less intermittently, wherever men and women are seriously trying to interpret life in fiction or drama or in the nonverbal arts, in workshops and laboratories, and in the quiet studies of creative thinkers. Wherever there is an original mind, innovation inevitably occurs. But again, as in diffusion, all this is no longer merely a matter of individual initiative. Modern society, unlike all earlier societies, has long since developed specific institutions for encouraging, organizing, and “inevitabilizing” innovation activity. The scientific tradition and the research laboratory, and business enterprise and the patent office, plus technology, are the great cultural complexes devoted to the production of new ideas and new things. In 1938 the National Resources Planning Board listed 133 federal agencies spending over \$100,000,000 annually on research. Nearly 2000 industrial laboratories were spending an equal amount, and universities were estimated to be spending about half as much—a grand total for research of \$250,000,000 a year by some 50,000 workers in industrial, commercial, federal, and educational agencies. This, of course, was completely dwarfed during the

war by the mobilization of scientists and engineers under the Office of Scientific Research and Development headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush. Over 2500 academic, industrial, and governmental laboratories concentrated on war problems with 90 percent of the nation's physical scientists helping to speed the war effort. The capstone of the whole research structure was the gigantic Manhattan District project that spent \$2,000,000,000 in producing the atomic bomb—and catapulted the world into the atomic age before mankind had yet learned how to live safely with gunpowder and steam!

The significance of the bomb, moreover, is not merely that it heralds a new age of power but that it heralds an age of competitive research for national survival. Whether we like it or not, until Russia and the United States can compose their political differences, the United States as a matter of holding its own in the race for increasing power over nature finds itself driven to subsidize physical research on a scale never known before. Thus the gap between the physical and the social sciences widens in the face of mounting social problems that traditional answers do not solve. Material inventions which are now diffusing with nobody-knows-what future social effects include the mechanical cotton picker (due to displace millions of field hands), television, prefabricated houses, the helicopter, tray agriculture, and the coal gas turbine. In 1950 the United States granted 43,072 patents, or 28 per 100,000 population, as against less than 1 per 100,000 in 1790.

To cite just one impending social headache issuing from prewar inventions alone, the United States is facing the displacement during the next few years of 3,000,000 farm laborers by the spread of mechanized agriculture. What the war-stimulated drive for new discoveries and new inventions will do to us under the forced draft of multi-billions of dollars a year no one can even guess.

I-12:11. Population as a Disturbing Factor

Disturbances in physical forces or in culture frequently cause changes in population which in certain space-time segments may be regarded as primary disturbances themselves. Thus droughts in central Asia in the third and fourth centuries A.D. apparently forced the nomadic tribes there to seek new pastures farther west, and to drive the Teutonic tribes in turn down upon the crumbling Roman Empire. In America after World War II the mechanization of agriculture was proceeding at an accelerating pace, driving millions of farm laborers

off the land. Thus, in the one case natural causes (the droughts in central Asia) and in the other, cultural causes (the mechanization of agriculture) produced tremendous population movements which themselves became disturbances in many situations.

Other disturbing readjustments of population have taken place from time to time throughout history. In its political and economic consequences the expansion of Europe following the great discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ranks probably as the greatest readjustment of population in all history. Yet World Wars I and II also produced tremendous dislocations of population. Tens of millions of people were driven from their homes. Even within the United States the impact of World War II led to the greatest internal shifting of population in American history. Not counting men and women in the services, the Census Bureau estimated that more than 17,000,000 Americans between 1940 and 1944 moved in a rush to man the factories and shipyards along the Lakes, the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific coasts and to turn out the planes in the airplane plants of the Southwest. Here readjustive (war) and cultural changes forced widespread individual readjustments (movements) which impinged on many local communities like Willow Run as primary disturbances.

One aspect of the expansion of Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the influx of immigrants to the United States. In 125 years this country received 38,461,000 aliens, the vast majority of whom remained to alter the ethnic composition of the population, make various contributions to culture, and complicate social and political problems. In 1940, foreign-born whites in the United States numbered slightly more than 11,000,000, and the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage totaled 23,000,000.³

Movements of population from the country to the city and changes in population composition have also acted as disturbing factors in various places at various times. Given American caste stratification, any marked increase in the Negro population of a white neighborhood or of a northern city, for example, tends to disturb existing social relations and social attitudes. Complicated by housing shortages and the tensions and insecurities of war or postwar years, such disturb-

³ A type of disturbance due to movements of population not touched upon in this book has been brought to the author's attention by his colleague, Dr. Robert C. Angell. This is the movement of *entire peoples* such as characterized the folk wanderings that brought the Germanic tribes down on the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries after Christ. Entire Indian tribes may have moved about in this way on this continent centuries ago, but such movements are no longer contributing to social changes in the United States and hence are not discussed here.

ances have sometimes precipitated race riots, as in Chicago, East St. Louis, and Washington in 1919, and Detroit in 1943.

Changes in population growth may also disturb social adjustments. Too rapid growth overtaxes cultural facilities, as at Willow Run. A slowing down of population growth, on the other hand, unsettles cultural adjustments in the reverse direction—the proportion of old people rises, conservatism increases, markets fail to expand, security rather than opportunity dominates public attention, and young people find it harder to get started.

This brings us to functional processes in general as factors of disturbance.

I-12:12. Functional Disturbances as Disturbing Factors

By functional processes we refer to the specific activities by which the members of any institutional organization, community, or society carry on its functions. We may assume that during any given period of time in the United States there is a certain volume of such activity. There is so much buying and selling, so much manufacturing, so much plowing and reaping, so much giving and receiving in marriage, so much doctoring and lawyering, and so on. There is no way of measuring the total volume of all this activity. But there are various indexes which indicate something of its fluctuations.

Thus when the national income fell off from 30 to 40 percent between 1929 and 1933, everybody agreed that there was a *depression*. It is unnecessary to point out that when a businessman's sales decline and he has to lay off workmen and other businessmen have to do the same and the unemployed have to go on relief by the million and government has to borrow billions to meet its bills, and so on, a certain *disturbance* has crept into the social system. It is a disturbance primarily of the way the economic system functions: the same combination of natural forces, culture traits, and population which last year or last month went clicking merrily along at reasonably full production now limps at 60 or 30 percent, or fails to produce at all. A depression is thus a functional disturbance in the economic system. It creates all kinds of problems and maladjustments for everyone and every business and family concerned. In the same way, when demand vastly exceeds supply, as it did immediately after World War II in the United States, the disturbances in normal functioning again create all kinds of problem situations for workmen, for unions, for employers, for government officials. The great coal and railroad strikes and the

fight over O.P.A. a few months later merely dramatized such disturbances.

It does not matter that from one point of view many of these disturbances were in themselves readjustive efforts by unions, great corporations, governmental agencies, and the like—readjustive efforts to solve problems created by some preceding disturbance or disturbances. The point is that for any given space-time segment in which we take as our threshold condition the state of affairs immediately preceding the strikes, the fight over O.P.A., and so on, these readjustive efforts then become *in that particular frame of reference* the primary disturbing factors. In this sense marked variations in the functional activity of any social organization become disturbances *when we so place them in our frame of reference*. Whether they are actually evidences of readjustive effort in some other cycle is irrelevant. For the time being, within the framework of our chosen space-time segment, these marked variations in function act as disturbances and set going a new cycle of adjustment, dislocation (problem), readjustment effort.

This brings us to the question of readjustive efforts within one space-time segment acting as disturbing factors for another.

I-12:13. Readjustives as Factors of Disturbance

It should be clear by this time that we are using the concept of the space-time segment as a tool of analysis, deliberately choosing our time and place, and we are using it with conscious recognition of the fact that any analysis of the continuous flow of experience through time must isolate and symbolize phases which exist only because of human interest. There are no beginnings and no endings in natural phenomena. There are merely transformations. The birth of a baby is not a beginning except for human purposes. The death of an old man is not an ending except for human purposes. Nature knows no beginnings and no endings. Those are purely human conceptions.

But after all we do have to come to terms with nature as human beings, beings who do have beginnings and endings, beings whose lives are made up of successions of beginnings and endings. On these terms we have to distinguish patterns and phases, sequences of repetition. There is nothing fixed or immutable about the *starting point* of any given sequence. *Practically* there may be—we have to adjust and readjust to life as it comes; but *theoretically* as detached observers we can select the particular segment of space and time on which we wish

to focus attention. This means, of course, that we must be prepared to recognize the impacts of activities going on in other segments too. What is disturbance for us in a particular segment may well be the readjustive phase of some other segment. Broadly speaking, the whole war effort of the United States government was a readjustive effort to meet the mounting challenges from abroad. The building of the Willow Run bomber plant, which profoundly disturbed that area, was only a small part of the whole complex of readjustive effort by the American people. In the same way the influx of so many strangers into the Willow Run area, which overtaxed housing facilities there and disturbed pupil-teacher adjustments in Mr. Stedman's school, was merely the cumulative impact of thousands of individual readjustive efforts directed toward better jobs, war jobs, draft-exempt jobs. What was readjustive effort for the numerous Sykes family from the hills of Tennessee, for example, added merely half a dozen more factors of disturbance to hundreds of others streaming in to bedevil the overworked teachers of the Willow Run school.

We must be prepared, then, to recognize the readjustive efforts of one individual or adjustment-system (family, corporation, or what-have-you) as possible factors of disturbance for another individual or adjustment-system. How this actually works out in situations is one of the things we are to watch.

I-12:14. Problem Situations

All these disturbances—disasters, inventions, population movements, ups and downs of prosperity, readjustments by individuals, corporations, governments—inevitably upset some routines beyond the limits of tolerance of existing adjustments. Problems are continually emerging for individuals, families, corporation executives, government officials. And since a problem inevitably means strain, anxiety, lowered efficiency, struggles for readjustment, incessant efforts to solve problems are going on around us all the time.

A few pages back we saw how the problems created by the population influx at Willow Run drove Mr. Stedman, the school trustees, the health department, and the apprehensive neighbors to try to do something about them. Mr. Stedman visited the construction superintendent. The school trustees voted for half-day shifts. The health inspectors had to go about testing wells and warning people to boil their drinking water. Property owners started protesting and pulling wires to stop the war housing project. Readjustive efforts of all sorts

were set going; and since the disturbances were numerous and widespread, and affected the whole community, the problems were community problems, not merely problems of individual readjustment.

There at Willow Run the disturbances were fairly obvious. The resulting problem situations were as visible as freckles. Nobody who lived in the area or who even visited it for a few hours had any doubt about the existence of problems, individual and collective. The usual doubt was what to do about them.

But Willow Run was something of a special case. Because of the war, social dynamics just happened to gang up there in a small area in a comparatively short time. When the same kind of thing happens more slowly and over a wider area, the results are harder to see and the processes are harder to trace. The multitudes of individual problem situations which are all parts of one big problem situation—obvious enough at Willow Run—now become a matter not of immediate perception and direct inference but of communication, cumulative evidence, and conceptual synthesis. At Willow Run the social impact of industrialization on a small rural area stood out even to the casual visitor. But the social impact of the advancing mechanization of American farms is too dispersed in time and space to register at all until one makes the life situation of all American farmers (and not the life situations of particular farmers) the object of attention, and supplements personal observation with comprehensive statistical data. In other words, individual problem situations in a complex modern society can seldom be understood in their immediate situational fields alone. One has to ask, What is the inclusive situation? What is the *common life situation* of all people affected like this?

Until these questions are asked and answered, one cannot in the nature of the case readjust to the real factors of disturbance.

I-12:15. A Lesson from History

Halévy, the French historian, has pointed out that, mobilized in Cromwell's army, the small yeomen farmers of England were the most powerful political force in the kingdom. Yet within a century they had practically disappeared. From being the most powerful political force in the realm they dwindled within three generations to no political force at all. Why? Because the big landlords and the wealthy merchants had been able to pinch them off with enclosures, a few at a time, without ever arousing the small yeomen as a class to fight back. The little men went down because they never collectively saw what

they were up against. One by one the rank and file of the Commonwealth's veterans and their children were picked off by economic snipers until they could not muster a corporal's guard. Failure to see their *collective* problem situation proved their undoing.

That happened in a simple rural world of comparatively isolated local communities, communities that might not hear of political events in London till weeks after they occurred. Yet difficulty of communication was not the only factor in the picture. If news travels faster in the twentieth century in America than it did in seventeenth-century England, it also has to travel with more baggage. Price control or the day-to-day operations of the United Nations are a bit more complex than was the simple passage of a private enclosure act by the British Parliament. The situational field is a bit more complicated in the days of the C.I.O., General Motors, and the U.S.S.R. than it was even in the distraught England of Prince Rupert and the Lord Protector.

The result is that our social problems are harder to define and many of them are much harder to deal with than were the problems of seventeenth-century England.

Our problem now is to gather evidence of the various mechanisms of social change discussed in the preceding pages.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 12

To assemble objective evidence of situational disturbances and social problems

1. Select some one specific social problem which has emerged within the last generation or two, such as the postwar housing shortage, the maldistribution of medical services, conservation, the atomic bomb, the upswing in the American birth rate, etc., and show
 - a. Which of the sources of disturbance mentioned in Section I-12:5 upset the old traditional adjustments and
 - b. What psychological, economic, and functional resistances have interfered with readjustment.
2. This will require the collection of evidence from newspapers, magazines, books, and reports of special studies. It may be useful to start from some bibliography of recent literature, such as the *Reader's Guide*, and trace the public concern with the problem back to its beginning. Distinguish the technical or professional recognition of the problem from more general or popular recognition. Conservation, for example, was recognized as a problem by the American Academy of Sciences in 1878, but

the first general awareness of it dates from the national conference on that subject called by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1909.

3. Note especially the psychological, economic, and functional resistances that (a) delay recognition of the problem and (b) block or slow down efforts at readjustment to it.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

What has been the evolution of social-problem theory in the literature of sociology from approximately 1900 to date? What are the major types of theory now? How do different theorists relate values to social problems? Note that this is not a study of the literature of social problems but only of the literature of social-problem theory, 1900 to date.

PROJECT B

What has been the history of the concept of social change in sociological literature? How would you distinguish social change from social changes? What changes have occurred in the concepts of social change? For example, when does the natural-history concept of social change emerge and what outstanding uses have been made of it? What have been some of the outstanding empirical studies of social changes? What has been their relationship to theory?

PROJECT C

Consult James Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion*, Washington, Bureau of Ethnology Reports, Smithsonian Institution, 1894. This is a case study of certain changes affecting the Plains Indians in the 1880's. Analyze in detail the changes described, using the conceptual scheme suggested in this chapter: the cyclical concept—routine, disturbance, dislocation, readjustive effort, new routine—and the various sources of disturbance indicated—forces of nature, populational changes, invention or diffusion of culture traits, etc.

PROJECT D

Mr. Carl H. Knopf, county agricultural agent for Muskegon County, Michigan, submits the following information on the impact of invention (technological change) on the amount of labor required to plant and harvest one acre of sugar beets, 1924 to 1954:

1924

Most farm work done with horses.

Man-hours required per acre of sugar beets: 119

1925-45

Tractors replace horses.

Man-hours required per acre: 74

% reduction: 37.7

1940-50

Mechanical harvester introduced.

Man-hours required per acre: 37

% reduction from 1924: 68.9

1950

Mechanical thinner introduced.

Man-hours required per acre: 27-20

% reduction from 1924: 78.1 to 83.3

How much has the number of persons engaged in agriculture declined in twenty-five years, 1925-1950? Obviously, sugar-beet growing is only a small part of agriculture, but what is the relationship of such figures as those given above to the decline in the number of people gainfully employed in agriculture now as compared with 1925? Where have they gone? What has happened to the population of cities during this time? What problems do you see implicit in the statistics just given? Problems for whom? Why?

Do new inventions affect only agriculture?

What significance do you see in the fact that in 1952 the five most heavily industrialized states (see Table I-6.2) produced patentable inventions at the rate of 44.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, the five least heavily industrialized states at only 8.9 per 100,000, the nation as a whole at a rate of 26.3 per 100,000? Total patents issued, 1952, to residents of the United States numbered over 41,040. Total in fifty years, 1901-1950, inclusive, was 1,871,189. If only 1 percent were practically useful, that would still be 18,711 new gadgets, from airplanes to radio, television, and radar. In 1952, government, industry, and the universities were spending \$3.75 billion on research seeking new discoveries, many of which, in turn, would become the basis of new inventions in the future.

Your conclusions?

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Readjustive Initiative: Social Problem-Solving

I-13:1. The Problem

Our task now is to observe the way in which individuals functioning in various social structures from groups to social systems readjust to problem situations.

The readjustive efforts are always those of individuals. Only individuals behave.

But the readjustments achieved must be readjustments in structures, processes, or culture to concern us here. The problem of individual readjustment as such belongs to psychologists and psychiatrists.

The readjustments that change structures, processes, and culture come about in two distinctive ways: (1) by a process of cumulative drift, particular individuals usually not realizing what is happening in its totality—as the English yeomen farmers “drifted” out of existence under successive encroachments on the part of wealthier men; and (2) by deliberate, purposeful direction—behavior oriented toward solving not merely an individual problem but a collective problem.

I-13:2. The Tentative Process: Drift vs. Direction

Years ago Cooley pointed out that individuals and social organizations carry on life activities by a series of adjustments and readjustments, each feeling its way ahead, so to speak, by a kind of *tentative process* of limited foresight and trial and error. A young couple not yet financially ready to set up their own home try out the plan of living with the groom's parents. All kinds of unforeseen frictions develop, from competition for the bathroom in the morning to dis-

agreements over who shall do the dishes at night, so after a few weeks or months the experiment is given up and the young couple try something else.

In the same way a business concern adds to its line, let us say, a new camera or some new auto accessory. If the new item catches on, if orders begin to flow in, the company expands its production of that particular product and goes on from there. If it doesn't catch on, if early prospects fail to come through, the item will be dropped and something else substituted.

Most concerns go ahead in the same pragmatic way. What works is retained and expanded. What doesn't work is lopped off and discarded. At the end of a generation the founder of the business can hardly recognize it. Families, corporations, municipalities go ahead in this same way. Individuals, executives, leaders plan ahead as far as they can see. Usually they can't see very far and have to make allowances for many unforeseen contingencies. As we shall see in the next chapter, within the limits of cultural routines the techniques of social foresight have been improving in recent decades, but when all is said and done and in spite of the great to-do about social planning and such outstanding examples as the Tennessee Valley Authority, most readjustments in the American culture still go on largely on the basis of limited views and partial controls. They are essentially tentative, as Cooley maintained.

It is important to distinguish two kinds of tentative processes, however: (1) the mere unconscious, *cumulative drift* of multitudes of individual decisions, each made with as much foresight as the individual can muster but still made in ignorance of the similar decisions of others; and (2) the conscious, *purposeful efforts of individuals to shape and control collective situations as such*.

At mid-century educators were beginning to worry about the swollen birth rate of the war years, i.e., about the social consequences during the 1950's and 1960's of the millions of parental decisions that had been made during the early 1940's for more children. Each such decision had been made without reference to the decisions that were being made at the same time by millions of other people, but the net result was a jump in the birth rate and a lively prospect of overcrowded schools a decade or so later. This was cumulative drift in population.

After the war, stimulated by the benefits of the G.I. Bill, thousands of veterans decided to go to college. In effect, without knowing what

others were doing, each "voted" for more college education. Again there was a cumulative drift, this time in college enrollments.

A vast amount of the readjustive behavior in any society is of this kind: Myriads of individual decisions are made, each primarily to further an individual's own interests without too much awareness of what others are deciding about the same problems at the same time. The net result is a depression slump in marriages or a wartime boom in babies, a decline in the business of harness makers and blacksmiths and a correlative rise in the business of auto makers and garages, or a swing toward country living and away from big cities. One important index of the readjustments going on in a society at any given time is thus any index of cumulative drift in population, in consumption habits, in public attitudes, and so on.

But as we have already suggested in regard to war births and the G.I. invasion of the colleges, any sizable cumulative drift presently means trouble for organizations set up to deal with a different order of normality. Exposed to the pressure of higher birth rates, schools had to expand. To handle hundreds of thousands of G.I.'s, the colleges had to find additional living quarters for them and their families and provide additional classrooms. In short, *cumulative drift presently necessitates conscious, purposive readjustive efforts to deal with it*. This means that somebody presently has to concern himself not merely with his own personal readjustments but with *directing and controlling the readjustments of other persons*. In other words, directive, or readjustive, initiative has to come into the picture.

I-13:3. Nature and Functions of Readjustive Initiative

A number of persons can readjust to a problem situation together, rather than separately, only (1) if they realize that it is a *common* situation and (2) if they accept *common directives*, i.e., directives which tend to orient them in the same general direction. In general, there are three major sources of such directives: (a) personal dominance, (b) authority, and (c) leadership.

Personal dominance is control imposed without authority and without consent. The stoker who assigns a banker to "pull on the bow oar" of a lifeboat and makes the order stick by the force of his fists would supply an example of personal dominance. He has no recognized authority to order passengers around and he does not wait for consent. The effectiveness of his directives issues straight from his own personal qualities. That is personal dominance.

A ship's officer in the same situation, on the other hand, would have authority. The passengers would recognize him as empowered to issue orders *by virtue of his function* in the organization which operates the ship. That is the essence of authority: recognition of directives on the basis of acceptance of organizational function. The authority actually exists only in and through its recognition by those to whom the directives are addressed, of course, but their recognition rests on their own acceptance of the organization and the specific function being performed.

Being an attribute of organization and function, authority is necessarily limited to the organization that engenders it. The president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, has no authority over employees of the New York Central. A military commander in ordinary times has no authority over civilians. Even in a disaster in which military aid has become imperative an officer's actual authority may not extend beyond his own organization. Thus, in San Francisco on the morning of the great earthquake in April, 1906, with the telephones all dead, General Funston, commander of the United States Army on the west coast, attempting to get a message through from Nob Hill in the city to his command at the Presidio several miles away, could get no coöperation at all from civilians in the streets. Nobody recognized his authority. He had to run a mile or more to an Army stable before he could find a messenger to post off to the Presidio to order up the troops needed to enable the major to restore order. In the Army he had authority; outside of the Army, no.¹ Authority, then, is an attribute of organizational function.

Both dominance and authority are thus sharply distinguishable from leadership, which may be defined as directive initiative accepted for itself. Of course, in so far as members of an organization and others come to identify themselves with an organization and its functionaries, they tend to accept authoritative directives as acts of leadership rather than mere acts of authority. And because of the connota-

¹ One must distinguish between the authority of a military officer within his own organization and the "authority" which he may exercise over civilians in an emergency under martial law. In the latter case, in so far as his control is not mere dominance due to superior physical force, it rests on the civilian's recognition of the proper function of government in maintaining order, the military thus becoming functionaries of the accepted civilian government. Another confusion must be avoided: Authority as the right to order people around is one thing; as prestige, superior knowledge, etc.—"he speaks with authority on British maritime law"—it is something else. We are concerned with authority only in the sense of legitimate—i.e., recognized, control or direction of others.

tions of the term *leader*, even in the most authoritative organizations, such as totalitarian governments, the top men usually try to propagate a stereotype or myth of themselves as "leaders." In the official mythology, Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco each was "The Leader." Likewise, in Stalin's Russia, despite the noiseless efficiency of the political police and the Siberian slave camps, "The Leader" sat enshrined in the Kremlin. But woe betide any misguided totalitarian "follower" who ever tried to transfer his allegiance to some other "leader"! Authority had them all by the throat!

I-13:4. Social Structures and Readjustment

We have noted that social structures are patterns or designs of lasting interrelationships among people, patterns or designs that tend in varying degrees to persist through time and against distorting pressures from without. This tendency to persistence and stability varies enormously from that of a temporary grouping of students on the campus, for example, waiting for a lecture to that of the class itself, or to the still greater stability of the university organization as a whole, and so on up to the massive stability of the entire social order. Against almost any disrupting suggestion or pressure the temporary group makes little resistance. The reacting individuals feel little or no desire to continue as a group and there are no cultural aids to keep it going as a group. The lecture class, on the other hand, as a sub-organization of a department in a particular college, is supported, as it were, not only by the expectations of the various students and the professor that it will continue as a class but also by the design of the curriculum, by the entire credit system, and by the other pressures of a going concern of which it is a functional part. Yet even the class is a very weak structure as compared with the college or the university. A department chairman or a dean could discontinue a class overnight, but the university institutional organization as a whole has a social momentum that would require a considerable disruption of economic and community routines to put it out of business. The social order itself has a momentum millions of times greater.

The point is, the social momentum of a social structure is the tendency inherent in it and in the cultural aids that sanction and uphold it to keep it going and to maintain it against disturbances of its structure and its routine. In other words, the social momentum of any social structure may be regarded as a function of its adjustive and

readjustive potential: the capacity of those who function in it, and especially of those who control it, to overcome disturbances as they occur and thus keep the structure intact and functional.

In the nature of the case, many variables determine the actual adjustive and readjustive potential of any given social structure. But one of the most important seems to be the readjustive initiative of individuals.

I-13:5. Readjustive Behavior

Readjustive behavior is always the behavior of individuals, but the readjustments sought are frequently superindividual, and they are sought by means of one or more of three kinds of action: (1) *collective or mass action*, (2) *organizational action*, (3) *public action*.

1. COLLECTIVE OR MASS ACTION

Crowds, mobs, popular demonstrations are examples of individuals collectively active. A lynching mob or a strike riot are examples of *protest readjustments*—collective action *against* something. Such outbreaks are almost always symptomatic of some sort of failure or delay in the readjustive processes of the institutional organizations of a society.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION

As we have already pointed out in previous chapters, every society develops institutional organizations for dealing with the great recurrent needs of the society: hunger, reproduction, education, etc. To meet such needs our own society has business concerns, family organizations, schools, and the like.

In the nature of the case, in order to carry on, each of these institutional organizations has to come to terms with the changing situations which it encounters. Carriage manufacturers had to go into making automobiles (Studebaker) or go out of business. Railroads had to reach out for the control of bus lines or take serious losses. Churches had to come to terms with science. And so on.

One of the functions of organization executives and policy-makers is to do just that. Different organizations do it in different ways, but they all have to do it, sooner or later. The great difficulty is, of course, that outside of highly competitive fields, such as business and science, the resistances to readjustment within the great institutional organizations such as government, the churches, the law courts, and so on,

frequently slow down readjustive efforts to invisible dimensions. Institutional organizations, especially those exercising social control functions, are notoriously hard to change. Congress goes on for generations with an almost impossible system of doing business. Some churches have not yet, after three generations, accepted the scientific evidence for natural changes in the world. The net result of all this resistance and cultural lag is that many readjustments have to be pushed and pushed hard on institutional authorities. The democratic political setup makes this possible occasionally for government; but other institutional organizations are not geared into any such transmission belt of social change. Even for the government the belt works jerkily and slowly. The result is that, over and above the readjustive processes going on within institutional organizations themselves, there is always a ferment of readjustive demands in the public mind outside. In the American scheme of things the supervising, criticizing, guiding force behind the specialized managers and policy-makers of all our great institutional organizations from government down is *public opinion*.

3. PUBLIC ACTION

Public is a somewhat deceptively definite term which we apply to an indeterminate number of people functioning loosely together at a distance on the basis of common interests and/or common means of communication. Modern publics are creatures of mass communication; hence, whoever controls mass communication—the press, the radio, the movies, television—controls a public.

The opinions which people have on public matters serve two somewhat opposed functions: on the one hand, in some situations they act as a kind of conservative, *conformity-enforcing moral police*; on the other, in different situations, they act as *innovative agents of readjustment*. When politicians, racketeers, and neighbors stray too far from the paths of ordinary morality, public opinion does its best to dragoon them back into line. This serves very well for stereotyped situations in which the only question is the maintenance of the moral order. But in a dynamic society situations are always developing which either challenge the moral order itself—Shall a man with a wife in an insane asylum remarry?—or else depart so far from the ordinary that old ideas and standards can be applied only with obvious strain and inefficiency. How, for example, shall atomic energy be developed—by private initiative or by the government? These are problem situa-

tions. The point is, for dealing with such situations the ordinary police function of public opinion, the mere enforcement of old patterns, is not enough. When problems are insistent and the institutional agencies fail to solve them on their own, public opinion becomes an active factor.

But the more complex the problem, the more diverse and powerful the interests involved—that is, the more important the problem—the more difficult it often is to get a public decision on it. In fact, it often takes a long hard fight even to make an appreciable percentage of a public recognize the bare existence of a problem. The first job of directive initiative in such situations is to establish the fact that there is a problem and to establish it in enough minds so that the discussion of the nature of the problem itself and what to do about it can proceed at least in an atmosphere of reality. Sometimes it actually takes generations to bring an appreciable number of people to admit the existence of a serious social problem, without attempting to win agreement on what to do about it.

This was the condition of the slavery problem for years before the War Between the States. It was the condition of the industrial accident compensation problem for two generations after that. It was the condition of the conservation problem for years before the first national conservation conference in 1908.

Practically every great social problem now facing modern society has had to go through the same slow evolution: Someone points it out, and then it takes generations to convince the public that here is something really worth worrying about. Nobody, for example, was able to stir up much enthusiasm in the United States for plans to control war—until after Hiroshima. It took the atomic bomb to bring the problem down out of the clouds—and most problems have no such horrendous assistant.

I-13:6. Resistances to Readjustment

All readjustive behavior is likely to encounter four kinds of resistances, which we shall merely point out here and discuss as obstacles to readjustment in Book II, Chapter 13. The four are:

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESISTANCES

These include ignorance, habits, emotional attachments to the familiar, fears of the new and untried.

2. INSTITUTIONAL-ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCES

Institutions by their very nature are cultural designs for organizations whose function is to satisfy some basic need of human beings. If they are to serve their purpose, they must be widely accepted and supported by a body of rationalizations and sentiments which are largely nonrational and cannot be easily changed. The family, the church, the school, the business enterprise, the federal government—these are institutional organizations each of which has built up a body of use and wont and a system of rationalizations and sentiments which now have a psychological and social inertia of their own. New ideas, new ways of meeting the same needs must run the gantlet of all this. In the nature of the case, each institution and each institutional organization resists change.

3. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RESISTANCES

By economic and political resistances we refer to resistances generated by privilege and vested interests. Privileged persons of all kinds from Joe Doakes with his little privilege of seniority on his job to the top officials in the Kremlin with their life-and-death privileges over 200,000,000 Soviet subjects and millions of satellite peoples—everybody with a privilege big or little tends to resist any readjustment that would curtail it.

4. FUNCTIONAL RESISTANCES

Functional resistances are resistances generated by a cultural system, the entirety of the structure facing readjustive change. The need of eliminating right-angle turns in an automobile age is resisted by institutional inertia. A proposal to abolish foremanship in factories or to eliminate officers from the armed services, on the other hand, would be resisted by the nature of the two systems involved. You cannot get any large-scale action system to function without supervision at the point of action. A proposal to abolish teaching in the schools would meet similar resistance not merely because any institutional organization necessarily resists change in order to maintain its stability but because no school could function at all without teaching.

We shall return in Book II, Chapter 13, to the problems created for readjustment processes by these four types of resistances. Mean-

while, the practical question for anyone interested in social problem-solving is how to overcome these resistances.

I-13:7. How to Overcome Public Inertia?

The unreadiness of the public to react to a problem in its early stages inheres partly in the fact that most people do not see the problem at all and partly in the fact that even those who do see it are so immersed in their own daily routines and have so many diverse interests that they do not agree on what to do about it. Hence, the mere announcement that a problem exists and the proposal of even the most rational solution for such a problem usually evokes little interest and even less action. Not infrequently, also, there are vested interests in the *status quo* which strenuously resist all suggestions that things are not as they should be. They deny the existence of the problem, belittle its importance if forced to admit that it does exist, and finally, if compelled to concede that something after all may be wrong, either deny that anything whatever can be done about it by conscious action or vigorously spurn every specific "solution" that may be proposed. Against all this ignorance, weight of habit, pressure of vested interests, and so on, the mere rationality of an idea usually makes little headway. Note, for example, the infinitesimal progress of simplified spelling—than which nothing could be more rational!

How, then, overcome this inertia of the public mind?

Two common devices of social action in the Anglo-American culture are the *pressure group* and the *social movement*.²

A pressure group is a special-interest group. It is an active nucleus of people who have the same economic or other interests and it functions through representatives who try not so much *to convert to membership* persons of other interests as to *influence and direct* persons of other interests. Thus at mid-century the eastern railroads formed one pressure group fighting the St. Lawrence Seaway. They did not try to enlist to membership with themselves midwestern manufacturers and shippers but tried to persuade such possible beneficiaries

² It is unnecessary at this point to follow Rudolf Heberle (*Social Movements*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951) in distinguishing a social movement not only from a pressure group but from a political party. A political party is an institutionalized organization for presenting issues for political decision and for electing candidates to office. A social movement, on the other hand, originates either as a protest against a lag in organizational readjustment or as a defense against a threat to some existing adjustment. A political party may come out of a social movement, or a movement may affect political parties, but the movement itself is bigger than, and more specifically re-adjustive than, a party.

of the seaway to believe that the seaway would be ruinously expensive, wasteful, and no real benefit at all.

A social movement, on the other hand, not only seeks to influence and control people who oppose its objectives but seeks *active converts*; it tries to enlist devotees, to get people of diverse interests to join up in a "crusade" for its own particular panacea. A social movement is almost always composed of *people of diverse interests* who orient themselves through the movement toward the issue and the solution proposed in the ideology of the movement. A pressure group may have a program; a social movement must have an ideology and a social myth.

I-13:8. Characteristics of Social Movements³

In fact, social movements are generally marked by at least three characteristics:

1. A social movement grows out of an *issue*—a question to be decided, a problem to be solved, and *the problem is always bigger than merely one set of interests*. The abolition of slavery, feminism, prohibition—issues of that kind were too broad and vital to be confined merely to people who had one common set of economic or social interests. The mental hygiene movement is not enlisting the support of people of diverse interests all over the country just to make jobs for psychiatrists and social workers! The American Medical Association in opposing certain governmental proposals for compulsory health insurance, on the other hand, has acted, on occasion, like a pressure group. But the proponents of cheaper and more adequately distributed medical service have developed a breadth of interests more characteristic of a social movement. Social movements grow out of issues broader and more inclusive than those that arouse pressure groups.

2. A social movement, in order to win converts, has to develop not merely a specific proposal or a specific program but an *ideology*, a

³ Three kinds of "movements" should be sharply distinguished: (1) *movements of population*, such as a gold rush to California, the expansion of Europe, etc.; (2) *movements of ideas*, such as the swing in British public opinion from laissez-faire individualism early in the nineteenth century to collectivism in the twentieth under the Labour government, or the swing in American thinking from theological pessimism (predestination, etc.) of colonial days to pragmatism, scientific realism, etc., in the twentieth century (see such books as Riley, *From Puritanism to Pragmatism*; Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century*; Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*; Cargill, *Intellectual America*, etc.); and (c) *social movements*, such as we are discussing here. Social movements may express or contribute to movements of ideas, but we are not here concerned with interrelationships of that kind.

body of rationalizations explaining the origins and purposes of the movement as well as a program of amelioration. This ideology in the case of great and powerfully motivated movements tends to become a *social myth*: a creed, a body of doctrine, emotionalized and idealized. It is the function of this kind of social myth to arouse and channelize emotion, to facilitate identification of the individual with the movement. A movement, then, tends gradually to become an expression of the social myth which the movement itself has generated. Every permanent social structure tends to develop its own social myth, of course, which seldom squares completely with reality. But the unique function of the social myth of a social movement is not merely to rationalize what is, as the functioning myths of stable social structures do, but to *derationalize what is and move men to action to change the status quo*. The functioning myth of ordinary social structures—families, business concerns, governments, armies, etc.—tells us that things ought to go on pretty much as they have been going. The social myth of a vital social movement, on the other hand, tells us that the way things have been going is all wrong and ought to be changed.⁴

Thus, in severely crisis-ridden societies one of the crucial symptoms of oncoming revolution has been the development of a revolutionary social myth, an entrancing picture of the New Heaven on the New Earth that is to be won by the ultimate victory of the revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) movement. Such utopian myths developed among the early Christians, in England on the eve of the Puritan revolution, among the American Revolutionists, in revolutionary France, in Russia during the last days of the Czar, etc. But a sharp distinction should be drawn between a revolutionary or utopian social myth *as a means for motivating action* and *as a description of reality*. The two functions are quite different.⁵

⁴ Even movements in defense of the *status quo* such as Native Americanism, for example, which has flared up in various forms from time to time in America's history, always find something in the *status quo* that ought to be changed. Usually it is a threat of some kind that must be removed or counteracted by the movement itself.

⁵ In the eyes of cynical professional revolutionaries this gap between the revolutionary myth and reality is unimportant. As Sorel, the French syndicalist, remarked of the myth of the general strike, the important thing is not that the general strike will work as the myth predicts but that men *believe* it will work. See Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*. One of the major difficulties encountered after World War II by American officials in combating Soviet imperialism and the actual threat of Soviet attack was the persistence in the heads of thousands of so called "liberals" and "idealists" of the Marxian revolutionary myth, which had long since ceased to have much relevance to actual conditions in Russia. See *Witness*, by Whittaker Chambers, New York, Random House, 1952. The *mystique* of revolution as *the way* to transform society made a powerful appeal to young idealists and malcontents during the 1920's and 1930's.

3. Both pressure groups and social movements always seek to convince the public that their particular panaceas are plainly in the public interest, but of the two, social movements are much more likely to personalize the issue, i.e., to dramatize it in the person of some "hero," or outstanding leader, who is usually represented as sacrificing himself for the common good. Either as a living symbol or in retrospect as the founder of the movement, the "hero" is made the protagonist of the good, the true, the beautiful. Against him are arrayed the Powers of Darkness. Heroes of social movements include the great religious founders, John Brown, Hitler, and many others.

Social movements, then, arise out of problems involving diverse interests which are being disregarded or flouted by forces in the *status quo*: why mobilize support for any specific "solution" if there is no resistance in the *status quo*? In order to win friends and influence people, a movement has to develop an ideology and a social myth, and the social myth, unlike any particular social myth of the *status quo* itself, seeks to derationalize what is and move men to action. To do this it is highly useful to dramatize the issue in the person of a "hero" or Protagonist of Light against the Powers of Darkness. Obviously, as it functions in a social movement, readjustive initiative calls for a diversity of skills. But this is true on whatever level readjustive effort seeks to direct the activities of others.

I-13:9. A Functional Analysis of Readjustive Initiative

To deal with any fairly complex problem situation people functioning in any social structure from a group to the social order itself can be observed to require the performance of at least seven different and distinct kinds of functions. In other words, the processes of collective and corporate readjustment seem to depend on seven functions of directive initiative:

1. Focalization of attention.
2. Definition of a common difficulty.
3. Proposal of solutions.
4. Coöperation for decision.
5. Allocation of function.
6. Release, inspiration, and guidance of action.
7. Appraisal of results.

These, in turn, seem to require as many different kinds of skills.

I-13:10. Focalizing Attention: Showmanship

How to focalize the attention of people facing a given problem situation is the first difficulty to be surmounted by any would-be con-

troller of readjustive behavior. How make everybody involved realize that all are in the same boat, that the difficulty is a common difficulty?

In an organization whose functionaries can speak with authority focalization of attention is no problem at all: the president issues a directive or the commanding officer shouts "Attention!" and the trick is done. But in the hurly-burly of public affairs, affairs affecting individuals and organizations but nevertheless external to any particular organization, attention-getting is not so simple. It not infrequently becomes a contest to outcompete thousands of other demands, problems, interests. Even the President of the United States has found it useful on occasion to consider ways and means for making announcements from the White House hit public attention harder. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, used to time important announcements specifically for the Monday morning papers, Monday morning being usually a slack time for competing news. Franklin Delano Roosevelt found it equally necessary to manipulate public attention. Forced on the defensive in one area of public policy such as W.P.A. expenditures or whatever, he would invariably start a counterattack in some other area on "economic royalists" or the like to distract attention from the weak spot in the line.

In a society in which nobody has enough hours in his day to attend to everything, it is obvious that showmanship, a flair for making other people stop, look, and listen, is a distinct asset to anybody who wants to influence the readjustive behavior of others. But as a contribution to collective or corporate readjustment the bare capacity to focalize attention is hardly enough.

I-13:11. The Intellectual Task: Defining the Common Difficulty and Proposing Solutions

Any clown can attract attention—as certain politicians are always demonstrating. But to define the crucial difficulty in a complex problem situation takes wits. When the problem happens to be an industrial revolution, slavery versus free labor, or a major depression, the best brains of several generations may struggle with it in vain. Modern experience demonstrates that to define the difficulties in the great problem situations of the contemporary world is an intellectual task of major proportions. To expect untrained minds to make any worth-while contributions at this point is naïve. Of course any Tom, Dick, or Harry with a bit of luck can discover a hotel fire and turn

in an alarm. That is not the kind of problem situation we are discussing. The basic inadequacies of a culture are not usually diagnosed by any chance passer-by. That is a job in the first instance for the practical men who control the institutional organizations of a society and ultimately for the intellectuals, the men who make a business of thinking. It is the practical men who have to meet the day-to-day crises as they come up; it is the intellectuals who have to tell why these crises keep coming up and what fundamental readjustments they imply. Henry VIII meets the crisis of the Reformation by setting England at odds with the Catholic powers of the Continent. Two generations later Thomas Hobbes rationalizes Tudor absolutism. Cromwell and his yeomen farmers presently destroy English absolutism altogether. Then John Locke rationalizes the theory of limited monarchy. Watt and Arkwright and a hundred others, revolutionizing practical life, outmode the social controls of feudal society. So Adam Smith, Ricardo, Senior, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx explain what is happening. Then Nicolai Lenin takes Marx's ideas and creates the first proletarian government in world history. The practical men act, the intellectuals interpret action—and the interpretations guide practical action in the future.

By and large, mankind has evolved four major methods of solving problem situations: *conversion, education, power, and control of causes*. Conversion, education, and power are all means of *social control*. Their aim is to solve a problem by controlling the *behavior of people*. Control of causes, on the other hand, aims directly at the *objective causal factors in a situation*. For example, to reduce the incidence of syphilis one can aim at the immorality of people or at the *Spirochaeta pallida*.

Effective solution of most social problems usually requires a combination of both kinds of control, social and causal. Reduction of traffic accidents, for example, will hardly come about through *either* more careful driving *or* more safety-engineered highways, but rather through a combination of both. The difficulty is that traditionally, coming down from the days when we knew little about social causation, the simplest solutions for many problem situations appear to be control of human behavior directly. Thus, it is still customary to discuss juvenile delinquency or crime as though the problem were mainly one of enforcing a given pattern of behavior. Little Johnny whacks Little Sister; therefore whack Little Johnny. More profound analysis might reveal the fact that Little Johnny and Little Sister are both up hours

after their normal bedtime. A causal attack on the problem, then, without dispensing with social control entirely, would bundle the youngsters off to bed while they are still able to get along with themselves, to say nothing of getting along with each other.

I-13:12. The Method of Causal Control: Scientific Technology

Problem-solving by controlling causes flies in the face of age-old reliance on social controls. Ask any group of adults what to do with a boy who has stolen an automobile, and almost invariably you will get prompt advice on how to *coerce* the lad back into line. Very seldom will it occur to anybody to apply to such a problem the same cause-and-effect thinking that we all apply as a matter of course to our cars or radio sets. Not so long ago, when men knew little about objective causes, the *unanimity* with which a social group attacked a problem was frequently of more importance than the specific things they did. Thus when folks believed in witchcraft and magic it was possible to exorcise the Smallpox Demon with great unanimity and dispatch. Unfortunately the Smallpox Demon had a way of forgetting that he had been exorcised; hence those of faltering faith might eventually let the paleface medicine man scratch their arms. In time survivors might begin to credit the statistics: *Control of causes keeps more people alive than unanimity in hocus-pocus*. The suspicion dawns that the quality of what you do is at least as important as the number of people who approve of your doing it.

That is a great and fundamental discovery, which as yet has hardly percolated below the building of steam canoes and the relief of many-man stomach aches. For otherwise respectable people, who would modestly hesitate to make suggestions to a garage mechanic or a telephone lineman, see no inconsistency whatever in advocating capital punishment or denouncing a loan to Britain!

I-13:13. Difficulties of a Causal Approach to Social Problems

Actually it seems to be difficult for the average person to distinguish between problems in which the crux of the matter is *that people do not agree* on what is desirable or what purposes to pursue, and problems in which the difficulty is *merely one of ways and means*. Much of the talk about a world police force illustrated this confusion. For Americans and Englishmen a police force necessarily implies law, and law necessarily implies a state. Without a world state there obviously can be no world law and hence no world police except as an instru-

ment of tyranny. Yet innumerable well-meaning people in 1945-1946 talked as though the setting up of a world police force were the next step in world organization. Actually, as the divergence of aims between Russia and the United States developed, it became depressingly clear that the great powers were still a long way from agreeing on the necessity for collective controls of any kind.

Thus it is only when, among those who dominate a particular situation, substantial agreement does exist on values and purposes that solutions by causal control can even be attempted.

If modern man solves more and more of his material problems by applying scientific knowledge through technology, it is because nearly everybody has long since become convinced that (1) the solution of material problems is worth while and (2) this is the way to do it. On the other hand, if we still fumble and fail in dealing with many social problems, it is because (1) we cannot distinguish problems of values and purposes from problems of ways and means and (2) we cling tenaciously to traditional answers which emphasize social controls when causal controls would be more efficient.

Another difficulty inheres in the fact that to use the scientific technology as an instrument of readjustment to a problem situation requires a grasp and coördination of techniques that is as yet rare in the social-problem-solving field. The reduction in the tuberculosis mortality rate from 400 per 100,000 in 1840 to less than 36 per 100,000 in 1950 was not accomplished by the use of any one technique alone. Scientific research contributed knowledge of the tubercle bacillus. Medical practitioners empirically developed techniques for arresting the disease. Publicists, educators, social organizers spread news of these things far and wide. And out of all this education, agitation, and organization issued eventually money for more facilities—clinics, hospitals, x-ray machines—to implement the fight against the disease. *Science, technology, social action, and social organization* all teamed up to win the partial victory that has been won.

Here was a single continuing interest in which everyone had a stake, namely, good health. Many other problems lack this central guiding theme of universal interest. People without children or people whose children have grown up cannot see their stake in reducing juvenile delinquency. People with comfortable incomes cannot see their stake in reducing poverty. People secure in their own social circle cannot see their stake in civil liberty and tolerance. That is all true. But it merely complicates the use of the scientific technology; it does not

fundamentally alter the fact that this is the method which offers the best hope of solving the social problems on which substantial agreement about basic values and ultimate objectives can be obtained.

In conclusion, we suggest that any definition of a difficulty or any proposal of a solution may usefully be challenged on two counts: (1) Is the crux of this difficulty the *absence* of agreement on basic values or purposes? Or is the crux of the difficulty really something else? (2) Is the proposed solution aimed at producing *uniformity of belief or action* (through law or otherwise)? Or is it aimed at *objective causal conditions directly*?

I-13:14. The Psycho-Political Task: Enlisting Support and Precipitating Decision

It is frequently assumed that the major task of readjustment to a problem situation has been accomplished when the difficulty has been clearly defined and a reasonable solution has been proposed. If man were the highly rational being that eighteenth-century social philosophers imagined him to be, such an assumption might approximate the facts. Actually, however, individuals, as we all know, are abstractly rational only in spots; the rest of the time they are creatures of impulse, prejudice, stereotypes, habits, narrow self-interests, and highly practical demands. Not only are they less interested in truth than in the practical results of truth; they are usually tangled up in all kinds of organizations and systems that must be kept going as systems. Consequently it is a rare individual who can combine scientific objectivity with skill in manipulating human relations. So as things are, few ideas in the practical world win their way purely on their merits. Just because of social inertia—to say nothing of the hostility of any vested interests that may be threatened—new solutions for problem situations inevitably encounter resistance.

Sometimes the proper authorities are too busy to bother with them. Sometimes they are turned down for quite irrelevant reasons: an executive does not want a subordinate to gain the spotlight. Sometimes they do not fall within the scope of any existing agency. The status of women, for example, would seem to be a type of problem beyond the province of any one control agency in our society in this century. Revolutionary ideas necessarily have no chance in any ordinary social scene. Hence the necessity for the proponents of proposed solutions for complicated situations to mobilize support, to “sell” their ideas to the Big Boss, if possible, or to the masses if necessary. This, be

it noted, is a legitimate place for social controls in the readjustive process—they are the necessary means for mobilizing support for causal as well as other solutions. Pressure groups and social movements are appropriate means for putting umph behind ideas.

But to enlist support for a proposed solution of a problem situation requires quite different skills from those needed to define the difficulty or to propose a reasonable solution. Now you are no longer in a rigorous logical world where evidence is evaluated on its intrinsic merits. You are now in a shifty psychological world in which the very evidence that appeals to one may turn another against you. You are in a world in which two men may favor your proposition for two diametrically opposite and inconsistent reasons. But your concern now is not with their reasons but with their support, a detail that drives the scientific mind to distraction. Yet since politics is “the art of the possible,” any really practicable solution in the end must include an anticipatory discount of what men can be induced to accept. The Eighteenth Amendment, for example, turned out to be something of a boomerang. Nearly every reform that manages to get through a legislature usually comes out a hodgepodge of compromises—compromises between the ideally and technologically desirable and the politically possible.

The details of how one actually goes about making friends and influencing people lie beyond our present concern. The point at the moment is that one of the essential phases in any collective readjustment to a problem situation is just this process of “selling” the proposed readjustment to the people who count.

I-13:15. The Organizing and Administrative Task: Organizing and Directing Action

To make a given solution “stick,” it is nearly always necessary either (1) to turn it over to an established agency to carry out or (2) to set up a new agency to do the job. Somebody has to be given the specific, full-time job of working at that particular solution.

This means organization, administration, and the direction and supervision of action. These functions again call for quite different skills from those demanded by the scientific and political functions which precede. Organization is a matter of functional analysis: What needs to be done, by whom, when, how? Administration runs all the way from policy-making to mere supervision. The top executives in any organization spend most of their time saying Yes or No to the

initiatives of their lieutenants and a good share of the rest of the time keeping would-be rivals under control.⁶ To imagine that politics is something confined to professional politicians is to display a charming ignorance of the local church sewing circle, the nearest university campus, the big factory across the tracks, the A.F. of L. Wherever there is power or status at stake, men jockey for position. Hence the struggle that every top official in every organization has in order to keep his job. It would no doubt be ideal if merit alone counted in advancement and recognition in any organization. But it would also be quite a different world from the one in which we live.

How much, therefore, of a given person's activity is actually aimed at furthering his functional role in his organization and how much is aimed at furthering his own personal fortunes? This is frequently very difficult to answer from the outside; but there is no harm in keeping it in mind.

I-13:16. The Inspirational Task: Building *Esprit de Corps* and Morale

When you have your organization, there is frequently need of something more than the organizer and the administrator can supply. This something more is fire and enthusiasm—the sense of identification with the organization and the determination to go through fire and water and come back begging for more. The sense of identification is *esprit de corps*. The General Motors office boy who begins to talk about “our cars” and “our competitors” on his second day has developed *esprit de corps*. The Montgomery Ward executive who allegedly lost his job because the chairman of the board overheard him referring to the central office as “this joint” seemed to lack *esprit de corps*.

Morale is something else again. It is the determination to go through with what you start, to stick to the organization's objectives through thick and thin. The United States workmen who stuck to their machines until they dropped in order to turn out the tanks that ultimately saved Montgomery in Egypt—and the war—had morale. So did the men on Bataan, the men who went ashore in Normandy, the men who relieved Bastogne, the men who rushed the bridge at Remagen, the men who stuck to the stricken *Franklin*, the Marines at Okinawa, the bomber men in the ack-ack over Schweinfurth, the submarine crews in the lonely Pacific—all these. But the scientist who

⁶ Lyman Bryson, “Lincoln in Power,” *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1946, pp. 161–174.

keeps on at research when promotion lies in administration, the man or woman who keeps the marriage vow in the face of separation and loneliness, the artist who keeps faith with himself come Hollywood and high water—these too have morale. One major function of readjustive leadership is to inspire that kind of devotion. How it is done is a detail. The point is that the effective leader, the man who makes a mark on his time and his people, inspires morale.

I-13:17. The Evaluative Task: What Have We Accomplished and at What Cost?

The great social readjustments of this or any other time can be appraised only in the perspective of history. What World War I did to Europe, for example, did not become completely clear until Hitler went into Poland. What World War II has done to the world may not be completely clear even to our grandchildren. Men are still trying to appraise the industrial revolution.

This does not mean, however, that men do not try to cast up accounts even in the midst of such upheavals, and certainly there is a growing tendency in the American culture to seek objective measures of accomplishment in lesser readjustments. Next to business concerns which always face the deadly peril of red ink, the institutional organizations that have probably done most to measure their own accomplishments are the schools. The organizations that have probably done least are households and churches. In both these organizations it is apparently assumed that if one does the best he can the results must somehow be good. No such comforting assumptions are tenable any longer in business, education, military life, or the scientific field.

Unfortunately the art of accounting is strictly an economic art for the benefit of profit and loss. There is no art of social bookkeeping. How much a given job of street paving has cost the taxpayers can usually be ascertained—given reasonable candor at the City Hall. But how much the closing of one recreation field has cost the fathers and mothers of one ward cannot be set down in black and white. Even the schools cannot appraise the larger consequences of their programs; how much, for example, does it cost a city to educate most of its children for an intellectual training that they will never get while denying them practical skills that they will urgently need? How much does it cost to teach the children of a whole generation superficial literacy while leaving them emotional ignoramuses? Nobody knows.

How much does it cost a nation to encourage material change and

ignore the distribution of the burdens of that change? How much did the industrial revolution cost the people of England? How much will the mechanical cotton picker cost the people of America? Nobody knows. Ours is a happy optimism that never asks such morbid questions. But for situational analysis it is important to observe how much appraising, if any, of current readjustments may be going on. Who is making the appraisals, and how? *The Grapes of Wrath*, for example, not only helped to define a difficulty during the uneasy 1930's; it also contributed to an appraisal of the society in which such things could happen. Of course there was no quantitative summing up—so many driven off the land, so many lives thwarted and twisted, so much less production. Some of those details can be gleaned from the official sources—which never tell the whole story either. But *The Grapes of Wrath* told more of all that than the official reports could. Well, how much appraising is going on during and after a given readjustive process, and what sort of appraising is it? How much of it is the “self-criticism” so dear to the politically muzzled Russians and how much of it comes from “outsiders” like John Steinbeck?

Obviously in its broader aspects this job of appraisal, like that of definition and proposal of solutions, belongs, in the last analysis, to the intellectuals. It is the men and women who are detached enough to take the long view, yet sensitive enough to feel the human gains and losses, who must in the end cast up accounts. This means that artists and literary folk probably play as big a role as social appraisers as do historians, sociologists, and other social scientists.

I-13:18. What Is the Evidence?

The job now is actually to see directive initiative, particularly leadership, at work. Again you will have to turn to secondary sources: newspapers, magazines, books.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 13

To assemble evidence of directive initiative

1. Find specific examples of each of the seven functions of readjustive initiative listed in Section I-13.9, either on the level of organizational readjustment (action in an organization) or on the level of public readjustment.
2. If possible choose your examples from one continuous process, readjustment to *one* problem. (Consult your clipping file.)

3. The evidence may be from personal observation or from indirect sources such as newspapers, magazines, or books. But it should be presented in such a way as to bring out the distinctive characteristics of each function of directive initiative.
4. What are your conclusions?

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Make an intensive analysis of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's leadership between 1933 and Pearl Harbor in preparing the American people to face the Nazi menace. Distinguish the different functions performed.

PROJECT B

Select one or more books dealing with the need of organizing the world for peace after World War II. (Wendell Willkie's *One World*, Sumner Welles' *Time for Decision*, etc.) Analyze the readjustive initiative functions performed by that book or by those books.

PROJECT C

Select some important social movement—abolition, the prohibition movement, the Marxist movement, the feminist movement, etc.—and analyze (1) the issue out of which it emerged, (2) the resistances in the *status quo* which the movement sought to overcome, (3) the ideology and social myth which the movement eventually produced, and (4) the way in which some individual became the "hero" of the movement. Note fiction and drama dealing with the movement or expressing its ideology, or myth.

PROJECT D

Compare the rise of the Ghost Dance Religion among the Plains Indians in the late 1880's with the early history of Christianity. (For the data on the Ghost Dance Religion see James Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion*, Washington, Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, 1894. For data on the early history of Christianity see the New Testament and the works of such scholars as Adolf Harnack and others.)

PROJECT E

Analyze the relationships between the movement of ideas in America during some selected period—1620–1776, or 1865–1917, or 1918–41, etc.—and the social movements of the time. Show how prevalent ideas affected the social movements and the social movements in turn affected prevalent ideas.

Supplementary Readings

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Adjusting to the Future: Foresight and Planning

I-14:1. The Problem

As World War II drew toward its end the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, of which Robert R. Nathan was deputy director and economist, predicted that there would be 8,000,000 unemployed in the United States after V-J Day, approximately the number unemployed in 1940. Actually unemployment never exceeded 2,270,000 in 1946 and receded to 2,064,000 by 1948.

Then in February, 1949, Leon H. Keyserling, vice-chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, urged measures to block *impending inflation* just as the *recession* of 1949 was beginning to drive unemployment to its postwar high of 3,395,000.

One investigator, in 1953, totting up the record of economic soothsayers since mid-1946, concluded that "out of twelve forecasts the economists' consensus could be graded 'right' only four times," i.e., once in every three tries; and Arthur F. Burns, economic adviser to President Eisenhower, admitted, "Economists have not yet evolved, if they ever will, a technique for making dependable forecasts."¹

Neither have others—social scientists or practical men of affairs either. If Lancelot Hogben once singled out economists as "the astrologers of the machine age," he flattered them only by undue selection. Lacking the conceptual systematics and quantitative indexes of their economic colleagues, sociologists make even a poorer showing, and as for practical men, business loses billions every year and statesmen blunder into wars betting on the wrong filly in futurity.

One great Chicago mail-order house, assuming that a commodity

¹ J. A. Livingston, "How Wrong Can Economists Be?" *The Reporter*, May 26, 1953.

price collapse would follow World War II as such downswings had followed previous wars, kept its inventories low in 1945—and saw its rival's sales zoom up 180 percent in succeeding months while its own rose only 65.

In August, 1939, Senator Borah assured the country, despite State Department warnings, that there would be no war in Europe—and Hitler's bombers were blasting Poland almost before the interview was off the newsstands. Withdrawing American troops from Korea in the spring of 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the world the United States had no further interest in the continent of Asia. Then Congress without one dissenting voice refused to send military aid to Syngman Rhee *barely four months before Russia decided to plow the Korean Republic under.*

Such are some recent examples of the fallibility of human foresight. Thus, for scientists, businessmen, and statesmen one of the great problems of life remains what it has been for ages—the problem of man's adjustment to the future.

As Korzybski said, man is the time-binding animal: he stands in a present and looks back to a past and forward to a future. But what he sees in the past is usually what his cultural myths or political interests predispose him to see and what he sees in the future is all too often merely what he himself wants to see.

One of man's oldest yearnings has been for power to foresee events. Down through the ages sorcerers, medicine men, priests, and fortunetellers of all sorts have flourished on their promises to reveal what was still to come. The ancient Romans even in the days of the Empire maintained official diviners called augurs whose function it was to consult omens in the entrails of fowls and other mystic sources in order to advise the government how public business might go forward under good auspices. Medieval kings often maintained their own private soothsayers to guide affairs by consulting the stars. Even today spiritualists, crystal-gazers, and astrologers still do business at the old stand. While fortunetelling for pay is outlawed in most states, devotees of the ancient art of astrology are so numerous that metropolitan newspapers which have little space for debates in Congress or the doings of the United Nations find it worth while to give eight or ten column-inches in every edition to a cultural anachronism called "Your Horoscope" or "Daily Astrology," or whatever. Thus, on the woman's page of the *Detroit Free Press* of February 19, 1954, directly below a fashion item labeled "Shirtikins," we find a two-column feature head:

★ ★ ★ Daily Astrology ★ ★ ★

BY RITA DEL MAR

This steers us into some six column-inches of assorted advice on how to tie the world in knots "while shunning risks" and how to "be extra discriminating regarding credit, merchandising transactions," but "reserve the evening hours for major efforts." The first bit of wisdom was for the happy children born under the sign of Virgo, the Virgin; the second, for those under the sign of Sagittarius, the Archer. Meanwhile, the children of each of the other ten signs of the zodiac got equally sage advice, each gem, apparently, beamed only at the beneficiaries of the proper sign, but all of it—considering its celestial origin—surprisingly like the centuries-old folk wisdom of mere earthlings. What would happen, however, if some compositor happened to transpose the signs so that folks born between August 23 and September 22 (Virgo, the Virgin), instead of "driving toward pet goals" as here advised, should all set out to avoid those "befuddled views" which the poor fish born between February 19 and March 20 were advised to shun (Pisces, the Fishes)—this the mind hesitates to contemplate. Wreck on the interstellar!

All this, of course, is only mildly futuristic—only twenty-four hours at a shot. For real astrological foresight you must turn from the metropolitan press to the special periodicals devoted to piercing the future months and years at a clip. Take the January–February, 1954, issue of *Astrology Guide*, for example, which sells for 35 cents and graces the displays of many newsstands. *Astrology Guide* not only offers daily horoscopes for everyone—differing day to day oddly enough from the pellucid precision of the celestial revelations in the *Free Press*—but really rolls back the curtain. There is, of course, a slight interstellar collision at the start, you might say, since the editor's "Merry Christmas and an unusually Happy New Year" to his readers on page 4 directly faces a little opus called "World of Tomorrow" by Alma Crawford Graning on page 5, and if anybody thinks Alma is one of those Pollyannas with no eye for the darker side of life, he hasn't met Alma:

"A year of revolution of peoples around the world. . . . Political and national upheavals will strike in this country. We will be tossed on a stormy sea with critical political and economic events."

That's just Alma's preview of 1954. When the lady begins to fill in the details for January it becomes obvious that the editor must have overlooked his lead article when he wished his readers that unusually Happy New Year. If there was any calamity left out in January, the author made up for it in February. According to Alma, the happy New Year that the readers of *Astrology Guide* were heading into was going to include such little details as "deaths of national figures . . . grave financial trouble, January through February 2 . . . president's health and safety endangered . . . great political changes . . . trade troubles . . . warlike foreign conditions . . . danger to crops, epidemics . . . tragic travel disasters . . . U.S. postal affairs badly affected. . . ."

The bright spots for Americans were to be: "The disintegration of Russia continues . . . and deaths of Red Chinese Communist leaders."

February was to be equally disastrous with sex atrocities, and with "dangerous happenings" threatening schools and theaters, "public health still under a cloud," "labor mutinous . . . naval disasters . . . deaths of government and fighting services people." But—glad news to the economists—prosperity was to improve!

Well, there it is—a sample of the great astrological school of American fiction! Nothing that was foretold specifically enough to be checked actually happened. No national figures died in January, the President's health and safety were not endangered, there were no great political changes, no dangers to crops, no epidemics, and not even any very serious travel disasters although accidents are, of course, always occurring. U.S. postal affairs improved, if anything. The disintegration of Russia continued to be invisible to the naked eye and no Red Chinese leaders of any importance died. Score for January, 0. Score for February, 0. Instead of prosperity it was unemployment that increased!

Yet *Astrology Guide* announces on its cover that it is in its eighteenth year of publication. And there are dozens of periodicals of this kind, catering to mysticism and anxiety about the future. And hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of readers. The human yearning to peer into the future is ages old, and for the superstitious and the half-educated these magazines obviously fulfill a need. Neither traditional religions nor the social sciences so far have been able to meet that need: the need to see ahead; to feel that somehow, some-

where, somebody can give a chap a helping hand into tomorrow.²

That is the problem which the social scientists must meet on a more verifiable basis than astrology or psychic mysticism.

I-14.2. How Does One "See Ahead"? Hunches, Habits, and Routine

The ultimate objective of all science is to predict—to say that, given such and such specific conditions, such and such specific events will occur. But most of us—even those of us who shun fortunetellers and the "Daily Horoscope"—orient our behavior toward the future on far less certain grounds than those of scientific prediction.

To begin with, we have "hunches." We get up in the morning "feeling" that today is going to be a lucky day—and sure enough, Little Johnny wins first prize in a spelling contest! Or happening to notice the deep blue of the sky, we presently encounter a race-track entry called Sky Blue and play the hunch. If prophecy of that kind happens to pay dividends, it is purely coincidental. There is no causal connection between your feeling about the impending future and your son's success in spelling, or between your chance observation of a gap in the clouds and some nag's performance on a race track. That, let us say, is orientation to the future on the basis of *expected coincidence*.

Occasionally, however, we have hunches of a different character. Meeting a new acquaintance, you get an impression, a hunch, that he is not to be trusted. Nothing that you know about him or that you can point to at the moment justifies such an impression. But there it is. Such a hunch may, of course, be purely a matter of expected coincidence, like your wager on Sky Blue. Yet often there is more to it than that. Somewhere in your past you have had an unfortunate experience with someone who in some way was actually like your new acquaintance; he had the same build, facial expression, way of expressing himself, manner of acting. Or perhaps you have seen unpleasant characters in the movies not altogether unlike this chap, so you have a stereotype of that kind of personality. In any event, something in your past that may not now register clearly in consciousness predisposes you to be wary. Because you cannot put your finger on it, be-

² For a glimpse of a prosperous "astrologian" at work with some distinguished clients, see "Stargazer for Stars: Astrologer Richter Does Hollywood's Horoscopes," by Robert Wallace, *Life*, April 5, 1954, pp. 143–155. Carroll Richter's daily column of astrological advice "is distributed by the General Features Corporation in 113 newspapers which have a combined readership of 18 million."

cause you cannot conceptualize it, the past experience merely grazes your consciousness, not as a definite idea but as an impression, an intuition, a hunch. That kind of orientation to the future has a slightly more respectable standing than expected coincidence, but it is still based on purely subjective states of mind—on one's own feelings and rationalizations.

A considerable step up in dependability occurs when the basis of one's estimates of future events shifts from his own subjective hunches to knowledge of the routines of nature and of his own culture. An old farmer, for example, can frequently foretell tomorrow's weather from the characteristics of tonight's sunset. Having over the course of years observed again and again the apparent connection between a reddish sunset, let us say, and clear, warm weather next day, he foretells a clear, warm tomorrow from tonight's rosy west. In the same way, having from childhood experienced the dependability of the postal service, you "foretell" a certain outcome every time you post a letter. Perhaps your expectations concerning the postal service are somewhat sounder than the old farmer's about the weather; you do have some idea of the causal processes that move letters on their way, whereas he probably has no conception of how the weather works. But both of you are projecting into the future expectations based on specific experiences with particular local routines: the succession, red-sunset-clear-and-warm; and the succession, letter-posted-letter-delivered.

I-14:3. Scientific Foresight—Forecasting and Prediction

This is all well and good so far as it goes. But it does not go very far. The old farmer is no match for the Weather Bureau, and you are no match for the statisticians. The Weather Bureau projects into the future not merely its past experience with a particular local routine of nature but lines of trend based on data from wide areas and on a definite theory of air masses, eastward drift, and so on. The statisticians project into the future not merely past experiences with a given social routine but lines of trend based on repeated measurements through time, on the mathematics of curve fitting, on theories of cycles, and the like. Thus, the Weather Bureau and the statisticians are not foretelling; they are *forecasting*—projecting into the future lines of trend tracing the probable course of weather, business, the birth rate, or what-have-you. Every projection, or extrapolation, of a series of measures depends for its validity on the continuance of the conjunction of

forces that produced the trend. All such series are therefore at the mercy of disturbances which exceed the limits of tolerance of the systems that produce them. A Japanese earthquake, a pandemic of influenza, a Russian revolution, a world war—disturbances of such magnitude stand ordinary statistical projections on their heads. But statistical forecasting is still the most dependable way of estimating the future of many social situations. Yet the social sciences have not been able to attain the goal of the natural scientists, actual prediction.

Prediction is the precise statement of future events, based on exact knowledge of the sufficient conditions under which they occur. A sociologist, knowing the delinquency rate of a given community, can only say that if you pick at random the first boy you meet in the street your chance of finding a delinquent is 1 in 100, or 1 in 50, or whatever the actual probabilities may be. This is the best the social scientists can do, talk in terms of probabilities. To the natural scientist with his controlled experiments, his mathematical measurements, and his instruments of precision, all that is pretty feeble. The physicist does not talk in terms of probability—not at least until he gets down to electrons and protons and neutrons. On the atomic, molecular, and molar levels he talks in terms of positive laws; given such and such conditions, such and such results follow. Drop a weight in a vacuum, for example. How fast does it gather speed? The physicist doesn't answer that by saying that there are so many chances in a hundred that it will fall 32 feet in the first second. He tells you flatly that it will accelerate at the rate of 32.1808 feet per second minus .0821 times twice the cosign of the latitude in which it is dropped. No probabilities about that. It's a positive law. You know that if you duplicate the conditions of the experiments in which those facts were ascertained and do an equally good job of measurement, you will get the same results.

Likewise you know that the astronomers who predicted four partial eclipses of the sun in 1946 were not talking in terms of probabilities. Mathematically they had long since calculated the paths of the earth, the moon, the sun, and they knew that those eclipses, like others predicted years and centuries ahead, were as inevitable as the sunrise; the only thing that could prevent them would be some cosmic catastrophe like the explosion of the sun itself. Thus they were able to predict to the second, years ahead of time, precisely when the partial eclipse of November 23, 1946, would begin in the United States: precisely at three seconds after 10:24 A.M., Eastern Standard Time; and they knew it would end at four seconds after 2:49 P.M., after having reached a

totality of 77.6 percent. *That is prediction.* Social scientists simply don't play in that league. The best they can do is to *forecast*—extrapolate trends. And the best the average man can do is either to play his hunches or to bet on the routines of nature and society.

I-14:4. The Role of Foresight in Situational Readjustment

Most of the time orientation to the future depends either (1) on some idea of a continuity of process or (2) on some theory of the functional relationships of variables. Either we think that production will increase, certain processes thus continuing to operate; or, in terms of variables: Prosperity and delinquency being positively correlated, we envision a *decrease* in juvenile delinquency with the next wave of unemployment. In other words, as Professor Cooley once remarked, we look ahead in terms of habit and routine. But most of us are also vividly aware of social dynamics, the incessant impact of new ideas, new inventions, new leaders, new situations, and of the constant insecurities of a society that has not learned how to keep coöperation in gear. This means that we have constantly to *estimate* the likelihood of this or that disturbance and to discount its consequences in advance. As best we can, we try to discover basic trends or tendencies—the drift toward more and more collective control of the individual, the growing role of science and technology, and so on. But beyond that we are driven back to the questions, What does all this mean for me? Can I safely invest money in housing—or will government step in with rent controls and resale regulations and destroy any possibility of profit? Can I plan on a career in engineering—or will the rush of G.I.'s to the technical schools flood the market and make engineers a dime a dozen five years hence? Can the stumbling, inefficient machine at Washington possibly readjust American society to the problems of the atomic age, or will we have to centralize more power in the presidency; and if we do, how can we save political and civil liberty? Questions like these cannot be answered with statistics and curves. One is forced into a kind of dramatic projection of trends and forces, a balancing of this against that. How will the American people react to the next depression? Are the Communists right that Fascism must be the inevitable answer? How shall we face up to the military responsibilities required to maintain our half of two worlds? How shall we carry the growing burden of fear that already taints every discussion of scientific warfare? Can the United Nations prevent a show-

down with Russia, and if not, what kind of world will be left after the next war?

Questions of this kind cannot be answered in terms of trends. Ideas, practical interests, dominant personalities, the dynamics of power fields—all enter into the picture; and there is no scientific formula such as any bright graduate student can find in astronomy or physics or chemistry, for example, by which to strike an equation. The social sciences still do not know how to plot the future of a civilization. There is no substitute yet for individual wisdom, and there is no social machinery to make sure that wisdom will prevail.

All of which is somewhat beyond our present interest. The immediate problem for us is how foresight actually works in controlling actual situations.

I-14:5. The Prevalence of Planning

Everyone plans to the best of his ability. Everyone tries to get certain outcomes in the future, rather than others. Most of us plan on a limited scale, with inadequate information, with little or no knowledge of overall trends, and with no access to the more inclusive plans of governments and corporations that dominate our environment. You plan a home for yourself, for example, and purchase property on the edge of town. Then you discover that the state highway department is planning to construct a limited-access, cut-off highway between you and the community. Or some air line is buying up adjacent property to make an airfield. And so it goes. You plan to get married in six months. But before the six months are up your nation is at war or is headed down the slope of a major depression. The individual always plans, in other words, under a canopy of uncertainty and inadequate control of the essential variables.

To remedy this, there has been growing up in recent decades a definite demand for more inclusive planning by public agencies—planning by communities, by regional authorities, by the federal government, even by international organizations. This demand is evidence of increasing awareness that the problems of modern society cannot be solved by individuals acting merely as individuals. Even the value of your investment in your home must be protected by building restrictions. Somebody must plan minimal limits of construction for an entire subdivision or an entire section of a community. If masses are not to be thrown into the streets periodically in depressions, someone

must plan to control at least the limits of economic processes to prevent major dislocations. Willy-nilly, if we want the economic fruits of high interdependence, we are challenged to accept the social costs of such interdependence—the curtailment of some of the freedoms of Robinson Crusoe. This seems to be the inescapable issue in the modern world: *How are we to get the benefits of the technology of high interdependence with a minimum loss of the benefits of independence?* That issue stretches from the newest subdivision dependent on central-station generators all the way to Washington and Moscow where men are trying to learn to get along either without war or without civilization.

The answer, like the issue, also seems to be inescapable: *We can get the maximum benefits from the new technology with a minimum loss of social values only by intelligent public planning.* Yet this answer itself immediately seems to threaten the independence it professes to serve.

The issue has been joined by the defenders of private initiative on the one hand and the proponents of collective controls on the other. Hayek and the embattled defenders of decentralized private planning profess to see dictators and concentration camps around every corner.³ Barbara Wooton and other liberal advocates of collective intelligence, on the other hand, fear no such outcome.⁴ Our Communist friends meanwhile think that private capitalism must inevitably evolve into a Fascist regime, planning the extermination of Communism.

This is not the place to appraise the merits of this debate. The point for us is that more rather than less public planning seems inevitable in the atomic age; so the real question is, For whose benefit shall the planning be done and who shall control the planners?

I-14:6. Problems Recognized as Requiring Some Degree of Planning

By 1942 seven kinds of conditions were generally recognized in the United States as requiring some kind of public planning:

1. Conduct of war and preparations for war.
2. Transition to peace.
3. World organization for control of war.
4. Rehabilitation of veterans.

³ Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944.

⁴ Barbara Wooton, *Freedom Under Planning*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1945.

5. Stabilization of employment.
6. Social welfare.
7. Conservation of natural resources.

In these fields there was no longer any argument about the need for some kind of intelligent collective foresight for agreed-upon ends. The big issue always was, How much planning? Who shall do the planning? And for whose benefit?

By the autumn of 1945 an eighth problem had emerged which overshadowed all the rest:

8. How shall atomic power be controlled, and for what ends?

There could be no answer to this question except in terms of public planning. After wrestling with the matter for the better part of a year, Congress finally set up a civilian commission to control atomic power. The way was open for a planned approach to peacetime uses of nuclear fission.

I-14:7. What Is Social Planning?

Planning of any kind seems to depend on the psychological ability of human beings to hold experience in a time order, to stand in a recognized present and to look before and after. Animals below man lack this capacity.

On the basis of this capacity man relates means to ends through time. The essence of plan is the purposeful, preliminary, symbolical arrangement of natural, cultural, and human factors in a situation to overcome resistances, incidental or intentional, that block the achievement of a predetermined end *in the future*. The old German Imperial Army used to have an exercise that brought out the nature of plan very neatly. Young officers were required to state their business in the following form:

1. What is your mission (i.e., what purpose have you been detailed to accomplish)?
2. What are the obstacles to the accomplishment of your mission?
3. What are your resources for overcoming these obstacles?
4. What is your *plan* for (a) using your resources (b) to overcome the obstacles (c) in order to accomplish your mission?

A plan may be local or world-wide in scope. It may be directed toward any objective that human beings value—religious, economic, social, political, military. It may be all inclusive like Communist planning or partial like your planning for a picnic. It may be public and

centralized as in totalitarian governments or private and decentralized as in laissez-faire America of the early nineteenth century. It may be dictatorial as in Italy and the Third Reich or it may be democratic as in Socialist Britain. There is nothing inherently good or evil in planning any more than there is anything inherently good or evil in machine guns or nuclear fission. Planning is a tool. It is not tools that have moral qualities but the men who use the tools, and the purposes men seek to achieve.

From this point of view planning can be used to destroy democracy or to strengthen and preserve it. After all, intelligence is not inherently evil. It can even be used for purposes of survival.

I-14:8. A Specific Example of Social Planning

The Tennessee Valley Authority is perhaps the best example in the United States of long-range, peacetime social planning. Beginning shortly after World War I, the question of what to do with the nitrogen plant at Muscle Shoals became an issue in Congress. Gradually, under the leadership of the late Senator Norris, sentiment crystallized in favor of expanding federal utilization of the river's energy from the Muscle Shoals installation to include the entire watershed of the Tennessee River. Ultimately this led to the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the inauguration of the most far-reaching piece of social engineering ever attempted in the United States—nothing less than the deliberate lifting of the standard of living of millions of people in five states by the annual production of billions of kilowatt-hours of electrical power, by the control of floods, by the deepening of navigation channels through 652 miles of the main river, by the reduction of erosion and the conservation of soil over millions of acres of farms, and especially by the planned development of the physical, economic, and human resources of an entire region handled as a unit. Nothing like this had ever been seen in the United States before, and the fame of the T.V.A. as a dam builder, power agency, flood controller, conservator of soil resources, developer of recreational facilities, aid to munitions and atomic bomb-makers, and the greatest regional planner in the Western Hemisphere has spread throughout the world. All this has been done not to or for *but with* the people of the valley. The T.V.A. has relocated over 12,000 farm families, moved entire villages, helped whole communities plan a better future, and withal it has demonstrated that social planning can win the enthusiastic support of the people at the muzzle end of it. So the T.V.A.

has set a pattern for social planning for a generation. As the results roll up, one may expect a rising demand for the application of similar social intelligence to the taming of the Missouri, the Ohio, and other wasteful rivers. Eventually man may even get to the point of viewing the world itself as a field for intelligent organization. But the point may not be reached in our present cycle of civilization.

As the T.V.A. demonstrated, and as every social plan implies, social planning necessarily supersedes private planning and therefore threatens the prerogatives of vested interests. Every one of us has a kind of vested interest in the little area of security and social certainty that he has been able to pin down for himself—his job, his family, his home, his neighborhood, the property he has accumulated, the career for which he has prepared. During World War II in no community in the United States did the people go all-out for the war in the sense of totally disregarding these vested interests for the sake of the war. Many were willing to get up at 2 A.M. to distribute coffee and doughnuts to the departing draftees and willing to oversubscribe their bond quotas twice over. But subordinate local real-estate interests to the need of government housing or welcome Negro war workers into a white neighborhood? Never! That kind of thing was "Socialism," or "un-American," or some other type of menace. Nobody from Joe Doakes up regarded his defense of his own vested interests as in any way interfering with the war effort. The war effort was one thing—you transferred to a war job, you bought bonds, you sent your sons to possible death on the battlefield, and that was the War Effort, that was the way we were going to lick hell out of Hitler and Hirohito. Every loyal American had to put his shoulder back of that. No slacking in the War Effort! No, sir!

But government housing for war workers? Hillbillies competing for scarce round steaks in Detroit? Negroes threatening to move next door to whites in Newport News? Brother, that was something else! That wasn't the War Effort. That was a wallop at Joe Doakes where he lived, a lot more real than Hitler and Hirohito.

So hurrah for the flag—and down with these damned Socialists and these foreigners from out of town!

The pattern of defensiveness that the Little Man follows in the face of a threat to his job, his home, his social status is precisely the pattern that the multi-million-dollar corporation follows in the face of a threat to its investments, its property, its future. The only difference is that the corporation, having the social and economic power of tens

of thousands of Little Men, makes a bigger ruckus when it fights back.

And in the face of proposals for various kinds of public planning, particularly new T.V.A.'s, the corporations—particularly the power interests—do fight back. They fight back with carefully planned anti-planning propaganda, with political influence, public relations counsels, advertising campaigns, high-priced lawyers, and all the other weapons of prosperous Virtue in Distress. Public planning, in other words, in so far as it threatens the vested interests of powerful economic interests, tends to become a political football. This means that further extension of public planning, the organization of additional T.V.A.'s and so on, will not be decided purely on the merits. It will be decided partly on the merits but much more on the basis of the relative political strength of the planning and the anti-planning factions. The control of wasteful rivers, like the provision of adequate housing for war plant workers, is essentially a technological matter. But when technology threatens too many or too powerful vested interests the American method of reaching a solution is not to disregard the vested interests and turn the technologists loose. The American method is to settle the matter by a political power-struggle. This does not always provide enough houses or tame enough rivers, but at least it recognizes the right of everyone, big and little, to participate in the making of the future.

I-14:9. The Unexpected Variable

One difficulty involved in all conscious attempts to control future social situations should not be overlooked, namely, the fact that the very attempt at control becomes itself a factor in later situations.

This was illustrated by the Volstead Act prohibiting the sale or interstate transportation of liquor. Instead of reducing the consumption of liquor after the stored stocks had disappeared, the Volstead Act made drinking "smart." The comfortable classes suddenly discovered another way of displaying their economic prowess—by maintaining private bars! Millions of Americans, otherwise law-abiding, set out to nullify this particular law and succeeded so well that the underworld, financed by their lawbreaking millions, flourished as never before. The attempt at control in that case, resisted as it was by so large and important a segment of American society, introduced entirely new complications into the liquor picture, until the nation gave up in disgust and finally repealed the Eighteenth Amendment.

The point is, the prohibition planners had merely overlooked the

Unexpected Variable. Foresight in the face of change is very short.

After World War II one of the big oil companies built a new \$25,000,000 refinery in the Middle West. One of the crucial operations required the lifting of a powdered catalyst hundreds of feet to the top of the huge drip towers. In a scale model compressed air had puffed talcum powder to the top of a toy tower without a hitch. But when the \$25,000,000 plant had been completed and the compressed air was turned on, the terrific blast required blew thousands of dollars' worth of the expensive catalyst straight out the upper works. The Unexpected Variable in that case was the fact that the catalyst refused to behave in the full-scale blast as the talcum powder had in the toy model.

Any social plan is, in a sense, a toy model: a symbolic construction of the situation which the planners hope to achieve. The trouble starts when the toy model gets blown up to life size. You crack down on killers with a capital punishment law—and tender-hearted juries refuse to convict. You plan a child guidance program for a state that has none—and run smack into a veto from organized medical interests that want to handle it in their own way. Following the pattern set by highly respectable manufacturers throttling production in a depression, you slaughter little pigs to reduce supply to force up farm prices to save a hundred thousand farm mortgages—and the world denounces you as an enemy of free enterprise! In each such case the Unexpected Variable wooshes the life-size gimmick to the four winds.

This is why politics is defined as "the art of the possible"—the art of figuring out in advance how far you can go before the Unexpected Variable backfires and blows you out of the driver's seat.

The Proof

OBSERVATIONAL PROJECT NO. 14

To assemble objective evidence of the operation of foresight and planning in human situations

Undertake either or both of the following:

1. Go back five years in the files of *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, or some other dependable source and extract five or more specific instances of *foresight*, i.e., prophecy, forecasting, or "prediction on the part of some scientist, corporation executive, or public official *with reference to some particular problem or condition*. (Preferably U.S.—Soviet relations or conditions in some U.S. industry or region covered by the student's clipping file.) Then move forward and check each par-

ticular example of foresight against actual developments in that field. How accurate was the prophecy, forecast, or "prediction"? What specific variables seem to have determined its accuracy? Discuss.

2. Analyze specific examples of *planning* on the part of individuals, corporation executives, public agencies. What sort of planning is it, i.e., what condition or trend is to be dealt with in the future? What assumptions underlie the plan? What part do science and technology play in it? How would you relate these examples to the general problem of planning as a precondition for a rational society? Discuss.

Suggestions for Further Research

PROJECT A

Make a detailed study of the origin, organization, and operations of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a specific example of organized foresight and planning as applied by a public agency in a particular area. Evaluate criticisms and endorsements. What obstacles did the Authority encounter and how were they overcome? To what extent are vested interests still fighting the Authority and what political pressures affect it?

PROJECT B

Take any one of the eight problems which have been generally recognized in the American culture as requiring some kind of public planning (Section I-14:6) and trace the way in which attempts at planning have actually evolved. What resistances and obstacles have had to be overcome? How is planning actually carried on in this field? Etc.

PROJECT C

Make an analysis of the literature pro and con in the field of economic planning (Hayek, Wooton, etc.). Why is corporate planning, i.e., planning by individual corporations, generally accepted whereas opinions differ so radically about public planning? What assumptions underlie the positions of the advocates and the opponents of public planning? (Include in your reading Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* and Karl R. Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.)

PROJECT D

What private and public agencies are engaged in issuing forecasts concerning the future? In what fields do these operate? On what are the forecasts based? What degree of accuracy has been found relative to each? How long has each been operating? Etc. (This survey could range from the U.S. Weather Bureau to public opinion polls, Babson's Market Letter for Investors, etc., and on to the outfits that issue the "Daily Horoscope" features for daily newspapers.)

Supplementary Readings

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BOOK II

THE SOCIAL WORLD IN TROUBLE:

THE WORLD-IN-BEING RELATED TO

SOCIAL VALUES

Social Problems and Their Solution

PART A. WHAT ARE SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT THEM?

II-1A:1. The Problem-Solving Approach to Life

To describe and analyze human association as something given, as we began to do in Book I, may help us *to see our social world* as an objective reality. But it will hardly help us *to feel* it as the kind of world we live in. The social world we live in is not merely given; it is constantly being made by and for us by the way we perceive it and by the choices we make in dealing with it. It is not merely a world of association forms, categories, and processes; it is a world of esteems, disesteems, preferences, values, choices. Every day and practically from moment to moment we have to express these preferences or values by the choices we make and the attitudes we take. And our preferences and attitudes, in turn, call out preferences and attitudes from others. Thus, our own behavior becomes a factor in making our associational environment in a sense that is not at all true of our relations with our purely physical environment. Whether we like or dislike the way the wind blows or the lightning flashes during a storm has no effect whatever on the elements. But whether we like or dislike individuals of another race will have a great deal to do with the way those individuals behave toward us.

Yet after all, the impact of any one individual on most of the social situations of his life is relatively limited. Each of us is born into a pre-existing society with its preëxisting association forms, categories, and processes and its preëxisting culture of language, customs, institutions, and so on. As children we are not even aware of these things, to say nothing of our ever attempting to change them at that stage. Even as adults we find ourselves caught in all kinds of social conditions that have developed without our consciously desiring them. There are such undesired things as housing shortages, depressions, the President's compliments from local draft boards. A hundred other unwished-for contingencies arise which force us to readjust to our social world.

In primitive life, in the Middle Ages, and in the Orient before the coming of Western ideas the customary response to such contingencies would have been submission, reliance on supernatural aid, passivity. But since the rise of modern Western civilization a different attitude has come to prevail. Modern Western man takes it for granted that man ought to dominate his environment, even his social environment, instead of letting the environment dominate him.

These contingencies that one cannot take in stride, occasions that one cannot any longer handle on the basis of habit and routine, are what we call *problems*. The word *problem* comes from a Greek word, *problema*, which means something "thrown forward," or thrust on attention. And what is thrown forward or thrust on attention in the case of a social problem is the failure of a social situation to meet our preferences or values. *A problem, then, exists whenever we become conscious of a difficulty, a gap between our preferences and reality.* When that consciousness of a difficulty involves enough persons to constitute a challenge to the *status quo*, we speak of a social problem. How many individuals are enough to constitute a challenge depends on many things: who they are, how effectively they can dramatize the issue, and so on. Socrates and Jesus of Nazareth were able to make social problems out of moral issues. Karl Marx, as Laski said, "found Socialism a chaos and left it a movement." Social problems begin with individual perceptions of inadequacies, awarenesses of the gap between preferences and reality, and become social in their significance when this dissatisfaction becomes formidable enough to challenge the continuance of things as they are. We can see how the process works in the emergence during the last fifty years of the problem of mental hygiene.

II-1A:2. How Individual Problems Become Social Problems

Early in this century a young Yale man, Clifford Beers, believing himself doomed by a hereditary ailment, spent some time as a patient in an "insane asylum." Convinced by his experience that there is a vast amount of preventable mental suffering, and that a lot of it need never reach mental hospitals at all, he proceeded after his release to spread his perception of this problem by writing a book, *A Mind That Found Itself*, urging that something be done to prevent mental breakdowns such as his. Many who read the book agreed with him and within a few years thousands of people had enlisted in what is now known as the mental hygiene movement. By means of his book and by his own personal appeals to leaders in all walks of life, Beers succeeded in transforming what had been a purely personal difficulty, his own mental breakdown, into a social problem of collective importance.

This is perhaps a somewhat over-neat example of the way in which individual problems become generalized into collective problems. Often the transformation is not so clearly traceable to one man as it was in this case, but for problems of any complexity some sort of transformation of this kind must take place. Somebody must identify a specific difficulty, show that it is a common difficulty, and point a way out.

When the difficulty lies outside the individual in some inadequacy in the social system, the task of identifying it and prescribing a remedy for it may be much more complex. Scores and even thousands of men may contribute definitions of the difficulty and propose solutions which may range from suggested reforms in individual morality to the revolutionary transformation of the entire social system. No one man, for example, inspired the discontent of midwestern farmers after the War Between the States or called the modern labor movement into being. The agrarian problem and the labor problem were both of gradual growth, and as the decades passed thousands of different men publicized their own definitions of the difficulties and propounded their own particular solutions. As every student of the labor problem knows, trouble between wage workers and employers began in the struggling young nation even before the Constitution was adopted and before there was a single factory in America. Slowly and against all the forces tending to identify wage workers with the middle-class ideal of independence and self-sufficiency, more and more hand workers accepted the idea that they had more to gain by collectively raising

the status of the job than by trying individually to get better jobs. Whether this was right or wrong is beside the present point. The point is, individual difficulties in getting ahead were gradually redefined into a collective problem of raising the status of wage workers collectively. How this came about through agitation for organization, demands for collective bargaining, strikes, and so on, is the subject matter of studies in the history of labor, industrial relations, industrial sociology, and similar more advanced disciplines. For the moment we need merely note that many leaders participated in the process: thousands whose names have been forgotten, to say nothing of outstanding leaders who were conservative union men like Samuel Gompers, Sidney Hillman, John L. Lewis, and Walter Reuther; political radicals like Eugene V. Debs; radical theorists like Karl Marx; practical politicians like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt; and hundreds more. The net result is that where once the very idea of unionism was generally regarded as "un-American," nearly one-third of the nonagricultural workers of the nation now carry union cards.

In the same way the most individualistic and independent American of all, the midwestern farmer, was brought to see his problems in a broader context than his own farm and his own individual struggles with the weather and the chinch bugs. In the 1870's and the 1880's midwestern farmers became increasingly conscious of a common problem: survival in an economy dominated by economic forces manipulated by powerful special interests intent on draining profits to the cities—the railroads, the banks, the credit system, the grain markets, the tariff. Farmer Smith's difficulties in meeting his mortgage payments were at first merely his own private affair. But as Farmer Smith found himself and his troubles duplicated by tens and hundreds of thousands of other farmers, season after season, he learned gradually that there was something behind all this other than "acts of God" and the grasshoppers. Experts from his agricultural college told him about "world market conditions." Editorial writers discoursed on the difficulties of rural credit. Urban conservatives sometimes advised Farmer Smith "to raise more corn and less hell," but the more articulate members of the Grange distilled their own reading and thinking into dour comments on Wall Street and the "Money Power." In Farmer Smith's mind gradually emerged a picture of a vast complex of forces pushing all farmers around. "Acts of God" and the grasshoppers faded into the background and as more incidents in a bigger, life-and-death struggle—the agrarian problem, the shrinking role of the farmer in modern society

which still belittles the share of agriculture in an economy rapidly outgrowing its own food resources. From that sovereign remedy of all agrarian movements, tinkering with the currency, farmers generally moved on from Populism and its startling progeny, Free Coinage of Silver, to demands for federal aid in marketing and even to acceptance of price supports and governmental limitation of acreage to reduce surpluses. In 1954 the Grange, the Farm Bureau, and scores of other agricultural organizations all attested the slowly developed consciousness of millions of farmers that their problem of survival, in a metropolitan, industrial economy which underpaid its food producers in a world so overcrowded and poorly organized that half of its people were still underfed, was no longer an individual problem peculiar to Farmer Smith but had become a nation-wide problem common to all the farmers in the United States. The farmer, like the urban hand laborer, had come to define the problem of raising his standard of living as a common and not merely as an individual problem. Thus, when individual problems become problems to significant numbers of people they cease to be merely individual problems and become social problems.

II-1A:3. The Slow Emergence of Social Problems

Every society encounters problems: vagaries of nature, the impact of other peoples, and so on. The white man's near-extermination of the buffalo in the 1880's, thanks to transcontinental railways and the sport of buffalo-shooting from moving trains, created a terrific problem of survival for the Plains Indians, whose entire culture was built around the buffalo. This was a social problem for the Indians in the sense that it was a problem for all of them, but it was not a problem due primarily to any clash of values within the tribes.

Most social problems in Western civilization, on the other hand, are problems not merely in the sense of being common difficulties but in the sense of being difficulties that have arisen primarily out of conflicts in social values. Mental hygiene, the labor problem, the agrarian problem and scores of others are problems not merely in the sense that any problem is a problem, namely, that reality fails to jibe with man's preferences, but also and more especially in the sense that the reason why reality fails to jibe with man's preferences is that reality expresses one set of preferences while those who feel the problem hold another set. The problem for those who challenge the *status quo* is precisely this: The *status quo* embodies what they regard as outmoded, ineffi-

cient, or otherwise undesirable values. *Modern social problems, then, are mainly problems in conflicts of values.*

The first such problem to attract attention in the Western world seems to have been slavery. As early as the seventeenth century English Quakers took the lead in denouncing it as inconsistent with Christian morality. Prison reform became an issue in England late in the eighteenth century. About 1811 churchmen in America attacked drinking in the home and eventually drove it out—into the saloon. That in turn became the target of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, which started in the Midwest in the 1870's, and eventually of the more efficient Anti-Saloon League, which led the fight for the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act outlawing traffic in liquor.

Almost from the beginning of the factory system in England, wage workers and reformers from other classes began to concern themselves with the abuses and social degradations that grew with the factories. As the system spread, consciousness of problems spread likewise. Thus there has been a labor problem ever since there has been a job-dependent proletariat.

But one must remember that there is usually a long gap between the first recognition of a social problem by a few moralists or social theorists and the awareness of that problem on the part of the population generally. During the interval the outlines of the problem usually sharpen and change definition. Sometimes the conditions which are ultimately recognized as constituting a problem, or at least the environing matrix of a problem, may exist for a long time before they are recognized even by specialists. Economists, for example, discussed the new factory system for several generations before it occurred to them that the coming of the new system had amounted to an "industrial revolution." In the same way, although the ups and downs of business had been marked at intervals for at least three centuries, it was only after 1900 that the concept of the business cycle began to win acceptance.

II-1A:4. The Natural History of a Social Problem

In a brief paper before the war, Fuller and Myers pointed out that social problems typically tend to follow a common pattern of development.¹ First, there is gradually a spreading sense of discontent, dissat-

¹ Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1941, pp. 320-329.

isfaction, unrest. Then come various attempts to improve matters in a kind of blind, aimless way—a period of milling or running around in circles without any clear recognition of what is wrong or what to do about it. Out of this milling process come attempts to define the difficulty and to suggest ways out. Eventually leaders begin to attract followers to particular points of view or particular programs, and a struggle of rival leaders and rival programs may ensue. This is the stage at which social movements emerge. Parenthetically one might observe that social movements are probably indexes of inertia, and of the forces of resistance in the *status quo*. Given little inertia or organized resistance, reforms may be accepted with little or no ganging up, so to speak, of reformers. But the greater the inertia the greater must be the mobilization of dynamic forces to bring about a change.

II-1A:5. Whence Come Our Problems, and Why?

In the last analysis, social problems are due to social changes. Changes create conditions which old adjustment patterns—folkways, mores, institutions, laws—cannot handle to the satisfaction of existing values. Various theories have been advanced to explain the emergence of social problems, theories ranging from overpopulation and war to human depravity and cultural lag. What one must explain here is not the fact of change but why the readjustive processes of a society fail to keep pace with it. This failure Ogburn called *cultural lag*. In a book titled *Social Change* and published in the 1920's, Ogburn challenged sociologists to quit speculating about the long perspectives of social evolution and begin taking note of the actual processes by which things change today. He pointed out that the material culture is tending to change faster than the institutional, or adaptive culture, and he called the resulting discrepancy cultural lag, the lag of the adaptive culture behind the material. Critics at once pointed out that this lag which we see today between the material culture, on the one hand, and the adaptive culture, on the other, is only a special case of disharmonious change. In other countries and in other periods of history the lag has been quite the other way, the material culture lagging behind the adaptive. Such was certainly the condition during the early years of Christianity, during the Protestant Reformation, and during the hundreds of political revolutions from the time of Plato to that of Lenin. Persistent readjustment lag may lead to such an accumulation of social tensions as to produce under certain favorable conditions explosive social upheavals of the most violent character. Nevertheless, it

is probably true that in most societies most of the time adjustment patterns tend to be more static than the non-control traits, material or nonmaterial. To be effective, folkways, mores, institutions, and laws must be generally accepted, and general acceptance implies a relatively slow rate of change.

But the most useful reference of the term *cultural lag* is not to the specific lag between material and nonmaterial culture traits, or to any lag between non-control and control traits, but to any kind of disharmony between the parts of a culture brought about by changes in one part and relative stasis or stagnation in other parts. For us, then, cultural lag is not any specific kind of lag but the *result* (1) of differential rates of change in different parts of the same culture, regardless of what particular parts, and (2) of the failure of readjustment to keep pace with the changes (readjustment lag).

For a general explanation of social problems in the United States, therefore, we need to know (1) what forces have produced the outstanding changes in our social system since colonial days and (2) what general factors have retarded readjustments.

II-1A:6. What Forces Have Changed America?

To answer that question in detail would require another book, or a library of books. But everyone knows the elements of an answer: (1) science; (2) the industrial revolution; (3) the attainment of national independence and the consequent struggles to extend it, maintain it, and meet the challenges of a changing pattern of world power; (4) nationalism; (5) the spread of democracy; and (6) the conflicts implicit in the evolution of capitalism at home and abroad.

1. Science has transformed man's view of the world and of his own destiny, has given him increasing control over that world, and now has equipped him with atomic and thermonuclear power sufficient to destroy civilization unless he can learn in a few years to control the international conflicts that have decided world dominance down to the present time.

2. The industrial revolution has brought tens of millions together into cities, has raised millions to a decent level of living, and for the first time in human history has brought within the range of possibility the actual abolition of poverty—if man will now adjust his breeding to his resources!

3. National independence gave the American people a chance to acquire and develop a continent. Subsequent wars have unified them

and given them ultimately a decisive voice in the future of civilization.

4. But nationalism, meanwhile, spreading out of Europe, has enlarged the tribe to span continents and has divided mankind into a congeries of in-groups and out-groups, just as science and the industrial revolution have been opening the way by steamship, railroad, airplane, the telegraph, radio, and television for the possible organization of world-wide coöperation.

5. Meanwhile, the spread of democracy has given hundreds of millions some voice in the conduct of their own affairs but has also aroused the bitter hostility of vested interests in all countries. Everywhere the ultimate answer-back of privilege to the spread of democracy has been Fascism—actual Fascism under Mussolini, Hitler, Salazar, Franco, Peron; or crypto-Fascism such as the Ku Klux Klan and the various “shirt” movements in the United States. Another aspect of this struggle of democracy vs. privilege has been the increasing challenge of colored races to white dominance. This has become a vital issue from Washington to Johannesburg and all the way to the Far East.

6. Conflicts implicit in the evolution of capitalism have broken out in the labor movement, capitalist imperialism, world radicalism (Anarchism to Communism) and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The Bolsheviks in turn and their successors, the Russian Communist party, are now using the Russian Soviet government and their ideological weapon, Communism, to carry on a world-wide struggle with the peoples of the West for the ultimate control of the world.

So much, as a thumbnail notation of some of the major forces that have transformed America since 1750.

Now why have individual, collective, and institutional readjustments tended to lag behind the changes introduced by these forces? The lag is attested by the fact that social problems exist. Why the lag?

II-1A:7. What Blocks Readjustment?

There are three places in our analysis of social situations and social problems at which we shall find it necessary to consider the various kinds of resistances that tend to block the readjustive efforts of a society. One is right here where we are trying to get an overview of social problems in general. Another naturally occurs when we take social problem-solving as an object of observation and analysis and find resistances not only contributing to problems themselves but also hampering attempts at their solution. This becomes pertinent in Book I,

Chapter 13. And finally, when we face up to the ultimate consequences of extreme resistance, namely, revolution, as we do in Book II, Chapter 13, we shall find ourselves dealing once more with the same phenomena.

At this point, merely to aid us in developing an idea of the nature of social problems in general, we need only point to the constant presence of resistance to readjustment in a society and note that there seem to be at least four kinds or sources of it: (1) psychological resistances; (2) economic and political resistances; (3) institutional-organizational resistances; (4) functional resistances.

Psychological resistances consist of habits of routine and comfortable myths and stereotypes which people cling to because they are familiar and comfortable. Economic and political resistances are the resistances of those in privileged positions who oppose any threat to their privileges or power. Institutional-organizational resistances are the resistances which organizational functionaries tend to offer to attempts to change their organization—the inertia, in short, of an organization's own routine. Functional resistances are resistances due not so much to psychological, politico-economic, or organizational inertia as to (a) the physical persistence of outmoded traits such as 90 degree turns in an automobile age, (b) the indirectness of impact of many kinds of changes, those affected (like southern field hands displaced by the mechanical cotton picker) not being in a position to control the readjustive machinery of the society, and (c) systemic consistency, the tendency of the parts of any associational and cultural system to hang together as a system and to exclude traits antithetical to the principle of the system as such. Illiteracy, for example, does not "fit into" a school system nor atheism into a church.

How these resistances—psychological, politico-economic, organizational, and functional—actually affect the processes of readjustment we examine in the analysis of readjustive processes themselves in Chapter 13 of Books I and II. At this point it is enough to know that social problems emerge because at a given time a significant number of people come to a common realization that conditions in the physical or social world imperil important values. Attempts to change those conditions or to solve the problems are frequently slowed down or blocked altogether by various kinds of resistances. How readjustment actually goes on, how men meet problem situations, we shall examine in later chapters.

II-1A:8. Science and Social Problems

If, as we have said, science is an attitude, a point of view, a method of finding out, and a systematic body of verified knowledge, it is obvious that science can have a number of different relationships to social problems. In the first place, one can adopt the scientific attitude in approaching a social problem or social problems in general. This means that one approaches the problem with scientific objectivity and seeks to understand it rather than to solve it. A second kind of relationship appears when one uses existing scientific principles and facts in trying to solve the problem. Approaching the problem of crime, for example, one might make use of the findings of modern sociology, medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. The application of scientific *methods* to social problem-solving rather than mere accumulated facts and principles would represent still a third kind of relationship of science to social problems. In attacking the crime problem, for example, instead of merely reorienting current correctional programs in the light of existing scientific knowledge in sociology, medicine, psychology, and psychiatry, one might conceivably apply the scientific methods of the various behavior sciences to the study of individual offenders, to the study of police practices and court procedures, to the study of correctional programs, and to the study of personality and situational causal factors. Scientific methods might be used to increase understanding of the problem all along the line and to guide in the development of more scientific techniques of treatment and prevention.

Actually for this problem as for most others none of the three indicated possible relationships is much in evidence. Most people, in fact, show little scientific detachment in approaching any social problem; the findings of the behavior sciences are little used in our problem-solving attempts, which are nearly always based on tradition rather than science; and scientific methods of understanding and of improving techniques of problem-solving are very spottily applied and vary widely in adequacy when they are applied. The curious fact emerges that scientists themselves, even social scientists, have developed no really scientific theory of social problem-solving. For the most part they have been content to go along with only slightly more sophisticated versions of three more or less common-sense methods of problem-solving: (1) by converting opponents, (2) by dominating them,

or (3) by introducing some kind of rational solution by political or other means. What kind of problem gets solved by what means under what specific conditions can be answered in terms of examples and case studies, but not in terms of any comprehensive analytical survey of the total spectacle of social problem-solving in any modern society. Yet from individual families to the federal government, groups, organizations, publics, social movements, and social systems are all in a constant dither of problem-solving.

Some of the problems are peculiar to particular association units or local situations; others are of general concern and grave importance. Where do the solutions come from? When do they aim at behavior directly, when at the causes behind behavior?

The changing status of women, for example, is something of a social problem and has been for at least two generations. Is this being "solved" in any different way from the way the problem of controlling depressions is being solved? In what different way and why different? There are various arts of social problem-solving but no scientific analysis of what conditions determine which art is used when, where, and why, and with what results.

The control of the great killer diseases such as tuberculosis, cancer, and heart disease is a social problem as well as a medical one. So is the control of mental disease. Yet it is obvious that such progress as we have made in "solving" such social problems has required a great deal more than mere medical discoveries. The scientific discoveries have been the necessary conditions for improvements in control but they have not been the sufficient conditions. The discoveries have had to be applied through skilled treatment (technology), people have had to be educated up to seeking the treatment in time—a matter of social action—and facilities have had to be provided to make the treatment available. Special agencies have had to be set up—sanitariums, hospitals, clinics, diagnostic programs, and the like; in other words, social organizations have had to be formed to provide the treatment. The tuberculosis death rate has been cut in a little over 100 years from 400 per 100,000 Americans in 1840 to 22.5 in 1950. What did that was not scientific discovery alone, not by a jugful, but science *plus* technology *plus* social action *plus* social organization. The very same mobilization of science, medical technology, social action, and social organization is now being zeroed in on cancer, heart disease, and mental ills. It is the type pattern for the solution of any social problem when people agree (1) that there is a specific problem, (2) that scientific methods

are likely to be more effective than traditional, rule-of-thumb methods, and (3) that a solution is worth seeking by coöperative, organized effort. Note, however, that such a pattern can be applied only when there is widespread agreement on those three points: the existence of a specific problem, the usefulness of scientific methods, and the necessity of coöperative, organized effort. Without that widespread agreement, no dice.

Why isn't that pattern, which has been so signally successful in reducing the incidence of tuberculosis and promises to be equally successful against other diseases, applied to other social problems? We have no scientific answer. Nobody has determined the precise conditions sufficient for bringing that method of social problem-solving into action. Widespread agreement is only a necessary condition. It is not a sufficient condition. Something more is needed, but we do not know in any scientifically precise way what more is needed.

Meanwhile, aside from health problems, most of the problems with which Americans concern themselves—crime, delinquency, divorce, threats to free speech and academic freedom, social change, and so on—they are still attacking with traditional, nonscientific methods. If science is used, it is nearly always a physical science, as in the attack on the automobile accident rate through better engineering of highways. Comparatively little use is being made of the behavior sciences. Most people still support prescientific laws and correctional practices, for example, without showing any awareness whatever that the problem of *changing* individual behavior is a problem for the behavior sciences, not for traditional rule-of-thumb methods. The applicability of the behavior sciences to social problems is only dimly grasped by the average American.

Science cannot determine the ends or the values to be sought in the solution of a problem, but once ends and values have been agreed upon, science and scientific methods offer the most effective means for advancing toward those ends and realizing those values that man has yet developed. Always and everywhere scientific methods tend to increase man's *power* to achieve his purposes. *What* those purposes are to be is, of course, not a scientific question at all but a question of *values*.

PART B. SOCIAL VALUES AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

II-1B:1. What Are Values?

In an individual, values are both the results of previous selective behavior (choices) and the grounds, or conative conditions, of present or future selective behavior. *In a culture, common values are culture traits.* As such they constitute a kind of selective atmosphere in which the individual lives and which he tends to absorb as effortlessly as the air he breathes.

Selective behavior is a precondition of biological survival. One cannot possibly react to everything at once, and everything at once is not of equal importance to us anyway at any given moment. To a hunter, face to face with a bear ten feet away, that particular bear is of vastly more immediate importance than is the bear's mate a mile away across a river. To save his life the hunter must react to his immediate bear, not to the mate a mile away. Attention and discrimination are the psychological mechanisms which are necessary for him to do this. He must focus perception on this bear and distinguish it from the rest of the scenery. But these necessary preliminaries alone are not sufficient to insure his survival. Not only must he perceive the bear and distinguish it from all other objects, but he must *want* to do something about it—some *one* thing rather than some other thing. He must make a choice: do nothing, fight, or run. He must throw himself into one course of action (or inaction) rather than another. He must select one from many possible alternatives.

This actual choosing of one alternative rather than some other is always a function, a product, of an individual's esteems and disesteems, his *values*. As Urban points out, these esteems and disesteems are felt rather than perceived or thought about.

"Existence is perceived; truth is thought; value is felt."²

² Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, being a General Introduction to the General Theory of Value*, London, Swan Sonnenschein and Company, Ltd., 1909 (later published by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.), p. 22. In such an attempt as ours to simplify the problem of valuation for practical purposes, it is unnecessary to examine the relationships of value judgments to existential judgments, judgments of truth, or to various psychological components of the evaluating personality.

An interesting symposium on "Values and the Social Scientist" can be found in the

And since all conscious behavior constantly expresses or implies esteems and disesteems, choices and preferences, all conscious behavior constantly expresses or implies values. Hence, each individual not only constantly expresses or implies values in his every conscious act but is constantly reacting to a continuous stream of acts by other persons, each one of which in turn expresses or implies specific values.

We live, therefore, in a behavioristic medium, toned, colored, and in some sense structured by the values of those about us. This behavioristic medium is an objective fact: It existed before we came into it; it functions outside of us, largely independent of us although affected to some extent by our own behavior and values; and it goes on after we depart. It is *there*, like the physical atmosphere, and we have to come to terms with it, whether we like it or not. It consists (1) of the associational processes in which we participate and (2) of preëxistent cultural elements or traits expressed in and through the associational processes. Values are thus not merely kinetic factors in association, the choices and preferences of others constantly forcing us to make choices and express preferences of our own; values are also in a sense cultural constants with which we must come to terms.

Consider, for example, some of the cultural value constants in any ordinary American community. They include such *valuables*, i.e., objects of values, as private property, private enterprise, monogamy, theism, patriotism, i.e., identification with the symbols of national unity and power, and economic and sexual morality. These are valuables in the ordinary community because they are valued, esteemed, highly regarded. The community value scheme imposes various kinds of social pressures to enforce outward conformity to the patterns of behavior consistent with the values underlying these objective valuables. The individual is expected to respect private property, approve private enterprise, uphold monogamy (at least in public), respect the symbols of religious faith, demonstrate loyalty to the United States, pay his debts, and maintain sexual decency. If he fails to conform to any of these value expectations, he finds himself the object of a whole battery of social sanctions ranging from criticism by his friends to actual physical coercion by officers of the law.

If one doubts that values are culture traits as well as kinetic factors in actual associational experiences, he need only become a noncon-

former in any one of the value areas mentioned to discover how real and how solid are the value expectations of any community.

After all, in any culture the mechanisms of social control from public criticism to the death penalty exist primarily to uphold, defend, and enforce the basic values of the culture. Challenge any one of those basic values seriously enough in a Stone Age tribe, Soviet Russia, or the United States and the result will be substantially the same: the machinery of social conformity will begin to function. Actually, it is always functioning from the jungle to Kankakee. We live in an inescapable cultural atmosphere of values pressed in upon us by every person we meet, every newspaper we read, every broadcast we hear, every television program, and every book. If criticism is ever tolerated, it is only in the name of another cultural value, the value of truth.

As we have already noted, everything we do either implies or expresses values. Thus, your very existence implies certain values on the part of your parents, and your continued existence expresses the value which you yourself place on life as against death. In this case, both life and death are the objects of values: life the object of esteem or desire; death the object of disesteem or aversion. In other words, as the objects of values, both life and death are *valuable*s.

The object of any value we have called a valuable regardless of whether it is esteemed or disesteemed. When it is esteemed we may call it a plus-valuable; when disesteemed, a minus-valuable. But it is a valuable in either case: an object of evaluation.

Evaluation is the term applied to the psychological process by which one weighs or compares valuable

s. When one buys a new pair of shoes or shops for an automobile the process is familiar enough. But essentially the same process operates whenever we are faced with the necessity of choosing among two or more valuables: two or more objects, objectives, or courses of action. Facing any forked-road situation, in so far as one does not react automatically on the basis of habit, he has to make a choice: evaluate one course of action as against the other.

As Freud and the genetic psychologists have long since made clear, infants come into the world as little bundles of impulses centered on the gratification of their own bodily needs. Only gradually do these impulses become organized into other-regarding sentiments and motives: ultimately, socialized personalities. By the time individuals attain adulthood most of the values which their behavior now expresses have been internalized from the values prevalent in their culture. Exposed to the values of respectability, conformity, self-sacrifice, patriot-

ism, and the like, they volunteer to defend their country or submit to military training in full awareness that such action may possibly cost them their lives. Life itself, in other words, than which no other valuable would seem more individual or ultimate, becomes subordinated to other values imposed upon the individual by his culture. Thus, no individual creates his own scheme of values *de novo*. Willy-nilly, thanks to primary and other forms of association, he builds into himself, as it were, the pattern of values which he finds most useful in the culture and subcultures to which he is exposed.³

II-1B:2. The Problem of Value Conflicts

But to recognize that the individual's value system is a product of his associational experiences and his culture is only the beginning of wisdom. Any complex culture in the West offers many different value systems.

It is a peculiarity of civilization, and particularly of our own civilization, that it does not expose individuals merely to one consistent pattern of values but to innumerable conflicting patterns. As an outgrowth of the Middle Ages and as an amalgam of elements from many other cultures, Western civilization confronts the individual with a confusing hodge-podge of value schemes. Short of outright cannibalism, almost anything one can name is esteemed by somebody, disesteemed by somebody else. The value of Life Hereafter competes with materialism and worldly success. Neopaganism denies the virtues of Christian self-denial. Pacifists challenge patriots. Vegetarians denounce meat eaters. Communists would abolish private property—and civil and political liberty. Authoritarians deny the virtues of democracy. Nudists shock surviving Victorians. Monogamy tolerates prostitution. Atheists deny the existence of God. The list of value conflicts in the American culture could be extended for pages. Competition is one of the shibboleths of private enterprise—but successful enterprisers devote their best efforts to eliminating it with monopolies and so-called fair trade acts. Equality of opportunity is one of the basic ideals (values) of the American Creed⁴—excluding Negroes and the

³ Thus, if we find criminals with value systems differing from those of so called honest citizens, we may be sure it is because whatever antisocial impulses they may have had as children—and all of us develop such impulses at some stage—were encouraged and reinforced by contacts with antisocial values expressed by others: examples of criminal behavior, news of crime, approvals of criminal acts, and so on; a volume of antisocial stimuli that now in many places amounts to a kind of criminal subculture, the culture of the underworld.

⁴ For a definition of the American Creed see below, Section II-1B:6.

children of the poor, of course! We spend hundreds of millions to fight crime—and tolerate the tie-up of politicians with the underworld. We profess to value premarital chastity—while the percentage of virgins at marriage sinks steadily toward zero.⁵

In short, we live in a turmoil of value conflicts, made all the worse by the most basic value conflict of all: the dispute over the nature of moral values themselves. Are moral values unchangeable, given once for all, or are they merely the accidents, as it were, of a particular culture at a particular time? Moral absolutists insist they are immutable; that murder, for example, is murder always and everywhere. But the moral relativists reply that there are no moral absolutes: moral values like other values merely express the dominant preferences of a culture. Among certain Eskimos, for example, it is a moral duty to kill one's grandparents when they can no longer contribute to their own support. The functional value of moral codes appears here, since these tribes live on such a narrow margin of subsistence that to continue to support nonproducers would condemn all to slow starvation. As Sumner said, "The mores can make anything right": infanticide, wife-lending, cannibalism, anything. So this dispute like the others adds to the general confusion.

Where do we go from here? In all this welter of conflicting values, opposing value systems, contradictory theories about the nature of moral values themselves, where can the thoughtful individual find firm standing ground? The individual's value system is a product of his own selectivity, and of his associational contacts and his culture. But how does one evaluate a culture? And how does one evaluate evaluations?

II-1B:3. How Evaluate a Culture?

The study of values as such is the business of ethics, a discipline that dates back to Aristotle, a Greek philosopher of the fourth century before Christ. For centuries the basic problem of ethics has been to determine what is the basic human value, the highest good. Most philosophers have agreed that the highest good is human happiness, but there the agreement ends. Hedonists say happiness is pleasure. Rigorists identify it with virtue; hence, unhappiness is vice—or vice versa. Self-realizationists, on the other hand, insist that happiness consists in the normal exercise of man's faculties. But what is normal? And what faculties are to be exercised? The very term *faculties* smacks of an out-of-date psychology.

⁵ See Dr. Alfred Kinsey and associates, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1953.

Actually, of course, all these issues were brought up long before the birth of modern psychology, anthropology, or sociology. Old-time philosophers knew nothing of the emotional dynamics of personality or of the existence of culture. Some of them, like the Roman poet Lucretius, may have caught glimmerings of the idea of evolution, but none of them could know that in evolutionary terms the viscera are millions of years older than the cerebral cortex and that "the mores can make anything right."

Modern research has demonstrated that whatever may be the ultimate good, or basic human value, it is never achieved by human beings in isolation. The good life is always a social product. So we come back to the question, How evaluate a culture or a social system?

Years ago the British mathematical philosopher, Bertrand Russell, in a book authored jointly with his wife, Dora, suggested five possible criteria for evaluating a social system:⁶

1. *Habit and traditional prejudice.* On this basis people like a social system merely because they have grown used to it and they get along somehow. This must have been the basis on which most Europeans accepted their societies of the Middle Ages, and it is probably the basis of acceptance of all static societies.
2. *Belief that the social system provides, or will provide, a desirable career for the kind of person that the individual thinks he is.* The Russells note that Napoleon, for example, would hardly have welcomed a world organized for peace and that captains of industry would have no use for one in which machines, as in Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*, were illegal.
3. *Agreeableness of the activities involved in creating it.* Critics of the present social system frequently find pleasure in imagining their own roles in making it over. Whether they realize it or not, Fascists and Communists in the "decadent" Western world view their proposed Utopias through a haze of self-projection: what fun it would be constructing the new order!
4. *Aesthetic sensibility.* There is much about the present social system in the United States that is haphazard, disorderly, ugly. It is easily possible to imagine another system which would be much more harmonious and symmetrical—a system without smelly poor people and slums, without the ugliness of factory towns and false-front real-estate developments; a system of beauty and peace. The only

⁶ Bertrand and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, New York, The Century Company, 1923.

trouble is that human beings up to now can't be made to fit into any such pleasant scheme without radical disregard of their rights as individuals. As the Russells remark, philosophers and other well-wishers often find it difficult to think of a social system in terms not of harmonious ideas but of actual human beings. Unless they are forced into some kind of Procrustean bed, human beings come off the assembly line quite unready to fit into any one beautiful, harmonious design.

5. Finally, *the present well-being of those who compose the social order and its capacity for developing into something better*. This criterion, however, brings us face to face with what the Russells call the "aristocratic fallacy" in societal evaluation, the fallacy of judging a social system in terms of the kind of life that it provides for the privileged classes regardless of the misery and frustrations of all the rest.

No society ever developed a more brilliant life for the privileged classes than did ancient Athens between Marathon and the death of Plato. But ancient Athens like the other cities of the ancient Mediterranean civilization consisted of a minority of free citizens and a mass of poor artisans, traders, and slaves. Every other social system that has ever existed has shown the same cleavage: a privileged minority and an underprivileged, or actually enslaved, majority. Hence, to judge a social system merely by the kind of life its privileged classes enjoy regardless of the condition of its underprivileged masses is surely not to judge a social system at all but only a part of it. The question is not what kind of life the privileged classes live, or even what contributions they have made to other societies. The real question is, What is the norm of human happiness in the total society? What percentage of the population lives how long? What percentage enjoys a decent level of living, participation in the best the culture has to offer? What percentage has a realistic chance to reach full personal development? This is the kind of inquiry that is important, not what privileges the privileged have hogged for themselves.

Judged on this basis, the American social system at mid-twentieth century, despite its problems and its obvious shortcomings in terms of its own social ideals, could stand comparison with any other social system the world had ever seen. And as for its potential for evolving into something better, i.e., closer to its own values, no other in the world seemed to have a more hopeful chance.

But when we attempt to evaluate a social system in terms suggested by the Russells, we are obviously taking for granted a social value more basic than any yet mentioned: the value of the human being himself, the value of the human personality. It is the argument of Part B of this chapter, and indeed of this whole book on social problems, that *viewed empirically man's ultimate value in this world is nothing other than the value of the human personality itself.*

II-1B:4. The Nature and Importance of Personality

By personality we mean the totality of the characteristics of a human being. This includes all those characteristics by which and through which an individual relates himself to others and is related to others, as well as those characteristics which are peculiarly organic in source and function. Thus, an individual's conception of himself, which is a function of his social experiences and social relationships, is as much a part of an individual's personality as is the color of his eyes. Personality, then, is an individual in his organic, associational, and cultural totality: *the product* of all the associational and cultural impacts upon and in (interaction) with the structural and behavioral potentialities of a particular human organism during a given period of time in a particular social system *functioning as a person*⁷ in a particular social context.

What is the importance of this socio-organic totality in our present discussion of basic human values?

The answer is fivefold:

1. Personalities have been and are the only sources of human values of which we have any *empirical* knowledge.
2. Personalities are the functional agents in and through which values find expression in this world.
3. Since personalities are the only empirical sources and the functional agents of all values, personality as such may be posited as the necessary precondition of all human values.
4. A necessary precondition of all values must obviously be more basic, more indispensable, and hence more valuable than any specific value that depends upon it.
5. Hence, personality becomes the ultimate human value, the one value to which all other values are subordinate. Objectively, person-

⁷ A person is more than a mere human individual. A person is a human individual as related to others by (1) his conception of himself, (2) his group relationships, and (3) the specific repertoire of roles which he is called upon to play.

ality, then, becomes the most valuable human valuable; the ultimate plus-valuable.

Only the first and the last of these propositions need further comment at this point: the first because it may be misunderstood as having religious implications; the last because it very definitely does have far-reaching social implications.

When we say that personalities have been and are the only sources of human values of which we have any empirical knowledge, we mean merely that. We do not mean to imply either (1) that empirical knowledge is the only kind of knowledge; or (2) that there cannot possibly be any ultimate sources of human values above and beyond empirical verification. In the present state of human ignorance concerning the ultimate nature of the universe, it would be charlatanism of the worst sort to pretend to *know* what limits there may be to human knowledge or what ultimate sources there may be of human values. All we can say, and all we have intended to say in that first proposition, is that within the limits of human empirical knowledge all our values have had their *observable* sources in personalities: in the personalities of seers, prophets, religious leaders. That is simply a matter of historical fact, and we leave it at that.

As for the last proposition, personality posited as the ultimate, most basic of all human values because all others issue from it, and therefore objectively (i.e., outside the person) the most valuable human valuable, the social implications are tremendous. If this proposition is accepted—and not to accept it one must refute one or all of the four propositions on which it is based—if one accepts this proposition, then all other values (and valuables) must be judged in the light of their bearing on personality. Does the state enhance the value of personality or belittle it? This is essentially the test that the Russells propose for evaluating any social system: Does it make for human well-being or human illth? Not the well-being of some, a few, the privileged, but the well-being of all? What more basic test can be suggested? Survival of the state? But survival to what end? To regiment and exploit the masses or to enhance their well-being and happiness? Communism, Christianity, democracy, free enterprise—any cause or doctrine one cares to deify? Did not some personality propound or sanctify it? Are not the protagonists of any cause or doctrine who call upon others to sacrifice themselves to what they call its needs—are they not themselves personalities, and in calling for the sacrifice of others are they not repudiating the very principle of the sanctity of the

individual with which they surround themselves? Privileged persons and privileged classes have violated the logic of their own existence for centuries. They have done it by rationalizing individual or class *differences* and ignoring the *utter likeness* of all personalities in *basic needs*.⁸

Once one has accepted (1) the priority of personality as such in the human scale of values and (2) the likeness of all persons in their basic needs, it is then quite impossible to claim superiority over others except on two grounds: importance of special function or distinctive achievement. And the validity of each of these, in turn, depends on the ethical validity of the social system which they supposedly serve. Special function for what? Distinctive achievement to what end? Gone is any possibility of appeal to any other value supposedly superior to the value of personality itself. The state, one's social class, race, wealth, power—all are values dependent on personality; dependent on discovery, expression, and recognition *by persons*.

Whoever denies the ultimate value of personality, the individual person, demonstrates by his denial the ultimacy of what he denies. For if personality is not the ultimate value, the ultimate valuable in this world, what is? All other values are produced and expressed by persons. Whatever more "ultimate" criterion we suggest turns out always to have had its source in personality and to have its rationalizations in the claims, hopes, fears of *persons*. It is human beings, persons, like Mussolini, Lenin, or Stalin who declare the state to be supreme. It is human beings who fall on their faces before the golden calf. It is human beings who have made of racial categories "man's most dangerous myth." It is human beings, human personalities, who set up all kinds of values and valuables as superior to themselves, but in the very act they demonstrate the ultimate value of what they deny.

One looks in vain to find any ultimate source of human values *in this world* other than human personality. If that is true and if all personalities are alike in their basic needs, how can anyone or any class claim primacy over others except on the basis of some other personality-generated value? And if personality itself generates those values by which the privileged claim primacy over others, how can they pos-

⁸ Here may be an acid test of ethical orientation. What impresses you most when you meet a stranger, the characteristics by which he *differs* from you or those in which he is *like* you? You must take account of both, but which ones dominate your reactions? One interesting hypothesis suggests that conservatives tend to react primarily to differences, liberals to likenesses. That may be an oversimplification, but it would seem worth testing

but never in the history of the world had men *without the control of capital* ever before enjoyed even a fraction of such economic freedom and never anywhere before had they enjoyed it in a social atmosphere of civil and political liberty such as they found in Britain and America. This was a real and tangible gain in the social dignity of man.

Yet unfortunately, man did not yet know how to make this gain secure. At mid-twentieth century it still lay under two major perils: recurrent depressions and another world war.

War itself in a world of sovereign nation-states remained the crowning example of the contradictions implicit in the modern world order. Most of the Western nations at least professed to be struggling to improve the well-being of their people, i.e., to set high store on the value of the individual. Yet every one of them owed its very existence to past repudiations of the Kantian principle in wartime, and the survival of our whole civilization in any future showdown with Russia would obviously depend on a wholesale repudiation of that same principle. The tragic antinomy of world politics remained: If freedom and the principle of government for the well-being of the individual were to survive in the modern world, millions of free men would obviously have to forego freedom and subordinate themselves to the state to preserve freedom and the principle of nonsubordination! The tragedy of this paradox was in no way lessened by the grim fact that it had always confronted political man from Marathon to Korea. On the morrow of the Korean truce it confronted him still. And if in some distant future a world organized for peace should have to call on him to participate in some "police action" to preserve world peace, it would confront him again.

In short, *so long as social organization of any kind exists, so long will some men have to subordinate themselves on occasion to preserve that organization.* What this means is what Kant so clearly saw: No principle of practical action can be carried through 100 percent of the time by all men in all situations without colliding at some time with some other principle of action which contradicts it. No ethical principle whatever, even the basic principle of the unique and ultimate value of the individual, can ever be acted upon with complete fidelity by 100 percent of any given population 100 percent of the time. Always and everywhere there must be left some room for compromise, for adjustment of rival claims, for subordination of mere verbal logic to the conflicting logics of the real world.

Thus, it becomes clear that the task of political man is not to make

the world over in the image of some logician's perfect scheme but to make all logical schemes fit reality.¹⁰ To what end? *To the ultimate end of building a social system flexible enough to move in the general direction of expressing and serving, for more and more people more and more of the time, man's highest and most ultimate value in this world, the value of personality itself.*

Such is the ethical standard of evaluation with which we approach the analysis of social problems in the United States. We have reached it without an appeal to any source of information beyond man's empirical verification. Whether such a source exists; whether, if it does exist, it is accessible to man; and whether, if it is accessible, dependable access has already been gained—as all great religious traditions claim—all these questions we regard as irrelevant to the establishment of a purely rational-empirical basis of a scientific ethics.

This does not mean that the prevalence of religious *belief* in the unique value of the individual personality is not of incalculable social importance as a sanction of such a value. Although habits rather than beliefs immediately control most behavior, beliefs play an important part in shaping many habits. Hence, if there is, as some claim, evidence of a decline in the vitality of religious belief about the value of the individual personality in America, that in itself would have to be classed as a social problem of the first order.¹¹

But to recognize religious belief as a kind of moral policemen with reference to the value of personality does not at all require one to accept the policeman's own version of the source or nature of the law (or value) which he upholds. His version *may* be right, and without him respect for the law itself (or value) *may* disappear (as one sees in antireligious Russia). But that is not the present point. The point is, whether or not there is any supernatural sanction at all for the value of personality, that value can be established as primary in the human

¹⁰ For a glimpse of the psychologically crushing effect of imposing a purely logical scheme of life on subject populations see Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953, which describes the numbing pressure of dialectical materialism on the Baltic peoples subject to Soviet Russia at mid-century. And for a picture of the social consequences of really efficient totalitarianism also see George Orwell's 1984.

¹¹ Church membership was never so prevalent in the United States per 100,000 population as after World War II. But whether this meant an increased belief in the ethical meaning of Christianity—the unique value of the individual—or rather a groping for supernatural protection against an increasingly threatening world of A-bombs and Communists, none could say with authority. Certainly neopaganism, concerned only with pleasures here and now and the worship of power, seemed more prevalent than in former times even of relatively low church membership.

value scale without any appeal to supernatural sources. Hence, by the principle of scientific parsimony, it is unnecessary to seek any value-source beyond the reach of rational-empirical methods. Personality demands respect in its own right as the empirical source and agent of all our other values, regardless of whatever super-empirical origin or destiny may be claimed for it.

With this as the ultimate basis of our value judgments, then, a final question emerges before we begin the analysis of specific problems: What values are in conflict, or at stake, in American social problems?

II-1B:6. The Values at Stake in Social Problems

We have already noted the multitude of value conflicts in American culture (Section II-1 B:2 above). Fundamentally, most of these can be shown in the last analysis to be conflicts between principles, practices, or doctrines which implicitly or explicitly assert the primacy of personality, on the one hand, and principles, practices, or doctrines which implicitly or explicitly deny that primacy, on the other.

The number and the intensity of the value conflicts in our society have led some critics to contend that Americans really have no basic values at all in common. This is an easy, superficial conclusion. But the facts contradict it. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist who published during the 1940's the most thoroughgoing study of the problem of Negro-white relations in the United States that has yet appeared, faced this question at the start of his investigations and concluded that citizens of the United States do have a common core of basic values. He called this common core the American Creed. What is this basic core, this American Creed, as Myrdal defined it?

It is difficult to avoid the judgment that this "American Creed" is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation. . . . These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice and a fair opportunity represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's early struggle for independence. . . . The ideals of the American Creed have thus become the highest law of the land. The Supreme Court pays its reverence to these general principles when it declares what is constitutional and what is not. . . . In all wars . . . the American Creed has been the ideological foundation of national morale.¹²

¹² Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944, pp. 3-25.

Rooted in Christianity, the principles of English law, and the philosophy of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, the American Creed forms, as Myrdal said, the core value system by which Americans evaluate their social system.

By and large, then, Americans expect their institutions to enhance the value of personality: to make life more worth living for ordinary, individual, common people. In so far as their institutions do this, no problems. In so far as they fail to do it, problems aplenty.

Why do institutions fail to meet such demands?

The answers will vary as the conditions affecting institutions, and as institutions themselves, vary. We have already, in Book II, Part A of this chapter, noted the various kinds of resistances to institutional readjustment which appear in our social system—psychological, economic, political, organizational, and functional resistances. As we take up specific social problems we shall try to show how these actually operate in the service of conflicting values; how the problem, in other words, has emerged because of various kinds of conflicts and resistances.

Throughout our analysis, we shall rely heavily on six kinds of concepts: (1) *conditions precedent*—the historical background of the problem; (2) *social changes*—what it is that has upset the old *status quo*; (3) the personality and institutional *values* now at stake; (4) *Readjustments* under way or proposed; (5) *resistances* to readjustment; (6) concepts of present *trends* and *future possibilities*: perspectives and estimates.

With this brief introduction to the great problem of social values and their role in social problems, we go on now to examine some of the major problems that are bedeviling American society, a Social World in Trouble.

Problems of Adjustment

II-2:1. What Are Problems of Adjustment?

First, let us begin by asking what we mean by the term *adjustment*. Webster's dictionary distinguishes adjustment as a process from adjustment as a state, or condition. As a process, it is the "establishing of a satisfactory relationship, as representing harmony, conformance, adaptation, or the like; the bringing of a thing or things into proper or exact position or condition." As a state or condition, it is "the state of being adjusted." The dictionary also distinguishes between the action words *adapt* and *adjust*.¹ To adapt "specifically implies modification to meet new conditions, sometimes connoting pliability or readiness."

In this book we shall use the words *adjust* and *readjust* to refer to modifications *in behavior*; the words *adapt* and *adaptation* to refer to modifications *in structure*. When we wish to refer to what the dictionary calls "a bringing into as exact or close a correspondence as exists between the parts of a mechanism, but (with the connotation of) more tact or ingenuity in the agent" we shall use the word *adjust* (or *adjustment*). The limitations of that concept we shall examine in a moment. When the problem is one of meeting *new* conditions, the process becomes one of *readjustment*.

Adjustment and readjustment of what?

¹ Not to speak of *accommodate*, *conform*, and *reconcile*. Accommodate implies "a yielding or giving in to the demands of others." To conform "implies a bringing into accordance with a pattern, example or principle." To reconcile "implies the demonstration, to one's own or another's satisfaction, of the consistency or congruity of things that are, or seem to be incompatible."

Three things: (1) individual behavior, (2) specific culture traits and complexes, and (3) associative forms and processes.

But before we go further into the nature of adjustment and of the problems connected with it, we should have some general idea of the broad basis of human adjustive behavior.

II-2:2. Why Do We Behave Like Human Beings?

Years ago an anthropologist undertook to answer that question in a fat book of several hundred pages.² When he got all through, his answer boiled down to one word, "Heredity," We behave like human beings because we are born with a human heredity!

What a letdown—from an anthropologist, of all persons!

If he had said that an automobile gets from New York to Philadelphia because it is built to run like an automobile, nobody seeking light on "why automobiles behave as they do" would have been particularly enlightened. Naturally, without an engine, wheels, and a few other items no automobile would get from New York to Philadelphia—or anywhere else. But just the fact that a car is built to move itself over the ground doesn't explain why it happens to turn up at Philadelphia instead of Boston, or how it got across the Hudson River and didn't get stuck in the Hackensack marshes. Given any complex phenomenon that is the product of a whole combination of factors, you do not "explain" it in terms of a single factor alone. That is the rankest kind of particularism.

At least four different kinds of complicated processes underlie the behavior of any adult human being.

II-2:3. The Making of an Adult

Every adult human being is a product, an outcome, of the interplay of at least four processes: (1) *hereditary transmission*, (2) *maturation*, (3) *acculturation*, and (4) *association* with other persons.

1. HEREDITARY TRANSMISSION

Every individual starts his existence in the union of two germ cells, male and female, at the moment of conception. In that union the process of hereditary transmission—the passing on of unit characters by means of complex electrochemical substances called genes—takes place and provides the individual once for all with all the biological

²George Dorsey, *Why We Behave Like Human Beings*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1925.

"capital" that he will ever have. He can never grow bigger or be smarter or live longer than this hereditary equipment of his will permit. But if anything goes wrong with one or more of the other three processes—maturation, acculturation, or association—he may very easily fail to get as big or as smart or as long-lived as his hereditary equipment itself would have permitted. Maturation, acculturation, and association can never make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, but they can jolly well make a sow's ear out of a silk purse! Deficient diet, rheumatic fever, polio, poverty, parental rejection—a hundred and one inadequacies and obstacles can distort, pervert, or even destroy the innate potentialities of any infant. Considering the risks facing any new arrival in a world as poorly organized as ours today, the average parent would seem to need a blind fatalism like that of the soldier under fire. For his own mental protection the soldier assures himself that the bullet "with his name on it" hasn't yet been made. Today's parent needs to feel that the hit-run driver, the rheumatic fever bug, and the stupid statesman that might destroy his child haven't yet been hatched either.

Unfortunately, for all the brave fatalism of hopeful parenthood, poverty, accidents, disease, criminal killers, and war have all been with us for a long time and show no symptoms of disappearing overnight. Although children in the United States have a better chance of survival and a better chance of making the most of their biological "capital" than children in almost any other country today—and a far better chance than any similar number of youngsters have ever had in the past—preventable diseases, needless accidents, and unnecessary social villainies are still squandering altogether too much of the world's biological capital. Half the human race goes to bed hungry every night!

And even in the United States, for millions of children who just happened to select the wrong parents, we *could* do better than we do.

Two thousand years ago in ancient Rome the average child's life expectancy at birth was 25 years. Today in the United States it approximates 70 years—in 1949, 65.9 years for white males and 71.5 for white females.³ Born of a slave mother in the ancient world, a child's chance of sharing fully in the contemporary culture was practically nil. Yet slavery was the lot of millions of men and women whose only

³ Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births, 1948: District of Columbia, urban, white, 22.7; New Mexico, rural, nonwhite, 175.7; Maine, rural, nonwhite, 181.8. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1951, p. 73.

qualification was that they had happened to be members of some city or tribe conquered by the Roman legions.

Even in the United States at mid-century it still made a good deal of difference where a child was born, on what economic level, and of what race. Born to white parents in Washington, D.C., for example, in 1948 a baby's chances of living out its first year were *eight times* those of a nonwhite child born in rural New Mexico or in rural Maine. As a matter of fact, any smart baby in 1948 could have given itself a 12 percent edge on future life expectancy simply by taking the trouble to get itself born white instead of black. Whites were living 7.4 to 8.5 years longer than Negroes. There is *no* evidence that under the same socioeconomic conditions Negroes as a race are any shorter lived than are whites.

Any smart baby in 1948 could also have given itself a big head start toward higher education by picking parents on the business and professional level rather than hand workers and farmers. Disproportionately large numbers of young men and women go to college from business and professional homes as compared with the numbers from homes on the wage and farm level. Yet according to one authoritative study there are actually *more* A and B brains in the blue-collar classes than in the white-collar classes!⁴

All of which means that even modern American society is not very well organized to make the most of the hereditary possibilities of *all* its people. Many, because of preventable accidents, infectious diseases, poverty, racial discrimination, and the like, are doomed to unnecessary crippling, physical and mental; to frustrations and limited opportunities.

Unquestionably, if this became of enough concern to enough people, we *could* do better. Even with what little we know about the factors that control human behavior and human development, we could do better right now. And if we were ever to divert a sizable proportion of the national income—say 2 percent of the defense budget, which was nearly \$62,000,000,000 in 1952—if we were ever to spend *real* money on scientific studies on how to do better still, on how to de-

⁴The Army mental tests of World War I showed a higher *proportion* of A and B brains from white collar homes, but the blue collar population so greatly outnumbers the white collar that *in actual numbers* there are hundreds of thousands more A and B brains on the blue collar levels than on the white collar. See Harvey C. Lehman and Stuart M. Stoke, "Occupational Intelligence in the Army," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1930, p. 15.

velop to their fullest the social potentialities of the biological inheritance of *all* our people, we could transform practical living for millions in a single generation. All of which obviously implies preferences, values, something other than complete objective indifference to the way the American social system works. In short, it implies the existence of social problems.

2. MATURATION

Growing up is a complex of processes about which not too much is yet known scientifically. We know that different individuals grow at different rates. We know that different structures and functions of the same individual's body may grow at different rates. Teeth and bones, for example, may develop faster or slower than mental age and reading ability. Such unevenly growing children seem to suffer from more internal strains and are more likely to show behavior deviations than are more symmetrically growing children. We know that certain of the ductless glands have a great deal to do with controlling the rate and direction of growth. But what controls the ductless glands and to what extent and how do emotional factors affect growth?

We still do not know in much detail how internal mechanisms (the genes) control cell division or how particular environmental factors such as gravitation, cosmic rays, and so on, affect these internal mechanisms so as to produce a so-called normal individual. What seems to be certain is that some kind of interplay between the organism and its environment is necessary and that when, as in experiments with fruit flies, external factors are varied beyond a so-called "normal," or usual, range peculiar monstrosities result. Normal growth, therefore, seems to be some kind of resultant from the interaction of internal mechanisms with various sorts of external and internally mediated (ingested chemical) stimuli operating within a so-called normal range.

What this means for human beings, of course, is the clear desirability of keeping the factors that control growth safely within the normal range. And that means more adequate cultural protections and more satisfying associational relationships. Again, problems—collective problems of how to make life experiences approximate our values.

3. ACCULTURATION

Acculturation is the process by which an individual takes on the culture of his associates. It is not the same as the influence of culture.

Most of us were influenced by culture even before we were born. It is culture that sets mating standards—although it is association that brings potential parents together. It is culture that sets the “proper” size of family, provides means for controlling conception, and so on. After the child has been born, acculturation begins. Margaret Mead tells us that in one South Pacific tribe a baby is left to fret and bawl when it is hungry, wet, or otherwise uncomfortable. The theory is to “teach him to assert himself.” In another tribe of the same racial stock, on the other hand, the objective is quite the reverse: “to make him quiet and peaceable”; so his wants are attended to immediately. As these examples show, it is culture that prescribes the when and the how of toilet training, which, by the way, is more rigorous and demanding among American middle-class parents than among working-class parents. It is culture that defines the occasions for, and the nature of, discipline; specifies specific attitudes toward sex, the social world, the universe at large; tells the parents and the child what to expect concerning life, work, the future.

But how the cultural norms are actually transferred to the child so that eventually he comes to interiorize them, i.e., to identify with them and regard them as *his* standards—that is largely a matter of the fourth and final process that goes into the making of an adult human being, namely, the process of association with others.

4. ASSOCIATION

The individual's experience of association—association in five different senses: (a) direct stimulation, (b) interaction, (c) communication, (d) cultural impact, and (e) physical coexistence—begins for the sociologist when the individual comes into the world at birth.⁵

Our culture prescribes care and affection for the child by the mother. But what such a prescription shall mean in particular cases is a function of the quality of the associative experiences of mother and child. If the child is unwanted, if the mother has not herself accepted her cultural role as a mother, if the child is rejected for any one of a hundred reasons, the mother-child relationship not only will fall short of the cultural ideal but will begin to slant the child himself toward

⁵ Physiologists and psychiatrists may consider that the mother and her unborn child are technically in “association,” since each is directly stimulating the other, but since neither is independent of the other physically, we can leave that as a marginal case with which we need not concern ourselves. This is not to belittle the importance of that nine month period for either mother or infant, but merely to indicate that if that is to be called “association,” it is so radically different from anything that comes later as to deserve consideration in a different frame of reference.

insecurity, anxiety, inadequacy, fear, hatred. Whether he grows up feeling confidence in his world and in himself, happy in the enjoyment of his home and his parents, is a matter determined by the quality of the associative experiences of infancy and childhood.

It will be convenient to regard such associative experiences as distributable on a continuum from the intimacy of mother and infant at one end to the impersonality of organizations, publics, and the social order at the other. From insights such as those of Charles Horton Cooley in distinguishing the universal and universally formative nature of primary-group experience—intimacy of association a few degrees removed from that of mother and infant or husband and wife, but still more potent per unit of time than less intimate forms of association—from such insights and from contemporary studies by psychiatrists, it is clear that the psychological and social consequences of intimate association have not always been adequately appreciated. We have space to consider only two of the major forms of intimate association: (a) mother-infant and (b) primary grouping.

II-2:4. The Importance of Mothering

Until recently one of the most baffling kinds of mental disorder was the so-called psychopathic personality. Psychiatrists used the term loosely and did not agree too well among themselves as to just what characteristics marked a psychopathic personality, but in general they tended to mean by the term an individual who was fairly normal in other respects but lacked any capacity for normal emotional responses to other persons. Such an individual had no sensitivity to the feeling-tone of association and no sense of responsibility or moral obligation. He was quite capable of shooting his little sister and going on his way without a qualm. He could do the most outrageous things—and often did—without feeling the slightest twinge of conscience. Apparently such characters had no consciences at all, no sense of any moral responsibility whatever.

What made it worse was the fact that ordinary psychiatric therapy usually failed to change them. They seemed virtually untreatable. Fortunately, there were very few personalities of this kind, but how they got that way and what to do for them remained a mystery until recent years.

Then in 1950 Ralph D. Rabinovitch, M.D., chief of Children's Service, Neuropsychiatric Institute, University of Michigan, reported the results of a study of the psychopathic personalities among the

8000 children who had passed through the psychiatric division of Bellevue Hospital, New York.⁶ Analyzing the records of 800 children, he found that most of them had been treated well enough physically. They had been fed, clothed, waited on at intervals, and so on. But socially, *associationally*, they had been *starved* during the early months of their lives. Most of them had been institutional cases. They had been little cogs in the machinery of big hospitals, foundling homes, and the like. At proper intervals they had been fed, changed, put to bed. But never had they been picked up, fondled, loved. Never had they received any real mothering. Never had they received any warmth of human affection. And so there they were in the records of Bellevue Hospital, psychopathic personalities, emotionally "dead" children.

How essential mothering is to the healthy development of babies was also demonstrated by a motion-picture film taken by Dr. René A. Spitz of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in a South American foundling home a few years ago. This film has become a documentary classic in psychiatry. Here, again, 91 infants who had been deprived of their parents received all the physical care any child could need. They were well fed, clothed, changed. Each had everything it needed—except a mother. Nine nurses had to look after the lot, ten babies to each nurse. Technically, those nurses were superior to the average mother. Each of them knew more about the physical needs of an infant—the details of proper diet, symptoms of physical disorders, and so on—than any ordinary mother would. But each nurse had ten babies to care for. Clothing, feeding, bathing, and other routine tasks took so much of each nurse's time that she never could fondle or play with any of her charges. Each baby had the equivalent of one-tenth of a mother—and it wasn't enough.

Thirty-four of those 91 infants simply shriveled up and died for lack of adequate mothering. Lack of emotional experience subjected those infants, from 3 to 36 months old, to stresses as great as any they might encounter in life from malnutrition, infection, or injury. And for 34 of them it had the same fatal consequences. Three months of this changed them profoundly and after 5 months it was impossible to correct the changes. Checking after the pictures were made, Dr. Spitz

⁶ See Ralph D. Rabinovitch, "Psychopathic Personality in Children: Implications from Established Psychiatric Factors," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, April, 1950, pp. 232-236. For an interpretation of the concept psychopathic personality somewhat different from that offered by Dr. Rabinovitch see *Personality Development* by J. L. Slotkin, New York. Harper & Bros., 1952; or, *The Psychopathic Delinquent and Criminal* by George N. Thompson, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, publisher, 1953.

where on all levels of social development: i.e., they are universal. (3) And they are primary in the sense that they come very early in the life experience of the average individual and antedate more complex forms of association.

On the basis of their racial antiquity, their universality, and their relative primacy in individual experience, Cooley regarded the family, the playgroup, and the simple neighborhood as the sources of certain age-old, universal, and deeply seated individual behavior traits which (1) vary little if at all from culture to culture and (2) uniquely distinguish man from lower animals. These traits, universal and uniquely human, he called human nature traits, or simply *human nature*.

Human nature, as Cooley conceived it, was thus peculiarly a product of association—face-to-face, spontaneous, unstructured association. The learnings which men acquire in this type of association and which together constitute human (as distinguished from animal) nature Cooley specified as (1) *self-consciousness*, i.e., awareness of self as a distinct center of social reference; (2) *social sensitiveness*, i.e., sensitiveness to the approval and disapproval of one's fellows; (3) *conscience*—a sense of "right and wrong" as one's associates define right and wrong; (4) *rivalry*—an awareness of specific goals and of others as competitors for those goals; (5) *hero worship*—the acceptance of another person as a model to be admired or imitated; (6) and finally, perhaps most important of all, *sympathetic insight*—the learned skills required to adjust to persons *as persons* and not as mere animated objects in the environment.

Whether or not all these types of learnings are the products of primary *group* experience, as Cooley contended, there seems to be little doubt that they are at least the product of associational experiences of a highly primary character. And whether one calls them human nature or not is a semantic question of little importance. They are certainly peculiar to human beings; they do appear in all sorts of different cultures; and they do not develop normally when infants are deprived of mothering and of normal human contacts.⁸ Primary asso-

⁸ The studies cited in Section II-2.4 above and others summarized by Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951, pp. 44-69, indicate that some of Cooley's human nature traits probably derive from the association of mother and infant rather than from primary-group association as such. It is obvious that the specific content of conscience, the degree of rivalry expressed, and the kind of models chosen for emulation all depend on culture. Cooley, of course, recognized this quite clearly. For a more detailed consideration of research studies of primary-group association see Book II, Chapter 3, below.

ciation; from the intimacy of mother and infant to the psychological pressures of the simple neighborhood, is thus of fundamental importance in preparing the individual for living with other persons.

The net effect of it, as Cooley discerned, is to produce in the individual as a basic condition of individual adjustment a sense of identification with the group, a we-feeling, which Cooley called *moral unity*. This moral unity Cooley regarded as the psychological generator, so to speak, of the great moral ideals of all social systems, the ultimate source of the great major values of *loyalty* to one's fellows; *lawfulness*, or willingness to abide by group rules; and *freedom*, the opportunity to be oneself, or as Cooley said, "to write *whim* on the lintel of the doorpost."⁹

So much, then, for the processes that produce an adult human being: *hereditary transmission*, *maturation*, *acculturation*, *association*. It is in and through these four processes that eventually the adult individual develops whatever adjustive capacity he may have.

Now let us return to our analysis of the concept of adjustment itself.

II-2.6. The Nature of Human Adjustment

As the dictionary points out, the connotation of the verb *adjust* is mechanical, static. Despite the admission that some tact or ingenuity may be employed by the adjusting agent, the implication obviously is that to adjust is to accept the given and to bring something—one's own behavior, the behavior of others, culture traits, etc.—into alignment with the demands of the given. In other words, the terms *adjust* and *adjustment* imply that the environment and not the adjusting agent is the determining factor. The environment is "right" and the

⁹ Primary associational freedom to be oneself should not be confused with cultural freedom to control one's own life and to suggest innovations in culture. "The groups in which the individual is freest in his personal relations are . . . the very groups in which he is least free to tamper with his group culture. How is this paradox to be explained? There is reason to believe that the freedom of association enjoyed in the primary group is a pre-cultural thing, a freedom inherent in the face-to-face relationship from the beginning, while the freedom to innovate is a relatively late cultural achievement, based not on the nature of the associative process but on certain ideas which are precipitates of that process, namely, ideas of right, of legal status, of privilege, and so on. The demand of the French revolutionists for equality was an echo of the primary-group experience; but the need of making such a demand was a product of a complex secondary situation in which many cultural barriers to free association had been set up. Accordingly we are not surprised to note that it was the secondary-group center, Paris, and not the primary-group centers of rural France that led the revolt." Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Cooley Angell, and Lowell Juilliard Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, pp. 67-68. On the whole, cultural innovations tend to come from secondary-group centers, cities, not from primary-group areas, the open country. Civilization, as the derivation of the term implies, is a product of city living.

environment is "given." The adjusting agent has only to meet its demands to be "adjusted."

Here, obviously, are two large questions. (1) Is the environment always "right," either ethically or practically? And (2) since human beings by their definition of situations by means of stereotypes, social myths, and mental constructs always help to create their own environment, in part at least, is the assumed "givenness of the given" a valid assumption?

1. THE ASSUMED "RIGHTNESS" OF THE ENVIRONMENT?

For generations one of the easiest ways for conservatives of all types to rationalize their own conservatism and discredit critics has been for them to regard the critics as maladjusted, individually "queer," personally abnormal. For the conservative the existing institutional environment has been "right," the reformers and radicals necessarily "wrong." Slavery, corporate monopoly, laissez faire, the subordination of women, the racial caste system—scores of conditions bitterly attacked by some have thus been defended by champions of the *status quo* by the simple process of ruling the attackers out of court as incompetents and pathological characters.

Now it is true that in so far as existing institutions always express the funded values of many generations, the *status quo* is always in that sense "right." It consists of the adjustments and adaptations that have worked, that have survived.

But in another sense it is always "wrong." The adjustments and adaptations that have survived are always adjustments and adaptations to past conditions. In a dynamic society such as ours every institution is always to some degree out of date. To regard those who call attention to this out-of-dateness as neurotics and crackpots is to bury one's head in the sand.

The world does move. Nearly everything of moment in the modern world was once a radical challenge to some previous *status quo*. Were the men who introduced and fought for Christianity, Protestantism, capitalism, democracy, American independence merely neurotics and crackpots? To assume that the *status quo* is always right and the individual critic is always wrong is to assume that man's ethical and social insights never change. The massive evidence of history is dead against any such assumption.

True, neurotics and crackpots have participated in the great movements of social protest and reform. But which is horse and which is cart? Did the personal abnormalities produce the protest, or were the

protest and the abnormalities both the products of their time? The nineteenth century saw the end of slavery, the rise of the labor movement, the beginnings of feminism. There were antislavery fanatics, prolabor extremists, and neurotic feminists. But was Abraham Lincoln a crackpot? Did millions of Negroes have nothing to complain about? Were the millions of white men who joined the American Federation of Labor mentally diseased, or were they ordinary skilled workers trying to protect their standard of living? Were the millions of women who demanded the right to vote merely imagining their inequality of status? Did the demand for equal suffrage come out of paranoid delusions or out of normal resentment of actual inequalities?

Old adjustments change because individuals dare to challenge them. Some challengers are the warped and twisted products of the conditions they denounce. So what? Does that mean that the *status quo* is always "right" and any challenge always "wrong"? Was Jesus of Nazareth a mental case?

It is the unforgivable sin of totalitarianism that it asserts precisely that—the eternal rightness of the totalitarian *status quo*. Yet given reason and the unique value of the individual as the ultimate source of all values, no institution can ever be regarded as an absolute good in itself. All institutions are merely cultural patterns made by men. Institutional organizations are merely men controlled by a few executives and bosses, performing services for other men. Are the few to say that all other men are mere means to serve the purposes of the few?

That has been the claim of the powerful and the privileged throughout the ages. It is a claim that rests squarely on two premises that stand on the ethical level of the jungle: (a) Personality, the source of all our values in this world, is not an ultimate value in itself; and (b) power and privilege and not reason *should* govern the world. Accept (a), that personality is not an ultimate value in itself, and you must accept Buchenwald and Soviet slave camps. Accept (b), that power and privilege and not reason should govern the world, and you must accept gangsters, dictators, and totalitarianism. There are no other choices. Take it or leave it.

To maintain the right, therefore, to challenge the *status quo* is to maintain the right of reason and humane purpose to control the affairs of men. No American who values his heritage of free institutions can afford to do less.¹⁰

¹⁰ For an elaboration of this argument see Karl F. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950.

2. IS THE ASSUMED "GIVENNESS OF THE GIVEN" A VALID ASSUMPTION?

Human adjustment is a process of bringing about some sort of balance between a person and his environmental situation, but the situation to which the person adjusts is not something apart from and completely distinct from the adjusting individual; it exists *for him* in and through his own conscious activities in perceiving and defining it. No situation is merely given, any more than a fact, so called, is merely given. Situations, like facts, are conceptual constructs. Stereotypes, social myths, our own defining activities *create* the "entity" to which we react. Instead of merely adjusting, therefore, what we actually do is *projust*, i.e., to project outside of ourselves, so to speak, a self-made picture of what it is that we have to deal with.

A noted historical example may help to make this clear. In 1692 the Pilgrims at Salem became tremendously excited over the accusations of a few children who claimed they were bewitched.¹¹ Modern psychiatrists would immediately conclude that these youngsters had merely discovered a bizarre way of attracting attention, a particularly dramatic method of inflating their own egos. That, of course, was not the way in which our Pilgrim fathers defined the situation at all. For them the childish convulsions were obvious evidences of the dark, dangerous, and limitless machinations of satanic witchcraft, a cultural stereotype drawn from their own interpretation of certain passages in the Bible: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," etc. So they duly tried and executed some twenty-odd harmless characters, including a few stubborn old men who persisted in seeing only so many wicked little girls and no witches whatever. Yet the panic fear of witchcraft kept the killings going until the star performers began to accuse renowned Men of God and other prominent persons—at which point it became evident to nearly everybody (especially to the renowned Men of God and other prominent persons) that even the Devil wouldn't go that far. So the killings stopped. Faced with the plain implication that *nobody could escape*, the community recoiled from the ultimate logic of its own behavior. Aided by a little belated clarity on the part of renowned Men of God and other prominent persons, the good people of Salem redefined the situation. Childish behavior, regarded yesterday as impeccable evidence of satanic bewitchment,

¹¹ For historical details, see Marion L. Starkey, *The Devil in Massachusetts*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950.

now appeared merely as the unusual orneriness of a handful of little she-brats. The Devil, of course, still menaced everybody, but no longer by means of harmless old ladies. Having peopled their environment with witches in the first place, the good people of Salem now banished them with equal effectiveness. Witches or no-witches, the supernatural environment was obviously the creation of the good people of Salem themselves.

Adjustment in this instance was clearly a very different kind of thing from a farmer's adjustment, let us say, of a broken wagon. Yet even the adjustment of a broken wagon depends on one's conception of what the thing is and what it is for. One cannot "think away" the physical world—with due apologies to certain religious sects whose members bravely make the attempt; but one can and one does imbue the physical world with all kinds of attributes and potentialities that exist only in one's own imagination—like the witches of Salem. In the same manner, it is a bit difficult to "think away" the existence of other people in the world, although schizophrenics occasionally manage to do so to their own satisfaction. But we can and do imbue our social world nearly all the time with attributes and potentialities startlingly similar to the witches of Salem. Never is one's physical and social environment merely given. Always it exists *for us* in and through conceptual constructs, and those conceptual constructs are in large part the products of our culture and of our associative experiences. Just as no resident of Salem in the 1690's could have invented witches all by himself without Biblical and contemporary authority, so no one of us invents *de novo* the ideas by which he conceptualizes and interprets his social world. Yet the point at the moment is not merely that our ideas about our social world come to us largely ready-made but that our adjustments to our social world are adjustments not to a social world independently given but to a social world conceptually constructed by ourselves and then adjusted to as thus conceptually constructed. In short, adjustment, as human beings practice it, is a process by which individuals *conceptualize* other persons, culture traits, and associative processes in terms of their culture and then strive to bring the relationships of themselves, their culture traits, or their associational forms and processes into balance with the demands of their environment, *as they conceive those demands and that environment to be*. This is a long way from adjustment as a process of merely "fitting into" an environment externally and objectively given. Psychologically, human beings always contribute to the making of their own

environment, and adjustment is a process of bringing the claims of the adjusting agent and this conceptually constructed environment into some kind of balance.

II-2:7. Adjustment as Balance: Routines and Patterns

Usually balance, or equilibrium, is defined for the adjusting individual by the routines of his culture and by his own pattern of living. It is a major function of the adjustment patterns of a culture, particularly of institutions, to standardize situations, as we shall see presently; to provide common patterns or designs for meeting the problems or needs that have come up over and over in the experience of the society. Hunger needs, sex needs, reproduction needs, educational needs, protection needs, control needs, and all the other basic needs that have come up over and over again in human associative experience are thus provided for by economic institutions, by the family, by the school, by government, by military institutions, and so on. And in situation after situation as these needs appear, it is the adjustment patterns of the culture—the folkways, the mores, the institutions, and the laws—that provide the standardized answers, the standardized *routines*, for satisfying such needs.

Growing up in any given culture is thus a process by which individuals take over these patterns and fit themselves into them so that each eventually develops for himself a *pattern of living* which, by and large, tends, of course, to conform to the broader patterns of his culture. For each of us, therefore, the cultural routines and our own patterns of living constitute *the* balance or equilibrium between ourselves and our cultural environment. And it is this balance, or equilibrium, these routines and patterns of living, that we strive to maintain against disturbances by releasing adjustive energy whenever necessary. *As a process, then, adjustment can be viewed as the expenditure of energy by an individual to maintain or restore his customary cultural routines and his own patterns of living against disturbances impinging, or threatening to impinge, from the environment, as he conceives it.*

II-2:8. How Does One Maintain or Restore Routines and Patterns?

Not until we analyze the nature of social change will we be ready to ask what kinds of forces disturb cultural routines and patterns of living. At this point we shall content ourselves with a mere appeal to common-sense experience that in a dynamic society such as ours cul-

tural routines and patterns of living do get disturbed. The Fuller Brush salesman calls as a housewife is washing dishes, or the boss's secretary comes down with a cold, or a rainstorm immures one's car in a downtown parking lot. Something is always happening to disturb ordinary routines and patterns of living. So to maintain or restore those routines and patterns individuals are constantly forced to expend adjustive energy.

Specifically, what does one do?

Usually one of four kinds of things: (1) attacks the disturbance directly—chases the Fuller man off the porch; (2) compromises, gives up one thing to save another—postpones dictation till tomorrow; (3) invents a way out, manipulates elements of the situation to overcome the difficulty—bridges the parking lot flood with planks; or (4) simply withdraws, gives up—goes home and lets the car stick. Which one of these methods of dealing with a disturbance or difficulty one will choose in any particular case will depend on circumstances and particularly on one's temperament. The aggressive tend to attack, the timid to withdraw, the "good fellows" compromise, the cool and calculating may favor manipulation. Some may try all four. There are more ways than one to "skin a cat." But the point is, given a "cat to skin," a disturbance to overcome, each of us takes a hand at it to maintain or restore his routines and patterns of living.

The reasons for this are manifold. Habit holds us to the pattern. Social interdependences gear us into specific functions which others expect us to perform. All sorts of control pressures from the approval of friends to loss of income for failure to perform make the routines and life patterns the lines of least resistance. The net effect, multiplied by millions every day, is to give to cultural routines and patterns of living a kind of psychosocial inertia, or momentum, of their own. Unless disturbances reach major proportions, routines and patterns persist day after day. In simple primary-group cultures this tendency is apparently irresistible until some natural catastrophe or some cultural invasion breaks up the mold. In our own society, as we shall see, pressures for change have been built into every laboratory, factory, city, in addition to which international commerce, world wars, and the tensions of Soviet-Western conflict continually disrupt routines. Many of the resulting disturbances exceed the limits of tolerance of our customary adjustments. They force us not merely to adjust, i.e., to try to keep old routines and patterns intact, but to *readjust*, to work out new routines and new patterns. All of this we shall consider in more detail

when we study social change. At the moment our concern is with the phenomena of adjustment.

II-2:9. The Adjustment of Social Structures: Adaptation

How the individual adjusts, how after becoming aware of a situation, defining it, and assuming a role the individual attacks, compromises, manipulates, or withdraws to maintain or restore his cultural routines and life patterns—all that is of primary concern to the social psychologist or to the psychiatrist rather than to the sociologist. The sociologist, with his eyes primarily on human association, is concerned not with the way the individual maintains or restores his cultural routines and life patterns but with the way in which individuals *in association* maintain or restore their *common* routines and life patterns—the routines and life patterns of groups, assemblages, organizations, social systems. How, in short, do people generally maintain or restore the routines and life patterns of their various *social structures*?¹²

To answer that in detail would require a more exhaustive analysis than has yet been made of the specific ways in which individuals strive to keep in being particular social structures in specific social situations. The difficulty is that the very same kinds of adjustive behavior that serve a pair-group, an organization, or a social system may also be used merely for individual ends. Thus, the late Albion Small's four classes of adjustive activities—competition, accommodation, conflict, and assimilation—may in one instance—competition, for example—serve to advance the interests of one business organization as against another. But individual members of the organization may be competing against each other at the same time. As a matter of fact, this ambivalence of adjustive effort formed the basis of the old classical economic

¹² Note at this point a serious difficulty: Social structures differ greatly in objectivity or tangibility as perceptually verifiable. All, of course, as we have already pointed out, are conceptual constructs, but some of them have a perceptual base more easily identifiable than the perceptual bases of others. Thus, groups and assemblages are visible instances of differential association. Their actual physical limits, or "frontiers," can be seen. Organizations, although frequently extending beyond the horizon, usually have a physical locus of authority and they likewise have identifiable "frontiers," a "social surface" of inclusion-exclusion. The same is true of social systems such as neighborhoods, communities, metropolitan centers, metropolitan regions, and the social order itself. They have identifiable limits. Publics and social movements, on the other hand, have rather vague and uncertain limits. We cannot without elaborate investigations determine at any given moment who has read the *New York Times* this morning or who is participating in the movement for fair employment legislation. Yet the *New York Times* public and the movement for fair employment legislation are real "things," i.e., forms of association out of which specific events emerge. The differences between different social structures, however, complicate the task of observation.

theory of the virtues of a laissez-faire economy. Competing against each other, each seeking his own ends, individuals were supposed to bring about without specifically intending to do so an optimum condition of production and distribution in a given economic system! But as every reasonably literate person since the days of Karl Marx has long ago realized, this theory was not a picture of actual economic conditions in any economy known to man but constituted merely a theoretical model about which to speculate. It assumed too many contrary-to-fact conditions such as perfect markets, perfect equality of bargaining power between the individual job-seeker and the individual capitalist employer, and so on. But it bemused the minds of the middle classes in the Western world for several generations, and it was based, as we have said, on the fact that the adjustive energy of the individual can be turned in either of two ways: toward his own individual adjustment only, or toward the adjustment of some social structure in which he functions. The classical theory assumed a preëstablished harmony between these two. Experience has long since demonstrated that, if there is to be harmony, it must be achieved; it is not preëstablished. Instead, therefore, of asking how social structures in general adjust, i.e., how individuals bring about such adjustments in general, it will be more useful to ask how particular kinds of structures adjust: how business organizations adjust, how communities adjust, and so on.

II-2:10. Organizational Adjustment as a Function of Executives

More than a century ago Frédéric Le Play, a French engineer, pointed out that industrialism had failed to create communities as well integrated as the simpler rural communities which it was displacing. Near the end of the nineteenth century Emile Durkheim, the great French sociologist, came to the same conclusion after studying modern division of labor, and he posed a dilemma: division of labor and resulting interdependence do not guarantee integration. A generation later Elton Mayo of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, emerging from his famous Hawthorne experiment to determine the variables controlling industrial productivity, made the application to particular business organizations: "*Collaboration in an industrial society cannot be left to chance. . . .* Every social group, at whatever level of culture, must face and clearly state two perpetual and recurrent problems of administration. It must secure for its individual and group membership:

- (1) The satisfaction of material and economic needs.

- (2) The maintenance of spontaneous cooperation throughout the organization.

“Our administrative methods are all pointed at the materially effective; none, at the maintenance of cooperation.”¹³

In other words, as Mayo saw it, business organization functionaries, i.e., executives, have a job to do to keep coöperation going in their organizations. This calls for what we have called adjustment, constant adjustment.

Now how does a business executive go about this process of constant adjustment to keep his organization functioning?

Probably the best theoretical analysis of the process is that by Chester I. Barnard, former president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, in *The Functions of the Executive*.¹⁴ The activity through which the executive makes these essential adjustments is *decision*, the choice among alternatives to accomplish an end. As he says,

“It is the deliberate adoption of means to ends which is the essence of formal organization.”¹⁵

Barnard breaks a business organization into four different kinds of “economies,” or systems of means and ends: a material “economy,” i.e., the things used by members of the organization; a social “economy,” i.e., “the organization’s relationships (that is, power of exchanging utilities) with other organizations and [outside] individuals”; individual “economies,” i.e., the power to do work on the part of each member of the work force; and finally, the organization “economy” itself, which is made up of these other three—its physical materials, the social relations it controls, and the personal activities it coördinates. The task of the executives of any business organization, then, is simply to make these various “economies,” or systems of means and ends, operate as something approximating a unity, a single *system* of activities.

To do this there are three things that they have to do: First, they must provide a system of communication to transmit information up and directives down; second, they “must promote the securing of essential efforts,” as Barnard terms it—establish a scheme of organization and then select personnel to function in it; and finally, they must formulate and define and push toward achievement the ends, or purposes, of the organization. Throughout executive functions, the all-

¹³ Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, Cambridge, The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1945, p. 9.

¹⁴ Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1946.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

important requirement is that all adjustive decisions be made in the light of a constant awareness of the organization-as-a-whole and of its ultimate objectives. Functioning in this way, the executives of business organizations are constantly making decisions whose ultimate effect is to maintain or restore the routine activities, the day-to-day, hour-to-hour sequences of coöperation, that turn out the goods and services for the production of which the organizations technologically exist.¹⁶

Barnard estimates that there are probably 5,000,000 business executives in the United States, perhaps 100,000 of them in positions of major responsibility. He adds, incidentally, that "there is no science of organization or of cooperative systems."¹⁷

We have discussed the problem of organizational adjustment in terms of the functions of business executives. But exactly the same kinds of adjustive functions have to be performed by the executives, or decision-makers, of any organization—a household, a school system, a police department, a government bureau, an army.¹⁸ If any organization is to continue as an organization, somebody has to make decisions whose net effect is to keep individual activities coöordinated—in other words, routinized, going on as usual. What happens in any organization in the face of crisis, or an emergency, is another story which we shall touch on later. For the moment let us turn away from the adjustive processes of particular organizations and consider what keeps constellations, or systems of organizations, local social systems, going as systems.

II-2:11. Adjustment Processes in Local Social Systems

What keeps the routines of any ordinary American community going from day to day?

Probably six things: (1) the recurrence of the same kinds of needs

¹⁶ Economically, private business organizations exist to make profits for their owners, but we are not here concerned with that aspect of the matter. The actual production of goods and services is a technological matter, the motivation for which is another story. In other words, industrial executives in the Soviet Union, working for the state, have to carry on exactly the same kind of organizational adjustive activities as do private industry executives in America. Organizational adjustment to keep an organization going is a technological requirement of that form of human association, regardless of the motivations behind it. The relevant factors to be considered by an executive in the adjustive process will, of course, vary from organization to organization, from situation to situation, and, obviously, from culture to culture.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

¹⁸ For a glimpse of some of these problems as they come up to military "executives," namely, general officers, see General Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1951. Bradley describes many of the crucial decisions that had to be made by top commanders in the field from the Tunisian campaign in 1942-43 to the German surrender in 1945.

that had appeared the day before and the day before that; (2) the adjustment patterns of the culture—the folkways, mores, institutions, and laws of the community; (3) the inertia, or psychosocial momentum, of existing institutional organizations, each set up for certain specific purposes and each inculcating in its members very definite expectations about its continuing operation; (4) the “inertia of interdependence”—the necessity facing each individual of performing his specialized functions in order to maintain contact with his source of income, retain social status, live up to the expectations of others (children going to school, for example), escape the penalties of nonconformity, and so on; (5) the activities of various “enforcement functionaries”—local government officials, nongovernmental executives, civic leaders, newspaper editors, and so on, who devote themselves to maintaining the existing patterns of routine, the customary patterns of use and wont in the community; and finally, (6) public opinion in its enforcement, or moral police, aspect as a powerful upholder of the mores, the approvals and disapprovals of one’s fellows.

Only a small part of the adjustive activities of the citizens of any ordinary community are consciously directed toward maintaining the business, social, and other routines of the town. But only a vastly smaller part is ever consciously directed toward changing or disrupting them. Most of the time the line of least resistance for Joe Doakes and his wife runs along the road of simply doing their respective jobs, keeping up their home, looking after their children, and living up to the various other “responsibilities” implied by membership in all sorts of social structures from the P.T.A. to the union and the church. Some meet these responsibilities enthusiastically and well; others, poorly; but the point is, until some institutional organization fails seriously to meet its ordinary obligations, or until a disaster strikes, or until some other kind of “problem” emerges, very few individuals ever set themselves deliberately to try to change the community patterns of use and wont. Why should they? So most of the time most of us simply adjust ourselves and whatever organizations we control to keep community routines going as they are. Anything else would require as a motivating force a build-up of frustration that only institutional-organizational failure, disaster, or some other problem generates.

Given reasonably competent operation of its various institutional organizations and no physical disasters, a community—and by the same token, a social order—carries within itself a tremendous inertia of existing routines. Many things conspire to keep them going.

How the dynamics of modern business, discovery, invention, popu-

lation movements, war, and other disturbances impinge on communities and disrupt this simple partiality for things as they are we cannot consider here. The basic fact is that adjustment, the urge to maintain the going pattern of use and wont, is a force to be reckoned with in all communities. And one of the big factors in this urge is public opinion as sentiment, or attachment to old values. Public opinion has a readjustive function, too, through discussion, but the persistence of values gives it a conservative, or moral police, function which must not be overlooked as an important factor in the inertia of community routines. So communities, like individuals and organizations, "try" to maintain routines and life patterns. Social structures tend to persist.

Sometimes they persist long after they have ceased to have any useful function at all or long after they have broken down and no longer meet the needs of those they are supposed to serve. When that happens, as it did with the papacy in the sixteenth century, with the feudal regime in France in the eighteenth century, and with the czarist autocracy during World War I, revolutionary situations develop. People lose faith in the old structures and in the old myths that protect and sanctify them. Usually this breakdown of faith takes generations. The end result may be a social upheaval such as the Protestant Reformation that split Christendom, the French Revolution that destroyed feudalism in France, or the Russian Revolution that cleared the way for Soviet totalitarianism.

The persistence of social structures is the basis of the social order. But this implies some functional relationship between the structures and the needs of the time, the needs of the people they are supposed to serve. It implies a constant process of adjustment and readjustment by the functionaries of such agencies to keep them abreast of their responsibilities. As with individuals acting for themselves, so with organization executives acting for their agencies, adjustment and readjustment require continual Gestalt awareness of situations, definition of those situations as they arise, and assumption of a role for the organization as well as for the individual. Neither for an individual nor for a corporate entity can situational adjustment be allowed to become a state or condition rather than a continuous process. But always it is values that sanctify the given and guide the adjustments and readjustments as the process goes on.

II-2:12. Summary

We began our consideration of problems of adjustment by giving a common-sense definition of adjustment (which later we analyzed

more critically), by noting the three kinds of things to be adjusted, namely, individuals, culture traits, and associative forms and processes, and by indicating the four basic processes that produce the adult human individual, who always does the adjusting. We noted two processes of association which, if they go wrong, produce serious problems of individual adjustment, namely, mothering and primary association. Then we analyzed the nature of human adjustment more in detail, pointing out the inadequacy of assuming either the "rightness" or the "givenness" of the environment and defining adjustment as a process of reaching a balance between the adjusting agent and the demands of his environment as he conceives that environment. But balance is defined for the individual by his cultural routines and by his own pattern of living. Maintenance or restoration of balance is a matter of attacking a disturbance directly, compromising with it, inventing a way out, or giving up.

The adjustment or adaptation of social structures is, of course, a function of individuals strategically placed, and the way such individuals do this, as Barnard says, is by making decisions intended to keep the organization functioning successfully. In local social systems—neighborhoods, cities, metropolitan centers, and metropolitan regions—ordinary routines are backed by recurrence of identical needs, cultural adjustment patterns, inertia, enforcement functionaries, and public opinion, as well as by the adjustive behavior of individuals. The persistence of social structures is the basis of the social order. To keep in reasonably satisfactory relationship with social needs, adjustment of such structures must be continuous and reasonably effective, sanctioned and guided by social values.

Problems of In-Presence Association

II-3:1. The Nature of In-Presence Association

In-presence human beings affect one another in at least four ways: (1) by direct stimulation, i.e., physical contact; (2) by communication, i.e., contact through signs and symbols; (3) by indirect stimulation by means of cultural objects such as playing cards, tennis balls, clothing, furniture, etc.; and finally, (4) by the incidental consequences of coexistence—exclusion of others from space occupied by each, competition or conflict among individuals for any necessity (air, food, water) in limited supply, transmission of infections, etc.

The term which refers to the mutuality of process in the first three of these is *interaction*. *Interaction is the give-and-take of stimuli between, or among, two or more human beings in presence*. At a distance this give-and-take can only be by means of signs and symbols, hence is not interaction but *communication*.

A fundamental distinction between interaction and distance communication is that interaction is nonselective—in presence everything goes through—while communication is inevitably selective—only that kind of stimulation goes through that the communicator or operator will commit to the transmitting medium (letter, newspaper, telephone, radio, television, etc.) and that the medium itself can transmit. To date, no distance medium can transmit odors, temperatures, tactual pressures, or the totality of peripheral stimuli that always surround a communicator. In presence a face-to-face interview is always a complex of four things: direct stimulation as in shaking hands; preverbal as well as verbal communication (i.e., tones of the voice, facial

expressions, gestures, tempo of reactions, etc.); indirect stimulation through clothing and adjustments to such cultural artifacts as furniture, punctuality, etc.; and finally, peripheral stimuli such as noise, tactual pressures, temperature, light, odors, and general awareness of surrounding conditions. The contrast comes out when one compares the experience of MacArthur Day in Chicago in 1952 as conveyed by television cameras with the actual experiences of observers scattered among the crowds in the Chicago streets. By selecting certain parts of the crowd and certain moments of the day the television cameras conveyed an impression of *universal* and *continuous* enthusiasm. Actually the observers noted that there were at least as many non-demonstrative onlookers as there were individuals cheering and waving, and most of the time even the demonstrators were not demonstrating at all. In the nature of the case, the actual temperature, the feel of the wind, the tactual jostlings of the crowds, and whatever odors might have been perceptible to the observers, all failed to come through to the video audience. "In presence" by video at a distance was distinctly a different experience from in-presence experience in the crowd itself.¹

And obviously it was not an *interactive* experience for the video audience at all. People watching their television screens could not in any way interact with the members of the Chicago crowd nor could they attract the attention of the members of the MacArthur party.

Up to this time, except for marginal cases like heliograph signaling, and so on, the telephone is the only distance communicative device by which individuals can interchange stimuli at the rate of normal interaction. But the telephone is limited to vocal stimuli and even if it is eventually equipped with a television camera eye and screen will still be limited to what is in front of the camera and to visual and auditory stimuli alone. The full reality of an in-presence situation cannot be transmitted as such by any communicative device now existing or likely to be produced in the foreseeable future. In terms of variety, freedom from control, and range of stimuli, an in-presence situation is still one thing; a distant situation is something else. We may be able to get vivid impressions of selected aspects of distant situations, more real and alive than anything possible in the past, but for the perceptual freedom and fullness of the reality there is still no substitute for being there in person. We can "imagine how it feels," but actually to feel it, we still have to be there ourselves.

¹ See Kurt Lang and Gladys Engle Lang, "The Unique Perspective of Television and Its Effect: A Pilot Study," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1953, pp. 3-12.

II-3:2. Dramatic and Undramatic Situations

An Army officer's adolescent daughter came in from school one afternoon to find the living room filled with the wives of most of the top-ranking brass on the post. Mother was entertaining the commandant's wife at afternoon bridge. Mother, engrossed in a no-trump bid, looked up to remind her carefree offspring of a domestic chore neglected as usual that morning:

"Your room, dear. Will you *please* tidy it up!"

Then it happened. With the commandant's wife and nine-tenths of the best gossips on the post looking on, the youngster suddenly went Hollywood:

"Mother," she wailed in a quavering voice, "ple-e-eze don't beat me!"

Sensation! Mother in a slow burn! What a dramatic child!

Five words and a cringe that would have baffled Bill Sykes had suddenly turned an ordinary sociability situation into one filled with tension and uncertainty. That, apparently, is the essence of drama—tension and uncertainty.

Playwrights have long since learned that if a play is to hold an audience the one thing it must never be is unexciting and too predictable. In the old-fashioned Shakespearean pattern the function of the early scenes is to grip attention and pile up complications till you think the poor hero is certainly done for this time. But no, later scenes show him doing the dastards in or at least vindicating his role as a hero. Since Ibsen—with due allowance for Hollywood flashbacks and television acknowledgments to the sponsor—a different pattern may be used: As the curtain rises, the build-up of trouble is all past and the real drama is now the struggle of the hero or the heroine to escape or control the consequences of it all. In both cases, however, there is no drama, only narrative or boredom, unless the successive scenes build up tension, uncertainty, multiple possibilities, and do it with a crispness of action and a constant unexpectedness that force the audience to strain to keep pace. Conflict between characters is the standard dramatic tool for creating tension and uncertainty. Yet things have to happen if the conflict is to hold attention. A husband-and-wife conflict that simply drags along with sameness of inaction is about as dramatic as a sinkful of dirty dishes.

A dramatic situation, then, is one of tension, uncertainty, *and* action—the antithesis of routine, predictability, and boredom. Since it is the

function of culture to routinize life and make most of its situations predictable, most life situations are not dramatic. But a play, whatever its medium, must telescope reality, eliminate irrelevances, and build up tensions if it is to be dramatic. Real life is not without its conflicts and dramatic moments, but on the average in the lives of most people situations of coöperation, routine, and predictability outnumber those of conflict, tension, and uncertainty. In fact, it seems to be a function of leisure time to provide opportunities for breaking away from routine and monotony through games, love-making, vicarious adventure at the movies, and the like, i.e., to spice life with a certain amount of tension and uncertainty, however synthetic and artificial.

II-3:3. In-Presence Situations and Social Structures

What kinds of social structures do we find in in-presence situations?

In the nature of the case, dyads (pair-groups), groups proper, crowds, and assemblages are peculiar to in-presence situations. But such structures can be related to distant situations also. Their members can be focusing attention not on the in-presence situation as such but on situations beyond the horizon—on what is going on in the Orient or what the situation is in the main office of some organization (corporation), for example. Actually, many dyads, groups, and assemblages often concern themselves with situations which in part at least extend beyond the in-presence situation itself. In other words, in-presence observation frequently calls for an analysis of two inter-related situations—the in-presence situation and some sort of more inclusive situation: the state of the auto market, the prospects for a bright young man in engineering, the overall economic situation, and so on. The particular social structure—dyad, group, assemblage, organization—which structures the in-presence situation may, of course, have nothing to do with structuring the distant situation.

A further complexity comes in from the fact that, thanks to symbolical communication (words and concepts), the focus of attention of individuals functioning in any in-presence associational structure (dyad, group, assemblage) may actually be primarily not a social situation at all but an idea or a complex of ideas. A college class, for example—a group or assemblage—may be focusing attention not on the actual in-presence situation in which it meets but on the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution or on the concept of the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy. In that case the social situation, the in-presence situation,

is focused on the leader or leaders of the discussion but the intellectual situation, on the idea or ideas under discussion:

So the observer has two things to watch: (1) the social developments in the in-presence situation—who interacts with whom, who leads and who follows, how individuals behave toward one another and toward the situation as they define it—and (2) the intellectual developments, the play of ideas—the progress and outcome of the social interactions.

Research has shown that in an in-presence situation—whether the participants constitute a dyad, a group, or an assemblage—not only does form affect interaction but the structure of that form, i.e., the status relationships, the functional relationships, the categorical relationships (classification relationships), and so on, also affects interaction. And both of these—form and internal structure—have their impacts on the way ideas are handled by the participants and on the way individuals relate themselves to each other and to the ideas.

It is becoming clear that successful individual adjustment to different kinds of in-presence situations involves certain specific social skills. Awareness, for example, of the effect of one's own attitudes and reactions on other persons is a kind of skill. Naïvely the child attributes directly to others the characteristics of their behavior without realizing that their behavior has been called out in part by his or her own behavior. When Little Sister accuses Little Brother of "hitting me" (aggressive behavior), she usually neglects to mention the fact that Little Brother is reacting to some fancy name-calling or face-making on Little Sister's part which in turn may have been simply her projection of hostility aroused hours before by somebody else—Mother, Daddy or even Teacher at school. Before that child can become a socially competent adult she must learn how to relate herself to others in terms of a conscious discount of the effects of her own behavior on them and of their behavior on her. And to function successfully in a group or larger social structure she must become highly sensitized not merely to the states of mind of other persons but to interrelationships between and among them. She must come to "know the ropes"—and discount in advance the reactions of a teacher, a foreman, or even a husband, when she happens to trip over one of the ropes.

As a homeroom counselor you become aware, for example, that the English teacher, let us say, is unintentionally creating a negativistic attitude in one of your homeroom boys. What interpersonal and or-

ganizational insights do you need to handle that situation (1) without antagonizing the English teacher, (2) without getting your principal down on you as a busybody, and yet (3) salvaging your pupil before it's too late?

As the foreman of a finishing gang in a factory department you find that the assemblers under another foreman are feeding your gang defective subassemblies. What interpersonal and organizational insights do you need to correct that situation without (1) antagonizing the other foreman, (2) getting him in bad either with your own boss or his, (3) making your boss feel that you are usurping some of his own prerogatives, and (4) attracting the unfavorable attention of the superintendent?

How do you find your way around among the formal and informal relationships in any large organization? A mere desire to spare individual feelings isn't enough. You have to know what specific choices to make at what times under what circumstances: when to be "frank," when to be tactful, when to be aggressive, when to look the other way. And a bull-in-the-china-shop indifference to individual feelings is certainly not the answer, either. If love isn't enough in the parental handling of children, who require understanding and discipline as well, mere good intentions and even sensitivity to interpersonal relationships, on the one hand, and ruthless "efficiency," on the other, are not enough amid the complexities of large organizations.

II-3:4. The In-Presence Pair-Group (Dyad.)

Any two persons interacting in presence more with each other than with others constitute a pair-group, or dyad.

It is possible to distinguish a dozen or more characteristics in which pair-groups differ from one another, but for present purposes we need note merely certain aspects of composition, interrelationships, interaction, and situational involvements. Thus, it seems to be important whether the pair differ much or little in age, are or are not of the same sex, race, social class, and so on; what their mutual relationships may be—mother-child, lover-sweetheart, husband-wife, employer-employee, officer-private, and so on; what degree of intimacy prevails; what purpose brings them together; what is the degree of isolation or privacy under which they meet; and finally, to what extent they are involved in other social structures and situations. Probably the simplest and most interdependent pair-group of all, as we have said, is that composed of mother and infant. Lover and sweetheart or husband and

wife would probably come next, and then at varying points along a variety of scales one would find golf twosomes, salesmen and prospects, casual associates, physicians and patients, job applicants and personnel interviewers, social workers and clients, supervisors and workers, and so on. Extreme cases would be characterized by wide personal differences, impersonal relationships, highly formalized interaction and institutional compulsives—cases such as one finds involving prison guards and convicts, for example, or military martinets and their men.

We have already pointed out the importance of mother-infant relationships for the normal development of personality (Book II, Chapter 2). During recent decades much attention has been devoted to studies of other kinds of pair-groups, much of it for practical as well as scientific purposes. Social workers, for example, have needed to know more about techniques for interviewing clients: how to establish rapport, how to help the client define his problem, how to motivate coöperation for its solution, how to terminate an interview, and so on. Psychiatrists likewise have been developing their own skills for using pair-group situations for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. In education a whole new field of specialization has opened up with the advent of vocational and other kinds of counseling. And since the famous Hawthorne studies by Elton Mayo and his associates demonstrated the practical importance of industrial counseling, many companies have made increasing use of interviewing techniques not merely as an aid in the selection of employees but to supplement psychological tests as a basis of promotion and to help employees solve personal problems of adjustment. Yet the purely scientific study of pair-groups seems to have advanced somewhat less rapidly than the study of larger groups.²

II-3:5. Scientific Studies of Small-Group Situations

The best summary to date of the scientific study of primary groups and primary group situations is that prepared by Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, edited by Daniel Lerner and

² This seems to be in line with the tendency in the social sciences generally to concentrate attention on phenomena not where they appear in their simplest form—the point of attack so often preferred in the physical sciences—but at the point where practical problems appear. Thus, the study of juvenile delinquency has flourished in cities rather than in the country. Political scientists devote themselves to the study of government, not to the simplest forms of power relationships. Economists tend to high-hat the economics of households. And so on.

Harold D. Lasswell and published in 1951.³ After noting the contributions of European sociologists such as Ferdinand Tönnies—*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*—Georg Simmel, and Emile Durkheim, Shils takes up the American tradition stemming from the work of Charles Horton Cooley. W. I. Thomas, for example, in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* “concentrated his attention largely on the disintegration of primary groups as a consequence of migration.” “Like many of the best sociologists of his generation, he evaluated ‘primary groups’ as impediments to the development of the full potentialities of the ‘great society.’” Robert E. Park likewise was fascinated . . . by the disintegration of the primary group attending the growth of the great urban society.” But one of Park’s students, Frederic Thrasher, in what Shils calls “the most extensive first-hand field study of primary groups,” namely *The Gang: A Study of 1313 Gangs in Chicago*, showed the impact of primary relationships on delinquency and crime. Other Chicago sociologists, John Landesco and Clifford Shaw, carried this further—Landesco in a study of a notorious criminal gang and Shaw in a series of case studies of boys’ primary groups. Shaw also joined with E. W. Burgess in the Chicago Area Study which was directed toward reducing juvenile delinquency by encouraging the formation of new primary relationships in high-delinquency areas.

Another trend in the 1920’s, spearheaded by Mary P. Follett, Robert MacIver, Arthur Sheffield, and Harrison Elliott, focused attention on group behavior in the democratic process, but little came of this for the scientific understanding of primary association as such.⁴

The new impetus for the scientific study of small groups has come largely from the work of four men: Elton Mayo, Jacob L. Moreno, Kurt Lewin, and Robert F. Bales.

Mayo, an Australian psychologist who came to this country in the 1920’s and eventually taught at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, conducted a number of studies to discover the determinants of industrial productivity, absenteeism, and other aspects of work behavior. The most noted of these was the five-year study of productivity in the Western Electric factory at Hawthorne, Illinois, in the course of which Mayo discovered the importance of

³ Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, pp. 44–69.

⁴ See, for example. Mary P. Follett, *Creative Experience*, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1924; Robert MacIver, *The Modern State*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1926; Arthur Sheffield, *Creative Discussion*, New York, Association Press, 1924; and Harrison Elliott, *The Process of Group Thinking*, New York, Association Press, 1928.

informal groupings in the factory and the need of an industrial counseling service to reduce emotional tensions in the work force.⁵

As Shils says, "Whereas writers in the tradition of Park had seen modern society disintegrating into individualism, Mayo discovered through his own acute clinical insight and imagination that the disintegration was not atomizing society into discrete individuals. It was . . . breaking up into numerous mutually alienated primary groups, sometimes fusing into class consciousness. . . . He [Mayo] has . . . gone further than almost any sociologist . . . in pointing out the re-




FIG. II-3 1. Illustration of Moreno's Social Atom. Sociogram Arranged for Group of Five Boys: Everybody Likes A, Nobody Likes the Isolate, E.

lationship between personality equilibrium, primary-group structure, and the larger society."⁶

The interest of contemporary sociologists in industrial sociology stems largely from Mayo's work.

In 1934 J. L. Moreno, an Austrian psychiatrist who had come to America after World War I, published a book, *Who Shall Survive?*⁷ which as a contribution to mental therapy and to institutional administration proposed a technique for the study of associative preferences among displaced persons, mental patients, institutional inmates, school children, and others. This technique consisted in (1) asking the subjects to indicate preferences for and aversions toward other individuals with whom they had to associate and (2) then constructing graphically a "sociogram," or picture of "the social atom" resulting. Although Moreno himself was more interested in the emotional adjustment of his subjects than in studying primary-group association,

⁵ See Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933, and *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, Cambridge, Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1945

⁶ Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 49

⁷ Washington, Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 58, 1934 Later revised, 1953.

"The wide and increasing popularity of the technique itself . . . has helped to focus the attention of American sociologists on primary groups, since it has given them a means of describing one of the major elements of the primary group, i.e., the spontaneous mutual attraction or solidarity of its members, and has also provided the means of detecting cleavages and gaps in the solidarity."⁸

Probably the most creative thinker in the field of social psychology in America in the last generation was the German Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin, who came to this country in the 1930's. At the University of Iowa Child Welfare Research Station and later till his death in 1947 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lewin originated and directed a series of studies which not only demonstrated the value of democratic as against authoritarian methods in group adjustment but provided the factual material for the development of his stimulating formulation of field theory. Lewin was outstanding not merely for the way in which he organized his research projects to test specific hypotheses and for the painstaking care with which his investigations were planned and carried through, but for the theoretical as well as practical value of his researches.⁹

As Shils says, "Whatever may be the fate of his general theory, his combination of observational rigor, sensitivity to the possibility of practical applications, and insistence on clear-cut hypotheses deduced from a general theory represents a rare achievement in the social sciences. It is not without good reason that the most fruitful self-conscious work on primary groups being done today in America is the work of Lewin's disciples."¹⁰

After Lewin's death the Research Center for Group Dynamics which he had founded at M.I.T. moved to the University of Michigan, where it became a unit in the Institute for Social Research, Rensis Lickert, director, with Dorwin Cartwright directing the Center itself. With John R. P. French, Jr., as program director, and Ronald Lippitt, Alvin Zander, and other Lewin protégés on the staff, the Center continued its intensive studies of small groups.

Meanwhile, at Harvard Robert F. Bales developed a different and even more quantitative method for the study of small groups.¹¹ Bales'


⁸ Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁹ See, for example, K. Lewin, "Behavior and Development as a Function of the Total Situation," in L. Carmichael (ed.), *Manual of Child Psychology*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1946, pp. 791-844.

¹⁰ Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹¹ Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Press, 1950.

BALES' 12 CATEGORIES FOR ANALYZING INTERACTION



- Key:
- a. Problems of Communication
 - b. Problems of Evaluation
 - c. Problems of Control
 - d. Problems of Decision
 - e. Problems of Tension Reduction
 - f. Problems of Reintegration

From *Interaction Process Analysis*, p. 9.

contribution consists essentially of two things: (1) a set of twelve categories for classifying interactions among individuals and (2) an interaction recorder which enables an observer to keep a running record of interaction on a moving tape to supplement the use of a sound recorder.

At mid-century the two problems which were mainly engaging the students of small groups in America were: (1) the function of the primary group in formal organizations and (2) the internal dynamics of the primary group itself.

The first was represented by such studies as those by W. L. Warner and J. O. Low in *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (Yankee City Series, Vol. IV),¹² by the work of Everett Hughes at Chicago, and by S. A. Stouffer's studies of the importance of primary-group loyalty for military morale in wartime.¹³

The second, in addition to the work of the Michigan Research Center for Group Dynamics, stemmed largely from workers interested in group psychotherapy. The most important of these was probably Fritz Redl, who in intensive studies of delinquent boys in Detroit pointed up the relationships between leaders and followers in primary groups. As Shils remarks, "Through his work (and Bion's in England) it is now becoming possible to see in its most incipient form the possibility of unifying psychoanalytic theory, in a reformulated version, with the empirical regularities observed in the clinical and experimental studies of group behavior."¹⁴

Actually, despite the attention that has been devoted to primary groups for half a century, we have hardly begun to crack the problems involved in primary association. For one thing, we do not know in any systematic way the actual differences for the individual between different degrees of primary association. We know the importance of mothering and there is some evidence to support Cooley's theory of the moral influence of primary association. But what about the role of the dyad in association, anyway? And what are the *limits* of primariness in association? How many persons can associate face to face with a sense of intimacy, freedom, and completeness of contact, and under what specific conditions? What differences do age categories, sex cate-

¹² New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947.

¹³ S. A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. II), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. 130-149.

¹⁴ Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

gories, racial categories, stratification categories make? How much association goes on in groups of two, groups of three, larger groups, and what kind of association is it, anyway? Two persons face to face are not necessarily in primary association. Most of the economic transactions in the United States are completed by buyers and sellers face to face, but they are certainly not in primary association.

What do different degrees of primariness of association do to different types of individuals? We don't know. What do different types of individuals do to different degrees of primariness of association? We don't know. How do different degrees of primariness of association affect organizations? We don't know. What are the relationships of the emotional dynamics of personality to different forms of association? We don't know.

And when one asks how all these things are related to differences in situations the answer is the same. We simply don't know.

As a matter of fact, we still lack adequate tools for measuring association. Most sociologists more or less explicitly assume that there must be some sort of continuum from the face-to-face intimacy and completeness of contact of mother and infant at one end to some contrasting condition of distant, impersonal, and partial contact at the opposite extreme. But nobody has established any identical units of measurement to apply along that continuum. How much less primary, for example, is the association of husband and wife than that of mother and infant? And how much less primary still is the association of teacher and pupil as compared with that of husband and wife? Nobody knows.

Until some method of calibrating degrees of primariness of association can be devised and validated, no one will be able to study this phase of association with any precision. Studies of the dynamics of primary groups are all very well, but until we can specify with some objective certainty the variations in primariness from group to group, we shall be unable to show that we are studying the same thing from group to group.

Before rushing out to offer advice on how to compose union-management disputes and what to do in interracial situations, sociologists should bethink themselves of some of the unfinished business on their own desks.

As we shall see, the solution of most practical problems is usually beyond the scope of any one social discipline, anyway. The essential

skills for controlling an epidemic may be medical, but they could hardly have much effect without money, legal authority, and various administrative and public relations skills to boot.

The only justification which a sociologist has for discussing social problems in a book devoted to the analysis of human association is that no other discipline concerns itself with a total view of what human beings are up against in trying to operate a social system. We have already noted that no one discipline is enough for the solution of any important social problem and that whatever the sociologist may have to offer must be offered very modestly and tentatively.

Nevertheless, as we hope to demonstrate, the sociologist does have something to offer for many of the ills that afflict American society.

Problems of Population

II-4:1. The Problem of Population Analysis

The coexistence of human beings presents almost innumerable problems to practical men and scientists. One such problem is the relationship between numbers and resources. Another has to do with population distribution—the relative prevalence of dispersed vs. concentrated living, and the drift in the United States toward cities and their hinterlands. A third kind of problem concerns population composition—relative numbers of old and young, males and females, Negroes as compared with whites. And a fourth question concerns population quality—the relative prevalence of certain qualities esteemed by the culture as compared with those regarded as undesirable: longevity, for example, as against short life spans; high intelligence as against low; disease resistance as against disease susceptibility. Questions of this kind—numbers, distribution, composition, and quality—are much too complicated for us to discuss in detail. But we can at least suggest some of the difficulties involved and contrasting points of view.

II-4:2. Numbers and Resources

As a practical matter, the problem of numbers has faced mankind for ages. On the preliterate level of collecting, hunting, and fishing, primitive man has always lived under stern restrictions—restrictions imposed directly by the poverty of his resources or by his cultural adaptations to such limitations. As the English clergyman, Rev. Thomas Malthus, long ago pointed out, famine, pestilence, and war have been the great adapters, when man himself has lacked foresight enough to restrict his own numbers. Abortion, infanticide, limitations

on sexual association, sex moral codes, and control of conception, singly or in combination, have all been used by various peoples to keep fertility (the number of ova fertilized) from approximating fecundity (the number of ova available for fertilization).¹ But not until the improvement of European food supplies that followed the Great Voyages and particularly not until modern medical science had begun its conquest of infectious diseases did the death rate in any large area of the world fall so far or so fast as to alarm prudent men.

As a matter of fact, down through the ages the death rate was actually so high in western Europe, as it had been in the ancient world, that religious leaders, statesmen, and warriors universally advocated big families. "Multiply and replenish the earth" was accepted as the acme of population policy. Tertullian and others in the Roman Empire had touched on the man-land ratio, but in a context so widely different from that which emerged after the Great Voyages had demonstrated the rotundity of the earth, and the consequent ultimate limits of human habitation, that the real problem remained obscure. Right down through the centuries the leaders of the great civilizations agreed with the Book of Proverbs: "In the multitude of people is the king's glory." Moses, Confucius, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Theodore Roosevelt—the list of boosters for big families could be extended for pages. Spiritual as well as secular authority sanctified high fertility.

True, the monastic movement and eventually the papal doctrine of priestly celibacy exalted childlessness, but even St. Paul had admitted that it is better "to marry than to burn," and once married, Catholic theory held, there must be no impediments to childbearing. When the time came that birth control loomed as a practical method of holding down fertility no spiritual or secular leaders outdid the Roman Catholic hierarchy in opposing it.

For ages, right down to the twentieth century, tradition and authority urged humble folk to let nature take its course. In fact, for those who regard morals as functional means for adapting a society to its life conditions, any other kind of teaching would have invited societal suicide. Until better food, community sanitation, and modern medical science had cut the death rate in two and then halved it again, a birth rate of 30 or 40 or 50 per 1000 population was absolutely necessary if

¹ As suggested before, human fecundity is still biologically adapted to a risk situation far more lethal than anything found in any advanced culture or in most preliterate cultures. Hence, to avoid overbreeding resources, most peoples have tried to restrict fertility. When they haven't, famine and disease have balanced the books.

any pestilence-ridden, poverty-stricken people such as those of the Middle Ages were to survive at all.

The awareness that conditions were changing emerged only gradually. Given the prevalent impression in Europe of the vast wildernesses of the New World, it is perhaps remarkable that it emerged as soon as it did. But by the middle of the eighteenth century at least three outstanding thinkers—Rousseau, Arthur Young, and Benjamin Franklin—were skirting the edges of the problem, and Franklin with his “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind and the Peopling of Countries” was actually anticipating Darwin’s idea of the struggle for existence among all organisms. By 1792 an Italian writer, Ortes, in his “Reflections on Population,” managed to put his finger squarely on the problem that Malthus was to publicize so effectively six years later, but nobody paid much attention to him. The Italian had made the mistake of talking only about population and not “talking back” to the French Revolution!

It was Malthus’ achievement to dramatize the problem of population numbers by doing just that: “talking back” to the French Revolution. For the benefit of conservatives everywhere he made his “principles of population” not merely principles of population but a whacking good defense of class privilege. The French Revolutionists had struck at social institutions—the monarchy and the aristocracy. Malthus promptly ferreted out of the true villains in the piece—human breeding habits, not social institutions. Thus, it appeared that the poor are doomed to poverty not by the inequity of society and the rapacity of the rich but by their own fertility! At one stroke the pious English clergyman disposed of Rousseau’s utopianism, William Godwin’s dreams of the perfectibility of man, and all upper-class moral responsibility for human misery! What if he also opened the way for later sneers at economics as “the dismal science”? The genie was out of his bottle, and nobody has ever been able to get him corked up since! The problem of numbers has bedeviled Western man for the last century and a half.

II-4.3. Is the 400-Year Population Boom Over?²

Malthus lived just at a time when world population was responding to two of the most astounding events in human history: the “ex-

² Adapted from the title “Ended: 400-Year Boom,” by Walter Prescott Webb, in *Harper’s Magazine*, October, 1951, pp. 25–31. The thesis there is that the European and derivative European charter to exploit the rest of the world has run out, and the

plosion of Europe" out of its little peninsula after the Great Voyages, and the industrial revolution. Together these two transformations put Europeans and their descendants in possession of vast new food resources all over the world and provided them with the goods—manufactured goods—with which to command world markets, raise their own standard of living despite increasing population, and subsidize such a development of science and scientific technology as had never been seen before. Nothing like the uprush of numbers that followed the explosion of Europe and accompanied the industrial revolution had ever happened in man's previous history. Between 1650 and 1850, a span of about six generations, while Asia was multiplying its teeming 260 millions by 2.5, Europe multiplied its 100 millions by 2.6 and the New World, overrun by Europeans, multiplied its paltry 8 millions by 7.3. A world population estimated at 470 millions in 1650—the top total that man had been able to accumulate in 1,000,000 years, or at least in something over 25,000 years *as man*, i.e., in 1000 modern biological generations—that total more than doubled to 1091 millions in 6 generations. In another century, i.e., by 1950, this product of 1000 generations had *doubled again*. Between 1939 and 1949 it is estimated that the world added nearly 20,000,000 a year to its population to bring the total on the eve of the Korean attack to more than 2,367,000,000.³

This means that as of the mid-twentieth century there are 43.5 human beings for every one of the 55,000,000 square miles of dry land in the world—over five times as many as there were per square mile in 1650. But since vast areas of the world are cluttered up with deserts, mountains, and polar solitudes, only very thinly habitable at best, while other areas such as China and India are so densely settled as to force their agricultural populations to live on the margin of starvation, it is an intensely practical question whether recent population growth-rates are to continue in the future.

The answer to that depends on an understanding of the causes of population increase since 1650 and on the probabilities that similar causes will or will not continue to operate in the future as in the past.

Western world had better adjust itself to the fact. Whatever the merits of that thesis, the fact of population growth since 1650 is undeniable. Perhaps the facts would be even more striking had we the data on which to make dependable estimates of world population as of 1550 or 1250.

³ *The Economic Almanac, 1951-1952*, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1951, p. 1.

II-4:4. Why World Population Multiplied by Five in Ten Generations

World population changes according to the difference in each generation between the number of births and the number of deaths. Anything, therefore, that decreases the number of deaths while the number of births remain fairly constant will result in population growth. And since the added numbers will in turn add more in the future, population growth tends to follow a curving rise rather than a sloping straight line. It grows geometrically like money at compound interest instead of arithmetically like a new house, one unit at a time.

Until the dawn of the modern age man's margin of births over deaths had always been small and precarious. With no understanding of the principles of sanitation and no effective medical techniques for controlling infectious diseases, even the early civilizations lived under the toll of high death rates. The average life expectancy in Rome in the days of Augustus did not exceed twenty-five years. Even as late as 1750 in Edinburgh it approximated only thirty-five years. Against the lethal risks implied by such figures high birth rates were absolutely necessary. And again and again vast pestilences swept away whatever slender vital margins had accumulated. An epidemic, possibly of smallpox, killed Pericles and thousands of other Athenians. Another pestilence drove the Carthaginians out of Sicily on the eve of the Punic Wars. Ancient Rome was ravaged periodically. Hundreds of thousands died in Justinian's empire in the sixth century. In the fourteenth century the Black Death killed every third or fourth person in Europe. The reign of Charles II is notable among other things for the Plague of London. Even in the United States during the early part of the nineteenth century yellow fever repeatedly decimated the country as far north as Cincinnati, and the great European cholera epidemic of the 1830's reached over to take its toll on the American frontier. General Winfield Scott on his way to the Black Hawk War—in which Abraham Lincoln served as a volunteer—helped to nurse his soldiers, stricken as their ship was crossing Lake Erie.

Scores of diseases like tuberculosis, more deadly than any war of the time, killed their tens of thousands year after year. In 1840, 400 persons out of every 100,000 in the United States died of "lung fever." In a population of 17,000,000, that meant 68,000 in that one year of that one disease alone. It was our No. 1 killer. But malaria, typhoid,

and puerperal fever (after childbirth) were also slaying their tens of thousands.⁴

On the world front, of course, disease had already been on retreat for several generations. What set it in reverse in the first place was probably the improvement in diet for all classes in Europe, made possible by the extension of food lands, thanks to the Great Discoveries and the expansion of Europe. Modern sanitation and medical science came into the picture later and accelerated the trend. So in country after country the death rate, as compared with the terrible toll of the Middle Ages, began to slide.

But it soon became apparent that it is much easier to slow down the Grim Reaper than to slow down the Stork. The Grim Reaper has only a biological momentum behind him; the Stork has all the tremendous momentum of family, church, and state. A societal adaptation to a given level of life risks develops only slowly over a long time. It consists of myriads of individual habits, massive customs, and powerful institutional reinforcements, all interrelated and mutually supporting. As we shall have occasion to note time and again, culture and social structures have an inertia, a resistance to change, that tends to keep them going on and on. This is especially true with reference to the pressures that control man's sexual habits. These pressures have to be tremendously emotionalized and reinforced, in the first place, to control one of the strongest human drives, and frequently these sanctions are reinforced with religious prescriptions which profess to lie beyond the range of rational criticism. To change or to counteract the pressures toward large families usually requires strong economic as well as merely abstract motivations—and even then, as in the Orient, tradition may be so deeply grounded in nonrational beliefs that millions will endure semistarvation rather than change their breeding habits.

In country after country, as the impacts of the “explosion” of Europe and the industrial revolution spread, expanded food supplies, improved sanitation, and eventually modern medicine pounded away at the death rate, but the massive inertia of age-old breeding habits, sanctified customs, and institutional pressures held the birth rate at its old levels. Hence, the rate of population increase leaped upward and world population headed for the stars.

⁴ By way of contrast, 109 years later, in 1949, the tuberculosis death rate was down to 26.3 per 100,000, a poor seventh among all causes of death and far below heart disease, 349.1; cancer, 138.9; and even pneumonia, 30.0.

But this result was not uniform from country to country nor was it uniform as between social classes within particular countries.

II-4:5. Problems of Differential Increase

Everywhere the first impact of the modern age was to cut deaths, widen the vital margin, and send population climbing. Only after a lag of two or three generations would the effects of city living, the spread of contraceptive information, and so on, eventually send the birth rate falling on the trail of the death rate. Country after country, in other words, passed into or through (1) a phase of falling death rates, stationary birth rates, rising population; (2) then a phase of mutually declining rates; and eventually (3) a phase of stabilized population once more.

The first nation to reach this third phase was France. In the days of Louis XIV France had had the biggest population under one government in western Europe. A century later it still had the man power to drive Napoleon's armies careening around Europe. Ironically enough, it was Napoleon himself who triggered the collective response that was to send the French birth rate falling. In the Code Napoléon, the new legal system set up by the Corsican adventurer, there was a provision expressing the egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, namely, a requirement that estates be divided equally among all heirs. The effect of this was to motivate the French peasants to begin reducing the size of their families so that each heir could have a bigger slice. Meanwhile, however, France did less than most other European nations in spreading the benefits of modern sanitation and modern medicine. Hence, with a more slowly declining death rate and a more rapidly falling birth rate the French were the first to approximate a stationary population, and they accomplished this at a time when it was bound to affect their relative position in the international power-field. Next door to them to the east the more numerous Germans were achieving unification under Bismarck in the rapidly growing German Empire. The diplomatic and military consequences of this reversal of man-power roles in Europe may be read in the history of two world wars.

There are indications, however, that the French have merely been the first of modern peoples to run through the growth cycle initiated by modern times. With the exception of the Netherlands, all the older nations of western Europe, and even the United States and Australia among the newer peoples, were tending toward stationary populations

before World War II. The war reversed the trend in the United States until in 1954 Americans were increasing faster than any other Western nation. Meanwhile, Canada, Russia, and the Balkans as well as most of the Far East were still in the second phase of fairly rapid increase. How long this phase would last with any particular people could not, of course, be predicted.

The present differential rate of increase of the peoples of the Soviet bloc and of the Western world may have grave military implications. Two facts, however, tend partially to offset differentials in population totals: (1) Russia and the Oriental peoples require far higher percentages of food growers per 1,000,000 population than do the more mechanized Western nations, hence have a lower percentage of their populations free for military duties; and (2) atomic and thermonuclear warfare by enormously increasing the lethal risks of massed armies is tending somewhat also to neutralize the advantage of numbers. How important such offsets may be, if and when an armed clash comes, must be left to the event to answer.

Not only are there differentials as between nations in the speed at which they reach a new balance of births and deaths; there are also differentials as between different social and occupational classes in the same nation. In Western nations as population growth begins to slow down, it is the upper and middle urban classes that restrict births sooner than do wage workers and peasants or farmers. In the United States for more than a generation future Americans have been coming preponderantly from the homes of the poor, the farmers, and the foreign-born. But with immigration restricted since 1924, the foreign-born have been outgrowing their childbearing age, and in the second generation they tend to adjust their family size to that of their American neighbors. Thus, at mid-century the low-income categories and the farmers constituted the major reservoir of future citizens. On the whole, big cities do not replace themselves nor do the comfortable urban classes.⁵

II-4:6. Uniformities in Population Growth

So far we have been examining differences in population growth. There are also similarities.

Ever since the work of Le Play and Quételet in France in the nineteenth century social scientists have realized that human beings when studied in large numbers display uniformities similar to the regulari-

⁵ Despite a tendency for the very rich to reverse this trend.

ties observed in other natural phenomena. Thus, while there are always minor variations from year to year, on the whole, the birth rate, the death rate, the marriage rate, and the divorce rate, for example, all show a good deal of consistency, as one can see in Figure II-4.1. Sometimes, as in the case of the death rate, it is a consistency downward;




FIG. II-4.1. Vital Statistics Rates: 1915-1949. (From Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1951, p. 58.)

sometimes, as in the case of the divorce rate, it is a consistency upward; and sometimes, as in the case of the birth rate, it is a consistency both ways, i.e., a tendency toward cyclical variations. As a matter of fact, given longer periods than the third of a century illustrated here, statisticians look for four kinds of variations in any series of measures through time: (1) a long-time *secular trend*, which in the case of the death rate, we know, has been downward for more than a century; (2) *cycles*, or recurrent ups and downs such as all economic systems in

the Western world have shown for three centuries; (3) *seasonal variations*. The latter do not appear in our vital statistical rates as shown here mainly because the scale is too small. Many series, however, do show such variations. Certain infectious diseases fluctuate with the seasons: chickenpox is three times as prevalent in January, February, and March as in other months of the year; measles is four times as prevalent during March, April, and May as in other months; poliomyelitis is nine or ten times as prevalent in late summer and early fall as during other months; and so on. Marriages run lower in the winter than in other seasons and reach a peak in June. During 1947-48-49 marriages in January, February, and March averaged 22 percent lower per month in the United States than during other months, and in June they averaged 37.5 percent higher. Juvenile delinquency has two peaks a year—one in the spring, one in the fall. Crimes against property peak up in the winter, crimes against the person in the summer. Department stores usually sell more in December than in other months. Whatever may be the general level of employment in the economy in a given year, it is usually higher in the summer, thanks to farm work, than in the winter. Many other kinds of series show similar tendencies toward seasonal fluctuations.

Secular trends, cyclical variations, and seasonal fluctuations are the three kinds of changes through time that can be forecast on the basis of past trends, so long as the complexes of forces that produced them in the first place continue to operate.

One more type of variation, however, is quite unpredictable, namely, (4) *random fluctuations*. In our figure showing the course of the death rate in the United States from 1915 to 1949 there is a hump or peak in 1918-19. This is a random fluctuation caused by the impact of the world-wide pandemic of influenza which caused hundreds of thousands of deaths in the United States that presumably would not have occurred had there been no such epidemic. A random fluctuation of a negative kind occurs in the patent application rate during a prolonged war. Both in Britain and in the United States World War I and World War II cut notches in the curve of patent applications. In most series most of the time, however, random fluctuations cause only minor tremors in the curve. Fortunately, world wars and pandemics of influenza do not happen every day. The major variations to watch for are traced out by the secular trend, cycles, and seasonals.⁶

⁶ For statistical methods of describing and measuring such variations, see any standard textbook in statistics under "Time Series": for example, B. H. Camp, *Mathematical*

While such relatively simple patterns seem to characterize many of the behavior measures of human beings through time—death rates, bank clearings, marriage rates, and so on—they do not adequately describe the way in which population itself changes through time. Perhaps the closest approximation to a mathematical description of this has been made by Pearl with his adaptation of the logistic curve to




FIG. II-4.2. Population of the United States, 1790–1950, According to Census; and Projections Beyond 1950 by Pearl to 2100 A.D., and to 1975 on Basis of Growth Rate, 1940–1953. (From Pearl, *Studies in Human Biology*, Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins Company, 1924, p. 591, with estimated actual growth, 1950–1970, added; 1940–1953 projections from “No End in Sight to U.S. Growth,” *U.S. News and World Report*, January 1, 1954, p. 20.)

population data.⁷ Pearl found that the mathematical formula which describes the acceleration of an automobile, i.e., slow acceleration at first, then faster and faster, then again slower and slower acceleration, also describes the way in which fruit flies multiply in a milk bottle, the

Part of *Elementary Statistics*, Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1931; R. E. Chaddock, *Principles and Methods of Statistics*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925; J. R. Riggleman and I. N. Frisbee, *Business Statistics*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, rev. ed., 1938; Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, *An Outline of Statistical Methods*, New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1938.

⁷ Raymond Pearl, *Studies in Human Biology*, Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins Company, 1924.

way in which the population of a given metropolitan area increases, and the way in which the population of a country such as the United States, Germany, or Japan grows.

The difficulty—using this curve for predicting future population—is that one cannot be sure that the same forces which have produced its slope to date will continue to operate in the same way in the future. For example, the industrialization of Germany after the Franco-Prus-

TABLE II-4.1. U.S. Population by Census Periods, 1790–1950, and Estimates of Totals at Other Periods

Year	Census (in millions)	Pearl's Calculations (in millions)	Low Estimates (in millions)	High Estimates (in millions) as of 1953
1790	3.929	3.929		
1800	5.308	5.336		
1810	7.240	7.228		
1820	9.638	9.757		
1830	12.866	13.109		
1840	17.069	17.506		
1850	23.261	23.192		
1860	31.513	30.412		
1870	39.905	39.372		
1880	50.262	50.177		
1890	63.056	62.769		
1900	76.094	76.870		
1910	92.407	91.972		
1920	106.466	107.394		
1930	123.077	122.397		
1940	132.114	136.318		
1950	151.689	148.678		
1953	161.000 (est.)	151.000		160.195 High rate approxi- mated in 1953
1960	—	159.230	161.241	179.839
1975	—	171.000	185.000	206.600 Expected in 1975
2100	—	197.274	240.000	300.000 (?) Possible if 1940–75 rate holds

sian War increased the slope of Germany's population growth: the same curve had to be tilted upward. The modernization of Japan did the same thing to the slope of the Japanese curve. Furthermore, a very slight change in some of the basic components of the equation will greatly alter the end result. Pearl's predictions in 1924 that U.S. population would approach 150,000,000 in 1950 erred by only 1.3 percent, but the projection of his curve beyond that date seems to involve a greater and greater underestimate of U.S. population. His predicted 159,230,000 for 1960 was exceeded by 1953, and the upper limit of U.S. population, on his curve 197,274,000, predicted for the year

2100 A.D., will be reached or exceeded at the mid-century rate of growth *by 1970 or a few years later.*

There is actually no airtight method of predicting population growth. The most useful procedure seems to be to combine as many different methods as possible. Impressed by the slump in births during the depression, many experts predicted that U.S. population would level off at less than 170,000,000 by 1970. The leveling off will undoubtedly come some day, but the day now seems rather distant and the ultimate total when it is reached will quite probably be closer to 300,000,000 than to 200,000,000.

There are too many variables involved in population increase to justify the use of any fixed formula for more than very limited predictions. An atomic war, the discovery of how to produce food by direct photosynthesis without plants—or farmers—a dozen different things could upset present trends and again confound the experts.

But in 1954 the United States was growing at the rate of five persons every minute, 300 an hour, 2,725,000 a year. Every month it was, in effect, adding a new Akron or a new Dayton, Ohio, and in twelve months added two Clevelands, or four Cincinnati's, or another Detroit *and a half.*

The Stork seemed definitely out to eliminate the farm surpluses.

II-4:7. The Future of World Population

At mid-century it seemed probable that the further extension of modern sanitary and medical skills to the Orient and the continuing resistance of native customs and religious beliefs to the acceptance of birth control would insure the upsurge of world population for at least another generation. It seemed likely that Western nations, practicing family limitation, would continue to lose in relative population standing until from constituting nearly a third of the world's total (30 percent) as of 1949 they would presently find themselves back to the proportions of 1492, when western Europe held only about one-fifth of mankind. What such a shift in relative man-power would mean in world economics and world politics in the Atomic Age was anybody's guess. In energy available per capita the West was probably farther ahead of the rest of the world, excluding Russia, than in the days of the Great Voyages. The atomic revolution promised to increase that lead for a time at least. But judging from the increasing resistance of the colored peoples of the world to Western domination, it seemed safe to conclude that the golden age of Western world dominance was

ending. The "400-year boom" at the expense of the Far East was over. Some other *modus vivendi* for Western man was in the making.

II-4:8. Can Science Take the Lid Off?

Food and space are the two ultimates limiting human reproduction. With an estimated total of 2,300,000,000 in 1949, increasing at over 20,000,000 a year, mankind was already pressing hard on its food supplies, and 50 percent of it lived on the verge of starvation.

But even if artificial photosynthesis should suddenly release unlimited food supplies, space still remains inexorable. There are only 55,000,000 square miles of land surface on the globe. If the rate of increase of the nineteenth century i.e., 100 per cent in 100 years, were to hold for a period in the future no longer than the time that has elapsed since the Battle of Hastings "and all that" in 1066, there would be the equivalent of an average American city of 1940, i.e., 20,400 people, on every square mile of land surface from pole to pole, mountains and deserts included, before 2900 A.D.! We know from the S-curve picture of population growth, however, that no such unlimited geometrical increase is possible. Population limitation of some kind is as inevitable as death.

Death will, in fact, be the limiter if human intelligence fails to meet the problem in time. Shall it be limitation by famine, disease, or war to extermination? Or limitation by prudent foresight? Which fits best with ideals of human dignity, rationality, freedom?

II-4:9. Problems of Population Distribution

Table II-4.1 shows up another thing that's the matter with the world at the moment: half the human species lives in Asia. This would be fine except for the inconvenient fact that Asia doesn't happen to have half of the world's food resources. Hence, Asia constitutes the world's No. 1 economic problem. Rich in all kinds of raw materials for the world's commerce, Asia simply doesn't raise enough to feed itself, and never can so long as the inhabitants continue to breed like flies. The end of European exploitation, even if it is not succeeded by a period of Soviet exploitation, cannot solve this problem. Industrialization in so far as it increased Asia's capacity to import food would help, but not if the birth rate were allowed to go up with the food supply. Pressure of population on food resources will continue to be the main problem of the Orient for a long time to come.

Another kind of distribution problem has grown up in the advanced

nations all over the world, namely, the increasing concentration of population in cities. Civilization, as the name implies, is a product of cities, and there have been a number of cycles of city-living in the last 6000 years. The present cycle began to emerge in western Europe as the towns of the later Middle Ages gradually expanded their markets and more and more artisans and merchants found it profitable to live near one another. How the present organization of city living has developed and what it means in terms of human association we shall examine elsewhere. At the moment we are concerned merely with the broad facts of urban concentration in the United States.

The United States began as a nation of farmers and villagers. The first census in 1790 found 95 percent of the people living in places of less than 2500 and working as independent entrepreneurs whose economic security depended on small holdings of property. In 1950 nearly 60 percent of our population lived in urban places of 2500 or more—11.5 percent of the total in 5 places of more than 1,000,000 each—and more than 80 percent of them worked for other people as employees. Farmers constituted only 8.0 percent—less than 1 in 12—of the gainfully employed civilian population.

What is more, thanks to automobiles and surfaced roads, all the city workers didn't necessarily live in the cities, either. What the census called the nonfarm rural population amounted to 31,128,000, exceeded the authentic farm population by 8,000,000, and constituted more than one-fifth of the national total.⁸

But while concentration of population in cities and their immediate hinterlands has been increasing apace, concentration of population in individual households has been decreasing for at least two generations and probably much longer, thanks to smaller families and the growing drift of young persons to the cities. In 1890 the population per household (including hotels and lodging houses) averaged 4.93. In 1900 (excluding hotels and lodging houses) it averaged 4.76. By April, 1951, it was down to 3.34.⁹

In 160 years the center of population in the United States moved over 700 miles from the eastern shore of Chesapeake Bay, twenty-three miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, to a point near Olney, Richland County, Illinois, a few miles west of the Wabash River, which divides southern Illinois from Indiana. Average density per square mile had risen from 6.1 in 1800 to 50.7 in 1950. Rhode Island, heavily urban-

⁸ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1952, p. 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

ized, counted 748 per square mile; Nevada, of the great open spaces, only 1.5. Some of the variations as between cities we shall note later.

How these various clusterings of humanity were tied together in the transport and communication meshes of the metropolitan-industrial culture at mid-twentieth century, we shall likewise examine in more detail when we consider local social systems.

II-4:10. Problems of Population Composition

The composition of a population refers to the various percentages of individual characteristics found in it—age, sex, race, ethnic origins, social class, marital status, and so on.

The median age of the white population of the United States has risen steadily since 1800 from 16.0 years to 30.7 years in 1950. This rise can be accounted for partly by the falling birth rate, which decreases the relative number of young people in the population, and partly by the decline in the death rate, which has kept a larger percentage of all ages alive and therefore along with the lowered birth rate has caused the percentage of old persons to rise.

As the low median age in pioneer days suggests, the percentage of persons over 65 in frontier communities was very low. In 1840, for example, Ypsilanti township, Michigan, only seventeen years after its first white settlement in the wilderness, had only 1.1 percent over 65 years of age; in 1940, on the eve of the tremendous invasion of bomber workers at the Willow Run bomber plant, the percentage over 65 stood at 5.1 percent, over four times the relative number of 100 years before.¹⁰

In the United States as a whole the percentage 65 and over had climbed to 4.6 percent by 1920, and by 1950 it had reached 8.2 percent. In another generation the numerical burden on the 15–65-year-old working force imposed by those beyond the usual age of retirement will probably have risen by another 30 to 50 percent.

Such figures suggest one of the major reasons why social security measures such as old-age pensions became live political issues in the United States during the 1930's and afterwards.

An easy way of visualizing the age-sex composition of a population is by imagining that the population is shaped like a pyramid. Normally more male babies than female are born. The male death rate is higher throughout life, however, so that each male baby comes into

¹⁰ Lowell Juilliard Carr and James Edson Stermer, *Willow Run*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952, p. 25.

the world with a life expectancy nearly six years shorter than that of his little sister (white male infants, 65.88 in 1949; white female infants, 71.51).¹¹

The major problem in the sex composition of the American population is the changing ratio of the sexes. Males consistently and considerably outnumbered females until the census of 1950, when for the first time females at last outnumbered males—100 females to only 98.6 males. State by state, however, the ratio varied from only 89.1 males per 100 females in the District of Columbia with its thousands of government clerks to 114.1 males to every 100 females in Wyoming, whose open spaces were still predominantly masculine. In general, from the point of view of the statistical chances of marriage, Horace Greeley's advice to young men to go west now applied more aptly to their sisters. There were more men than women in all the Mountain and Pacific states.

Yet it was the disproportion between males and females in the Negro race that mainly accounted for the excess of females in the national average of all races. Native whites were almost exactly balanced, male and female.

Racially, the nation consisted of 135,000,000 whites—only 10,000,000 of them foreign born—not quite 15,000,000 Negroes, and 588,000 members of other races, over 300,000 of these being descendants of the original proprietors of the continent. Negroes, who had constituted 20 percent, or one-fifth, of the population in 1790, now comprised only 9.9 percent. Nonwhites were replacing themselves somewhat more rapidly than were the whites, but there was a much wider difference between the net reproduction rates of urban dwellers and the farm population than between races. In other words, as Negroes moved to the cities their rate would probably more nearly approximate that of the urban whites. On the basis of S-curve estimates, Negro population in the United States was expected to level off at 25 to 30 millions.

Marriage was considerably more popular than it had been two generations before. As against a mere half of all males over 14 married in 1890 (52.1 percent) and 54.8 percent of the females, in 1950 more than two-thirds of each sex over 14 were in double harness: 68.2 per-

¹¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 78. Negro babies have a lower life expectancy at birth: males, 58.57; females, 62.93. But thanks to more rigorous selection early in life, Negroes who reach the age of 65 have a somewhat higher life expectancy than do whites: white males at 65, 12.4 years; Negro males, 13.1; white females at 65, 14.6; Negro females, 15.5.

cent of the men and 66.5 percent of the women. Divorcees constituted 1.6 percent of the male population and 2.2 percent of the female—eight times the percentage of male divorcees and five and a half times the percentage of female divorcees in 1890.¹² Despite the tremendous increase of divorce in sixty years, divorcees amounted to only 1 in 62 of the males and 1 in 45 of the females over 14.

II-4:11. Problems of Population Quality

No two societies agree as to what they consider the most desirable qualities in human beings, and by no means all persons in any given society agree. Then, on those qualities concerning which there is widespread agreement, such as fine physique, high intelligence, and so on, there is a wide gap between the complexities of actual human qualities as they appear in society and scientific knowledge about the mechanisms of hereditary transmission. More is known on the negative side than on the positive. We know a great deal more about what individuals should not mate than about what individuals should. A society concerned about keeping down the burden of dependence must obviously discourage the mating of the feeble-minded, the emotionally unstable, the syphilitic, and the like. But despite the fact that a few complex qualities such as musical ability, mathematical aptitude, longevity, and so on, seem definitely to be hereditarily transmissible, genetic science still does not know how to provide more than the *necessary* conditions for the production of a given human quality; society itself must provide the *sufficient* conditions. Born in the midst of poverty, like Thomas Chatterton in eighteenth-century England, even a potential genius runs a high risk of never outliving his youth, and without the culture base required for his talents he obviously can make only a limited contribution. The best the geneticists seem able to do at present is to increase the probabilities of desired results. There is still a huge biological wastage of undesired results—children who don't have what it takes—and a huge social wastage of those who do have but die or are crippled in youth or grow up under inescapable social handicaps.

If, theoretically, geneticists by carefully controlled mating can decrease the probabilities of undesirable human types and increase the probabilities of desirable types, they still cannot produce geniuses to order or do much to reduce the chance of getting merely average results. The dice are all loaded in favor of the average. But undoubtedly

¹² *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1952, p. 44.

improvement in desired directions could be made, *if the theories could be applied to human breeding without regard for any other human values.*

There comes the rub. Animal breeders have long since learned how to "improve" animal breeds along the lines they desire: high production of meat, milk, eggs, etc.; speed in race horses; muscle in draft animals; and so on. All they have to do is to breed any selected pair of animals together and ruthlessly eliminate any of the offspring that fail to measure up. The qualities they seek are relatively (1) simple, (2) objectively verifiable, (3) determined almost wholly by hereditary mechanisms, and (4) attainable by complete disregard of the individuals concerned except as means to the breeder's own ends. In every one of these respects human breeding differs from controlled animal breeding. The qualities sought are never simple; they are frequently only partially verifiable objectively at the usual age of mating; they are only partially determined by heredity alone—the adult is a product of heredity *and* maturation, acculturation, and association, as we have seen; and human individuals have quaint ideas about themselves as ends and not merely means. Thanks to acculturation in the Romantic and Success Traditions, young people in America mate for such non-eugenic reasons as "happiness," "Papa's millions," and so on. And family and social stratification values limit the range of mate selection in all kinds of ways. Bernard Shaw once expressed the extremely radical opinion that the ideal society would be one in which any male could become the husband of any female. What he meant was that an ideal society would be one in which the business of human breeding would be managed by the individuals concerned as intelligently as smart animal breeders now manage stock breeding. What he assumed was that human mate selection *can* be intelligently accomplished by those involved.

Caste-dominated societies have always assumed the direct opposite: that mate selection is a function not of the parties but of the stratification system and parental wisdom. You married within your class a mate selected for you by your own and the prespective mate's parents, and that was that. The two individuals most immediately concerned had nothing whatever to say about it and might never even have seen each other before the betrothal. Customs of this sort have prevailed at least on the upper levels of all civilizations before our own, and there are still strong institutional pressures in Western nations among the rich and well born to select mates who will add to the family prestige,

wealth, and power, not necessarily to individual happiness or biological soundness.¹³

Yet as substitutes for caste and parental judgment in determining mate selection, the American culture has not produced any sure guides for young persons. Caste lines certainly still exist as between whites and Negroes, to some extent as between Gentiles and Jews, and even between rich and poor. But they are much weaker than they used to be, and much more depends on individual choice.

This choice is unquestionably one of the most crucial any young person will ever be called upon to make. Yet our culture provides very inadequate means of preparing the young for that choice. Mainly it leaves the preparation almost wholly up to parents, most of whom are prisoners of such cultural traditions as the Romantic Tradition or the Success Tradition, and few of whom have any but the vaguest ideas about the biological values at stake. The young people themselves, thanks to the Romantic Tradition, approach the decision itself in what may be called a somewhat lowered state of rationality. They seldom pay much attention to the biological backgrounds of each other's family lines. Like true children of their parents, they are likely to consider much more realistically the social backgrounds—provided, of course, that either can see beyond the other at all. The whole process fills the modern eugenicists with dismay, but it may actually be relatively harmless as compared with what happens afterwards.

Once married, the young couple, especially in cities, find themselves the victims of landlords who don't want any children among their tenants, employers who pay fathers and mothers no more than they have to pay single workers, and merchants who charge family folks just as much as they charge bachelors and spinsters. Moreover, if the newlyweds have a middle-class yen to get ahead in the world, they find it hard to avoid trying to keep up with the Joneses—more easily accomplished with a small family than with a big one—and the wife inevitably notes that children cramp the achievement of personality satisfactions outside the home. The result, despite higher birth rates on the lower-income levels: urban areas generally barely replacing themselves in 1950 and the big cities definitely not.

Biological authorities differ widely in their opinions concerning the

¹³ When Edward VIII of England so far forgot his position in 1936 as to announce his intention of marrying an American divorcee "beneath his station," the outraged Royal Family and various dignitaries of church and state forced him from the throne. See *A King's Story*. (Preface signed "Edward") New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1947, 1950, 1951.

net effect on the level of national intelligence of this higgledy-piggledy method of reproduction. Eugenists generally hold that it is breeding brains out of the American people at a rate of from 5 to 10 I.Q. points a generation. Some eminent geneticists emphatically disagree.

The question is obviously beyond the sociologist's province, but since the eugenic position rests on certain sociological assumptions, we may as well point these out. The eugenic thesis holds that (1) intelligence, i.e., I.Q. score, is correlated with social status: the higher the status, the higher tends to be the I.Q. and vice versa; (2) in an open society such as ours in which social climbing is not only possible but culturally encouraged, the abler individuals in the lower social strata tend to move upward; (3) economic and other pressures on the higher levels tend to sterilize the stock, i.e., upper level families tend to restrict births, to have small families, not to replace themselves; (4) hence, social mobility upward tends to reduce the relative amount of brains in the society, i.e., to reduce the percentage of high I.Q.'s and thus to reduce the average intelligence level of the society.

Critical appraisal:

1. That intelligence is correlated with social status does not mean that all high I.Q.'s are in the upper brackets. As a matter of fact, there seem to be more A and B brains in blue-collar than in white-collar occupations. Accepting the Army mental tests of the First World War at face value—although psychologists have long since recognized that they measured a good deal more than mere innate ability—that is, assuming that their showing of higher percentages of high I.Q.'s in upper social levels actually meant higher percentages of high innate intelligence on those levels, there are so many more blue-collar workers than white-collar that in absolute numbers the high I.Q.'s among farmers and factory operatives and the semiskilled outnumber the upper-level brains by a million or more. Add to this the fact that vast numbers of low-scoring individuals on the lower levels scored low not because of innate lack of brains but because low-level acculturation and association in their communities had never enabled them to acquire the paper and pencil problem-solving skills accessible and common in the more advanced communities, and it becomes apparent that the reservoir of high-level brains on low social levels must not be sold short. The pyramidal structure of the stratification system—a few at the top and many at the bottom—inevitably shuts out many who are innately capable of functioning far above their actual social status.

2. When one argues that the abler individuals in American society

tend to move up the social ladder he defines abler in the sense of individuals most capable of creating and capitalizing on opportunities for advancement in our pecuniary culture. To regard such capabilities as exhausting the range of innate biological abilities seems a bit naïve. The abilities that make for advancement in one culture do not always make for advancement in another. Organizing and executive ability is highly rewarded in our culture and to a considerable degree also in Soviet Russia. But intellectual, artistic, literary and scientific abilities do not in our culture command the respect and encouragement given to more practical talents. And when one talks about the abler individuals on any inferior level tending toward the top the argument nearly always refers to men. Opportunities for intellectually superior women to move up the social ladder are far more limited, especially if the brains happen to belong to women who want to marry early and raise families. (Or is it a sign of feminine brains *not* to want to marry early and raise a family?) This is not a question of a few highly exceptional individuals getting to the top, but of what happens to the *average* person of A and B caliber.

To support the eugenic thesis one would have to show that generation by generation more of the A and B brains of *both* sexes born on lower social levels were escaping upward than were remaining on the level on which they were born. There is no such evidence. At most it seems probable that of the *minority* of a given social stratum who move upward during any given generation a higher percentage consists of A and B people than one would find among the majority who remain on their old level. But whether the A and B climbers themselves constitute a majority of all the A and B brains born on that level is the real question.

Yet even if that were answered satisfactorily for the eugenic thesis, the answer would still not be conclusive. You would also have to prove that the supply of A and B brains in any given generation comes mainly from A and B parents—and precisely at this point geneticists like Jennings insist that the facts are all the other way. Jennings contends that “the ‘classes’ do not perpetuate themselves as such. From the higher many lower are produced; from the lower, many higher. *From the great mediocre group are produced more of the higher than the higher group itself produces; and more of the lower than the lower group itself produces*”¹⁴ (italics added).

¹⁴ See H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1930, p. 221.

In other words, not only do the sociological facts fail to support the eugenic argument; the biological facts themselves fail to support it. And since assumptions (1) and (2) cannot be accepted, the conclusion (4) does not follow. The eugenicists are gloomier than the facts seem to warrant.

Yet the problem of population quality demands continued scientific attention. If interest up to now seems to have centered so largely on negative aspects—how to prevent undesirable matings and how to keep differential reproduction rates from lowering the average level of national intelligence—enough has been learned to indicate that still more complex problems lie ahead. How raise the average biological expectancy of life—as distinguished from the actual expectancy, which is a function of the biological potential plus the environmental-cultural hazards that an individual encounters? How increase the percentage of biologically sound nervous systems in the population? And how produce specific desirable traits by particular matings? Questions of this kind suggest something of the scope of the problems comprehended under the term *population quality*.

The one thing that stands out in any summary review of population numbers and quality is that these matters are no longer hidden in the obscurity of massive, collective drift. Since Malthus and the rise of the eugenic movement they have become matters for rational consideration and choice. Man *can* control his own numbers, if and when he so wishes. And he can take measures for encouraging certain types and discouraging others. Obviously, we are back once more to the question of values. How many human beings is it desirable to have in the United States? And what kinds should they be? The answers need not be left wholly to chance.

Problems of Adjustment Patterns

PART A. FAMILY, SCHOOL, CHURCH

II-5A:1. Cultural Integration and Its Agencies

Cultural integration may refer to either or both of two things: (1) homogeneity or consistency among the traits or complexes of a culture, and/or (2) the degree of conformity that exists among the members of a society in following the patterns of their culture.

In the first sense ours is a culture of relatively low integration. It has many traits and complexes which do not fit together very well. This is because some parts of culture, especially material traits, have changed faster than other parts. The square turns of our surviving horse-and-buggy highways do not fit the automobile age. Cities may have to go underground to survive in an age of hell bombs and long-distance rockets. As surface phenomena, they seem to be approaching obsolescence. Or is it war that is obsolescent? Certainly high tariffs, which some business interests and politicians still advocate, are utterly inconsistent with the international position of the United States as a creditor nation. If we expect other nations to buy from us rather than from Russia, we must obviously buy from them. If we do not, we must support their economies with more subsidies. At home, as a final inconsistency to be noted at the moment, consider the contradiction between the tradition of "that government is best which governs least" and the existence of scores of regulating commissions, the federal income tax law (partially redistributing wealth through government services), and Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt functioning as quasi-dictators in our greatest wars. Such examples merely

suggest the thousands of culture traits and complexes which in our changing culture are inconsistent with one another.

When the inconsistency is one between rival or conflicting adjustment patterns—heterosexual association without chaperonage, companionate marriage, law defiance, and so on—it is not merely an inconsistency of two traits that do not go together, like square turns and automobiles, but one of a partially accepted trait competing with a supposedly all-or-none trait. The basic purpose of all adjustment patterns is to provide *one* common pattern for everybody who happens to face a given type of problem situation. The importance of the pattern of right-hand driving, for example, is not that it puts all drivers on the right side of the road—the English do quite well on the left side—but that it is the *one* pattern *all* drivers in this country are supposed to obey. The importance of it, in short, is that it *monopolizes* the alternatives as two drivers approach each other on the road. Each must keep right. What began as a custom in rural horse-and-buggy days became so necessary for public safety with the arrival of cities and ultimately the automobile that laws have long since discouraged nonconformity on the highway.

This, incidentally, illustrates one function of the criminal law: to force conformity to the one pattern of behavior which government has defined as indispensable for public health, safety, or security in each specific type-situation. When laws conflict, it is the function of the higher courts to resolve the inconsistency. For in matters in which uniformity of behavior is regarded as vital to the public interest, one pattern there must be. With its police and its armed services the state through its government undertakes to insure that uniformity under the law.

The uniformity of customary and institutional behavior is left more to individual habit, good judgment, and the pressures of public opinion and institutional regulations. But a high degree of uniformity there must be even here if customs and institutions are to routinize life, as is their function.

Hence the problem that develops in every dynamic society. New situations arise because of social changes. Old customs and institutional patterns no longer fit. Something different has to be tried. But since not everybody is exposed to the same changes to the same degree or all at the same time, old customs and institutional patterns linger on cheek by jowl with the new. This can be seen all about us, for American culture has a built-in dynamic which we shall examine later;

but perhaps we shall find no more dramatic examples of the breakdown of uniformity due to social changes than the coastal regions of China displayed under the impacts of Western ideas after the fall of the Manchus. By the 1930's observers could easily find towns in which emancipated young couples would be dancing cheek to cheek in the Western fashion at one end of town while at the other end foot-binding would still be in vogue.

In the United States the last century has seen somewhat less drastic but no less fundamental changes in living habits, institutional adjustments, and legal controls of conduct. From a predominantly rural-agricultural people we have become an urban-industrialized empire. Science has transformed our conceptions of the world and challenged old ideas about religion. Birth control has made the small-family system standard for the middle class and raised moral questions on which the churches still do not agree. For all kinds of life adjustments, from earning a living to educating the young, enforcing the law, and spending leisure time, science and technology together have outmoded the traditional small units of organization: The neighborhood, the workshop, the one-room school, the little church, county-supported courts and law-enforcement agencies—all are utterly out of date, utterly inadequate for the tasks of modern living. One writer, Dr. Kenneth Boulding, calls it "the organizational revolution," the passing of littleness; the swallowing up of the individual in bigger and bigger units of association: cities, factories, the world market, one world (of two contending superstates). Whether we like it or not—and many people still cling nostalgically to their memories of the past—the old horse-and-buggy world is gone. The automobile, the airplane, radio, television, the hydrogen bomb, and a thousand other inventions and discoveries have killed it utterly. Yet the great ideas and institutions of the past live on in this new world in which we must make our way.

How can the past and the present come to terms? How can we keep alive and vital those values which all history tells us are basic to human happiness—respect for personality, freedom, rationality, the values of humane living—in the face of social giantism, the New Paganism, the massive insecurities of individual loneliness, mass production, entrenched privilege, the shadows of World War III?

Of course at this stage of the world's history we have no answers. Our civilization has entered its time of troubles and we along with tens of millions of others have only uneasy questions.

In this section of this chapter our questions have to do with three of our basic institutions, the family, the school, and the church.

II-5A:2. Changing Functions of the Family

From prehistoric times to the present, functions of the family have changed in two broad ways:

1. From primitive life to civilization, as kinship progressively ceased to be the organizing principle of society, the family lost its functional monopoly as the one, inclusive institution in and through which all functions of associative living were performed from reproduction to protection against human and supernatural enemies. Instead of being the one and only institution in a society, it became merely one among many institutions each of which now performed a specialized function once carried on in and through the family. This transition one may call the change *from omnicompetence to specialization*.

During the course of it, although no two societies ever developed in quite the same way, there was a general tendency as culture became more complex for more and more family functions to pass to other agencies. Political functions passed to headmen, tribal chiefs, territorial governments. Religious rites were taken over by tribal medicine men, temple priests, churches. Education, variously managed in various cultures, finally in Western civilization became mainly the function of the secular school. In the Western world magic gradually gave way to science as a more effective means for projecting wishes, and the devils who had once racked men's bones yielded to advancing medicine. Against human enemies the blood feud proved less efficient than the king's peace and the king's men.

Even spinning and weaving, it turned out, could be done more effectively in factories than in the home. And when economically productive work had been taken out of the home, the family had lost another of its crucially important functions and the way was open for a greater transformation of practical living than man had experienced since the agricultural revolution displaced hunting and fishing in 10,000 or 15,000 B.C.

2. For ages, in various Western cultures the family has functioned to conserve property and to insure the legitimacy of descent. It still does. But the impact of the industrial revolution, which began to affect the United States early in the nineteenth century, transformed the typical American family from one concerned primarily with farm property to one dependent on somebody's job in a city.

In 1820, 80 percent of Americans worked for themselves on their single-family farms. In 1950 more than 80 percent worked for others. What has happened to the family since 1800 has been a change, not

from the omnicompetence of tribal days to the institutional specialization of civilization, but—a change in that specialization itself—from the colonial family as a domestic *production* unit directly controlling its own subsistence to the modern urban family as a domestic *consumption* unit now dependent for its subsistence upon others. That a higher standard of living has been made possible by this change is beside the present point. The point is, a higher standard of living has been bought at the cost of lessened primary relationships and independence. Isolation and provincialism have gone down the drain, but superficiality and insecurity are hardly good substitutes.

What was family living like in colonial and nineteenth-century rural America? In pioneer days and well down into the nineteenth century the typical American family lived on a farm, produced nearly everything it used except metal tools, and heard little about and had even less to do with the world outside its own immediate neighborhood. It not only produced its own food and baked its own bread but made most of its own clothing, all of its own soap, and, until the kerosene lamp began diffusing after 1860, all of its own candles. Poorer families either inherited such furniture as they had or fashioned it in their own woodsheds. Each family, of course, did its own washing and cleaning. All over the northern states in the post-log-cabin era the annual housecleaning, including the retirement of the living-room “baseburner”—among those who had living rooms—constituted a kind of vernal rite celebrating the demise of the inconveniences and filth of winter. In the South the great plantations constituted self-sufficient communities governed by the aristocratic minority who owned them, but the great majority of rural white Southerners, the “poor whites,” lived lives even harder and narrower than those of their northern counterparts.

All over the country, North and South, rural families took care of their own physical and mental ills. As a matter of course the old-fashioned housewife was expected to know all about the blood-purifying virtues of sulphur and molasses and the potencies of snakeroot.

As for recreation, over and above such collective occasions as barn-raising, quilting bees, barn dances, and church “sociables,” not to speak of camp meetings, most family members had to find their own.

Most of the time the immediate neighborhood constituted the family’s social world. On the frontier, where miles sometimes separated the nearest families, this was understandable enough, but even after population had reached its greatest open-country density—as it did in

Ypsilanti township, Michigan, for example, by 1870—
 tinued to have little contact with the outside world. This
 mainly to poor roads, the horse and buggy, and the rela-
 ciency of the typical farm home. The roads and the hor-
 proved particularly inadequate every spring. Booth Tai
 others have described the seas of mud that annually p , ... the
 Indiana countryside as late as the 1890's. The same mud bath afflicted
 the entire Middle West. It was not unknown for wagons to mire down
 to their hubs in village streets. Civilization had long since overcome
 one handicap of the frontier, the lack of bridges; but by failing to im-
 prove its roads between the bridges until the diffusion of the automo-
 bile in the twentieth century, it still permitted occasions to arise when
 the frontier practice of "footing it" in boots or riding horseback
 proved the only practicable way of getting to town. Actually, getting
 to town not only in winter and spring but during the summer peak of
 farm work amounted to something of a major undertaking on the
 more remote farms. From such homes farm women might not get out
 of their own neighborhoods for years on end.

Farm homes themselves had only the most primitive conveniences.
 Even today only a minority are equipped with running water, and in
 the still-existing rural slums in the mountains and backwoods many
 lack even outside toilets. Beyond the diffusion range of urban con-
 veniences, the outside toilet is still a characteristic feature of rural
 architecture. It arouses no fond recollections whatever in anybody who
 has ever spent a winter on a northern farm!

If American farmers were not what H. L. Mencken once called
 them, "peasants who sleep in their underclothes," at least until well
 into the twentieth century the great majority certainly lacked most of
 the physical amenities of urban living.

II-5A:3. The Contemporary Urban Family

More than three-fifths of all Americans lived in places of 2500 or
 more population at mid-century, and another fifth, the rural nonfarm
 families, were urban-oriented. The typical American family at mid-
 century was an urban family.

On the average, this family produced from 2.5 to 3.0 children.¹
 Thanks to the declining death rate, these were just about enough to

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1952, p. 42. The lower figure is the average for all urban families; the higher for fertile marriages only. About 16 percent of all married women have no children. Based on a sample of 4,414,650 native white women 45 to 54 who had ever been married and had passed their childbearing period by 1940.

replace the parents. Thanks, however, to the much greater number of urban families as compared with the fewer but more fertile rural families, the actual surplus contribution of the urban and rural populations, respectively, to the next generation ranked as 3 to 2.²

Meanwhile, the typical (or median) urban family lived in a city of about 130,000 and consisted of two native white parents with one or two children actually present. It had a total money income in 1950 in excess of \$3673.³ The parents had had a year or two of high school before going to work or getting married. They lived in their own home of four or five rooms with the usual urban conveniences: electric light, inside toilet, bath. The house was twenty-eight or twenty-nine years old, and unmortgaged. Like nearly all urban homes (96.9 percent), it had a radio but was unlikely in 1950 to have television, as only one-sixth of all urban homes were so equipped in that year. It did have a refrigerator, however (95.9 percent of urban homes did), and a furnace (62.2 percent). As the home of a white family, it was probably valued at more than \$8400 (median value of all urban dwellings), in contrast to the median rural nonfarm home, which was valued at only \$4900.

Our median urban family owned an automobile—62 percent of urban families did in 1950—and drove it an average of 8000 to 12,000 miles a year.⁴ If millions of tenement dwellers could not afford cars and other tens of thousands in the bigger cities found them too inconvenient to bother with, there were other tens of thousands with two or more cars per family. The median urban family contented itself with one—and didn't buy a new model every year, either!⁵

² *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 43. Rural nonfarm families: net reproduction rate, 1944-49, 1628; rural farm families, 1806; urban families, 1186 per 1000. A rate below 1000 means a potentially declining population; a rate above 1000, a potentially growing population. Because of the much greater number of urban families, 25,796,000 as against 8,388,000 rural nonfarm and 5,638,000 rural farm, the urban families were making a greater *absolute* contribution to the next generation than were the rural families: over 308,000 net excess over deaths as against a net excess of about 130,000 for the rural nonfarm families and 90,300 for the rural farm category.

³ This compares with a median income for rural nonfarm families of \$3027 and with a rural farm median of \$1970 money income. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 264. These averages are for all races and therefore understate the white averages.

⁴ *The Economic Almanac, 1951-1952*, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1951, p. 153.

⁵ A sample of 3,390,288 farms, not analyzed by race of occupant, averaged 1.24 passenger automobiles per farm in 1950. At this rate the total 5,382,162 farms in the United States would have been using 6,673,000 passenger cars. But it is probable that the sample somewhat overrepresented the better white farmers and underrepresented the one mule Negro farmers and sharecroppers, whose rate of automobile ownership is

All in all, our typical urban family in 1950 lived in considerably more comfort, with vastly more mobility and far closer contact with the outside world than did the typical farm family a century before. It had a higher standard of living and a wider world outlook. But it had less independence and less economic security.

II-5A:4. Marriage⁶

As we have already noted, all societies deliberately call public attention to individual changes in status by means of formal rites or ceremonies. Marriage is one of the most important of these "rites of passage" from one status to another. Under American law and custom the prevailing form is pair-marriage: one husband, one wife—at one time!⁷

In caste societies and among the upper classes in contemporary Western civilization marriage is regarded more as an alliance between two families, or power interests, than as a romantic enterprise of two individuals. The Romantic Tradition originated apparently among the troubadours in the feudal castles of medieval Europe in the days of chivalry and is peculiar to the Western world. Primitive peoples and the peoples of other and older civilizations such as the Japanese and the Hindus know nothing of it and like upper-class Europeans tend to be somewhat scandalized by stories of the romantic desires of young Americans who want to marry for love regardless of the interests of

low. In other words, total farm usage of passenger cars may not have exceeded 6 to 6.5 millions, leaving 33,185,000 to 33,685,000 cars for the 34,000,000 nonfarm families and unmarried drivers. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, pp. 498 and 595.

⁶ The term *marriage* refers to two distinct things: (1) the ceremony or series of ritual acts by which a man and a woman are legally united as husband and wife and/or (2) the legal status of the two persons thus united. A common-law marriage is an agreement between a man and a woman to enter into the marriage relation without ecclesiastical or civil ceremony. In many jurisdictions common-law marriage is not recognized.

⁷ It is the crime of bigamy to have more than one marriage mate at one time, but there is no legal limit under American law to the number of legally recognized mates that a man or a woman may have, provided only that they are taken successively after either due public recognition of the death of the preceding mate or public registration of legal separation through divorce. Merely to separate without going through the ceremony legally prescribed for terminating a marriage does not free either contracting party from the marriage bond. While in the eyes of the law marriage is a status established by a civil contract, the obligations under that contract are regarded as of such social importance that the state refuses to permit either party to dissolve the contract at will. They can dissolve it only with the consent and approval of the proper authorities, the courts, for cause shown. The causes deemed sufficient range from adultery only in New York State to that plus seven other causes in Colorado and adultery and eight other causes in Kansas, Oklahoma, Alabama, and Washington. Adultery is the only cause recognized in all 48 states and the District of Columbia. Desertion is recognized in 47 jurisdictions, cruelty in 44, felony in 43, alcoholism in 42, nonsupport in 29, pregnancy at marriage in 15.

their respective families. What happens to love matches when they get in the way of really important power interests was dramatically demonstrated by the "dethronement" of Edward VIII of Britain in 1936 when his desire to marry an American divorcée collided with the demands of the Royal Family and the English church that he choose a queen whom they could "accept." Acceptability won out, the King abdicated, and he and his Dutchess went into virtual exile.⁸

The Romantic Tradition is currently blamed for many of the hundreds of thousands of divorces that occur annually in the United States. As against the "marriage of convenience" among the upper classes of the Old World, the romantic marriage of contemporary America leads young people to seek personal happiness in the marriage relation and to dissolve that relation when happiness eludes them. Instead of approaching marriage as a lifelong obligation to themselves, their families, and society, they tend to approach it as a way of finding personal fulfillment, with the result that when the process of mutual adjustment proves too painful they dissolve the marriage rather than sacrifice personal happiness for the sake of conformity to the institutional pattern. Religious people generally condemn this casual approach to marriage, and since the Roman Catholic Church has classed matrimony as one of the seven sacraments, church doctrine teaches that it should be indissoluble.⁹

Whether young people are taking marriage more lightly than they used to or whether the result should be credited rather to the rising standard of living, the fact remains that marriage has been increasing in popularity during the last two generations. In 1890 only 52.1 percent of the males over 14, and 54.8 percent of the females over that age, were married. In 1950 the comparable percentages were 69.9 for

⁸ The irony of all that to do about the "unacceptability" of a divorced woman as queen of England lay in the slightly immoral fact that most of the prudes would probably have accepted a sub rosa morganatic relationship between the King and Wallis Simpson had the two been willing to enter into such a deal. Because he stood out for his right to choose as his recognized wife the woman he loved, the King either had to precipitate a constitutional crisis, since the government had taken sides against him, or give up his throne. He gave up the throne—and made himself one of the great romantic figures of all history.

⁹ This does not mean, however, that Catholic married couples never separate or that Catholic marriages are never dissolved in effect. On certain grounds the ecclesiastical authorities can annul a marriage. On the whole, however, Catholic doctrine is a powerful barrier to divorce among Catholics, and many Catholic attorneys refuse to handle divorce cases. In addition to matrimony, the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches recognize as sacraments baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, holy orders, and extreme unction. Protestants recognize only two, baptism and the Lord's Supper (communion).

the men and 66.1 for the women. Both men and women are not only marrying in greater numbers. They are marrying younger. Whereas two generations ago the median age of women at marriage was between 23 and 24 and the median for men near 28, the median at mid-century had dropped to about 21 years for women and 24 for men.¹⁰ This means that half the marriageable women are married before the age of 22 and half the men before 25. Between the ages of 18 and 25, however, a higher percentage of women marry every year than men; from that point on, the men have a considerable advantage. At 30, for example, of 100 men and 100 women, 15.9 men as against 9.6 women may be expected to marry within the next twelve months; at 35, 8.2 as against 4.9; and at 40, 4.5 as against 2.7. Half the men who reach 35 unmarried will eventually marry, but only 34.3 percent of the women.

This apparently means that the longer a girl waits to get married, the greater the competition she encounters from younger women, while the longer a man waits before getting married, the greater is the age range open to his selection.

It also means that men qualify for marriage (i.e., become capable of supporting a family) later than women qualify for their part in marriage. Although all classes are now marrying earlier than they used to, marriage still lags for economic reasons several years behind sexual maturity. Inevitably this imposes a considerable emotional strain on young people in our culture which youth in simpler cultures fortunately escape. And since middle-class striving imposes an even longer delay of marriage than is true in other classes, because the middle-class youth, unlike the blue-collar young man, has to achieve a higher social level and, unlike his upper-class counterpart, has no inherited wealth to help him—for all these reasons the strain on middle-class youth is greater than on any other age and social segment in our society.¹¹

¹⁰ Median age, 1950. at first marriage, eight reporting states, 160,127 brides, 161,852 grooms: brides, 21.6; grooms, 23.9. States are Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire, New York (excluding New York City), South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, p. 81.

¹¹ But young men have no monopoly on problems of mating. It is an even tougher problem for young women and especially young college women. For one thing, college girls between 18 and 22 are far more ready for their part in marriage than are their male classmates and campus "dates" of the same age. For another thing, more depends on a girl's choice of a mate than depends on a young man's. The man expects to establish his own social status or to step into that of his parents. The girl nine times out of ten must accept the social status of her husband. If she picks the handsome and fascinating ne'er-do-well, she may have a delightful husband but she will do her own dishes for the rest of her life. A slightly more practical approach might have increased her chances for a country house and a private yacht. Marriage is the life career of 81 percent of American women. It merely facilitates or retards the life career of the

That the female is culturally regarded as ready for her part in marriage earlier than the male is registered in the laws of all states. Everywhere with parental consent a girl can marry from one to three years before a boy has a legal right to such consent. In Massachusetts and Mississippi even girls of 12 and boys of 14 can marry, if their parents agree. Otherwise, on their own without parental consent, young people have to wait till they are 18, 20, or 21, except in Minnesota, where a young girl can pick a husband for herself at 16. But 32 states make the boys wait longer than the girls. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia let girls marry at 18; only 5, including Minnesota, set that minimum for men. Thirteen make the girls wait till 21, but 43 impose that minimum on men. One, New Hampshire, lets a man marry on his own at 20.

Studies of marriage failures indicate that marriage before the parties have achieved psychological maturity is one of the big factors in divorce. In other words, young persons who marry at 19 or younger—"before they know their own minds"—are many times more likely to wind up in the divorce courts than are those who wait till after they are 20 or 21.

Yet for both men and women, 20 comes years after they have reached sexual maturity. This constitutes one of the great and troublesome differences between civilized living and primitive life. In primitive societies such as those described by Malinowski, Margaret Mead, and others, psychological maturity and social maturity for that level of life coincide with puberty; and what is even more important, the culture itself almost inevitably imposes early marriage. If young Trobriand Islanders, Samoans, or Tchambuli are to function normally as adults in their culture at all, they practically have to get married at puberty. It was much the same in early colonial days in this country: the culture simply had no place for bachelors and old maids. Early marriage was the norm. But in our own contemporary culture delayed marriage is the norm. Not only do the three phases of maturity never coincide in the individual, but since a higher level of psychological and social maturity is required in civilization, culture itself prescribes delay. The extent of the delay varies with different social classes. Lower-class mores based on early self-support and low living standards encourage early marriage. Middle-class mores, on the other hand,

marrying men. Byron may have been wrong when he made love "of man's life a thing apart, 'Tis woman's whole existence"—Freud hadn't yet been heard of—but the role of marriage is certainly different in a woman's life career and in a man's.

prescribe delay, partially to give the girl a better chance to look the field over but principally to enable the young man to complete his education and establish himself on a level of middle-class respectability.¹²

The net result for products of middle-class homes: heightened emotional stresses; premarital experimentation; added patronage for prostitutes.

What determines who marries whom?

That is much too large a question for us to answer here. In a general way, however, three things seem to be involved: (1) acquaintanceship—boy has to meet girl; (2) readiness—one at least of each pair must have made up his or her mind that the “date-’em-and-rate-’em” complex has gone far enough; and (3) some degree of mutual attraction, or possessiveness. The one thing sure is that, except among the domestic dynasties of the wealthy, the family plays a smaller part in determining who marries whom in the cities than it did back on the farm.

Unfortunately, not having grasped the degree of the family’s decline in preparing youth for marriage, modern American society has failed to develop any very adequate substitute. Not only has it no agency to perform the old status-sponsoring function of the family for eligible outlanders in a big city, but it leaves its young people completely uninstructed in how to estimate the emotional maturity of a prospective mate, how to evaluate his or her social attitudes and values, and how to understand basic personality patterns. Despite half a century of expert advice on the need of sex education, most boys still find out about the fallacies of the stork myth from their pals in the alley and most girls reach marriage with a pathetic pseudo-sophistication that tells them sex relations constitute a duty a wife must perform in return for her keep!

Thus, having chosen the wrong mates in the first place and having married in blissful ignorance of the basic mechanisms of personality adjustment in the second place, tens of thousands of newlyweds find themselves heading for the rocks the moment the knot is tied.

II-5A:5. Divorce

The rising tide of divorce, which in 1950 amounted to 385,000 cases, or about one-fourth of the number of marriages of that year, does not measure the amount of marital maladjustment in American

¹² The G I Bill and the willingness of some middle class parents to subsidize marriage in college partially changed this picture after World War II.

homes.¹³ There are tens of thousands of desertions every year which may or may not register later as divorces, and over and above both divorces and desertions there are millions of families that are functionally inadequate and carry on in a chronic state of emotional tension and turmoil. For every case of this kind that eventually reaches the divorce courts or crashes the front pages in some other kind of tragedy—the jealous husband who shoots his wife, for example—there must be dozens that go unrecorded. At least seven out of ten of the case records of the 300,000 to 400,000 children who reach the juvenile courts each year as delinquents tell sordid stories of domestic unhappiness. Half (48 percent) of the 1,400,000 hospital beds in the United States are filled with mental patients and there are probably as many more who need institutional treatment. Tens of thousands of these patients are the products of emotionally unhealthy homes. Social breakdowns—failures of adjustment serious enough to bring family members into contact with law-enforcement or social agencies—average 3 to 13 percent of urban families every year.¹⁴ Divorce as such contributes only from one-seventh to one-tenth of these social breakdowns recorded in an ordinary urban community, but about eight-tenths of the other types either are the products of family maladjustments similar to those that produce divorce or they are themselves helping to intensify such maladjustments. Divorce is thus a very inadequate index of family troubles in the United States.

Judging from the experience of nine states during the years 1948–49–50, the average marriage that is going to break up at all breaks up within the first five years, with the highest incidence coming in the second year. Nearly 8 percent of the divorces or annulments granted in those states during those years went to couples who had been married less than twelve months; 9.8 percent to couples married one year; and 10.5 percent to couples married two years—a grand total of 28.2 percent of all the divorces and annulments in these nine states to

¹³ In the nature of the case, while the number of divorces granted in any given year constitutes a sizable proportion of the number of marriages in that year, the great bulk of those divorces terminate marriages contracted in previous years. The second year of marriage is generally regarded as the most crucial. By far the great bulk of all marriages never reach the divorce courts at all.

¹⁴ Seven kinds of adjustment troubles are covered by the term *social breakdown*: delinquency, 16.3 per 1000 Stamford, Conn., families in 1936; crime, 11.3 per 1000; mental disease, 7.2; divorce, 5.7; unemployment, 1.6; neglect, 2.8; mental deficiency, 0.6. Total for that year for Stamford families: 42.6 breakdowns per 1000 families. In eight cities studied by Community Chests and Councils, Inc., in *Let's Make a Study*, Bulletin 114-B, New York, 1942, p. 15, breakdown rates ranged from 29.4 per 1000 families in Ann Arbor, Mich., in 1939 to 128.9 in Greenville, S.C., in 1940.

couples married only two years or less. By the end of the fifth year 51.9 percent of those who were going to break up had done so. In these states total divorces, etc., in three years amounted to 165,420.

On the average, in the nine states median years of marriage at time of divorce or annulment ran from three and a half in Tennessee to more than eight and a half in Connecticut. Table II-5.1 shows the median years of marriage at time of divorce or annulment in these nine states by years, the average duration for each state for the three-year period, and the divorce rates of these states per 1000 population.

TABLE II-5.1. Median Years of Marriage at Time of Divorce or Annulment in Nine States, 1948-49-50, and Divorce Rate per 1000 Population by States in 1950, Showing Some Association of Early Divorce with High Divorce Rate

State	Median Years of Marriage			Average Duration (years)	Divorce Rate (per 1000 pop.)	Rank in Duration	Rank in Divorce Rate
	1948	1949	1950				
Connecticut	8.9	8.4	8.5	8.6	1.4	1	7
Florida	4.9	5.1	5.0	5.0	6.5	4	1
Iowa	3.8	3.4	3.5	3.6	2.1	8	4
Mississippi	4.6	4.4	4.0	4.3	1.4	5	7
New Hampshire	6.6	6.0	6.2	6.3	2.0	3	5
Oregon	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.9	7	2
South Dakota	4.3	4.1	3.8	4.1	1.4	6	7
Tennessee	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.5	2.4	9	3
Virginia	6.9	7.4	7.2	7.2	1.8	2	6
Average of all U.S. 1950				Not available	2.6		

$$\text{Rank correlation: } \text{Rho} = 1 - \frac{6\sum d^2}{N(N^2 - 1)} = -.775$$

From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, p. 83.

It also shows the result of a rough rank correlation of state rank in average marriage duration and state rank in divorces per 1000 population. In general, there was some tendency for *early* divorce to be associated with a *high* divorce rate, and vice versa, as one might expect.

According to the census, male divorcees constituted 1.5 percent of the male population 14 and over in March, 1950, as compared with only 0.2 percent in June, 1890, while female divorcees constituted 2.1 percent of the female population 14 and over as against 0.4 percent in June, 1890. In other words, relative to population, male divorcees had multiplied by 7.5; female divorcees by 5.2.

Yet despite the increase in divorce, that kind of family breakage was

a far less serious risk for any pair of newlyweds than was breakage by death. In terms of the relative prevalence of divorcees and widows and widowers in the population, there were nearly two and a half times as many widowers as there were divorced men and over five times as many widows as divorcees in 1950. In other words, a bride was five times as likely to lose her husband by death as by divorce and a groom two and a half times as likely to be bereaved.




FIG. II-5.1. Divorce Rate per 1000 Population, 1900-51, Showing Changes in Rate Associated with Two World Wars. (From *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1952, p. 59.)

Nevertheless, the statistical risk of divorce is considerable and has been rising rather steadily for many decades. In 1900 the ratio of marriages to divorces was 19.2 to 1; in 1950 it was only 4.3 to 1. In terms of population, the rate of divorces per 1000 has multiplied by 3.57 since 1900—from 0.7 at the turn of the century to 2.5 per 1000 population at mid-century.

However, this trend while generally upward has not been uniform. The depression of the 1930's left it unaffected, but each world war increased the instability of marriage, and World War II increased it

very markedly. Figure II-5.1 shows the trend of the divorce rate during the last half-century. During the first forty years of this period the average increase per year was 0.035 per 1000 population. During the six years of World War II and the year immediately after, the increase averaged over *ten times* the rate of the preceding period (0.38 per 1000 per year). The 1946 peak of 4.3 divorces per 1000 was followed by an almost equally rapid decline during the next five years down to 2.4 per 1000 in 1951.

There are two ways of interpreting this curve: (1) Either the war simply accelerated the breakup of some tens of thousands of unstable marriages which would have reached the divorce courts anyway but more slowly under normal conditions; or (2) having reached a dizzy peak of disorganization in 1946 as a result of the war, the forces of disorganization have now receded and the divorce rate under normal conditions of peace should continue to decline for several years more. Under the first interpretation, the rate in 1960 would approximate that indicated by an extension of the trend line of the first forty years, namely, about 2.7. Under the second interpretation it might approximate only 2.0 per 1000 population by 1960.

The range of prediction, therefore, for 1960 lies between 2.7 at the 1900-40 rate of increase and 2.0 per 1000 population at the 1947-51 rate of decrease.¹⁵

Since the divorce laws differ so widely, state to state, it is impossible to compare the stability of marriage by states, but it can be compared on the farm and in the city. In 1951 the percentage of urban males 14 and over who had been divorced was over twice the percentage of farm males divorced—1.9 percent as against 0.9 percent; and the percentage of urban females divorced was almost four times the percentage of farm females divorced—2.6 percent as against 0.7 percent. The national average of divorcees was 1.9 percent for men, 2.1 percent for women.

Most divorces are obtained by women and by women without children. Children, in other words, constitute an integrating factor helping to hold a marriage together. Unfortunately, they also hold together

¹⁵ Unfortunately, after 1950 another war intervened, the war in Korea. The effect of this on the trend of the divorce rate is anybody's guess. But in view of the fact that the percentage of the male population engaged has been even smaller than the percentage involved in World War I, which had a comparatively minor effect on the trend line and that there has been no all out effort by the nation as a whole, one guess would be that Korea will have little effect on the trend line.

marriages that do them more harm than good. Evil as divorce is in its effects on everybody, depending, of course, on why and how it happens, it is sometimes less evil, especially if the child is too young to know what it is all about, than the continuance of a marriage relationship of hostility and emotional insecurity. The fact that women obtain most of the divorces is less significant than it seems, for in many cases to avoid scandal, the higher costs of contesting the action, and so on, the husband simply makes a purely formal show of opposition and lets his wife have the decree.¹⁶ States differ widely in their law of divorce from New York's stern refusal to grant a decree for anything except infidelity—giving it the lowest rate in the nation, 0.8 per 1000 population in 1950—to Nevada's cheery hospitality at Reno, where they not only issue divorces at a rate of 55.7 per 1000 native population, or over twenty times the national average, but issue marriage licenses as well at a rate of 311.7 per 1000 natives, or more than twenty-eight times the national average.¹⁷ Certainly divorce is a problem, but not one to cause any realist to give up in despair.

II-5A:6. Is the Family Failing as an Integrating Agency?

There is no way of answering such a question except in relation to some norm, or standard, of failure. If one says "failing as compared with the old colonial or nineteenth-century farm family," the answer is probably Yes; but that tells us nothing about the relative effectiveness of the family as such *until we have equated the other integrating and disintegrating factors in the cultures of the two periods*. Relative to the number and intensity of other conformity and nonconformity factors in the modern city as compared with the same factors in the old rural environment, the modern urban family is probably doing about as well as the old rural family did in its milieu. More divorces, more juvenile delinquents, more social breakdowns? Of course. There are also more stresses and confusions in modern life, and the art of social adjustment has not kept pace with the arts of discovery and invention. But relative to the size of the tasks confronting it, the modern urban family is probably doing as well as the school, better than the church, and at least as well as the law.

¹⁶ For either party to a divorce action to *agree* to dissolve the marriage is legally defined as *collusion* and vitiates the action. So unrealistic is this theory of the law that in New York State, where infidelity constitutes the only cause for divorce, the manufacture of incriminating evidence by hiring women to be "caught" with compliant divorce defendants in hotel rooms has reached the proportions almost of a minor industry!

¹⁷ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 80.

II

II-5A:7. The School in Myth and Reality

About 8 out of every 9 children of the 27,000,000 in the United States between the ages of 5 and 17, inclusive, attend the public elementary and secondary schools for an average of 156 days—out of the 178 days of average school operation each year—at an average cost of approximately \$200 per pupil. One-ninth, or about 3,000,000, attend parochial or other types of private schools, and another 931,000 are kindergartners, of whom about 1 in 6 goes to a private school. At the other extreme, there were 2,175,000 men and women enrolled in colleges and professional schools in 1950, 4 in tax-supported to every 3 in private institutions (organizations). In all, over 30,000,000 Americans of all ages were “in school” at mid-century. This was almost exactly one-fifth of the total population. No other single interest save self-support and housework claimed so much of the time of so many of our people.

Yet for the average pupil in elementary or secondary school, time in school accounts for only 936 hours a year, or 16 percent of his 5840 hours of waking time. Out of every 6 hours of the average pupil's waking time from 5 to 18 years of age, in other words, the school gets only one hour; other interests—the home, television, the movies, the streets, free play, and all the rest—get the other five. Yet of all agencies affecting the child, it is probable that only the home can equal the total impact of the school, for the school is organized, consistent, and persistent. From the kindergarten to the age of marriage or self-support, going to school is the child's major occupation, and the school does its best to see that he works at it.

If it is the home that teaches the child to speak and indoctrinates him with the deepest values of his culture, it is the school that makes him literate, equips him with the necessary skills for adjusting outside the home, indoctrinates him with a common historical tradition, and subjects the average child to the democratizing experience of competing with his peers from all social classes.

The public school itself, of course, has developed as a middle-class institution (organization) and works within the limits and pressures of the mores. This means that it tends to indoctrinate its pupils not only with a common historical tradition but with the middle-class virtues of self-improvement and social striving. The seamy side of this is that for millions of children from working-class homes, which see

little value in such virtues, the school not only fails to motivate coöperation and the desire to learn but kills curiosity and often stirs antagonism. Yet this is only one example of the way in which the facts of American life—the pressures of social inequality, racial discrimination, urban advantage over rural disadvantage—have diverted the public schools from their one-time cultural objective of providing equality of educational opportunity for all members of each oncoming generation. As in so many other aspects of American life, the myth of equality of opportunity has been one thing, the actual reality something else. When the myth conflicts with the interests of powerful segments of any community or region, the myth loses out in fact, but to preserve the myth itself the opinion leaders of the community usually ignore the gap, camouflage it, or deny it. “The mores can make anything right.”

Consider the incidence of economics on education. Various studies have shown that over half of the A and B brains in the United States are in the blue-collar occupations—farming and wage labor. Yet from the eighth grade on, the percentage of children who quit school to go to work, get married, and so on, rises much more rapidly year by year for blue-collar children than for those from white-collar homes. By the time one reaches the college and graduate-school levels the percentage of students from working-class and farm homes, which constitute the great majority of all homes in the United States, has sunk to approximately one-third of all those enrolled. Beginning in high school to cull out the children of the less prosperous, this economic differential *really* weeds them out of college and the graduate school. And since Negroes are an economically disadvantaged category in American society, this economic differential plus racial discrimination as such hits *them* harder than it hits white children. Together, the stratification system and the racial caste system—both of which we shall examine later—have driven a wide wedge between the myth of educational equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and the brute facts of actual educational inequality, on the other.

Then take a look at equality of educational opportunity as between country and city. Historically the rural school district was set up to support a “little red schoolhouse”—which frequently wasn’t even painted—within reasonable walking distance of every child in the district. The rural school district, in other words, is a horse-and-buggy district too small to support a modern educational plant. For years many states under the guise of state aid have been diverting more and

more urban tax money to supplement inadequate rural school funds. More recently the movements for consolidation of rural districts and the transportation of rural children to urban schools have still further narrowed the gap. But out of 70,000 school districts in 43 states, tens of thousands in 1950 were still operating outmoded one- and two-room rural schools. In other words, they were deliberately persisting in *undereducating* some millions of farm children, most of whom would eventually be forced to move to town anyway and enter into competition with the better-educated products of the city schools. Equality of educational opportunity thus got one black eye from the diminutive size of the rural school tax base, an insuperable handicap on the open country rural school; it got another from the farm-centered mores of many rural communities.

Everywhere until almost yesterday, and in many backward rural communities even today, the "little red schoolhouse" has done its best to "keep the boys on the farm." The teacher who dared to lift her eyes beyond the neighborhood and extol city opportunities for rural youth rarely lasted more than one year in her district. She was obviously a troublemaker and belonged in town!

What this amounted to was that to conform to the local farm-centered mores the school had to function as a feeder to the caste system of farming. Instead of relying on the price system to keep their industry going, as urban employers have had to rely on it to keep their businesses properly manned, farmers for several generations have been fighting "the pull of the cities" by using their schools to indoctrinate youth and deliberately limit their range of vocational choices. Willy-nilly the rural teacher has been practicing "vocational guidance"—without giving her pupils a fair look at any vocation except farming! In the cities only the very rich demand that their children subordinate their individual careers to family interests, and the city schools take no part in that plot. In fact, in direct contrast to rural practice over many years, they do their best to open to every pupil all possible vocations for which his aptitudes seem suitable. In this contrast between the rural and the urban schools equality of educational opportunity has taken another beating. Again, the myth vs. the reality.

II-5A:8. How the School Got Here

Schooling for the masses did not become a practicable possibility in the Western world until after the invention of printing in the fifteenth century and after the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth

had made the lay reading of the Bible, and therefore literacy, a foundation stone of the post-Reformation culture. But for nearly two centuries most such schooling as was offered in England and in western Europe continued to be controlled by churchmen and was definitely status-oriented—neither universal nor free.

Free public education at the taxpayer's expense seems to have been an American idea that came out of colonial New England and spread gradually after the Revolution. In 1785 the notion received the approval of the newly formed Confederation when Congress laid down a plan for surveying the western lands into townships of thirty-six mile-square sections, and allocated one section in each township to the support of schools. Two years later the famous Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory (north of the Ohio and west of New York) guaranteed freedom of religion *and* support of public schools.

But official action of this kind did not mean that powerful interests were not hostile to free public education. The clergy denounced public schools as "Godless schools" and the comfortable classes scorned them as instruments of "democratic vulgarity" in a day when *democratic* was a smear word on a par with *communistic* today. Even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century sturdy individualists in New England itself bitterly opposed the heretical idea of "taxing one man for the education of another man's brats." No doubt Thoreau, who had no use for government at all, must have felt strongly on this matter. Certainly across the ocean the great philosopher of *laissez faire*, Herbert Spencer, fulminated mightily against tax-supported schools as he fulminated against public milk inspection and other ominous symptoms of "socialism, the coming slavery."

But in America, championed by the early labor unions and against the continuing opposition of the "best people," the public schools continued to spread. In 1852 Massachusetts passed the first compulsory attendance law, curtailing the inalienable right to be ignorant. Twenty years later Chief Justice Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court carried this insidious attack on property a whole mile further by holding in the famous Kalamazoo case that school boards were legally empowered to levy taxes not merely for teaching the children of common people the three R's but actually for establishing and maintaining free secondary schools to compete with the aristocratic, fee-supported, private Latin academies. That did it. Eighty years later instead of a handful of 16,000 high-school graduates, a mere 1 to every 2476

persons in the general population, the nation's high schools were graduating over 1,000,000 young men and young women every year, 1 to every 125.

Along with that debacle, higher education also began to go common at the same time. From 9371 graduates in 1870—1 to every 4249 (81 percent of them men)—the colleges by 1950 got to turning out 432,058 graduates—1 to every 347 (only 76 percent of them men). True, the big expansion of both high-school and college populations came after World War I had demonstrated the social value of trained intelligence, but regardless of when it came, it was clear evidence that "the best people" had missed the bus. Tax-supported public education, capped with the state university to match the privately endowed colleges, seemed here to stay.

From the not quite disinterested point of view of Young America—as no doubt in the eyes of that early-morning character of Shakespeare's "creeping unwillingly to school"—all this indicated that the coming slavery wasn't coming any more. It had sure enough arrived!

II-5A:9. The School as an Agency of Integration

From the point of view of the American Creed and the rights of personality in a free and rational society, it is easy enough to point out that the American school system has many shortcomings. It has not lived up to the myth of equality of educational opportunity. It is subservient to local mores—as, indeed, what institution isn't? It has not yet won its battle with illiteracy; there were 2,838,000 illiterates over 14, or 2.7 percent, in 1947.

Overwhelmingly, Young America is taught by women—81 percent of the 900,000 elementary and secondary teachers in 1950—and vast numbers of these women are poorly trained and only temporarily interested in teaching at all as a mere stopgap till marriage.

Notoriously, these women are also underpaid in comparison with other professional workers. In 1949, for example, the *median* money income of all salaried professional workers was \$3809.¹⁸ A year later, with salaries generally tending to rise in the meantime, the *mean average* salary of 913,000 elementary and secondary teachers and administrators was still only \$3283.¹⁹ Since the median of a distribution of salaried workers cuts the distribution at the mid-point of the in-

¹⁸ *World Almanac and Book of Facts*, 1953, p. 566. Data from U.S. Office of Education.

¹⁹ *The Economic Almanac*, 1951-1952, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1951, p. 169.

dividuals concerned, half on one side, half on the other, while the mean average is affected by the few with high salaries, which are more numerous at the top among the urban administrators than at the bottom among the rural teachers, it is obvious that the mean average of such a skewed distribution of dollars must always be higher than the median of that same distribution of individuals. In other words, when the *median* income of all professional workers turns out to be over \$500 higher than the *mean average* of schoolteachers and administrators, you can bet your bottom dollar that the median income of the classroom teacher is a lot less than the mean average of teachers and administrators—and a lot *more* than \$500 *below* the median of all salaried professionals. Yet we are still talking about all classroom teachers, not merely women alone. Except in the most advanced school systems, there is still a tendency to pay men more than women for exactly the same work. So there can be no question whatever that women classroom teachers are underpaid, and underpaid by many hundreds of dollars a year as compared with other salaried professional workers. Teaching is not a moneymaking profession.

Out of nearly \$6,000,000,000 that Americans spent on their schools in 1950, nearly \$3,000,000,000 went into teachers' salaries, inadequate as these are by other professional standards. What was it all spent for? What were the schools trying to do?

Pretty much the same things that they have been trying to do for the last half-century: to turn the children out of the elementary school reasonably literate and out of the high school either prepared for college or for middle-class living in the community. This means that the elementary schools are still unaware of the psychological revolution introduced by Freud and the psychiatrists, and the high schools not only are also unaware of this but haven't yet come to terms with the sociological implications of modern industry. Given the complexities, confusions, and frustrations of modern life, it is pretty clear that literacy is an inadequate objective for the elementary school. Nothing less than total adjustment of the child is what is now needed, and this is precisely what the psychological revolution implies. The role of the emotions in social adjustment can no longer be ignored. To turn the child out with no training in mental hygiene is to turn him out under-equipped to deal with modern living.

On the high-school level, not only are the deficiencies of the elementary school on this point not being made good, but the high schools are falling between two stools: on the one hand, they are in-

adequately preparing a minority of their pupils for college, and on the other, they are inadequately preparing the majority for living in their own communities. Naturally, there are wide variations here from school to school. But the colleges constantly complain of "the breakdown" of secondary education, the failure of the high schools to teach effectively even simple English composition, to say nothing of grounding their pupils soundly in mathematics and elementary science. For the majority, meanwhile, both parents and employers insist that the high schools are *not* preparing their pupils either for marriage or for self-support, and not even for the constructive use of leisure time. Many times such criticisms are based on old-fashioned preconceptions and misinformation. They are certainly unfair when they come from people who have just been rapidly engaged in cutting school budgets. But where there is so much smoke there must be some fire. Yet when so many Americans cannot make up their own minds about what kind of society they want, and when the colleges are obviously confused about the purposes of higher education, as most of them are, perhaps the high schools should not be condemned too severely if they show a bit of confusion themselves.

Undoubtedly, the American school system spreads aesthetic and literary "culture" pretty thin—the median years of school completed approximates nine, or one year of high school, for native whites and about six for Negroes—and the hundreds of thousands of our college graduates do not begin to average the percentage of distinguished achievements credited to the much fewer and more highly selected graduates of British and Continental universities. In some forty-odd years of Nobel Prize awards in physics, chemistry, medicine, and physiology, Germany with about half the population of the United States won thirty-six awards, or 31 percent; the United States twenty, or 17 percent. Per million population, German university graduates were nearly four times as prolific in Nobel Prize winners as were United States graduates. We may well remember that it was a German who discovered how to split the atom, and it was the combined scientific knowledge of British, Italian, Danish, and other Continental scientists that provided the scientific know-how, the basic scientific concepts, on the basis of which American technology produced the atom bomb.

Yet broadly as higher education reaches in the United States to numbers unmatched elsewhere in the world, the National Manpower Council reported to President Eisenhower in May, 1953, (1) that *less than half of the young Americans who are intellectually fitted for*

college actually get there and (2) that *for every one who acquires a Ph.D. there are twenty-five more who could*, if they had the opportunity and the incentives!

All these shortcomings of the American educational system can be cited, and they by no means exhaust the criticisms. Yet when it has all been said, the fact remains that never in human history has any other nation placed such high hopes on education, spent so much money on its schools, opened higher education to so many people, or asked its educators to do such a complex job of welding into one people so many millions of children from so many diverse cultural backgrounds. That the hopes were exaggerated; that the money after all constitutes only a small fraction of a wealthy nation's income (4 or 5 percent) and less than the amount which that nation spends on recreation (\$11,300,000,000 in 1950); that the very multitude of college-trained youth may eventually become a drug on the middle-class market; and that the welding process has left some very rough edges indeed, which on occasion rip holes in things—all these aspects one must keep in mind when evaluating the American school system. It is trying to do more than any other school system ever tried. It is trying under more complex, dynamic, and confusing conditions than any other system ever faced. And if it is not too clear concerning its own objectives and not too uniformly dedicated to the very values it so frequently talks about, the fault may lie less in the school system itself and its operating personnel than in the society and the culture in which it functions. No institution or institutional organization can escape the pressures of the mores and the trends of its own times. The value of personality, the value of rationality, the value of democracy as a way of life—these values are betrayed more tragically by industry and government than they are by the schools. And as the one institution dedicated to the training of intelligence, the schools are probably lagging less behind the needs of the age than are the churches and the law.

III

II-5A:10. Religion, Theology, the Church

Man has confronted the need of relating himself emotionally as well as intellectually and practically to what the Lynds once called "the too-bigness of life" ever since he evolved wits enough to realize, however dimly, his own insignificance in the face of nature. There are many theories of religious origins. Three of the great ethical religions, those that regard man's conduct here and now as important to the

ultimate powers of the universe—Judaism, Mohammedanism, Christianity—trace their beginnings to some form of *revelation*.²⁰

But cynics long ago, as early as the sixth century B.C. in India, for example, suggested that all religions had been invented by priests or rulers for their own benefit. Some psychologists and some anthropologists have regarded religion as an expression of innate psychological predispositions, the product of something like a *universal religious instinct*. No such instinct has ever been verified despite the universality of religion.

Some psychiatrists see religion as “man’s supreme method of sublimating the repressions of infancy and childhood and gratifying the unfulfilled desires of maturity and old age through the use of sacred rituals and fancies.”²¹ Many anthropologists and sociologists have sought its origins in *primitive attitudes*. Durkheim, the great French sociologist, held that religion began in the heightened emotional experiences of primitive group assemblies, which first gave early man the feeling of the peculiarly potent, or sacred. Sir Edward Tylor and Herbert Spencer thought *animism*, the belief in spirits, started it all, while Max Müller found the origin in *naturalism*, the tendency of savages to fear and revere natural objects or occurrences of unusual impressiveness, or power, such as mountains, thunderstorms, etc. Sir J. G. Frazer, the author of *The Golden Bough*, traced it to *magic*, the primitive method of projecting wishes by various form of mumbo jumbo. Other writers see it beginning in *ancestor worship*. As the present writer pointed out years ago, four things can be said about religious origins:

1. Religion is very old, one of our oldest cultural forms, probably 25,000 and possibly hundreds of thousands of years old.
2. As magic or as religion proper, the religious impulse has expressed itself in every culture.
3. It has taken many forms.
4. No single theory of origins explains all the facts. Inspiration, the self-interest of priests and rulers, instinctive cravings, group influence, animism, naturalism, magic, ancestor worship—all may have had a share in its beginnings.²²

²⁰ If Confucianism can be regarded as a religion and not merely a system of ethics, there are five ethical religions, which in the order of their appearance are: Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. All came out of the East or Near East and all appeared (or reached a definitely socialized stage, as in the case of Judaism) in the space of 1372 years, between the birth of Isaiah, 740 B.C., and the death of Mohammed, A.D. 632.

²¹ Edward J. Kempf, *Psychopathology*, St. Louis, C. V. Mosby Company, 1920, p. 72.

²² Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Cooley Angell, and Lowell Juilliard Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933, p. 452.

Whatever may have been its origins, religion has been man's age-old acknowledgment of his own helplessness in the presence of the ultimate mysteries of life.

Religion has been observed on at least five and possibly six levels of intellectual sophistication.

1. ANIMATISM

The most primitive level is that of animatism. This is belief in the existence of some impersonal power, with little or no theorizing about the nature of that power: the level of the Melanesian *mana*, the Iroquoian *orenda*, Siouan *wakan*. It is merely belief in some mysterious potency in nature.

2. ANIMISM

The mysterious potency is now attributed to invisible spirits, usually believed to frequent a definite thing or place. The Trobriand Islanders place the wood-sprites in certain trees, and one of the magic rituals required for the successful construction of a canoe for use in the *Kula* expeditions from island to island necessarily has to do with propitiating the spirit of the particular tree involved. Other rituals are required to placate the terrible flying witches which always come from the south or from the east, and to balk the jumping stones that smash into canoes from the bottom of the ocean.

3. POLYTHEISM

This is the level of the early civilizations. Now dead heroes and exalted nature spirits have become gods. "A god is a spirit endowed with a distinct personality and the object of a cult, as exercising certain supernatural functions in nature or human life."²³

4. MONOLATRY

One god is now exalted above the rest, as with the Roman Zeus or the vengeful, tribal Yahveh of the Jews. Originally, Yahveh was probably a nature spirit, the spirit of the sky.

5. MONOTHEISM

This is the belief not that there is one most powerful god among many but that there is only one god in the whole world. Under the

²³ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, London, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1906, p. 402.

leadership of the ancient Hebrew prophets, the Jews became the first people in the world to reach this level of religious development. These prophets and especially Isaiah were the first religious leaders anywhere to conceive of the Ultimate Power in the universe as an ethical being, concerned about individual human conduct, and righteous, just, and loveable. Intensely ethnocentric, however, the Jews regarded God as primarily concerned with them. It took the advent of Jesus of Nazareth and later the Greek-inspired leadership of a former Pharisee named Paul to transform the ethnocentric heritage of this little Semitic sect into a world-conquering religion, Christianity.

6. TRANS-THEISM

The coming of modern science with its developing conceptions of a universe ranging from the infinitesimal energy-elements of the atom at one extreme to *billions* of *galaxies* 2,000,000,000 light-years away at the other has made it extremely difficult for many people to conceive of all this as the creation and the object of control of an Ultimate Power possessing the characteristics of a person as we know personality under the conditions of terrestrial existence. The atheist denies the existence of God. The agnostic denies the possibility of knowing anything about Him. The trans-theist would admit the existence of some Ultimate Power and see actual evidences of it—*something* makes the universe a unity instead of a chaos—but he would deny the likelihood that this Ultimate Power can be any humanlike *person*. Perhaps the New Humanism, which seeks God only in man's own will-to-goodness and addresses its prayers to the Spirit of On-Going Humanity, comes as near to trans-theism as anything yet formulated.

Whatever one may think of trans-theism as a possible sixth level of religious evolution, it is obvious that underlying the phenomena of religious behavior from animatism up there is always some theory about the ultimate nature of life and the world. For each theistic religion this system of religious theory constitutes its *theology*. Thus, we have official Roman Catholic theology, Calvinistic theology, and so on. Theology must always be distinguished from the actual beliefs and feelings which constitute religion itself; and both religion and theology are distinct from the *church*, which is an institutionalized organization consisting like all organizations of a selected personnel, specific forms, symbols, and so on.²⁴

²⁴ See Book I, Chapter 5, p. 82, for the constituent elements of an institutional organization.

II-5A:11. Churches in the United States

In 1950 there were 38 different religious bodies in the United States with a membership of 50,000 or more each, plus an indeterminate number of smaller bodies, totaling in all 86,830,000 church members.²⁵ These bodies operated through 281,511 separate individual churches, which were served by 285,014 ordained clergymen. Corporate mem-

TABLE II-5:2. Churches and Church Membership in Leading Denominations, 1950

Religious Body	Number of Churches	Membership	Ordained Clergy	Average Members per Church
Roman Catholic	15,533	28,635,000	43,889	1,843
Baptist, 10 different persuasions	77,750	16,490,000	83,667 ^a	212
Methodist, 5 different persuasions	54,597	11,063,000	36,565 ^b	203
Lutherans, 7 different persuasions	15,468	5,942,000	9,077 ^c	384
Presbyterian, 4 bodies	13,849	3,292,000	13,448	238
Protestant Episcopal	7,784	2,541,000	6,654	326
Disciples of Christ	7,769	1,768,000	8,208	227
Jewish congregations	3,728	5,000,000	2,350	1,341
Eastern Orthodox Churches, 5 different persuasions	882	1,650,000	415 ^d	1,871
Totals for leaders	197,360	76,381,000	204,273	386
Others	84,151	10,449,000	80,741	124
Grand totals	281,511	86,830,000	285,014	308

^a Does not include clergy of five small bodies of Baptists with a combined membership of 537,000 and 5168 churches.
^b Does not include clergy of Colored Methodist Episcopal Church, which reported 381,000 members and 4300 churches as of 1946.
^c Does not include the clergy of the Missouri Synod, which reported 1,675,000 members and 4430 churches.
^d Does not include clergy of Armenian, Russian, and Serbian churches, with combined memberships of 575,000 and 482 churches.
 From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 55.

berships ranged from the 50,000 members of the Pentecostal Assemblies of the World, Incorporated, with 600 churches, to the 28,635,000 members of the venerable Roman Catholic church with its 15,533 individual churches.

Table II-5.2 shows how the leading religious bodies in the United States rank in churches, membership, and ordained clergymen, with average size of membership per church.

²⁵ Different religious bodies define membership differently. The Catholic Church claims as members all children after they have been christened at whatever age. Most of the Protestant bodies regard as members only those of thirteen or older who are actually affiliated with the church.

The striking difference in average size of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish congregations, on the one hand, and the various Protestant churches, on the other, is largely due to the higher percentage of rural and small-town church membership among the Protestants. The American countryside is predominantly Protestant; the big cities sometimes 40 to 60 percent Catholic.

It is obvious that in the modern world, for supporting clergymen, providing modern facilities, and financing programs, small congregations are at a disadvantage as compared with large ones. For this and other reasons, open-country churches have been declining for more than a generation.

Yet in terms of relative membership in the total population, religious bodies in the United States seem to be flourishing. As against a membership in 1776 estimated at 4 percent of the population, and 48 percent in 1926, the membership in 1950 constituted more than 57 percent of all the men, women, and children in the country, and total contributions averaged \$4045 per church congregation.²⁶

II-5A:12. Churches Under Stress

Current problems facing American churches can be traced to eight sources: (1) modern science, (2) the higher criticism and new theological ideas, (3) the growth of cities, (4) diffusion of the Continental Sabbath, (5) economic pressures and social reform, (6) changing morals, (7) the spread of naturalism, and (8) the Soviet challenge to Christianity. We have space barely to mention each of these.

1. MODERN SCIENCE

Science has forced modern man to think of this world as ruled by universal law (invariant uniformities) instead of an arbitrary God. In effect, science has outlawed miracle.

Despite the historical struggles over the Copernican theory and evolution, the leaders of the great churches, Catholic and Protestant, have finally tended on the whole to accept the scientific conception

²⁶ During their history in the United States the Protestant churches have experienced wide fluctuations of popular interest in religion. On the eve of the nineteenth century, for example, many thoughtful observers like John Marshall, soon to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, regarded the church "as too far gone ever to be revived." Yet in 1796 President Timothy Dwight of Yale started the so-called second awakening—the first in 1735 had led to the founding of Princeton College—and this led to the invention of the camp meeting and renewed interest in the spiritual welfare of the settlers on the frontier. "At various times since 1800 waves of religious enthusiasm have swept over local areas, particularly Western New York where Mormonism, Spiritualism and a number of other new faiths appeared." Cooley, Angell, and Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-456.

not as excluding God or denying His existence but as evidencing even more strikingly His power and purpose. But millions still cling to a prescientific faith. The fundamentals were stated in 1910: the Virgin Birth; the actual, physical Resurrection; the inerrancy of the Scriptures; the substitutionary theory of the Atonement (Christ died to save mankind); and the imminent physical Second Coming of the Savior. This is fundamentalism, which claims millions of adherents, has succeeded in making the teaching of evolution unlawful in three states, prosecuted a young high-school instructor for such teaching at Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925, and led the public outcry that greeted the publication of the modernized New Standard Revised Edition of the Bible in 1952. It is prescientific in its theology and antiscientific in its social impacts. It particularly abhors any attempt to apply scientific analysis to the Bible or to study the original Biblical manuscripts in their historical setting.

2. THE HIGHER CRITICISM AND NEW THEOLOGICAL IDEAS

Under the lead of German scholars like Harnack, the scientific-historical study of the Bible has revealed the fact that the Christian tradition has itself evolved, and during this evolution prevailing beliefs about the nature of Jesus of Nazareth and His mission changed radically. One early struggle, for example, turned on the question of whether Jesus of Nazareth was simply a man with a divinely inspired purpose or was Himself divine. Under the conditions of the dying Roman Empire, the second interpretation won out not only against the naturalistic interpretation but against Mithraism, the Isis cult, and other Oriental religions of the time. Christianity, in short, began as a social movement and had to adapt itself in some measure to the conditions of its age in order to survive.

On the basis of such findings, modern theologians like Schleiermacher, Kirkegaard, and others have worked out new theories of the nature of God and of the meaning of Christ's message.

3. THE GROWTH OF CITIES

As Americans increasingly congregated in cities, the churches found themselves facing new problems. For one thing, congregations refused to stay put as business invaded residential neighborhoods and the ethnic complexion of different areas changed. During the course of the last century some big-city Protestant churches have moved as many as three or four times. Catholic churches, on the other hand, have tended to hold the line and thus find themselves in closer contact

with the immigrants and their descendants who have taken over many of the older middle-class areas. On the whole, the larger Protestant churches have followed the migrations of the middle class, and to a large extent, the migrations of the middle-class mind from fundamentalism to the acceptance of evolution and the scientific point of view. But in so far as Protestantism is reaching the submerged migrants from the farms and from the southern mountains, it is reaching them largely through fundamentalist sects and hell-and-brimstone revivalists like Billy Sunday and his successors. In the cities the "respectable" big Protestant churches are predominantly middle class; the working class is either Protestant fundamentalist, Catholic, or unchurched.

4. DIFFUSION OF THE CONTINENTAL SABBATH

In colonial days church attendance on Sunday was compulsory either by law or by custom, and churchmen enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the Sabbath. In Philadelphia even into the nineteenth century, the churches had a legal right to stretch chains across the streets to prevent traffic from distracting worshippers. Everywhere secular reading on Sunday was taboo.

Three streams of influence combined to erode and eventually destroy this monopoly: (a) The interdependences of city living—the necessity of continuous operation of waterworks, street railways, police functions, railroads, hotels, steel furnaces, and the like—made it more and more impossible to suspend all economic activities one day in seven; (b) the insistent public demand for news from the front on Sunday as on other days during the War Between the States broke down the taboo on secular reading and opened the way for the modern Sunday newspaper; and (c) increasing numbers of European immigrants with no Puritan inhibitions insisted on using Sunday not as a day of repentance and reflection but as a day of relaxation and enjoyment. The Continental Sabbath arrived. Blue laws still clutter the statute books but nobody bothers to enforce them.

Thus, the churches have been forced into competition with Sunday newspapers, the movies, the golf course, the public parks, television, the open road, and all the other diversions of a modern Sunday.

5. ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND SOCIAL REFORM

Economics presses on the churches in at least three ways: (a) Religious splintering is no longer economic; (b) the United States has too many churches to have efficient churches; and (c) the Protestant

churches are economically dependent on those social classes that historically have most strenuously resisted demands for economic reform.

a. Religious splintering is no longer economic. For about three centuries after the Reformation low living standards and the simplicity of self-support in an agricultural economy made it easily possible for any variant theologian to gather a few followers into a separatist sect and break away to devote himself to salvation by way of wooden buttons, Biblical whiskers, or whatever. The economics of urban industrialism make that a bit more difficult today. Since the turn of the century the trend in Protestantism has been toward integration rather than further splintering. Sectarianism is in a decline. It is not only harder to get a new sect going against all the economic and other pressures of modern urbanism; it is harder to keep it isolated and uncontaminated. Economics and modern communication are both hostile to sectarianism. Sectarianism is a luxury of rural isolation.

b. The United States has too many churches.²⁷ There are over twice as many churches as there are restaurants and cafeterias in the United States, and two-thirds as many as there are grocery stores. These comparisons in themselves mean nothing because there is no standard relationship between the number of a nation's food-dispensing agencies and the number of its churches, but they do suggest concretely the prevalence of churches. Table II-5.2 proves how similar in this respect is the plight of our Protestant sects to that of our rural schools: *per operating unit*, the economic base of support in each case is obviously too small. The little rural school district has long since been economically outmoded, although thousands of country schools still hang on. The *average* individual Protestant church congregation is likewise outmoded—it is too small to maintain a modern church plant. How can the 200 to 400 members of the *average* Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, or Presbyterian congregation—a handful of not more than 60 to 150 families at most—possibly offer salary enough to attract a properly educated minister, maintain a modern church building, and finance a church program capable of attracting young people? Yet without young people, the church dies. What can the *average* Protestant church offer them except second-rate sermons and amateur singing?

True, it offers a service of worship and an experience of personal relationships more intimate than one can find in the big churches. But the service is usually so stereotyped and tradition-bound as to contribute to a sense of duty fulfilled rather than to spiritual growth, and

²⁷ Churches, 281,000; restaurants and cafeterias, in 1948, 130,192; grocery stores, 387,000. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*: 1952, p. 894.

the personal relationships with people whose foibles one already knows too well may add little to one's spiritual elevation.

Like so many other little things in a world which technology is organizing into bigger and bigger units, the little church seems doomed. Like the one- and two-room rural school, it is a vestige of a bygone day. It can't support itself on a modern level and it cannot compete with the big city churches or with the message by radio and television.

c. Class dependence is characteristic of the Protestant churches. In the country and in the cities the Protestant church is primarily the church of the middle and upper classes. These are the classes which for so many years have fought the labor movement and resisted lower-class demands for governmental action to check or overcome the increasing concentration of wealth and economic power in this country. That so many Protestant clergymen like Washington Gladden, Walter Rauschenbusch, Shailer Matthews, Harry F. Ward, and others have nevertheless taken a leading part in the support of social reform bespeaks a certain weakness in the theory of economic determinism. The leaders of the Interchurch World Forward Movement at the end of World War I even destroyed the financial support of their own movement rather than suppress the devastating report of their investigation of the great steel strike of 1919 against the twelve-hour day and the seven-day week.

But by and large it is still true that because of fundamental differences in theology, church organization, and financial support, the Roman Catholic clergy in America is probably freer to align itself with labor than is the Protestant clergy.

How to apply the ideals of Jesus of Nazareth to a competitive economy is still a problem for all churches.

6. CHANGING MORALS

Traditionally, Christianity has belittled sex and sanctioned large families and unbroken marriage. Freudianism, birth control, and the increase in divorce have all aroused good churchmen. Modern frankness about sex, the small family system, and divorce constitute problems concerning which the churches find themselves in some confusion.

7. THE SPREAD OF NATURALISM

Christianity as preached in the past has professed to speak in the name of a supernatural power. Ever since the rise of modern science

and especially modern technology, however, American culture has gone increasingly naturalistic. The old-time magic functions of religion for alleviating disease, for protecting people from pestilence and other disasters, and for advancing one's personal fortunes by prayer have gradually been superseded by scientific and technological devices for the same ends. Obviously, there are some crises in life which are still too big either for the individual or for modern science and technology. For such occasions religion is still man's age-old refuge. And since the discovery that the more scientific power man gets into his hands, the more precarious becomes the future of his civilization, millions have become disillusioned with the dream of man's self-sufficiency and have turned once more to their spiritual comforter. Hence, among other reasons, the increasing percentage of church membership in the population since World War I.

8. THE SOVIET CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANITY

Marx called religion the "opium of the people" because so often in the past the churches in the Old World, like the Catholic Church in Spain and its colonies, played the game of the possessing classes against the poor. Hence the official hostility of the Soviet regime to Christianity.

The Soviets, along with their more or less avowed determination to conquer the world, are also out to destroy traditional churches. Yet when the Bolshevik Revolution first broke on the world a generation ago there were many Christian idealists who regarded the destruction of the capitalist economy as a step toward a more Christlike social order. A few like the Red Dean of Canterbury managed to cling to this fond hope throughout a generation of Red purges, slave camps, and international conspiracies.

Fortunately most religious leaders were more realistic, and the number who still give spiritual allegiance to Moscow is not enough to constitute a clear and present danger. But there are many who have so deeply taken to heart the Christian teaching about the value of personality that they completely ignore the historical facts of life. Christianity itself survived as a force in the world only because time and again men were willing to fight and die for it. So, willy-nilly imagining that they were advancing the cause of Christ, these unworldly churchmen have manfully served the Communist enemies of Christianity by preaching *pacifism* among the enemies of Communism! In these days when sacrifice is no longer fashionable, nothing could be

more dangerous. To counsel the West to turn the other cheek to the deliberate aggressions of the mightiest military power in the Old World, a power ruthlessly set on conquering the world, as Lenin and others have declared, seems hardly the most intelligent way to preserve Western civilization.²⁸

Although the great majority of the Protestant clergy have been too practical to contribute to this moral sabotage, many of them could still take lessons from the oldest institutional organization in the world. The Catholic Church has been coldly realistic. Peace to the Vatican is as wonderful as it is to the Protestants—but only when you have the Devil safely back in hell!

Obviously, social changes have brought many problems to the Christian churches: Science, the critical-historical movement, the growth of cities, the continental Sabbath, economic pressures, changing morals, naturalism, Russian Communism—all have forced churchmen to reëxamine traditional points of view. In the nature of the case, religion being what it is, traditional and superrational, readjustments have lagged. The Lynds in *Middletown* (Muncie, Indiana) during the 1920's found that the churches had changed less since the 1890's than had any other institutional organizations.

What does it all mean for the churches as integrating agencies in a community?

II-5A:13. Integration vs. Division in Religion

The Reformation set western Europeans at each other's throats for more than a century in the bloody wars of religion. If one great outcome of that period was the principle of toleration and an approximation to religious liberty in Britain and the United States, the social outcome was the division of the community into Protestants and Catholics and then the splintering of the Protestants into scores of mutually hostile sects. Although sectarianism has been losing its force in recent years, the vestiges of it still divide many small communities. And the more backward sects have shown surprising sympathy for a whole host of leaders preaching suspicion and hatred rather than Christian humility and kindness. This is the ideology of Fascism, the

²⁸ A great deal more is involved in the preservation of Western civilization against Russian Communist imperialism than mere military checkmate. But military survival is the absolutely necessary condition for any kind of survival. Merely to prevent world conquest by Communism will not guarantee the survival of those civilized values which Protestant churchmen prize so highly, but not to prevent world conquest will certainly guarantee their extinction. Hence the absolute and utter importance of military survival at all costs.

reactionary enemy of democracy, and it has found dangerous breeding ground among the disillusioned middle classes and the ignorant poor in southern and midwestern rural areas. Possibly the most ominous apparition ever to appear in American politics was Huey Long, the proto-Fascist, "Share the Wealth" politician who ruled Louisiana for several years in the early 1930's as a virtual dictator. Long was able to mobilize the votes of both Protestant rural whites and Catholic urban masses in Louisiana. Fascism, therefore, is neither a sectarian nor a religious movement. Abroad, it has been rather a politico-economic reaction of endangered reactionary elements against political democracy and the welfare state, a reaction manipulated by unscrupulous politicians to win mass support from frustrated middle-class youth and from insecure workers and peasants who have lost faith in both democratic reform and revolutionary radicalism. It originated in Catholic Italy, reached its apogee in Hitler's Lutheran Germany, and in Catholic Portugal and Catholic Spain has outlived both its parents. In this country while Huey Long was demonstrating in Louisiana how it might be introduced to America, its ideological overtones were finding a radio voice in the person of the Royal Oak radio priest, Father Coughlin, whose movement for what he called Social Justice stirred up a certain amount of anti-Semitism until, following his attacks on President Roosevelt, the church hierarchy forced him to choose between popular agitation and the priesthood. On the whole, in this country the various little proto-Fascist movements that flourished during the depression, especially the Ku Klux Klan, which has proved more enduring than most, have drawn their support mainly from rural Protestants. The Klan itself, of course, is as bitterly anti-Catholic as it is anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-Negro—and antidemocratic. All in the name of Christianity and exalted nationalism! What all this indicates is not that either Protestantism or Catholicism predisposes toward Fascism but that, given the necessary degree of ignorance, frustration, and disillusionment on the part of a simple-minded people of whatever religion, many can be bamboozled into accepting a Fascist-minded *Führer* as a political savior. It has just happened in this country that many of the specified types belonged to the more backward Protestant sects.

On top of such cleavages there has apparently been growing among Protestants in recent years an uneasy fear of the rising political strength of the Catholic Church. This has found its most striking expression in such books as Paul Blanshard's *American Freedom and*

*Catholic Power and Democracy, Communism and the Catholic Church.*²⁹ That Catholic political power has increased from the days when Catholics constituted less than 1 percent of the population, when Washington was inaugurated, is beyond dispute. In 1952 Catholics constituted about 15 or 16 percent of the total electorate, but since the Catholic vote is overwhelmingly urban and is largely concentrated in the big cities of the East and North, outnumbering Protestants in a number of cities such as Providence and Buffalo, its effectiveness on certain state and national policies is considerably greater than overall proportions indicate. In most of the industrial states from Massachusetts to Illinois the Catholic vote is a force to be reckoned with. Nearly 55 percent of all American Catholics live in the eleven states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, which include only 42 percent of the general population. Catholics constitute about one-fourth of the total population of these states. In the country at large they make up only 19 percent of the population.³⁰

Although most of the great increase in the Catholic population of this country came between 1880 and 1924 in the influx of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and this influx has long since been drastically reduced by tighter immigration laws drafted specifically to cut down "non-Nordic" immigration, the higher Catholic birth rate and the dramatic successes of Catholic proselyting during recent years, marked by the conversion of such notables as Henry Ford II, Clare Boothe Luce, and others, contribute to Protestant uneasiness about the future. The trend, not the present, is what worries Protestant leaders, who cannot forget past religious conflicts in the Old World and occasional clashes today in this country over birth control, censorship, and the sharing of public-school money.

Catholics, on their part, insist that they are as good Americans as any Protestant and as deeply devoted to American democracy and freedom.

This is another religious conflict that also has elements of danger for American unity.

²⁹ Books that were ably answered by James M. O'Neil in *Catholicism and American Freedom*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952.

³⁰ Since Catholics count church membership from the time of christening, a large percentage of Catholic membership consists of minors who cannot vote. Hence, the Catholic vote is a lower percentage of the total electorate than is the percentage of Catholics in the total population.

II-5A:14. The Menace of Anti-Semitism

But in addition to sectarian conflicts and the antagonism of Protestants and Catholics, one must not forget anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is older than Christianity. There are records of anti-Semitic riots in Alexandria a hundred years before Christ. Christianity, however, partly as a result of its own theological ideas about the relationship of the Jews to Jesus of Nazareth and partly because of its early struggles against Judaism as a competing religion, made anti-Semitism a culture trait of Western civilization. Although refusing to exterminate the Jews as living witnesses to the truth of its doctrines and often actually protecting them against the excesses of the mobs, the Roman Church down through the ages condoned when it did not actually instigate persecutions and massacres. All over Europe for centuries the Jews were fair prey. Herded into ghettos until almost the eve of the French Revolution and denied the most elementary protections for centuries, the Jews were the perennial scapegoats, the perennial objects of hatred and despoliation. They were expelled from country after country. England had no Jews for almost four centuries until Cromwell readmitted a few for economic reasons. Just before Columbus sailed for the New World, Ferdinand and Isabella celebrated their victory over the Moors in Spain by driving out the Jews, people who had lived in Spain for twelve centuries. French kings expelled them. The Germans drove thousands into Poland to become tax collectors for the Polish nobility and so to incur the undying hatred of the Polish peasants. Till the French Revolution struck off their shackles, the Jews were the outcasts of Europe.

And yet, cut off as they were from participation in the main stream of European culture and subjected to a process of lethal selection more rigorous than that affecting any other contemporary people, the Jews per 1,000,000 population have managed to produce more men of distinction in the last two centuries in more different fields of achievement, excepting only the military, than has any other ethnic stock.³¹

³¹ The Jews are not a distinct race. Anthropologists class them as members of the Semitic branch of the Mediterranean, or narrow-headed, brunet category of the white race. The narrow-headed blonds are the Nordics and the broad-headed blonds are the Alpines. Other categories we need not note. The point is, instead of being a race, the Jews are a cultural category, a religious nationality, unique in history for having developed not only a religious nationality but a nationality which has persisted for centuries detached from any particular territory. They constitute about one-seventh of the 75,000,000 Semites in the world, most of whom live in and around the Arabian peninsula. How little race as such has to do with war was revealed by the struggle between the

On the eve of World War II there were 16,000,000 Jews in the world, only a few hundreds of thousands in Germany, where they constituted *less than 1 percent* of the German population. Hitler between 1933 and 1945 exterminated 6,000,000 in Europe, the most abominable crime of genocide in the history of the world. In 1950 approximately 5,000,000 Jews lived in the United States.

As a result of exclusion from the aristocratic privilege of landowning during the Middle Ages, the Jews have been mainly an urban people for centuries. Hence, about 90 percent of all American Jews live in 73 cities: over 2,000,000 of them in New York, 325,000 in Chicago, 250,000 in Los Angeles, 245,000 in Philadelphia, 90,000 in Detroit, and so on down.

The religious motivation for anti-Semitism has long since ceased to be important. What has taken its place is the fear of economic competition on the part of other population elements and the age-old discovery by the upper classes that anti-Semitism can divert all kinds of social discontents from privilege itself to the traditional scapegoats. Thus, in the 1890's traitorous French Army officers attempted to throw the blame for their treason on their Jewish compatriot, Captain Dreyfus. But for the protests of liberal Frenchmen headed by Émile Zola they would have succeeded in keeping him a prisoner on Devil's Island for life. In Germany Hitler falsely blamed the Jews for the defeat of the "master race" in World War I. In this country anti-Semitism did not appear for a century after the Declaration of Independence. Then in 1877, when the discontents of a growing industrialism were bursting forth in the first of the great strikes and the upper classes were beginning to feel the competitive threat of the more able members of the millions of immigrants who were swarming to our shores, two Irish immigrants who had risen to the ownership of a swank hotel at aristocratic Saratoga signaled the new social tensions in the air by ostentatiously refusing accommodations to a wealthy New York Jewish banker and his family. From that point on anti-Semitism became a weapon for maintaining the social ascendancy of the older stocks. Unwritten "gentlemen's agreements" barred Jews from certain residential sections and from certain occupations and professions. College fraternities became "exclusive," i.e., exclusively

Jews and their Semitic brothers, the Arabs, for the control of Palestine after World War II. The terms *narrow-headed* and *broad-headed* refer to the cephalic index, i.e., to the ratio of skull width to skull length. A ratio over 80 qualifies a skull as broad headed. One under 75, as narrow-headed. Nobody knows what difference, if any, such skull differences make in intelligence and other mental characteristics.

for Gentiles, forcing Jews to organize fraternities of their own. Rumors of a quota system in colleges and professional schools began to circulate, vehemently denied by college administrators, whose schools nevertheless maintained a curious scarcity of Jewish students. Medical schools imposed "personality tests" to supplement purely academic or intellectual tests, at which, it seemed, Jews were notoriously good. Engineering became almost exclusively a Gentile profession.

Anti-Semites, meanwhile, aided during the 1920's by Henry Ford's Dearborn *Independent*, circulated dark stories of a secret Jewish conspiracy to dominate the Gentile world. According to these rumors, Jews were supposed to control the American banking system, manufacturing, the movies, and the press, and to have their hands on most of the nation's gold. Unfortunately for the anti-Semites, the facts were, of course, that old Anglo-American families were safely in control of the old established industries and the Jews were forced to make their way in the service industries and in fields newly opened by invention. Two Gentile banking groups, the Rockefeller (Baptist) and Morgan (Episcopalian) banks, dominated the financial world and incidentally controlled the key industries on whose patented products the whole movie industry depended. In manufacturing the greatest corporations like United States Steel, General Motors, and the Ford Motor Company were definitely not in Jewish hands. As for the press, except for the *New York Times* and a handful of other papers, most of the great newspapers and newspaper chains belonged to men with names like Hearst, Scripps, Howard, Gannett, Booth, John S. Knight, William Allen White, Bertie McCormick, Henry Luce. If few magazines could equal in intellectual quality the Jewish monthly, *Commentary*, it was not because Jews were debasing *Harper's* and *Scribner's*, the *New Republic* or the *Nation*, which they did not control. Some of the keenest minds in America merely happened to belong to Jews: Albert Einstein, Sidney Hook, Walter Lippmann, scores of others. In music, literature, science the story was the same. The great Jewish conspiracy, it seemed, was a Jewish tradition to value trained intelligence.

Yet Hitler had demonstrated one lesson plainly: Any political shyster and any privileged coterie that wanted to gain power and protect privilege need only raise the specter of the "Jewish menace"—10,000,000 Jews against 600,000,000 Gentiles in the Western world—to set the ignorant and the frustrated muttering and the crosses burning. Anti-Semitism no longer needed a religious motivation. It

had other uses. As Carey McWilliams points out, it had become "a mask for privilege."

One word more on the problems of the churches. We have noted some of those that divide us. Against all this do the churches still perform an integrative function?

Yes, by preserving traditional religious values—the value of personality, the value of faith in human life, the value of charity and kindness. Imperfectly as our civilization expresses these values and persistently as we flout them, they are nevertheless the common heritage of us all, perpetuated and reiterated by the churches. The great ethical values of our culture are the peculiar responsibilities of our religious organizations, Jewish as well as Christian. No other institutional organizations are dedicated to the preservation and enrichment of these values as are the churches. No others are so free of self-serving, cynicism, and profit-seeking as are the churches. Whatever one may think of their various theologies and their theories of the sanctions that uphold these values, the values themselves are vital to the survival of a humane, ethical, rational and free civilization.

Hence, one final problem: How preserve and strengthen these values when the supernatural sanctions which traditionally have upheld them seem to be weakening in the face of the spread of naturalism, the growing indifference on the part of modern youth to the very existence of anything beyond the reach of science? Mysticism still lives, but all too often only the mature can grasp its implications.

The moral confusions of the modern world find their most dramatic expression in the United States in the chronic and widespread disregard of law which stamps Americans as the most lawless civilized people in the world.

PART B. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

II-5B:1. Laws and Lawbreaking

Laws are instruments of the political state. Preliterate man has no laws. He has customs which have the force of law in controlling behavior but are not specifically formulated by any authority and are enforced not by any special functionary but by group opinion.

Laws begin in history as the arbitrary commands of rulers and as the statements of ancient customs. That the laws in practice might

express a rationale of human relationships applicable anywhere did not occur to anybody until the extension of Roman rule over the different peoples of the Mediterranean world forced the Roman proconsuls to develop theories concerning the nature of justice and to standardize their practices. The result was the great body of Roman law which, as codified under Justinian, became Rome's major bequest to later generations and the basis of the legal systems of western Europe. The English, isolated from the legal thinking of the Continent, developed their own system of jurisprudence, the English common law, which has been accepted as the theoretical basis of law in this country until specifically superseded by legislation.

In terms of the rights, obligations, and so on, with which they deal, laws may be classified as civil, political, administrative, and criminal.³² Civil law relates to private rights and acts affecting such rights. A violation of an individual's civil rights such as a trespass on his land constitutes a tort, and the remedy is a private suit for damages. Political law governs political behavior, the machinery of political action, elections, etc. Administrative law has to do with the administrative procedures of government agencies: courts, the police, particularly special commissions, and so on. Criminal law is law intended to prevent conduct harmful to the general interest. Every criminal law declares every act violating its terms to be a crime; and to make its prohibition of such acts effective, it prescribes some sort of sanction for each violation, i.e., some sort of penalty—a fine, a term of imprisonment, corporal punishment, or death. Mainly as a matter of convenience crimes have come to be divided into four categories: *misdemeanors*, or relatively trivial offenses like drunkenness, most traffic violations, etc., punishable by small fines or by imprisonment in a local jail for anything up to a year; *high misdemeanors*, more serious offenses—in some states indecent exposure, for example—which still do not carry loss of civil rights but may be punishable by short prison terms; *felonies*; and *treason*.³³ Except for treason, felonies are the most serious class of offenses as the law defines offenses. Until about a century ago conviction of a felony always involved drastic physical consequences—flogging, branding, imprisonment, death. But from the 1840's on, the idea of helping certain selected criminals toward rehabilitation by putting them on probation in the local community instead of sending them to prison began to spread after it had been introduced in Boston by a

³² Another classification divides laws in terms of special subject matter: admiralty law, corporation law, patent law, the law of real property, and so on.

³³ Loss of civil rights under a felony conviction is what the law calls infamy. An infamous crime is one that involves loss of civil rights upon conviction.

shoemaker, John Augustus, who had volunteered to look after certain selected cases. All states and the federal laws now permit judges to place selected offenders on probation, and a few states such as New York and New Jersey as well as the federal courts have excellent systems of probation supervision. From 20 to 60 percent of convicted felony offenders are now placed on probation instead of being sent to prison, percentages varying by states.

Whether an offender is to be charged with a misdemeanor, a high misdemeanor, or a felony sometimes depends not so much on the act as on what the prosecutor thinks he can prove. The classification has little to do with the kind of person who breaks the law, and sometimes hasn't much to do with the actual social seriousness of the offense. For example, in most states driving while drunk is a misdemeanor, but in some carrying a concealed weapon or even transporting one in a car is a felony. So we may find a drunken driver, who has gone careening down the road endangering scores of people and perhaps forcing several cars into the ditch, winding up with a ninety-day jail sentence as a misdemeanant,³⁴ while a driver who didn't even know some relative had placed a pistol in the glove compartment of his car comes face to face with a mandatory *prison* sentence for transporting a deadly weapon!³⁵

Traditionally for ages the law treated all offenders in terms of their offenses instead of their needs as persons. This meant that child offenders were treated exactly like adult criminals. Naturally, as moderns see it, there were fantastic cases of cruelty. In France, for example, in the 1600's an eight-year-old boy stole a loaf of bread. Like any adult, he was sentenced to the galleys *for life*, and spent the next *ninety years*

³⁴ In a ten year study by Dr. S. R. Gerber in Cleveland alcohol was found to have been involved in more than 50 percent of automobile fatalities. Most of the offending drivers were so called "moderate" drinkers. Tests have shown that a few drinks make a driver react more slowly in an emergency and make him generally less cautious. In 1951 in the nation as a whole 8000 persons were killed in traffic accidents in which liquor was a factor. *Federal Probation*, March, 1953, p. 62.

³⁵ This prospect faced the wives of two Air Force officers during World War II when they were stopped for an illegal left turn at the New Jersey exit of the Holland Tunnel after having delivered their husbands at a Long Island airport for transportation to England. Unknown to either of the women, the husband of one of them had forgotten his service pistol in the glove compartment of the car. When the traffic cop demanded the driver's license, out tumbled the gun. Mandatory prison under Jersey law! It took some frantic telephoning and a special session of a grand jury summoned by a sympathetic judge to keep two innocent women out of the Big House. New York has a similar law, and the war caused complications in that state too. When the Fourth Armored Division moved out of Pine Camp near Watertown in 1942 one of the officers casually asked an out-of-state relative who had driven over to see him off to "look after" his .22 long barreled target pistol. The relative carried the weapon out of the state in the trunk of his car—at the risk, deliberately accepted in this case, of a mandatory prison sentence had the thing been found in his car by any New York policeman.

pleases. The laws which are most effective in controlling behavior are those that prescribe conduct already heavily sanctioned by the mores, laws that reinforce, as it were, the individual's own conscience.

But immediately we encounter the fact that, while there are usually some values common to the mores of all members of a society, there are others which are peculiar to particular subcultures. For example, the value of human life is common to the mores of all groups in our society. Even criminal gangsters recognize the value of human life—within their own circle of loyalty. But gangsters at one extreme and certain types of unscrupulous businessmen at the other set more store on “success” as each defines it than on the conventional rules of the game.

Underworld criminals and white-collar criminals alike respond to the values of particular subcultures—subcultures which deviate from the norms of the society at large. These subcultures provide those who live in them with all kinds of rationalizations to “justify” the behavior which they sanction, even to the point of assuring the successful white-collar violator that he is no criminal at all!

How individuals feel about their own lawbreaking is a poor index by which to appraise their relationship to lawbreaking. As we have said, most Americans break laws accidentally, incidentally, and casually without feeling in the least bit criminal. Kinsey's studies of the sex behavior of American men and women indicate that nine out of ten men have violated the prescribed sex taboos at some time, that 85 percent of the men and more than half of the women marrying during the last generation had had premarital sex experience, and that 50 percent of married men and 40 percent of married women had been unfaithful to their marriage vows.³⁸ While all of these people must have known that they were violating the law and many of them may have felt some twinges of conscience, few of them really regarded themselves as criminals in their sex behavior. They simply rationalized that behavior as too personal and private to be anybody else's business. How a lawbreaker feels about the criminality of his behavior is a poor index of who is a criminal and who isn't.

In the sense of a criminal's being someone who violates a law, practically everybody is a criminal at some time or other. In the sense of a criminal's being someone who violates a law and feels socially inferior because of having done so, only an infinitesimal fraction of actual law

³⁸ See Alfred C. Kinsey and others, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1947.

violators would qualify. But if we mean by a criminal someone who has been convicted of a crime and punished for it, we are using the term with a highly selective reference: most law violators don't get convicted and punished. Yet certainly when we do use the term with this reference we have a tangible, objective basis for calling a law violator a criminal: he has been convicted and punished. Convicted criminals constitute only some unknown fraction of all law violators, but at least there is no denying the fact that society has pinned a label on them. And there is a constant struggle on the part of law-enforcement agencies to pin such labels on a sizable majority of our more *dangerous* lawbreakers. The avowed purpose of all good police departments is to make crime hazardous for all lawbreakers and highly dangerous for the killer, the rapist, the holdup man, the bank robber, and the enemy of national security. In other words, while millions of Americans are lawbreakers in a kind of amateur, sporting way, the men who really menace the lives and property of all of us are the real targets of law enforcement. These are the types that we ordinarily mean when we speak of criminals. In line with the modern tendency to study the offender rather than the offense, what kinds of such criminals can we distinguish?

II-5B:3. How Many Kinds of Criminals?

Perhaps the most useful classification is the one offered by Ruth Shonle Cavan in her book on *Criminology*, supplemented by one category which the Communist conspiracy has brought to the front.³⁹ Criminals, then, may be classified as follows:

1. THE CASUAL OFFENDER

This covers most of the accidental, incidental, and trivial offenders—the parking ordinance violators, the Hallowe'en pranksters, the football hell-raisers, and so on. The Virginia motorists whizzing across railroad crossings were casual offenders. Casual offenders are mostly nonmalicious criminals. They mean well!

2. THE OCCASIONAL CRIMINAL

This is the man who lives a predominantly law-abiding life but who in a moment of temptation commits a criminal act, often of minor importance. A motorist, panic-stricken after an accident, for example, drives away without fulfilling the mandates of a law requiring him to

³⁹ New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1950, pp. 22-31.

remain and identify himself. Or a workman, temporarily out of a job, burglarizes a filling station to tide himself over the emergency. The occasional criminal is simply the individual whose inhibitions against lawbreaking occasionally fail, but who does not make a habit of such violations or make a business of lawbreaking.

3. THE HABIT-BOUND CRIMINAL

The streetwalker, the drug addict, the alcoholic are examples of habit-bound criminals. Minor offenses have become habitual with these characters but there is nothing professional about them. They need no particular special techniques and feel no particular pride in what they do. Many of them are simply down-and-outers trying to keep alive.

The habit-bound criminal must be distinguished particularly from two other types: (a) the *episodic criminal*, who commits a criminal act under terrific emotional stress, and (b) the "*professional*" *criminal*, who makes a business of crime.

4. THE EPISODIC CRIMINAL

A few years ago an Army officer's wife stumbled into her husband's trailer near a training camp and sobbed out a story of having been raped by a near-by tavern keeper who had offered to drive her home after she had completed her purchases. The husband made her swear to it on the Bible, then strapped on his service pistol, drove over to the tavern, and shot the accused rapist dead. The officer was formally indicted for murder, tried, and acquitted. Although there is no provision in the law for recognizing the episodic criminal, the jury itself recognized this outraged husband as belonging to the type. He had killed under the stress of overwhelming emotion—and there was every likelihood that he would never repeat his crime. A rather high percentage of men serving life sentences in American prisons for killings are of this type. Most of them would be vastly safer risks out on parole than many lesser offenders who do get released. Unless they get into other situations of overwhelming stress, there is almost no chance of that these episodic killers will commit other murders.

5. THE "PROFESSIONAL" CRIMINAL⁴⁰

As Dr. Cavan says, the "professional" criminal is the career man of crime. Unlike the habit-bound criminal, he does learn specific tech-

⁴⁰ The term *professional* is a misnomer when applied to a criminal. A legitimate profession always develops a code of social responsibility, a code of ethics. The code of the

niques for particular kinds of crime, and unlike the episodic criminal, he goes about it coldly on a businesslike basis. Furthermore, unlike either of the types just mentioned, he uses crime definitely as a status-achieving activity. A burglar or a bank robber, for example, has higher status than a pickpocket—among those competent to judge! The “professional” criminal also lives closer than most other types to the grim code of the underworld which regards—and frequently repays—anyone who assists the criminal’s natural enemies, the police, as a traitor to his kind.

Many “professional” criminals operate as lone wolves or as members of merely temporary alliances of two or more confederates. When these alliances become permanent and organized, society has to deal with an even more formidable type of criminal.

6. THE GANGSTER, OR ORGANIZED CRIMINAL

This is morally the most vicious, physically the most dangerous, and psychologically the least reformable type of criminal. Not infrequently this is also the type that is hardest to apprehend and convict. Proportionately there are probably fewer gangsters in prison than criminals of any other type except the casual and the white-collar offenders. Only a few of the really Big Shot gangsters have ever been punished and only a handful of those have been punished for the actual kidnappings and murders committed under their orders. Al Capone, for example, overlord of the Chicago underworld during prohibition and the mastermind behind the infamous St. Valentine’s Day machine-gun massacre of six rival gangsters, February 14, 1929, finally wound up in Alcatraz not for murder but for having evaded his income tax! According to the Senate Investigating Committee headed by Senator Kefauver, organized criminals constitute one of the major menaces in America to the orderly processes of democratic government and to the legitimate control of many American business corporations.⁴¹

The burgeoning of this ominous development of crime can be traced straight back to the vast sums of money offered by so-called respectable people during prohibition for illicit liquor and the unlawful services required to provide it. Lawbreaking by the “respectable” became smart and lawbreaking by the disreputable became so enormously

criminal by occupation is a code of social irresponsibility. The term *professional criminal*, then, means merely a criminal by occupation. To emphasize this distinction we use *professional* only in quotation marks whenever it applies to a criminal by occupation

⁴¹ See Estes Kefauver, *Crime in America*, Garden City, N Y., Doubleday & Company, 1951.

profitable that bloody gang wars were fought in many cities to control the trade. Criminals never had it so good—and the underworld never got itself so well organized as during those years. The role of “respectable society” in financing the underworld during prohibition leads naturally to the question of the relationship of respectability to recognized criminality in general.

7. THE WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL

A number of criminologists still hold out against Edwin Sutherland's conception of the white-collar criminal as the businessman who violates laws and government regulations for the benefit of his business. (a) They contend that the respectable businessman who does these things does not conceive of himself as a criminal. We have already seen that such an index is not worth much as a test of criminality. (b) They also argue that society at large does not so conceive of him. This is undoubtedly true until such lawbreaking runs afoul of the traditional criminal laws against embezzlement, falsification of records, etc. But that means merely that society has not yet awakened morally to the demonstrable antisocial consequences of such offenses as violations of pure-food regulations, black-market operations, “cheating” on munitions contracts, and the like. One good sex murder will release at least 1,000,000 more ergs of moral indignation than the health-menacing adulteration of 100,000,000 loaves of bread!

White-collar offenses, Sutherland insists, occur with considerable frequency, are seldom prosecuted, and are even more seldom punished. Many of today's near-monopolies were built up by such practices. The original Standard Oil Company, for example, actually forced certain railroads to kick back with rebates on oil shipped by *Standard's competitors*! Naturally, the competitors went out of business.

Since white-collar offenders so universally escape conviction under ordinary criminal laws, they seldom appear in the ordinary statistics of crime. Hence, as Sutherland and his followers contend, criminologists impressed by the statistics have tended to regard crime as peculiarly lower-class behavior. If one takes account of casual offenders and white-collar criminals, this naïve conception must be radically revised. And when one remembers that much of the activity of the organized underworld such as racketeering⁴² and the management of gambling

⁴² Racketeering has been defined as predation pretending to perform a service. Example: underworld “protection” for garages, cleaning establishments, etc., menaced by the gangsters themselves.

and prostitution is inspired and paid for by members of the so-called upper world, who demand services which respectable business cannot supply, it becomes questionable whether the underworld is any more antisocial than is a considerable section of "respectable" society.

The essence of civilized behavior is to obtain satisfactions by means of culturally organized, roundabout methods of coöperation with others. The respectable way to make a living is to work for it or to derive it from property claims which are supposed to represent the accumulated results of somebody's past work. The disreputable way to make a living is to beg for it, and the criminal way is to short-circuit the whole roundabout route by arcing directly across, so to speak, from desire to satisfaction. Wherever such an arcing-across occurs, whether the law recognizes and penalizes it or not, the essence of criminality appears: getting something for nothing. And the ultimate form of crime is to disregard altogether the machinery for the orderly settlement of grievances and to take the law into one's own hands.

Unfortunately, however, all this presupposes on the part of individuals the capacity for rational choice—in short, an emotional adjustment which permits the personality to perceive the world as men normally perceive it and to deal with situations with due regard for the rights of others. As a distinct type of lawbreaker, therefore, we must take note of those who in varying degrees depart from this expected norm of personal adjustment. These are the individuals who whatever may be the degree of their socialization (which is obviously very low in the case of the "professional" criminal and the gangster) are also poorly integrated as persons, or else lack the wits to behave normally at all.

8. THE MENTALLY ABNORMAL CRIMINAL

Mental abnormality in its relation to lawbreaking takes two forms: (a) mental defect and (b) mental illness.

Mentally defective criminals are those lawbreakers whose intelligence is so far below the normal range of 90–109 I.Q. scores as to constitute a definite handicap in meeting life situations. These are the individuals who are often frustrated in school and led into antisocial escapades either to attract attention or to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, as it were, for brighter offenders. At one time they were regarded as constituting the bulk of all criminals, but more critical studies show that most mental defectives never get into prison and most individuals who do get into prison are not mentally defective. Even if prisoners

were regarded as typical of all criminals—which they probably are not—it is obvious that the study of the mentally defective prisoner would not solve the problem of why most prisoners have landed in prison, to say nothing of solving the problem of why criminals in general violate the law. Table II-5.3 shows the distribution of I.Q. scores among more than 5000 males committed for the first time to the prisons of a typical northern state in 1948 and 1949, as measured by standard psychological tests. Although as compared with the general population sev-

TABLE II-5.3. Distribution of Mental Test Scores Among All Male First Commitments to All Michigan Prisons, 1948 and 1949 (over 25 percent Negroes) and Among American-Born White Children of the Stanford-Binet Standardization Group (Normal White Population)

Mental Test Scores	5394 Michigan Male Prisoners ^a (percent)	2904 American- Born White Chil- dren of Stanford- Binet Standardi- zation Group (percent)
120 up	4.7	12.6
110-119	8.8	18.2
90-109 (normal range)	38.5	46.5
80-89	22.8	14.5
70-79	16.9	5.6
0-69 (idiots, imbeciles, and morons)	5.4	2.6
Unknown	3.2	
	100.0	100.0
Median	91.4	101.7

^a Michigan Department of Corrections as cited in *Report of the Governor's Study Commission on the Deviated Sex Offender*, Rev. Ralph M. Richards, chairman, Lansing, Mich., State of Michigan, 1951, p. 224.

eral times as many of these men were illiterate, unskilled laborers, some of them foreign born, and about one-third of them were Negroes of very low occupational status, their median I.Q. score still falls within the lower limits of normality (90-109). If we were actually to compare like with like, the I.Q. scores of these men not with the scores of American-born children but with the scores of free men of the same age, ethnic background, literacy, occupation, and race, there would be little difference between the prisoners and their counterparts outside the walls, and this despite the fact that the courts by selecting out the more intelligent criminals for probation have already loaded the prison sample in the direction of lower I.Q.'s! There is no evidence

from the prisons that the key to lawbreaking is the inferior intelligence of the lawbreaker.

What is obvious is that defective intelligence always constitutes a handicap in life situations and that even if all other things were equal, which they never are, the handicapped person would find it harder to stay out of trouble than would the normal person. The remarkable thing is not that more low I.Q.'s turn up in prison than one finds in the normal population but that the disproportion is not many times greater than it is. And when to a mental handicap is added the handicap of racial discrimination as it operates in our culture, it is all the more remarkable that the disproportionate number of Negroes in our prisons is only 4 or 5 to 1 and not 8 or 10 to 1.

Although the problem of the mental defective is serious enough, it is not the heart of the crime problem nor does it equal the seriousness of the mental illness problem.

A few years ago a young war veteran in Camden, New Jersey, got tired, as he said later, of people "talking about him." So he took a service pistol, stepped into the street, and murdered thirteen perfect strangers as fast as he could draw a bead on them under a traffic light. He was committed to a mental hospital—a trifle late. He was insane, a victim of a serious mental illness.

In 1950 3 percent of the crimes reported to the police in Michigan were sex offenses and 15 percent of the state's prison inmates were sex offenders. According to psychiatric authorities, sex offenses are practically always the products of some kind of mental abnormality, usually some sort of emotional maladjustment. If the Michigan percentages were to hold for the 161,160 male prisoners in state and federal prisons as of December 31, 1950, 24,174 of them would have been in for sex offenses and practically all of these 24,000 men would have been mentally ill.

Meanwhile, in that same year over 48 percent of all the 1,456,912 hospital beds in the United States were occupied by mental patients. Studies in New York and Massachusetts indicate that 5 percent of Americans can expect to spend some time in a mental institution during their lives. One in twenty will have some sort of mental breakdown.

But the incidence of mental disorder among the 167,173 men and women in prison (as of December 31, 1950) is many times 5 percent. Added to a prison population of approximately 9000 a year, Michigan maintains about 1200 patients in a hospital at Ionia for the criminal

insane.⁴³ This would be 11.7 percent of the 10,200 imprisoned and hospitalized criminals in the state. But since 15 percent of the state's 9000 male prisoners were sex offenders, practically all of whom were emotionally abnormal in some degree, another 1350 must be added to the 1200 Ionia cases, making 2250, or 25 percent of the 10,200 institutionalized criminals in the prisons and the mental hospital. Probably at least again as many male convicts outside of the mental hospital needed psychiatric help.⁴⁴

Expert estimates of the incidence of mental disorder among the 167,000 men and women in prison in the United States vary from 40 to 85 percent.

Sex crimes are probably the major type of crime attributable mainly to mental illness. But mental illness is a contributing factor in many other types of crime.

9. THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL

A political criminal is an individual who either violates the law himself in the interests of some ideal or is accused of such a violation and without deliberate intention on his part becomes an issue in a social conflict involving rival ideals.

There are at least three types of political criminals: (a) the revolutionist, (b) the protest criminal, and (c) the accidental or incidental political criminal.

a. All revolutionists and political adventurers who seize power or attempt to seize it unlawfully are political criminals. If their revolution succeeds, they redefine the meaning of the term *crime* and frequently settle accounts with their defeated rivals, who had previously regarded *them* as political criminals. Caesar crossing the Rubicon and Lenin and his Bolsheviks agitating against the Czar were classic examples. George Washington and the rest of the founding fathers were

⁴³ This figure does not measure the incidence of mental illness among prisoners. The overcrowded condition of the state's mental hospitals has for years prevented the transfer of less serious mental cases from the prisons. On the other hand, while 96 percent of the prisoners served sentences averaging only three to five years, the average mental patient remained in custody much longer. The sex offenders, who constituted 15 percent of the state's prison population in 1950, were by no means the only mentally disturbed prisoners. Two of the leaders of the destructive riot at the Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, in April, 1952, were such severely disturbed personalities as to have justified transfer to a mental hospital, and there were scores of others among the same prison's 6,500 inmates.

⁴⁴ As late as April, 1954, the state had in its prison system only one psychiatrist, who was kept so busy examining sex deviates as required by law before their release and giving new arrivals a quick once over that he naturally had no time for treating anybody. Later it added one more to "treat" sex offenders.

all criminals in the eyes of George III and would have been hanged in proper form had the British suppressed the American Revolution. Jefferson Davis was a political criminal after Appomattox and was imprisoned in Fortress Monroe for several years. Cromwell, both Napoleons, Hitler in his Munich beer-hall *Putsch*, and scores of other "successful" historical figures all belong in the category of political criminals, to say nothing of the thousands who tried to gain power unlawfully and failed.

b. Political "protest" criminals include Brutus and the other Roman senators who assassinated Caesar; Charlotte Corday, who murdered Marat during the French Revolution; Wilkes Booth who assassinated President Lincoln; Czolgosz, the anarchist terrorist, who murdered President McKinley; and the two Puerto Rican nationalist fanatics who tried to shoot their way into Blair House on November 1, 1950, to assassinate President Truman, those who shot up the House of Representatives in March, 1954; and so on. There have been, of course, thousands of others in the world's history.

c. Accidental or incidental political criminals, as we have said, are those individuals whose fortunes, often without any intention on their part, become symbols of broader social conflicts in which they are involved. The greatest examples in history were undoubtedly Socrates and Jesus of Nazareth. The early Christian martyrs and many of the victims of persecution down through the ages belong here. Giordano Bruno, burned at the stake for upholding the Copernican theory of the solar system, is an example.

More recently social conflicts in France, the struggle over slavery in the United States, and the bitter clashes of conservatives and radicals in the early years of this century have provided examples of their own. The Dreyfus case in France made Dreyfus a symbol of the injustices of anti-Semitism. John Brown's harebrained raid on the arsenal at Harper's Ferry transformed that turbulent old frontiersman into a symbol of northern opposition to slavery. During the early years of this century the Mooney case in California and the Sacco-Vanzetti case in Massachusetts dramatized the injustices inherent in the conflict of radicalism vs. blind reaction.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Tom Mooney, a radical agitator, was accused of having placed a time bomb to disrupt a Preparedness Day parade in San Francisco in July, 1916. Convicted on manipulated evidence, he became a symbolic figure in a battle of rival propagandas that reached all the way to Leningrad and resulted in the intervention of President Wilson to save him from the electric chair. With his death sentence commuted to life, Mooney was kept in prison till 1939, when he was finally pardoned by Democratic Governor Olson.

The Sacco-Vanzetti case grew out of the conviction of Nikola Sacco, a fish peddler

Whenever an individual becomes a symbol of a social conflict, material is at hand ready-made for propaganda. Communists, as the attackers in the present conflict between the Russian Soviets and the West, have made the most of the Mooney case and the Sacco-Vanzetti fiasco. From time to time they have also tried to transform other convicted criminals into similar symbols, notably Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs. Hiss, former State Department official, was convicted in 1950 of having perjured himself when he denied passing secret official documents to Whittaker Chambers, then a Communist, for transmission to a Communist spy ring. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted in 1952 of having revealed secrets of the atom bomb to the Soviets. A tremendous propaganda campaign immediately began, to save them from execution, originally set for the week of January 12, 1953. They were finally executed June 19, 1953.

These cases illustrate the complexity of the concept of political criminality. Whatever sympathy idealists, social protestants, and symbols of injustice may arouse, a careful distinction should be maintained between "*heretics*" within a nation and actual *criminal conspirators* intent on destroying that nation for the benefit of a foreign power. Under the conditions of the contemporary struggle for survival between the United States and Soviet Russia, American Communists who follow Moscow, and in effect all the fuzzy-minded who still fall for Communist propaganda, are no longer mere social heretics.⁴⁶ They

and philosophical anarchist, and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, a shoe factory employee and radical agitator, of the murder of two guards in a pay-roll robbery in Braintree, Mass., in 1920. Conviction rested on circumstantial evidence and very shaky identification by witnesses who had glimpsed the robbers only for a moment from windows hundreds of feet away. This plus the obvious antiradical prejudice of the trial judge, Webster Thayer, aroused radicals and liberals all over the world who built up a tremendous "Save Sacco-and-Vanzetti" propaganda campaign that finally forced the governor of Massachusetts, Alvan T. Fuller, to appoint a review commission consisting of President Lowell of Harvard, President Stratton of M.I.T., and a former judge, Robert Grant. The Commission upheld the conviction, the Governor refused clemency, and in the midst of a good deal of social tension Sacco and Vanzetti were finally electrocuted in Charlestown prison August 22, 1927. In 1931 the Wickersham Commission on court procedure condemned Judge Thayer for having denied six motions for a new trial and then refusing to have the question of his own prejudice submitted to another judge.

⁴⁶ There are some Communists, Trozskites in the main, who do not follow Moscow. But if anti Communists cannot distinguish between Communists and liberals and Socialists, who are the deadly enemies of Communists and are promptly liquidated whenever Communists take over, it is too much to expect that jittery Americans will be able to see the difference between the Moscow brand and the anti Moscow Communists. The American Communist party, whose top leaders are now in prison for advocating the forceful overthrow of the United States government, is a conspiratorial ring, Moscow dominated. The difficulty of drawing distinctions between unpopular isms is illustrated by the old story about the policeman who seized a bystander at a Communist front rally and was met with the protest: "But I'm an anti Communist." "I don't care what kind of Communist you are," retorted Law and Order, "you're comin' to jail."

are enemies of the United States, adhering to our enemies, "giving them aid and comfort." The crucial question no longer is, "Does a given act or policy square with liberalism and the ideals of democracy?" but "*Does it help Moscow, or does it help the United States?*" At mid-century no other question was more important than this.⁴⁷

So much, then, for types of lawbreakers: casual offenders, occasional criminals, habit-bound criminals, episodic criminals, professional criminals, organized criminals, white-collar criminals, mentally abnormal criminals, and political criminals.

The next question is, How much criminality is there?

II-5B:4. The Volume of Recorded Lawbreaking

In 1952 the volume of recorded serious lawbreaking, i.e., felonies known to the police, passed 2,000,000 for the first time. This gave the United States a total felony crime rate of approximately 1274 per 100,000 population. But such an overall rate meant very little, since it was actually an average of high-rate cities and low-rate country districts, high-rate crime among disadvantaged Negroes and low-rate crime among relatively more favored whites, and so on. Moreover, it covered only the more serious offenses, not misdemeanors such as drunkenness, disorderly conduct, minor traffic violations, etc. In 1950, for example, in 206 cities of 25,000 and over each, i.e.,

⁴⁷ Not even questions of civil liberties and academic freedom. Attempts by Congressional committees to explore the ramifications of the Communist conspiracy in the United States after the Hiss case stirred up a terrific to-do in the newspapers and the colleges. Abroad, Bertrand Russell solemnly assured the British people that Americans were living under a reign of terror. How much of this to do was a product of Communist propaganda, how much was due to liberal fears of American proto-Fascists, and how much traced back to guilty consciences of liberals who had previous Communist sympathies to conceal was anybody's guess. The fuss was out of all proportion to the actual "threat" to anybody except Communists. Most of the academic protests seemed curiously unaware of two things: (1) The first order of business for all Americans in 1954 was to survive under the menace of Russian world imperialism backed by the biggest army, the most formidable air force, and the second largest navy in the world; (2) the American people were in deadly earnest to scotch the Communist conspiracy in the United States by any and all means, and anybody or anything that got in the way of that determination was going to get run over. A resolution adopted by the American Association of University Professors in the spring of 1953, for example, called for the return of judicial inquiries from Congress to the courts, but singularly failed to endorse the *purpose* of those inquiries, the defeat of the Communist conspiracy. In general, the professors seemed more concerned about protecting freedom against their own government than about protecting their government and people against Soviet Russia. See Whittaker Chambers' debunking article, "Is Academic Freedom in Danger?" *Life*, June 22, 1952, p. 91 f. "If Communism succeeds in winning that larger war [the struggle for the world] . . . all freedom will have become academic, merely academic" (p. 104). Yet the commotion did spread an atmosphere of timidity among college students. Various investigators reported from different campuses that students were less willing than in previous years to criticize the *status quo* or voice unpopular opinions.

in about 16 percent of the total population most prone to crime, serious felonies known to the police—homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft—totaled 435,188, or over one-fifth of all felonies reported. For these 435,000 serious crimes, 77,891 individuals were held for prosecution. That was one offender for every 5.5 offenses. Nobody knows the total number of misdemeanors committed in a year in the United States and reported to the police. But we do know that in these 206 cities in 1950 nearly 7,000,000 persons were prosecuted as misdemeanants. If the same ratio of prosecutions to offenses were to hold for the minor offenses as for the more serious ones—which of course it probably did not, because of greater ease of prosecution in minor cases—there would have been more than 38,000,000 lesser offenses known to the police during 1950, *in these 206 cities alone!*⁴⁸ We need not speculate on the total volume of all lawbreaking known to the police. Two million serious offenses a year obviously constitute a grave enough problem for American society. What lies below them on a lesser level of immediate seriousness but evidencing a widespread attitude of social irresponsibility is an almost incredible volume of minor violations. In 196 cities traffic offenders alone held for prosecution in 1950 totaled 6,078,690, or a *ticketed* violation rate of 30,423 *per 100,000*! How many actual traffic violations occurred in those 196 cities during 1950 is anybody's guess. The total in the whole United States during any one year must be simply astronomical.

There is no visible prospect that our police departments and criminal courts are likely to run out of business! Not with over 4 percent of our adult population getting ticketed, arrested, or indicted every year.

Most of these lawbreakers are men by a ratio of better than 20 to 1. Women are notoriously more law-abiding than men. Rudyard Kipling was off the beam in his contention that "the female is more deadly than the male."

But the male's deadliness, as measured by the volume of recorded serious crimes, is not at all uniform from place to place, from time to time, or from age category to age category.

Although some higher-than-average rural areas can be found, especially in the southeastern part of the country east of the Mississippi and below the Ohio, rural areas generally have lower crime rates than do urban areas.

As between regions, the Northeastern states—New England and

⁴⁸ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 138.

the Middle Atlantic states (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) —rank lowest in serious crimes, and the Pacific states and the Southern states east of the Mississippi, highest. New England cities, for example, in 1950 had a murder and non-negligent manslaughter average rate of only 1.07 per 100,000 population. The national urban average was 5.11, nearly five times the New England rate, and the average in urban areas in Kentucky, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi topped that of all other regions with 14.44—nearly three times the national average and *13.5 times the New England rate*. In auto theft and straight larceny the Pacific states (Washington, Oregon and California), however, outdid the rest of the nation with 229.0 auto thefts per 100,000—Middle Atlantic rate, 96.6—and 1568.1 larcenies—Middle Atlantic rate, 447.4⁴⁹

From time to time, crime rates vary by seasons and by the state of the business cycle. Crimes against the person are highest in summer, lowest in winter. Crimes against property seem to increase in cold weather. In terms of the business cycle, suicides and crimes against property go up in depression and are relatively less frequent during periods of prosperity.

Curiously enough, the statistics on juvenile delinquency behave in an almost diametrically reverse way: delinquencies increase during prosperity and decrease during a depression. War also seems to affect the two kinds of lawbreaking in opposite ways: crime usually decreases during wartime, delinquencies increase. Mobilization in wartime draws into the services most of the male population in the crime-committing age category; hence the drop in adult crimes during war. On the other hand, it increases employment and restlessness of youth at the same time that it is stripping homes and welfare and recreation agencies of personnel that normally would aid in restraining juvenile lawlessness. Hence the rise in delinquency during war. Added to this is the effect of the economic boom which accompanies war and which always seems to stimulate juvenile lawbreaking, war or no war.

Crime is primarily an activity of young men, delinquency largely an activity of boys approaching manhood. In 1950, the F.B.I. arrest records of lawbreakers fingerprinted in the United States that year for violations of state laws and municipal ordinances totaled 793,671. Crimes ranged from criminal homicide to drunkenness, gambling, vagrancy, and mere suspicion. Of the 793,671 arrests, 224,911, or 28.3 percent, were of young men from 17 to 24 years old, inclusive, an age

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

bracket that constituted only 11.5 percent of the male population. Their arrest rate was 260.3 per 100,000. The next most criminally inclined age category consisted of men from 25 to 32, inclusive, 12.1 percent of the male population, who provided 196,250 arrests, or 24.7 percent of the total, at a rate of 209.6 per 100,000. The one yearly category most numerous arrested consisted of the 21-year-olds, who provided 32,313 arrests, or 14.9 percent *more* than the average number of annual arrests from each yearly cohort 17 to 24, inclusive.

It is obvious that young men from 17 to 24 constitute the most crime-prone segment of our population. Next come the 25- to 33-year-olds.

On the juvenile delinquency level, the most delinquency-prone age category consists of 14- to 16-year-olds, who contribute over 80 percent of the juvenile delinquency court cases while constituting only 42 percent of the boys 10-16, inclusive, in the country. In 1949 Edward E. Schwartz, statistician of the federal Children's Bureau, estimated that "about 275,000, or six in every 1,000 children under 18 years of age, were involved in juvenile court delinquency cases" each year.⁵⁰ On the basis of the usual age categories used in estimating the delinquency rate, the 10-16 age range, inclusive, this would give a traditional delinquency rate of 1.75 per hundred, which is somewhat higher than has usually been estimated, namely, approximately 1 percent as an average, year in and year out, for boys and girls combined. Since girls constitute only about one-fourth to one-seventh of the delinquents brought to court, it is obvious that whatever joint rate is accepted will badly underrepresent the rate for boys alone. This may safely be estimated at from 1.5 to 2.5 percent at least. But this rate, like the crime rate, varies widely from place to place and from time to time. In rural areas it may drop almost to zero; in disadvantaged slum sections of our great cities it may rise to 25 or 30 percent or more. And from depression to prosperity, as the business cycle changes, the delinquency rate of any particular area, rural or urban, may vary up and down from its own average by 40 or 50 percent.

By and large, while the problem of juvenile lawbreaking is a very serious matter for many communities and seems in recent years to have increased in viciousness, children still can hardly compete with adults in criminality. In the first place adults outnumber the youngsters (10-16) by about 7 to 1, and in the second place adults have

⁵⁰ "Statistics of Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S.," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1949, p. 12.

more incentives and more opportunities for lawbreaking than do juveniles. Juvenile lawbreakers belong mainly in the casual, occasional, habit-bound, episodic, and mentally abnormal types and hardly appear at all among the "professionals" (except in some slum areas) and certainly not among the white-collar and political criminals. Adult lawbreaking is still the major problem of law enforcement in the United States. Adults furnish far more offenders and do far more social damage than even the worst of our juvenile offenders. The significance of juvenile delinquency lies not so much in the absolute number of delinquents or in the actual damage which they do as in their role as oncoming replacements for the army of adult criminals.

II-5B:5. Why Are Laws Violated?

The simplest theory of why men violate the law is that the law is there and interferes with what they want to do. But why their wants should take an antisocial direction is the real question.

There would seem to be three kinds of answers:⁵¹ (1) inadequate socialization of the personality; (2) inadequate integration; (3) conflicts of codes.

1. INADEQUATE SOCIALIZATION OF THE PERSONALITY

Here is an individual who has failed to identify completely with the norms of the society in which he lives. He has failed to "interiorize" the values of his culture. In the language of the street, he is more interested in No. 1 than in being a "right Joe." He has learned to look on life as a dog-eat-dog struggle in which the individual owes loyalty to nothing higher than himself. Men and women with this kind of value orientation appear on all social levels. They obey the law only if and when it suits their convenience and seems safer to do so.

Apparently the human infant begins on this level, interested primarily in his own wants and satisfactions. When he is hungry, he squalls, regardless of the fact that he may be keeping the entire household awake at 3 A.M. It takes a deal of growing up before any youngster learns the meaning of fair play. Only gradually does such a term as *the rights of others* acquire any meaning for him even in a family in which he sees the meaning acted out every day. But in a family in

⁵¹ It is unnecessary to consider the theological theory of universal innate depravity: the innate wickedness of human nature as a result of Adam's failure to withstand the temptations of the Devil in Eden. Quite apart from any questions about the historical accuracy of this theory, it fails to explain why some of the innately depraved become criminals and others do not.

screams bloody murder. The unstable adult, failing to pass his bar exam or to hold the affections of his long-suffering wife, goes into a manic frenzy that drives everybody out of the house and lands him in a mental hospital.

Still another way of making it easy for oneself is to *deny reality* altogether and begin building up a more satisfying world in fantasy. This is the route followed by the *schizophrenic*, who withdraws from reality into a dream world of his own. Not infrequently, to absolve himself from all responsibility for his own disappointments, he begins blaming them on others and becomes a dangerous *paranoiac*.

Manic-depressives and schizophrenics are, of course, victims of serious mental diseases which apparently develop out of inherent instabilities of temperament and neural equipment and sometimes out of an unfortunate combination of constitutional defects, unusual environmental stresses, and poor habits of mental hygiene. To what extent mental illness is a purely biological matter and to what extent certain types are "functional," i.e., due to faulty emotional habits, is still a matter of dispute among psychiatrists. Merely to show that mental diseases "run in families" means nothing on this point, any more than proof that family names also run in families. Family names are passed on by cultural conditioning, and an unhealthy attitude toward sex, for example, can be passed on in the same way.

All of us are exposed from infancy to the experience of inferiority. Somebody is always bigger than we are and somebody can always do a lot of things more skillfully than we can. Every child has to live through this kind of experience; it is universal. But how the individual deals with it varies a good deal with individuals. The tender-minded types, those who would rather feel good falsely than face the brutal facts of life, tend to overcompensate for their own inferiorities: They become the bullies, the braggarts and the overaggressive characters who clutter up school playgrounds and luncheon clubs. They are examples of another perfectly normal reaction carried to an extreme. As Adler long ago pointed out, Freud's life drive, or libido, isn't the only basic drive in the individual. The individual also strives for a sense of adequacy, and as he becomes aware of some specific inadequacy, he tends to divert energy to overcome it. An infant learning to walk encounters a doorstep. The doorstep is harder to negotiate than is the smooth floor. So for the next day or so our future stroller concentrates on getting up and down that step. For several days or weeks he may devote special attention to that step. It becomes a point

of particular pride for him to be able to get up and down that step without landing on his rump. He is simply demonstrating on a small scale a tendency that will eventually make him a successful engineer, mountain climber, or householder. He is striving for a sense of adequacy and is doing it by devoting special attention to obstacles that threaten that sense of adequacy.

What has all this to do with integration of personality? Quite a lot. Individuals whose sense of adequacy in general is unsure and whose attachment to reality is weak frequently push this tendency to compensate for inadequacy to the point of pretending an adequacy that doesn't exist. Aware of occupying an inferior social status, let us say, as a Negro or as "one of those Shantytowners from across the tracks," the individual overcompensates by pushing other people around. He may develop the snobbishness of the snubbed. The few who happen to have real ability often tend to overshoot the average in their chosen fields just to prove that they can do it. Overcompensation on the playground, in a barroom, in a schoolroom, or in business is a sure sign that the inadequacy-correcting mechanism of the personality has slipped its governor. But in the process many individuals as show-offs and bullies come to regard lawbreaking as a peculiarly effective way of "getting even" with a society which they hold responsible for their inadequacies. A good deal of the criminal behavior of the underprivileged is probably overcompensation for a lurking sense of inferiority.

Inadequate socialization and inadequate personality integration frequently combine in the same person. Each intensifies the other. If, in addition, the individual is exposed to conflicting cultural norms, different sets of values, and different definitions of right and wrong, the result must be behavior that departs widely from the standards of the larger community.

3. CONFLICTS OF CODES

Conflicts of codes appear most obviously (a) where different ethnic cultures meet, as in the polyglot slums of our great cities; (b) in common problems differently defined by different strata of our society; and (c) in situations common to both sexes but differently defined and approached by the two different sex subcultures.

a. The clash of cultures is pointed up by two very obvious examples of cultural conflict between the standards of native Protestant Americans and those of immigrant Catholic Europeans: their respective

attitudes toward the late-lamented "noble experiment," prohibition, and toward observance of the Sabbath. Prohibition, as we have already suggested, was essentially an expression of the mores of Protestant, native-born farmers and villagers. Catholics, immigrants, and city dwellers generally consistently opposed it. All kinds of hypocrisies and inconsistencies eventually developed in the behavior of Protestant, native-born village elites, but this was a by-product of the curious upper-class view of prohibition as a device for insuring a minimum of hangovers in the work force on Monday mornings. The real clash came between the urban-minded, who regarded prohibition as an interference with personal habits, and the rural-minded, who regarded it as a great moral reform designed to save all those unregenerates who didn't have their own private supplies of hard cider. How that little conflict eventually came out we need not recall.

Meanwhile, another conflict between Continental mores and American Puritanism had emerged over the proper observance of the Sabbath. We have already called attention to this in discussing the problems facing American churches and need not dwell on it further. It is merely one more example of a conflict in moral codes.

b. Conflicts also arise between class codes. Different social classes are forced by the differences in their ways of living to define many situations and problems in different ways. We need cite only two examples: the greater emphasis placed by upper-class parents on success and social status than by lower-class parents; and the different meanings of such a term as *law and order* in a strike situation.

Success and social status. All studies of stratification show that middle-class parents especially are much more concerned with inspiring their children "to succeed" and "to stand well in the community" than are lower-class parents. In line with this urge for success and status, it is not surprising to find that middle- and upper-class parents are much more coercive in toilet-training their children, demand more self-control and demand it earlier, than do lower-class parents. This applies likewise to sex behavior: obviously, sex misadventures can be more of a social threat to high status than to low; hence, less permissive sex codes in middle-class homes and the higher probability of more repressions and sexually motivated anxieties.⁵² Recent studies of juvenile delinquency find emotional maladjustments more prevalent

⁵² On the other hand, according to Kinsey's findings, lower-class adults are likely to behave more prudishly, i.e., with more aversion to complete nudity, in intimate sex relations than are middle- and upper-class couples.

among delinquents from middle-class homes, less prevalent among slum delinquents.

Law and order in conflict situations. Everyone is, of course, familiar with the fact that the theorists of revolutionary social movements such as Anarchism, Syndicalism, and Communism have long since denounced bourgeois (middle-class) morality and the legal system of the capitalist state as devices for perpetuating upper-class rule and therefore without binding force for controlling the behavior of real revolutionaries. Right and wrong thus become inverted—what is right to the ordinary citizen in the United States becomes wrong for the Anarchist, Syndicalist, or Communist, and what is wrong for the ordinary citizen is right for the revolutionist. If the ordinary citizen accepts as right the statement, "A fair day's work for a fair day's pay," the revolutionist repudiates it as wrong. For him it is "right" to cheat the boss. Soviet Communists have even extended the principle to include cheating anybody—even the working class itself—so long as the cheating advances the interests of the Party, as those interests are defined by the handful of men who control the Party!

It is obvious, therefore, that revolutionists and ordinary American citizens obey codes of morality and legality which are diametrically opposed: what is right to one is wrong to the other.

A similar clash of codes often occurs as between workers and employers in nonrevolutionary conflicts. In a conservative A.F. of L. or C.I.O. strike in which both sides accept the wage system and private enterprise and are merely fighting for advantage under that system, law and order will often mean one thing to the employers and business interests in the community, another to the strikers. Law and order for the propertied classes usually means no interference with the normal conduct of business. Strikes in general and picket lines in particular are regarded as infringements of law and order even though the law now usually permits both. For the unionist, law and order means fair play, the right to keep nonstrikers from taking union jobs, and so on.

c. The third conflict of codes involves conflicts in sex codes. Throughout most of Western history and throughout the histories of all civilizations, in fact, women have been subordinated to men. Even in countries like England in which a queen may occupy the throne, the status of women generally will be inferior to that of men. In the United States there are all sorts of evidences of this from the fact that the husband's residence is legally that of his wife and that

her earnings belong to him to the fact that the 15,500,000 women who were working outside their homes in 1953—about one-fourth of the gainfully employed—usually had to accept lower rates of pay for the same work than did men. The census does not even list the nation's 36,000,000 housewives as gainfully employed or as engaged in a recognized occupation! The housewife receives no particular public recognition. Labor Day each year has nothing to do with the nation's homemakers.

For whatever reasons, biological, traditional, economic, the members of the two sexes grow up in different subcultures. These begin to differentiate the little boy from the little girl in the cradle. The little boy's name is distinctively masculine, the little girl's distinctively feminine. Because our culture traces descent in the masculine line and men are the heads of families, boy babies have a prestige value superior to that of girl babies. Each, of course, must learn the distinctive sex roles which each must play. Boys are encouraged to do "masculine" things—play ball, acquire skill in sports, develop initiative, and so on; girls to do "feminine" things—play with dolls, help take care of the house, adapt themselves to a masculine world, and so on. Each learns to look on sex itself from the point of view of his or her own subculture: The boy sees it as essential to his manliness but incidental to his career; the girl sees it as essential to her career, to the fulfillment of her biological destiny, but more than that, as the instrument by which she is to relate herself to her social world. Unless she is one of the comparatively small number born on a top-bracket income level or capable of making an independent career for herself in economic competition with men, she must look forward to establishing her social status by marriage. Of course she is freer to change mates than once was the case, but the majority of marriages still "stick." Her early life-choices are thus likely to be more determinative of social status later in life than are those of the young man. The feminine subculture defines personal relations and sex behavior as more vital to a woman's reputation and her future than the masculine subculture does for the boy. Sexual nonconformity, therefore, whether the parties are married or single, always implies a bigger risk, biologically as well as socially, for the female partner than for the male.

Some law violations, then, stem from conflicts of various kinds of codes; from inadequate integration of personality, permitting impulse to dominate on occasion; from inadequate socialization that leaves

many individuals basically antisocial whenever individual desires conflict with social norms; and so on.

What does society do about it when an individual, for whatever reason, does violate the law?

II-5B:6. Societal Reactions to Lawbreaking

The existence of laws necessarily implies the existence of some kind of social machinery for making them effective. This social machinery consists of four major branches: (1) *enforcement agencies*—rural constables and sheriffs, urban police, state police forces, various federal enforcement agencies like the F.B.I., Treasury officers, etc.; (2) the local *prosecutors and federal district attorneys*, whose duties in general include the initiation of prosecutions against apprehended offenders; (3) *judicial agencies*—from the local justice of the peace to the United States Supreme Court; and (4) *penal agencies*—probation and parole officers, local jails, state and federal reformatories and prisons.

1. ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

In contrast to totalitarian countries, in which policemen constitute a sizable proportion of the population, the United States in 1950 had only about 1.4 public peace officers per 1000 population. Out of the total of over 200,000, only a few thousands worked for the federal government. There were over 18,000 on state pay rolls, headed by the 1961 state police in California, Pennsylvania's 1921, Michigan's 872, New York's 785, and the Texas Rangers' 565. In other words, again in contrast to totalitarian countries, police work in the United States was mainly a function of local government.⁵³

In cities the public policing function costs about one-eighth of municipal budgets, or \$7.09 per capita in 484 cities ranging from 25,000 to 1,000,000 or more—slightly more than the average per capita cost of public welfare and about two-thirds of the average per capita cost of the schools. Table II-5.4 shows how total expenditures and per capita costs for these functions compare in 484 cities.

On the average, in these cities policing costs the average family less than seven cents a day.

⁵³ Actually it was even more a function of private self-protection. In 1940 private guards and watchmen outnumbered public peace officers of all kinds 212,000 to 171,000. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1951*, p. 185. There were more women among private guards and watchmen than on public police forces: 2255 private women police as against 2066 public policewomen.

Like the per capita costs of municipal government itself, the per capita cost of public policing tends to rise from \$4.73 in the 252 cities of 25,000–50,000 population to \$9.73 in the five largest cities of 1,000,000 or more. Figure II-5.2 shows how the per capita costs of all municipal functions and of policing alone tend to vary together as size of city increases. Per capita costs of all municipal functions and of policing alone are approximately 30 percent below the 484-city averages in the smallest cities; approximately 40 percent above the 484-city averages in the big metropolitan municipalities. The bigger the population aggregate to be served, the higher the per capita cost of policing as well as of other municipal functions: or, putting it

TABLE II-5.4. Population Totals, Expenditures, and Per Capita Costs of Three Kinds of Municipal Services in 484 Cities, 25,000 to 1,000,000 and Over, in 1950

Population and Costs	Expenditures (in 000's)			
	Police	Welfare	Schools	Total Expenditures, All Purposes —Fire, Health, Etc.
62,050,161	\$440,341.00	\$428,516.00	\$688,441.00	\$3,366,091.00
Per capital costs per annum	7.09	6.90	11.09	54.21

From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, pp. 28 and 377.

the other way around, the smaller the population aggregate, the lower the per capita cost of policing. In Oscoda County, Michigan, for example, the smallest county in the state with a population of 3143 in 1950, county government was part-time work for the county officials, who had to supplement their small public salaries from other sources. In that county the entire cost of the sheriff's office, covering maintenance of the jail, the serving of papers in civil suits, and so on, as well as public police work, totaled only \$4181.73 in 1949, or less than one and a half cents a day for each family in the county. Per capita, the annual cost of the sheriff's office came to \$1.33, or about 18 percent of the average per capita cost of policing the 484 cities.⁵⁴

Law enforcement in the United States is a more difficult business than in the smaller and more unified countries of the Old World. The population is more diverse, distances are continental, and the

⁵⁴ *Financial Report of Michigan County Government, Year Ending December 31, 1949*, Murl K. Aten, auditor general, Lansing, Mich., 1950, p. 24.

multiplicity of jurisdictions complicates things. Police work is a function of nearly 20,000 different units of government from the federal government down through 48 states, 3049 county governments, and over 16,000 municipalities. On top of all that, Americans take a much more casual attitude toward law observance than is true abroad and




FIG. II-5.2. How Police Costs and All Municipal Expenditures per Capita of Population in 484 Cities, 25,000 to 1,000,000, 1950, tend to Vary Together as Size of City Rises, as Measured in Percentage of Each Average. (Total population, all cities: 62,050,161). (From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 377.)

are more tolerant of local political influence in their police departments. The corollary is that the conception of police work as a quasi-professional occupation is less well developed here than in the big cities in Europe, although under the stimulus of the F.B.I. and a handful of able police chiefs the idea is spreading.

The biggest obstacles to efficient police work in American cities are still (a) the politician with his inevitable "fix" for his criminal friends, (b) tight budgets, (c) inadequate scientific equipment, and

(d) haphazard coördination of different law-enforcement units, city to city and state to state.

For more than a generation most departments down to the smaller cities have been doing a certain amount of crime prevention work, so called, through policewomen, special juvenile officers or divisions, and special programs directed at potential lawbreakers. How actually preventive all this is remains undetermined. Many variables other than policing affect the crime rate, but J. Edgar Hoover, head of the F.B.I., is probably right in claiming that the size and efficiency of a police force is one of the major factors.

2. THE PROSECUTING AGENCIES

The police apprehend individuals whom they charge with having violated the law. It then becomes the function of local prosecuting attorneys, state's attorneys, or whatever they may be called, or of federal district attorneys if federal laws have been violated, to prosecute the accused, i.e., to set in motion the legal machinery by which an individual will be brought before a court for the determination of his guilt or innocence.

The United States district attorneys in the eighty-one judicial districts in the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia are appointed by the President on the advice of the United States Attorney General, who heads the Department of Justice and is a member of the President's cabinet. It is the function of the district attorneys to direct the attention of federal grand juries to suspected law violators and to prosecute violators after they have been indicted. These officials are, of course, subject to control by the Attorney General, whose office therefore becomes a political prize of great importance to business and political interests subject to antitrust laws, pure-food laws, laws limiting expenditures for Congressional elections, and other federal statutes.

Every state has an elected official called an attorney general, but unlike the federal Attorney General, these state officials have no direct control over local prosecuting attorneys. They are, in effect, merely attorneys for the state governments. The prosecuting attorneys are locally elected as county officials or as officials of certain special municipal courts. Thus, for enforcing the ordinary criminal code responsibility rests mainly in the hands of over 3000 local officials who, when no arrests have actually been made, must decide in each case whether a warrant shall issue, and in all cases what charges to bring

against the accused. The local prosecuting attorney, in other words, is the key man in determining the effectiveness of the judicial part of law enforcement in the local communities of the nation. Without a capable and coöperative prosecuting attorney the best police department in the world will get nowhere in enforcing the law. By failing to prosecute, by having cases dismissed "for lack of evidence," by bungling cases once the trials begin, by all sorts of dodges, a non-coöperative prosecutor can defeat the best efforts of any police department.

Yet as elected officials, prosecutors are dependent on the dominant political powers in their communities. This means that when a city is controlled by a corrupt political machine the key office in the judicial enforcement of the law is likely to be conducted in the interests of the hoodlums and white-collar criminals who are playing footie with the Boss. Given the comparative obscurity of the prosecutor's office in the machinery of government and the public's notorious indifference to such matters, the marvel is not that an occasional prosecutor turns out to be lazy, inefficient, or corrupt but that the great majority of prosecutors are as energetic, honest, and effective as they are.

3. JUDICIAL AGENCIES

The most numerous, useless, and altogether outmoded type of court in the United States is the justice of the peace court which once served a useful function in medieval rural England. In the United States the odd-tens-of-thousands of justices of the peace—usually two or four to a township—have long since outlived any function at all except to operate an occasional speed trap for unwary motorists. In the cities, the justice of the peace has usually been superseded by a municipal or police court or by special courts for traffic cases.

In all states felony cases are handled by courts of record, variously called common pleas courts, county courts, circuit courts, and so on. A criminal court has two major functions: (a) to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and (b) to impose sentence—in other words, to determine what shall be done with the convicted offender. Both functions have come under increasingly severe criticism from modern psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and social workers.

As compared with laboratory efficiency, the process of determining guilt or innocence in a criminal court is clumsy, inefficient, and uncertain. Psychologists have long since demonstrated how undepend-

TABLE II-5.5. How 26 Michigan Criminal Court Judges Differed in Severity of Their Sentences for the Same Offense, Robbery Armed: 436 Convicts, Prison of Southern Michigan, December 28, 1951

Judge Number	Armed Robbery Cases in Prison Population	Mean Average Years Sentence	Percent Life Sentences
1	49	11.6	0
2	41	15.4	0
3	37	14.2	0
4	34	13.8	0
5	32	12.9	0
6	30	14.0	0
7	26	12.2	0
8	25	13.7	0
9	23	16.8	4.7
10	22	11.6	9.1
11	12	15.7	0
12	10	10.6	0
13	9	15.2	22.2
14	9	6.5	0
15	9	18.7	0
16	8	10.6	0
17	8	20.7	12.5
18	7	14.6	0
19	7	12.3	0
20	6	16.2	33.3
21	6	14.8	50.0
22	6	Life	100.0
23	5	15.4	0
24	5	8.3	60.0
25	5	15.0	0
26	5	12.2	0
26	436	13.9	4.8
Total in state 87	527	13.9	6.2
Standard deviation of 26		12.1	

Another problem emerges from their sentencing function. Except in the five states which in 1954 had State Correction Authorities—California, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Texas—no machinery exists in our states for introducing uniformity into the sentencing practices of the hundreds of state courts. Originally, the law did it—prescribed a fixed, definite penalty for each offense.

Then, as one small step toward recognizing individual differences among offenders, came the so-called indeterminate-sentence laws permitting the trial judge, within limits fixed by law, to determine the

maximum and minimum term to be served by a convict. Today the federal system and all but nine states use the indeterminate sentence.

But unfortunately, while giving judges more leeway in "making the punishment fit the crime," or criminal. most states still do nothing about the wide variations that exist in different judges' standards of severity for the same offenses. To cite but one example: Taking 26 judges out of the 87 from the state's 40 circuits whose sentencing practices were represented by 527 convicts serving time in the State Prison of Southern Michigan December 28, 1951, for armed robbery, the 26, each of whom had at least 5 convicts in the prison at that time, varied in severity from one judge whose 9 armed robbery convicts averaged $6\frac{1}{2}$ years each to another judge whose 6 armed robbery cases *all* had received life sentences. The 26 judges had meted out sentences to 436 armed robbers which averaged just under 14 years each, identically the same average that all 87 judges had handed out to the entire 527 armed robbery convicts in the prison. But the 26, most of whom served the larger counties, had imposed life sentences on only 4.8 percent of their 436 cases while the entire 87 had given life sentences to 6.2 percent of the 527. In other words, out of the 527 armed robbers in that prison, 33 were serving life sentences. The 9 from the court mentioned were serving an average of $6\frac{1}{2}$ years each, while at the lowest extreme of all, one armed robber was serving a sentence of only 10 months! Such wide variations in the severity of sentences for the same crime do not make for good morale among prisoners.

All of which brings us to the problems of correctional agencies as such.

4. CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES

Correctional agencies in the United States range, as we have noted, from over 3000 local and municipal jails—counting police lock-ups and so on, there are approximately 14,000 places of detention in the United States—to the federal maximum security prison at Alcatraz.

Correctional *practice* is making more and more use of probation as a method of treatment. Probation is correctional case work with convicted offenders in their local communities by an officer of the court or of a state department which is in charge of corrections within the state. While on probation, which may last for several years, an offender is required to obey certain rules and make regular reports to

his probation supervisor. A probation officer can do reasonably effective work with not over forty to fifty cases at a time. But most probation officers even in the better states have to work with case loads of 100 or more.

We have space to consider only two kinds of correctional agencies: jails and prisons.

At any given time the average jail contains from fifteen to twenty inmates. Most of these are drunks, vagrants, and other misdemeanants, but a number of them will be persons unable to give bail, awaiting trial; possibly a would-be fugitive witness needed by the prosecutor; occasionally a *capias* case—an individual who has defaulted on a court judgment and is being held at the cost of his creditors; and some pickup being held for the police or sheriff of some other county. Over 1,000,000 Americans pass through the nation's jails each year.

Jails are the oldest correctional agency in existence, dating back to the thirteenth century in England, and for 200 years they have been the most resistant to reform. Although there are many well-equipped and well-administered jails, the great majority, especially in the poorer rural counties, are antiquated, dirty, insanitary, overcrowded, vermin-infested, and operated for the benefit of the sheriff and his deputies rather than for the welfare of the inmates. The villainous kangaroo court, by which the toughest of the inmates mulct newcomers on trumped-up pretexts, still persists in most jails, and not infrequently the jail also houses the chronically sick poor and even the insane. The average jail has no educational or recreational facilities and nothing for the inmates to do except loaf and think up ways of bedeviling the most defenseless among them. It is also a rare jail that receives much attention from local churches or welfare agencies. The jail is the one correctional institution that has most successfully resisted improvement for 200 years. The reason is not far to seek. As Roberts J. Wright points out, "Jails mean *jobs*. Jails mean *income*. Jails mean *power*. Jails mean *influence*. Jails mean *patronage*. Jails mean *votes*."⁵⁵ In other words, jails are bonanzas for local politicians, and since nobody of importance gets into them for years on end, the local community does its best to ignore such cesspools of social failures which otherwise might bother its conscience. For two centuries nobody has ever been able to stir real public interest in doing anything about jails. The jail

⁵⁵ "The Jail and Misdemeanant Institutions," in Paul W. Tappan (ed.), *Contemporary Correction*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951, p. 310.

just goes on and on as the politicians' sinecure—and the inmates' nightmare.

As a measure of the adequacy of jails the country over, consider the results of federal inspection to determine which jails are fit for the detention of federal prisoners.⁵⁶ Between 1930 and 1949 inspections of 3128 jails, including 140 city jails, found only one jail in five ranking over 50 percent on the federal rating scale. Eighty percent of the nation's jails couldn't even be considered for housing federal prisoners, and only 1 percent scored 70 percent or over on the federal scale. Massachusetts led the nation in the percentage of its jails fit for federal use, with 15 out of 16 scoring over 50 percent. New Jersey came next with 23 out of 27 and New York third with 54 out of 72. As wealthy a state as Michigan could get only 11 of its 83 jails above the 50 percent mark, and most of the South and Middle West did no better.

What to do?

As Wright says, *take out* of the jails children, the physically and mentally ill, inefficient management, special privilege, idleness, cruelty, the fee system, politically chosen staffs, insanitary conditions, and kangaroo courts, and *put into* the jail system safe custody, segregation, classification, discipline, cleanliness, good food, medical service, good management, trained staffs, individual treatment, nonpolitical control, indeterminate sentences, chaplains, probation, parole, installment payment of fines, greater use of bail and recognizance. The evils are notorious, but how to get public action to abolish them is the real problem.

Beyond the jails, housing the longer-term prisoners and the more dangerous offenders are the reformatories and the prisons. When prisons were still penitentiaries to punish and produce penitents, the reformatory of the 1870's was an advance. It offered its inmates a chance to improve themselves by work. Today there is little difference between the best prisons and the reformatories except that the younger and more reformable offenders are supposed to go to the reformatories, the more intractable to the prisons.

If the jail is the most neglected and shameful of our correctional agencies, the prison is the most misunderstood and dangerous. It is here that two things come to a focus: The most violent of our apprehended lawbreakers are segregated here; and the current public confusions about what to do with them dramatize themselves behind

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

these walls. Most of our prisons were built before the idea of gradations of security had been heard of and in consequence resemble medieval walled fortresses. The largest in the United States is the monstrosity near Jackson, Michigan, the State Prison of Southern Michigan, scene of the biggest and most destructive prison riot of 1952.⁵⁷ It was built in 1927 to hold nearly 5000 prisoners—years *after* the American Prison Association had formally declared that 1200 prisoners was the maximum number that could adequately be managed in one prison! Michigan politicians knew better! At the time of the riot in April, 1952, Jackson prison had about 5300 prisoners within its walls and another 1200 outside on farms and in prison camps. The Michigan Reformatory at Ionia and the state prison at Marquette were similarly overcrowded. After consulting some of the best prison experts in the United States, who recommended the *immediate* construction of a medium-security prison since Jackson was overcrowded with 2000 or 3000 prisoners who did not need maximum security, the state authorities still had no such prison under construction *two years after the riot*! Instead they had a new law to relegate short-term men (under a year) *to the county jails*! Of all places!

The riots and the way in which the Michigan riot in particular was handled dramatize as nothing else could the current confusions about the basic purposes of our correctional systems. Why do we send men to prison? There are at least four answers to that and the public is gloriously confused about which answer or which combination of answers should determine prison policy.

Traditionally, the criminal law aimed at *punishment*. The savage tortures of the Middle Ages and the solitary confinement imposed on the inmates of the first American prisons (the Pennsylvania system at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as correctional practices outgrew the local jails) all bespoke a desire to make the lawbreaker suffer

⁵⁷ For the best descriptions of the Michigan prison riot see Vernon Fox, former assistant deputy warden, "How I Broke the Michigan Prison Riot," *Collier's*, July 12, 1952, and John B. Martin, "The Story of the Michigan Prison Riot," *Saturday Evening Post*, June 6, 13, 20, and 27, 1953. Also see Martin's little book, *Break Down the Walls*, New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1951, 1953, 1954, a devastating attack on American correctional practice and the best analysis of political factors behind the Michigan prison riot of April, 1952. There were twenty major uprisings in state prisons between March 20, 1953, when 23 convicts in a New Jersey prison seized guards and rioted for two days, and January 22, 1953, when 1500 convicts in three prisons near Pittsburgh exploded. Riots occurred in prisons in thirteen states, four of them in New Jersey alone and two each in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Illinois. About 5 percent of the 147,000 inmates of state prisons were involved. Except for a protest meeting of inmates at the Chillicothe Reformatory, federal prisons were unaffected. There were similar outbreaks in two Canadian prisons.

in expiation for his crimes. The very term *penitentiary* has a religious origin and refers either to a diocesan officer vested with power to absolve sinners in certain cases or to a tribunal of the Roman curia, which examines cases of conscience, absolution from vows, etc. Solitary confinement in the early penitentiaries was supposed to give the offender opportunity to meditate on his sins and become properly penitent. What it actually did was to drive so many inmates insane that it had to be given up, except as a temporary penalty for infraction of prison rules. If punishment is actually the purpose for which we send men to prison, we are singularly inconsistent about it. In 1952 the warden of a Colorado prison was haled into court on a charge of having violated the constitutional rights of prison inmates by flogging them for something or other. He was acquitted, but many newspapers denounced him editorially and criticized the jury for letting him go. Yet if convicts are sent to prison to suffer for their sins, why not flog them? Except that flogging is a bit old-fashioned. Dictator Peron's political police in Argentina are said to have perfected a more efficient method—electrical torture. A few applications of the electric needle in the right places can efficiently reduce even the huskiest offender to a gibbering idiot. Well, we too have the means. Even our 100-year-old prisons are now equipped with electricity. What are we waiting for? Properly approached, our psychologists could no doubt devise a simple test for selecting the necessary sadists as wardens who would be delighted to turn on the juice.

It would seem that we ought to be making up our minds. The present state of public ambivalence which cries for vengeance against the criminal on one day and drools about prison cruelty on the next must be wearing, both on the hired help and on the customers.

Another rationalization for imprisonment is that it is intended to *deter others by example*. In that case, why don't we send all our convicted offenders to prison? Actually, we are imprisoning only a sizable fraction of those convicted. The fraction varies from state to state, some states imprisoning three-quarters or more of those convicted of prison offenses; other states content themselves with a mere 30 to 40 percent.⁵⁸ Actually, of course, the extent to which imprisonment or any other kind of penalty imposed on one person acts as a deterrent on another person to prevent a similar law violation will depend

⁵⁸ Michigan courts in 1948, for example, convicted 7377 individuals of prison offenses but actually committed only 2488, or 33.7 percent. *Report of the Governor's Study Commission on the Deviated Criminal Sex Offender*, Rev. Ralph M. Richards, chairman, Lansing, Mich., 1951, p. 209.

largely on the kind of individual the second person is. Convictions of others and even of themselves seem to have little deterrent effect on habit-bound criminals, episodic criminals, the mentally abnormal criminal, and the "professional" and gangster type. Yet the threat of conviction is undoubtedly a strong deterrent for many normal individuals who stop to calculate risks. Possible deterrent effect is an incidental, however, rather than a major justification for imprisonment.

More to the point are two other justifications: *protection of society* by segregation or elimination, and *rehabilitation* of the offender himself.

It is obvious that while a criminal is in prison he can't be robbing, raping, and killing others outside. But when all allowance has been made for the small number who receive life sentences or are put to death, and for the somewhat larger number who receive rather long sentences such as the average of nearly 14 years imposed on our 527 armed robbery cases in Jackson prison, the fact remains that 95 percent of the convicts now in prison will be out within the next five to ten years. Thus, imprisonment as it is actually working out is an instrument for only temporary segregation—segregation which on the average lasts less than five years. A small percentage of the most dangerous are put away for life or for long terms and an even smaller percentage of the most vicious are executed—an average of 149 per year, 1930–1949 the nation over. But the great majority are merely taken out of circulation for a few years. What this means is that, whether we like it or not, *the question of rehabilitation becomes the most important question in the correctional field*. The practical question which confronts society when it sentences the average criminal to prison is this: What is prison going to do to this individual—make him a more dangerous enemy than he is now, or turn him into a reasonably safe risk? There is no escaping that question. And on the answer depends the final judgment on whether any correctional system is worth the powder to blow it up. Before we go further with this question, however, let us close accounts with the idea that tougher sentences and more elimination of criminals can be the answer.

It is not severity of punishment but certainty that really deters. The classic example is the oft-cited case of English pickpockets three centuries ago who never worked more industriously than among the crowds watching the hangings of pickpockets! The chance of one's being caught under those conditions was so small that the terrible

prospect of dangling at the end of a rope if one were caught acted as no deterrent at all. To confiscate drivers' licenses and to jail traffic violators does little to deter other violators so long as the chance of any particular violator's being caught remains infinitesimal. But if some genius could invent a device that would insure the detection and apprehension of *every* traffic violator for *every* violation, there would be almost no violations at all, even if the penalty were quite nominal. Likewise, it is not the severity of inconsistent and uncertain discipline that develops obedience in a child. It is the certainty even of very mild discipline; for *every* act of disobedience, a penalty *every* time, even when Daddy doesn't feel like it and Mother is too busy! *Consistency* and *certainty* from the cradle up—the formula for producing a model child is rather simple, but it takes quite a parent to use it wisely and well.

The good citizens who cry so loudly for vengeance and the death penalty after every particularly atrocious crime not only are acting on the assumption that punishment is the purpose of the law but unwittingly are doing their best to defeat that purpose. For their outcry about more severity distracts attention from the one thing that will make the law actually more preventive, namely, more certainty of punishment.

Increased severity also defeats certainty in another way. The more severe a penalty, the more cautious juries become in voting to inflict it. Lawyers testify overwhelmingly that it is harder to get a jury to vote for the death penalty than for life imprisonment. Although forty-two states have the death penalty for murder and most of them apply it to rape as well, the importance of the death penalty in the whole problem of crime control has been grossly overrated. Of all the 125,000 or more criminally homicidal killers and rapists eligible for execution during the twenty-one years between 1930 and 1950, inclusive, in the forty-two states with the death penalty, only 3029, or less than 2.5 percent, or *only 149 a year*, were actually executed. Over 54 percent of these were Negroes, a race that constituted less than 10 percent of the population. In their battle with crime American policemen probably kill more criminals every twelve months than all the gallows, gas chambers, and electric chairs in the country dispose of in several years.

The condemned criminal awaiting execution is a pathetic and dramatic figure, and the publicity he gets far overshadows his importance or the amount of public attention directed toward his vanished victim.

To the problem of controlling crime, the death penalty is pretty largely irrelevant. The states that don't have it get along as well as those that do; and the elimination of less than 2.5 percent of the killers and rapists by public execution has no visible deterrent effect on the episodic criminals, the abnormals, and the "professionals." It is still true that if you know the right people in almost any large city in the country you can arrange to have an ordinary person rubbed out for a little matter of \$100 to \$1000. The important thing there isn't the death penalty. It's how the local gang stands in with the political machine.

So with increased severity and the death penalty disposed of as cure-alls, what about rehabilitation?

That's no cure-all either, for about half of our prison population is made up of repeaters (recidivists)—characters who have been there before and will keep on coming back if and when they get out.⁵⁹ So rehabilitation as an objective can be flushed down the drain for about half of the American prison population. More or less permanent segregation is the only intelligent answer for them. But to get it would mean treating them in terms of their personality types, not their specific acts, and we have already seen that the lawyers have some weighty objections to such a shift in legal objectives. Nevertheless, we shall probably move in the direction of more permanent segregation of recidivists.⁶⁰

The other half of our prison population calls for quite a different kind of treatment. These are the ones, the first offenders, who if they are sent to prison at all should be the targets of expert classification and individual treatment programs. In the nature of the case, they should never be confined in the same institution with hardened offenders, and it is right here that overcrowding does its worst damage by forcing the mingling of recidivists with first offenders.

The gist of modern penology comes down to two ideas: *classification* and *individualized treatment*. Separate the "hard eggs" from the

⁵⁹ Recidivists constituted 48 percent of the population of the Jackson Prison at the time of the riot in April, 1952.

⁶⁰ For generations the laws of most states have provided stiffer penalties for repeaters than for first offenders. Laws imposing life imprisonment on "habitual" criminals, i.e., offenders with multiple convictions, exist in many states. The famous Baumes Law in New York was an example. Such laws are justifiable in intention but have usually been botched by too great rigidity in application. During prohibition some of them were even applied to offenders whose qualifying fourth offense, for example, might be merely the unlawful possession of alcohol. Moreover, prosecutors and courts tend to defeat the purpose of such laws by reducing charges to avoid invoking them.

hopeful cases, find out what each treatable individual needs as a person, then give it to him. Help him to meet and overcome his own problems. Then follow him out after release with parole supervision that helps him get on his feet again in the community.

The theory is reasonably simple. The application of the theory is incredibly difficult. Only a handful of institutions in the United States are actually applying it. The most notable are California's minimum-security prison at Chino, New York's Wallkill, and the federal government's institution at Seagoville, Texas.

Until the 1920's the federal government played a very small role in the correctional field. Since then it has built one of the outstanding systems in the world, with facilities ranging from open camps to reformatories, ordinary prisons, and the maximum-security acme at Alcatraz. Most of the states, operating with smaller budgets and more political sabotage, are far behind the federal correctional system.⁶¹

By and large outside of the federal system and a few outstanding state agencies, societal reactions to lawbreaking in the United States suffer from (a) too much public indifference; (b) too much public confusion concerning ultimate purposes and methods of law enforcement and penal treatment; (c) too much political interference all along the line; (d) too limited budgets; (e) the inadequate professionalization of police and prison personnel; and (f) inadequate utilization of science and scientific methods by police departments, the courts, and the correctional systems of the nation. As a result of all these cultural lags, crime and delinquency continue to constitute a major social problem confronting the American people.

⁶¹ For an ex-inmate's dim view of conditions in one Federal institution, however, read J. Parnell Thomas's story of his nine months in the Federal correctional institution at Danbury, Conn., after conviction of having padded his office payroll while a member of Congress. See *Life*, October 4, 1954.

Problems of Work in the Industrial Culture

II-6:1. Types of Work Problems

The problems raised by the impact of industrialism on traditional values divide sharply into two kinds: (1) those related to work under pecuniary market conditions, typically in the factory; and (2) those related to domestic, or household, work situations.

In both types of situations the average worker faces three kinds of problems: (1) problems of the individual in preparing for, getting, and adjusting to a "job"; (2) problems of the association unit—the factory or the household—in which the work is done; and (3) problems of the industrial culture itself.

Since we have to discuss various phases of the problems of factories and families in other connections (Book II, Chapter 5, Part A, and Book I, Chapters 6 and 7) and various problems of the industrial culture in later chapters, we shall confine ourselves in this chapter to problems of the individual in preparing for, getting, and adjusting to factory and domestic work situations. Moreover, it is necessary to note that even in thus limiting ourselves we shall be approaching work with a somewhat different point of view from the one that is traditionally current. The civilian work force of more than 62,000,000 men and women (1954) works in such different kinds of enterprises from farms to factories, under such different conditions, for such different goals, and under such different controls as compared with the nation's domestic work force, the 34,000,000 housewives, that the work problems of pecuniary workers and those of housewives must be analyzed from different points of view. Yet it may not be altogether without interest to disregard for the time being the sentimental connotations

of the terms *marriage*, *family*, and *home* and consider the average wife as just as truly engaged in an occupation as is her husband. When both are looked at in this way, certain things appear that are not so prominent when pecuniary workers and work situations are considered in one frame of reference and wives and mothers and domestic work situations are considered in another.

In this chapter we shall discuss some of the problems involved in factory work and in household work as problems of typical occupations—factory problems as typical of work under pecuniary motivations and machine production technology; household work problems as typical of work under nonpecuniary motivations and domestic consumer technology.

II-6:2. Preparing for and Selecting an Occupation

1. FARM AND URBAN PECUNIARY WORKERS

Prospective pecuniary workers on different social levels prepare for and select specific occupations in somewhat different ways and do these things differently on the farm and in the city. Prospective household workers, prospective housewives, however, prepare for and select their ultimate occupation in much the same way on all social levels and ecological locations, on farms as in the cities.

The farm boy usually learns the practical externals of farming by a kind of informal apprenticeship on the farm itself from the time he is able to collect the eggs and drive in the cows for milking till he can help fill a silo and is ready to quit school. The more prosperous and intelligent go on to an agricultural college and come back—if they do come back—to apply scientific methods to improve the quality of their seed corn and the breeding stock in the family herd. But since the nation's farm homes are producing more children than they can place on the nation's shrinking farms, most farm boys have to seek jobs in the villages and the cities. Only a small percentage of these urban migrants prepare themselves in any formal way for urban careers. They simply take the first job that offers after leaving school and make the best of it. They tend to marry early and soon find whatever plans they may have had for getting ahead handicapped by the responsibilities of a growing family.

At the bottom of the occupational pyramid in the country are the farm laborers—approximately 1,500,000 in 1950—including the several hundred thousand migratory workers who follow the fruit and

berry crops and the wheat harvest from the deep South to the Canadian border every year. Farm laborers in general tend to be older, less skilled, and more poorly educated than urban laborers, and the migratory workers include considerable percentages of Mexicans and their numerous families, who constitute an educational headache for the schools from California and Texas to Minnesota and Michigan. Like the children of parents on all occupational levels, the children of farm laborers tend to follow in their parents' footsteps and become laborers in turn and to marry on the same level.

In the towns and cities the children of hand workers have a somewhat wider range of occupational choices opened to them than is true of farm children, but most of them tend to become hand workers like their fathers. A tiny percentage marry up, manage to get into little businesses for themselves, or stay in school long enough to enter one of the professions. On the whole, however, the managers and technicians of urban businesses and the members of the professions are recruited mainly from the children of the middle and upper classes. The middle class fosters the tradition of individual self-improvement and social climbing.

Upper-class families have the money and the social connections to give their children any educational and occupational advantages that they desire.

In many ways, therefore, it is the middle-class youngster who really faces the toughest problem of occupational adjustment. He is brought up to regard hand labor as beneath him and yet he may not have the character and brains required to go through the long educational training which would fit him for a profession, or his family may not be able to afford it. Yet without special training, capital, or unusual social connections, he cannot get into a profession or go into business for himself and usually winds up in some job as a clerk, salesman, or white-collar office worker. As Mills has pointed out, the middle class instead of consisting largely of farm owners and small businessmen as it did 100 years ago has come increasingly to consist of salaried white-collar workers, employees working for others.¹


We have, in fact, become largely a nation of employees. For this kind of occupational career the customary public-school education with its emphasis on competitive striving and the myth of room at the top is a poor preparation. The organization of each business unit and

¹ See C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Class*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951.

the stratification structure of American society at large approximate a social pyramid: comparatively few at the top and increasing numbers on each stratum as one goes down (see Fig. II-6.1 and also Book I, Chapter 7). From generation to generation, despite the unusual opportunities for social mobility offered by the American social system, more people stay on the social level to which they are born than ever

Business Organizations

Chairman of the Board
Board of Directors
President and other
top executives
Top engineers, technicians
Minor executives
superintendents,
department heads,
foremen
White-collar office
workers
Hourly rated wage
workers



Distribution of Social Status in American Society

Upper upper stratum:
inherited wealth; family
Lower upper: acquired
wealth and position
Upper middle stratum: well
to do; independent
Lower middle stratum:
comfortable; quasi-
independent; white-collar
workers
Upper lower stratum: great
mass of hand workers;
dependent on wages
Lower lower stratum: lowest-
paid wage workers,
ranging down to relievers,
beggars, and criminals

FIG. II-6.1. Pyramid Illustrating the Form in Which Business Organizations Are Structured and in Which Social Status Is Distributed in American Society at Large. Another pyramid of status and authority extends into and out of many factories, namely, the pyramid of union organization. This rises from the broad base of ordinary members through the officers of the local to the higher strata of the international union, its office force, field representatives, etc., to the international executive committee and the union president.

change levels. Studies of certain large corporations show, incidentally, that (a) the higher the educational level reached by an employee and (b) the longer he has been with the company, the greater is his disillusionment and dissatisfaction with his job. Changing one's level of status and function in a business organization, as in society at large, seems to be more difficult than the traditional myth would lead a young man to expect. Both in Middletown and in Yankee City a decade later, the traditional ladder of advancement in industry from a job on the floor to the top had long since been outmoded. In Middletown the Lynds found that for *all* workers to have had a *chance* even to be promoted to foreman would have required an average lifetime of about 400 years! In Yankee City it was clearly recognized that

to start at the bottom and try to work up inside the factory was almost hopeless. The accepted pattern for getting ahead was for a young man to by-pass the lower echelons altogether by going to a technical school and then coming back into the factory as a skilled technician farther up the ladder.

In both Middletown and Yankee City, as in the rest of the United States, education was clearly recognized as a social elevator: the more education one acquired, especially of a technical nature, the better one's chances of getting up in the world. But unfortunately, the chances of getting an education beyond the eighth grade depended very largely on the income level of one's family: college and technical school were within the easy grasp of all upper-class children; within the grasp of a majority of upper-middle-class children and of many lower-middle-class children; but available only to a small minority even of upper-lower-class children. The lower lowers almost never got there.

Yet analysis of the distribution of mental test scores shows that there are more A and B brains in the blue-collar classes than on the white-collar level! The colleges get only about half of those who could profit from them. The distribution of brains and the distribution of educational opportunity in the United States do not coincide.

Now what about the problems that face a young girl in preparing for marriage and selecting a husband?

2. HOW TO PREPARE FOR MARRIAGE AND OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE

For the girl this question of how to prepare for marriage and select a husband is coördinate with the question which the boy faces—how prepare for and select an occupation. But how different the answers!

In contrast to the hundreds of terminal occupations open to young men, young women, no matter what incidental occupations they may enter on the way, wind up eventually in 81 cases out of 100 as housewives. Of the men, 75 percent over 14 are or have been husbands. But being a husband is not an occupation, i.e., it is not a way of making a living. Being a housewife is. And there are more Americans engaged in that one occupation *three or four times over* than there are engaged in any other single class of occupation in the United States! In view of this fact, it is a bit curious that so little attention has been paid by economists and sociologists to the one occupation which in terms of numbers engaged is obviously the most important in our whole economy!

True, in 1954 there were some 19,000,000 women gainfully employed among the 62,000,000 working in pecuniary occupations in the United States, and several million of these 19,000,000 were wives, but the employed wives still considered themselves wives first and employees second. Most of them would have given up their jobs overnight if their husbands could have earned enough to meet their families' needs, and the number of women who would have spurned marriage for the sake of what the romantic feminists called a career was probably small. The vast majority of all working women were working for one or both of two reasons only: (a) as a stopgap till marriage; (b) to help out a needy family. At least 90 percent of them were not working in preference to marrying or for the sake of independent careers. The career woman who regards marriage as old-fashioned and an interference with the full development of her personality is a figment of the imagination of the artistic temperament. Statistically she is almost as rare as a purple cow. For the vast majority of the 11,000,000 single women over 14 in 1950, *their career* was to get married. As culture once defined the occupational future of rural youth in terms of agriculture, our culture today still defines the occupational future of the unmarried girl in terms of marriage. In 1950 there were 14,000,000 single males over 14 and every one of them had a theoretical cultural choice among scores or hundreds of different occupations. If our economy was to work, they not only could but they were going to have to make their living in hundreds of different ways. But by the same token, if the American family was to go on, most marriageable women year after year were going to have to make their living in one single occupation, namely, occupation housewife.

True, a family, a household, was the joint responsibility of the husband *and* the wife. True, also, in many families the wife shared not only the responsibility but the pecuniary support of the family: either she held an outside job or, if she had an independent income, she shared in paying the bills. But all this did not change the cultural fact that a man was expected to make his living in some occupation *outside the home*; a woman was expected to *make homemaking her occupation*. She was expected to make her living primarily as a housewife. If she chose to supplement her husband's income by holding another job or by contributing from her own means, all well and good. But in the eyes of the law, of the average male, and of the traditions of her own sex, her major occupation was still that of housewife. She was a wife first and an outside employee or what-have-you afterwards.

Marriage had given her a legal status which outside employment or independent contribution could not change. By virtue of that status, whether she ever did one lick of work outside or contributed one red cent to the family budget, her husband owed her a living and she could collect. Hence, being a housewife is an occupation. It is a way of making a living. And it was the major occupation of 34,000,000 American women in 1950.

Why, then, isn't being a husband likewise an occupation? Because males don't normally make a living *merely by being husbands*. The 34,000,000 mates of those 34,000,000 married women made *their* living outside of and apart from their highly important functions as husbands and fathers.

Being a husband and father is not an occupation. It is a status and a function in relation to another person or persons, but men do not make their living on the basis of occupying that status (husband) or performing that function (father). Most women, on the other hand, do make their living in precisely that way: by occupying the status of wife and performing the function of mother.

The distinction comes out even more clearly when we compare the rewards that society allots to outstanding achievements in the two kinds of occupations, the pecuniary and the domestic. In general, outstanding achievement in any pecuniary occupation, even ditch digging, carries with it a greater measure of social recognition, prestige, influence, than mere mediocrity or downright failure. In business and the great professions outstanding achievement usually brings much more than this: it tends to bring high social status as a reward. In medieval times, as in some countries today, the status once achieved became the permanent possession of the family. Caste is merely a way of using the family as a means of perpetuating a given social status.

But under the caste system, or any other, social status generally does not depend on how good and successful a man may be as a husband and father or how good or successful a woman may be as a wife and mother. Status, like social recognition, prestige, and influence, which it embodies, *is a reward for achievement in the community, not in the home*.

And this at once points to another peculiarity of occupation housewife: it makes its economic contribution to our economy outside of the pecuniary market. Housewives add tens of billions of dollars' worth of personal services to the sum total of the national income every year, but the value of these services is never included in the im-

posing total of the national income. Their services are not bought and sold on an open market. Each household is a kind of "private market" protected by the highest, most impervious, and most autarchic "tariff wall" in the world—the marriage contract. It is a tariff wall defended not by revenue officers and the Coast Guard but by the law and the moral code. Smuggling here is known by the unpleasant term *infidelity*.

So consider the differences in the way culture prepares the girl for her occupation and the way in which the boy is prepared for his. The differentiation begins in the cradle with the sex classification of each new arrival. Each receives a given name sexually distinctive: George vs. Georgiana, Charles vs. Charlotte, and so on. Each sex is even supposed to have a distinctive color: blue for boys, pink for girls. Since the family name will descend in the male line, it is a rare family that does not attach a subtle importance to a male child which is denied to the female. Certainly long before the little boy is being slanted toward any *particular* occupation the little girl finds herself playing with dolls and helping mother with the housework. For a few years she may play in the same sandpile as her brother, ride a tricycle, and learn to roller-skate as he does, but by the time she is ready for school she has learned that little girls and little boys are "different" and that little girls aren't supposed to climb trees or hop trucks or do all sorts of other interesting things that little boys can do. If some small edition in skirts insists on behaving like a tomboy, this, of course, is regarded with almost as much concern as some little boy's fondness for dolls—except that the little tomboy is getting a lot of exercise that will stand her in good stead when the time comes for childbearing! The "little sissy," on the other hand, may be preparing himself to be a better-than-average father, but he obviously isn't learning the much more important function of taking his own part in competition and looking out for himself in the rough and tumble of male existence. The little boy must learn to be "a man," an individual able to stand up to other men; the little girl must be "a lady" and channel her aggressions in less obvious ways. If family circumstances require that the girl as she approaches adulthood must look forward to self-support, family and sex traditions nevertheless lead her to expect that such work will be only a way station on the road to marriage and a home of her own.

Many middle- and even upper-class parents nowadays encourage their daughters to prepare for self-support so that they "can be inde-

pendent in case anything happens." In a world of considerable uncertainty in which a depression may sweep away a family fortune or an automobile accident cripple a breadwinner for life, there is practical value in this. But the moral value is vastly more important. If the basic value of personality is to be realized in the modern home, husbands and wives must associate on the basis of "different but equal." This requires *emotionally mature and well-adjusted couples*—and equality of status in the marriage relationship. There can be no such equality so long as one partner holds the power of economic coercion over the other. As things are, there are altogether too many homes in which the husband takes out on his wife his own frustrations and inferiorities and the wife has to submit to his bullying because she is not equipped to earn a decent living outside the home. Many a middle- and upper-class home holds together only because the wife is afraid to sacrifice her comfort status to compete in the labor market as an unskilled worker. And unconsciously many husbands apply to their wives their own standards of pecuniary success: Since their wives couldn't earn a quarter or a tenth of what the husbands earn, they are obviously "inferior"! The wife who is not afraid to challenge that kind of rubbish is the wife who is more likely than the submissive type to command her husband's respect.

Complex as may be the boy's problem of selecting an occupation, given the variety of possibilities open to him today plus the average young man's uncertainties about his own capabilities at the start, that problem is simplicity itself as compared with the girl's task of selecting a husband. In the first place, the young man can go straight to his objective, either by applying for the first job that comes along or by first equipping himself with the skills required for a particular occupation or profession. The whole process is highly rational and straight forward. He qualifies in the eyes of a prospective employer or according to the standards of a given profession, or he doesn't, and that's that. He doesn't have to "date" the personnel manager or swear to love, honor, and cherish the chairman of the board till death us do part!

The girl, on the other hand, is not supposed to go straight to her objective. She is not supposed by our culture to take the initiative in sex matters. Nor is the process of selecting a mate supposed to be a purely rational process. In other cultures, where marriage is regarded as an alliance of families rather than a romantic adventure of two young persons, arrangements are made by emotionally disinterested

third parties, either the parents of the prospective mates or marriage brokers. Sometimes the happy couple never even see each other till all arrangements have been made and they are within a step of the final ceremony. Whatever Americans may think of such a cultural pattern for mating from the point of view of the happiness of the individuals concerned, there is no question about its being a more rational proceeding than our own approach to wedded bliss.

Our own method puts a premium not on rationality but on irrationality. The dating and rating complex permits young persons to test each other out, as it were, for desirability as companions and possible mates. Theoretically this would seem to be a highly rational approach to a marriage designed for personal happiness.

But while the objective of testing individuals for mutual compatibility may be rational enough, the methods which our culture has evolved for this purpose are something else. These methods involve (a) a somewhat hit-and-miss association process known as dating and rating and (b) a psychological condition known as "being in love." Dating and rating permits young persons to pair off and isolate themselves from adult supervision so that what goes on between them becomes largely a matter of their own good sense and self-control. "Being in love" is supposed to be the necessary precondition for selecting a mate. By definition it is a kind of emotional fixation that precludes rationality in the selection. Being in love means that the afflicted individual, first, has become preoccupied with romantic ideas and emotions concerning the object of his or her fixation; second, has lost all desire to evaluate that object in terms of coldly objective evidence and usually resists doing so; and third, has become intent on "possessing," or appropriating the other, i.e., on taking the other out of dating-and-rating competition.

What all this amounts to is that in contrast to the objective, straight forward method by which a young man selects and gets into an occupation, a girl reaches what is to be her lifelong occupation, housewife, only (a) by exposing herself to the amorous advances of a variety of possible mates in order to find one with whom she can fall in love, and then (b), having fallen in love, by making the ultimate decision under the influence of an emotional fixation that anesthetizes her critical faculties.

Although rating-and-dating behavior begins innocently enough and most of it is mere play, the participants especially as they approach the age of legal marriage frequently raise the emotional potential until

a date may become about as harmless as playing with a live wire. From the beginning it is the girl's business—aided by the fashion industry and the multi-million-dollar cosmetic trade—to make herself as seductive as possible. But it is part of the game that, although she is seductive and is supposed to hold her own in the sex competition with other girls, she is not supposed to let her male companions get something for nothing: she is not supposed to yield to seduction herself. When the aristocratic ideal of the gentlemen still prevailed this game was not so dangerous as it has become since the gentlemen has been replaced so widely by the underworld stereotype of "the wolf."² At best, however, the rating-and-dating game to remain merely a game requires, especially on the part of the girl, a fine balance of character, self-control, and finesse in handling the amorous male. The whole process, especially when it escapes from the protections of the family—as it does when some millions of young women get jobs away from home as waitresses, actresses, clerks, typists, secretaries, receptionists, sales-girls, and so on—exposes the girl to greater social risks and more possible exploitation than it does the man. Whatever one may think about the moral aspects of premarital intercourse—and the Kinsey reports and other studies indicate a rising prevalence of the practice—the fact remains that in our culture sex relations before marriage are considerably more risky for the female than for the male. The female, not the male, bears the illegitimate child or has the abortion. If Dame Gossip gets wind of illicit goings-on the girl's reputation invariably suffers more than does the man's. If the relations grow out of a seduction, or if the relations themselves create an attachment, the girl is less capable of bringing her partner into a legitimate marriage than is the

² Since sex has come to predominate so largely over economic motives for marriage among American males, young women are in the curious cultural position of having to stimulate sex interest for several years during the rating-and-dating period without actually gratifying it short of marriage. The colonial and Victorian cultures placed many more obstacles in the way of gratification than does our own. Some of the obstacles: the aristocratic ideal of the gentleman who protected women of his own social class; greater seclusion of women in the home—upper-class chaperonage; formal introductions; sex viewed as sinful, not rationalized by quotations from Freud and Kinsey; ignorance of contraceptives; greater difficulty in escaping surveillance of parents and neighbors—no automobiles, impersonal hotels, or auto courts; less prevalent atmosphere of sex suggestion—no movies, radio, television. Could any publisher in colonial days or even a century ago have brought out a title such as *Let Us Make Mary*? And is the blanket charge in *The Unfair Sex* that all any man wants of any woman is just one thing merely satire? Terman, Kinsey, and others present impressive evidence that premarital virginity is a vanishing virtue. See Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938, and Alfred C. Kinsey and others, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*, Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1948 and 1953, respectively.

man. Culture still leaves the initiative in the hands of the male. He is nearly always more footloose than is the girl.

Moreover, quite apart from the moral, physiological, social, and psychological effects on the individuals concerned, premarital relations obviously cheapen marriage. Two of the great motivations for marriage on the part of men are (a) the desire for sexual access to a love-object and (b) the desire to prevent similar access by other men, i.e., the desire to monopolize the love-object. To protect women themselves and to utilize these desires for social purposes, culture through the moral code and legal enactments prescribes the customary conditions which a man must meet in order to gratify those desires: he must publicly enter into a contract in which, in return for the right of sexual association with one woman, he specifically assumes the financial and other obligations of a husband. The girl who either sells sex or gives it away before marriage is, therefore, not only cheapening herself. She is cheating on other women and cheapening marriage.

What it comes down to, obviously, is that the wolf is a cheapskate, a chiscler, a guy who wants his partner to take all the risks and let him have his way for the cost of an evening's entertainment.

On top of all this, our culture still relies far more heavily on the home to prepare the girl for her terminal occupation than it does to prepare the boy for his. In so far as they are being prepared at all, the nation's future housewives are getting their training in a kind of old-fashioned apprenticeship to their own mothers, most of whom have had no training whatever as teachers and not too much as model housewives themselves. How many successful housewives have ever stopped to make a job-analysis breakdown of their own occupation? Many of them feel—and practically all the writers on "The Problems of the Modern Woman" insist—that occupation housewife is a complicated business whose complexities the average male inadequately appreciates. But how many housewives themselves have ever tried to unscramble these complexities so that they can do a better job of preparing their daughters for their life careers as housewives?

How many are as much concerned with training their daughters in the skills required to be adequate wives and competent household managers and workers as they are with training them in how to maintain social status, outcompete other girls for masculine attention, and bring the right young man to the crucial question? How many, in other words, are as much concerned with preparing their daughters to "make a go of marriage" once it has been achieved as with prepar-

ing them to succeed merely in the competition for a mate? It is important for girls to learn how to handle themselves—and young men—in the dating-and-rating period, but it is at least equally important for them to learn how to handle a husband, children, family finances, and the multiple tasks of a modern household. The rising divorce rate and the constant complaints of unhappiness among so many of the undivorced seem to indicate that somewhere along the line many modern homes on all social levels are failing to prepare young persons, boys as well as girls, for their common tasks as husbands and wives. But occupationally the failure is more serious for the girls than for the boys because, while both husband and wife must coöperate to make a marriage succeed, it is the wife who carries the major responsibility for making her own career as a housewife succeed. And that, after all, is *her* terminal occupation. She can't make a go of it with a mamma's boy or a two-timing double-crosser—types that proper training in mate selection would have saved her from in the first place; but neither can she make a go of it if she can't accept her role as a wife or can't adjust herself to the limits of her husband's income.

If many American homes are failing adequately to prepare their sons for marriage, their failure in this regard may have a direct impact on future marriages but it can have only an indirect impact on the occupational future of the sons. The sons will not make their living by being husbands. But the failure of American homes to prepare their daughters for marriage has an impact not only on future marriages but on the occupational future of those daughters. Four-fifths of those daughters *will* try to make their living by being housewives. Their success in that occupation will be *conditioned* by the coöperativeness of the men they have chosen as husbands, but it will be *determined* within those conditions by their own qualities as human beings and by the skills which they can apply to intimate relationships and to their functions as wives, mothers, and household workers. From the point of view of occupational futures, therefore, the inadequacy of domestic apprenticeship is more serious for the girl than for the boy.

It is more serious, also, for the girl because culture provides almost no other kind of cultural facilities to substitute for, or to supplement, domestic apprenticeship, while for her brother, apart from the agricultural apprenticeship provided by farm homes, culture has long since developed either craft apprenticeship in the skilled trades or more recently technological training in trade schools, high schools, colleges, and professional schools. The domestic science courses in

high schools and the few college curriculums in the same field, on the other hand, are not in any sense adequate substitutes for, or even improvements on, the kind of apprenticeship training that a model housewife would give her daughter in the arts of choosing a husband, running a home, and functioning successfully as a wife. At best, they may be called somewhat more scientific but still piecemeal supplements to such training. In no sense do they equip the prospective housewife with more than a smattering of the skills that she is going to need on the job. If being a successful housewife is at least as skilled an occupation as teaching, there would seem to be something of a discriminatory cultural gap here in the training facilities for prospective housewives—the largest single occupational category in our society—as compared with the training facilities provided for prospective teachers and other pecuniary workers.

We need not at this point speculate on why this gap exists. We merely note that there it is.

II-6:3. Fitting into the Routine

With 80 percent of American pecuniary workers working for others, the work routines to which they must adjust themselves are prescribed by the business organizations in which they work—prescribed by the purposes of management and by the technology of the industry. The routine of the average household, on the other hand, is prescribed partly by the occupation of the head of the house and by the school schedules of the children, partly by the domestic needs of human beings as such, and partly by the management skills of the housewife herself. Domestic routine is, therefore, much more a freely coöperative product than is the routine of the ordinary business enterprise. In other words, it is freer, more flexible, and less alien to those involved than is the routine of industry.

Mass production in particular seems to demand a routine that is especially abhorrent to many workers. One team of observers found six characteristics distinctive of mass production in an automobile assembly plant:³ (1) mechanically controlled work-pace—the worker forced to work at a rate fixed by the speed of the assembly line, the machine; (2) repetitiveness—the necessity of repeating over and over one or two or half a dozen stereotyped movements; (3) minimum skill—simple operations; pride of craftsmanship impossible; (4) prede-

³ Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 19.

termination of tools and technique—all the thinking done by the engineers, no problem-solving needed on the job; (5) minute subdivision of product—nobody ever completes anything; inability of worker to experience closure, the satisfaction of feeling that he has actually *made* something; (6) surface mental attention—automaticity of movement once the job has been learned in a few hours; failure of the job itself to enlist interest, to challenge anything but the most superficial attention.

The men interviewed in this plant liked the high rate of pay—the productivity of mass production—but disliked the routine required to earn it. Millions of industrial workers, apparently, even those on jobs less dominated by these mass-production characteristics, feel much the same way. They like the higher standard of living made possible by modern industry. They dislike the regimentation, the discipline, and the work pressure of modern factory work itself.

II-6:4. The Work Career of the Pecuniary Worker

Miller and Form distinguish six periods in the life career of the average pecuniary worker:

1. THE PREPARATORY WORK PERIOD—WITHIN THE HOME AND IN SCHOOL

The normal home inculcates in young people the ideal of work, i.e., making some return to society for subsistence and status. This is not always true in degenerate homes and in homes of the overprivileged, but by and large it is still true in the average home. Vocational goals develop and the first work models are found in the child's association with his parents and his brothers and sisters. In the school the child is trained to stay on the job and learn his lessons, to obey authority, to develop initiative of approved types, and to look forward to getting on in the world (the middle-class orientation of American education). He is also trained to develop character and to get along with his teachers and his schoolmates.

2. THE INITIAL WORK PERIOD—THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO EARN MONEY IN THE WORK MARKET

For urban workers this period may begin with a paper route or street-corner newspaper selling, doing part-time work for storekeepers, odd jobs for neighbors, etc. Many young people find part-time work after school hours. A study of part-time employment after school or

on Saturdays among Canton, Ohio, high-school boys and girls in 1937-38 noted for the boys 68 jobs in manufacturing and mechanical industries, 761 in transportation, trade, and clerical occupations; 77 in domestic and personal service; 13 in agriculture, 2 in extractive industry (mining), and 86 in miscellaneous occupations. For the girls, 152 worked in transportation, trade, and clerical occupations, 236 in domestic and personal service, and 21 in miscellaneous occupations. Part-time workers constituted 33 percent of the Canton high-school boys and 14 percent of the girls. Many high-school and college students also work during summer vacations. Miller and Form point out various conflicting cultural values that impinge on young workers during the initial work period: hard work vs. a soft job and getting by; getting along with people vs. aggressiveness to get ahead; learning to value money vs. the usefulness of penny-pinching; the decay of the religious view of work as serving God; etc.

3. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FROM SCHOOL TO WORK

About 1,750,000 young people enter the labor market every year. A Maryland Youth Survey at the end of the depression found that, of the young people who get full-time jobs, over half get them before the age of eighteen. The Canton survey already referred to found that two out of every three graduating high-school boys want white-collar jobs but that only half of them (on basis of experience of class of 1931) actually get such jobs. As for the girls who are going to work, 88 percent of them want professional or clerical jobs; only 38 percent get such jobs, while as against less than 7 percent wanting domestic or personal service work, over half (50.4 percent) get such work.

Miller and Form observe: "Considerable frustration is indicated as a normal product of the transition period."⁴

The reasons seem to be twofold: (1) Our culture, dominated by its middle-class orientation, tends to incite more young people to want higher social status than is possible arithmetically in a status pyramid such as ours—there just are not enough white-collar jobs for all who want them; and (2) the process of getting up the business ladder has come to depend more on technical education, knowing the right people, or control of capital than on mere hard work on the job and thrift outside of it as the middle-class myth would have us believe.

On the average, urban high-school graduates in the Middle West

⁴ Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, *Industrial Sociology*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 593.

in 1946 were entering pecuniary work at an annual wage or salary level of \$1680 for the boys, \$1460 for the girls. The girl's average income disadvantage at the start of pecuniary competition in a man's world thus amounted to \$220 a year, or 15 percent of her income.⁵ This differential in pay which will follow women throughout their pecuniary work careers, plus the reluctance of a man-centered economy to admit women to positions of authority, plus the value orientation of the feminine subculture toward home and children, plus the opportunities opened by the dating-and-rating complex, all combine gradually to sift the more marriageable girls out of the pecuniary labor market and sift them into their terminal careers as housewives. The boys remain and go on into the next phase of their work careers.

4. THE TRIAL WORK PERIOD

Miller and Form define the trial work period as "the period of job transition beginning when the worker seeks his first full-time job and continuing until he has secured a work position in which he remains more or less permanently." They find that accident, mainly the accident of birth, is the decisive factor in determining the occupation of most workers. The social level on which they are born, opportunities opened by it or the limitations imposed in the same way, the expectations of parents and friends—all these set the individual's occupational sights.⁶ In *Elmtown*, the little middle western city studied by A. B. Hollingshead, the vocational choices of high-school students declined steadily from the upper-middle and lower-middle classes to the upper-lower and lower-lower.⁷ Seventy-seven percent of the upper-middle students chose the professions or business and 12 percent chose farming while only 7 percent of the lower-lower chose the professions or business and 3 percent farming. On the other hand, only 3 percent of the upper-middle chose a craft occupation and none chose service trades and miscellaneous low-status occupations while 14 percent of the lower-lower wanted to be craftsmen and 25 percent chose service trades and miscellaneous. Moreover, the higher social strata were much more decided about their occupational choices than were the lower strata. Only 3 percent of the upper-middle and 13 percent of the lower-middle students were undecided, whereas 20 percent of the

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 609–610, reporting on results of a study of the high-school population of Akron, Ohio, in the 1940's.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 637.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 652. A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949.

upper-lower and 41 percent of the lower-lower strata did not know what they wanted to do.

Yet in a large percentage of cases from grammar school to college early occupational choice seems rather useless. Most young people in our culture have to pass through a certain amount of trial-and-error floundering around from one thing to another until they hit on something that they can stay with. Of the men and women who had chosen an occupation before they entered the University of Minnesota in 1924-30, 49 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women were not in that occupation ten years later.⁸ And of the 541 graduates of Harvard in 1911, 54 percent were not in their chosen occupations twenty-five years later.⁹

The trial work period is a period of considerable occupational mobility and residential change of location. The central tendency, according to Miller and Form, is toward high horizontal mobility—changing jobs on the same status level—with relatively little vertical mobility—little movement up the occupational ladder.

Workers tend to adjust to disappointing work careers in a way that approximates the adjustment of many persons to any kind of disappointment, i.e., by trying to project or transfer blame to someone else—parents, wives, bosses, industry, society; by making excuses or apologies to explain away their failures; or by simply accepting things as they are and possibly citing some cultural rationalization to uphold them: "Everybody has an equal chance," and so on.

Case studies by various investigators seem to indicate that the trial work period is a period of considerable strain and tension for the individual since he has not yet reached a permanent work adjustment and often is still unable to get married.

5. THE STABLE WORK PERIOD

This is the period in which the individual after more or less floundering around finally finds himself in an occupation which he can stay with and in a job that he can hold. This means that if he hasn't already gotten himself married and subjected his wife to the insecurities and anxieties of his floundering, now is the time for him to establish a family. He settles down. Normally this should happen by his early thirties but the statistics of the average age of marriage of Ameri-

⁸ Charles R. Pace, *They Went to College*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1941, p. 95.

⁹ John R. Tunis, *Was College Worth While?* New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1936, p. 16.

can males—most of them wage workers—indicate that a great many wage workers marry long before they have achieved their stable work period. Many of them marry while they are still in their initial period and many more before they have completed their period of trying one job, then another. The result must be to project into the home a great deal of the tension, dissatisfaction, and insecurity of the worker on his job during these periods. Early marriage itself, however, probably affects a man's work career in either of two ways: (1) If he is himself immature and unstable, the premature assumption of family burdens before he has settled down occupationally may, especially if the wife nags, overload his adjustive capacity and bring about a flight from responsibility—desertion, alcoholism, philandering, and so on; or (2) if he actually has character and a reasonably well-integrated personality, early marriage may act as a stabilizer itself, driving him to work harder and make more effort to adjust himself to his work—in other words, to shorten the period of trial. In any event, it is fairly clear that for most workers a stable period tends to be achieved by age thirty or thirty-five and from then on there is little changing of jobs and much less moving about than in earlier periods. At this time many start buying a house—to save rent—and usually start by going into debt with a mortgage.¹⁰ This likewise tends toward stability—there are obligations to be met at regular intervals and house ownership makes moving and job mobility less convenient. Once one has settled down, all sorts of social ties develop to complete the process. Friendships tend to hold a family to one neighborhood and one plant. Children get entangled with playmates and school. Union activities, church memberships, fraternal and civic participation all add their bit to the network of relationships that develop. The stable work period normally lasts from the worker's late twenties or early thirties till the end of his occupational activity.

6. THE PERIOD OF RETIREMENT

Probably until very recently most wage workers never retired. They either died in harness or broke down with the infirmities of age and

¹⁰ The increase in trailer living among wage workers, which began because of necessity during the housing shortages of World War II and continued because of convenience afterward, may have some disturbing effect on the achievement of occupational stability by many workers. A trailer costs less than a house, does not tie a family down to one locality, and does not predispose its occupants to enter into community life outside the trailer camp. Furthermore, it is an inconvenient place in which to rear a family. The social and occupational consequences of trailer living still have to be analyzed in more detail than they have been to date.

had to eke out the few months or years left to them as best they could, usually dependent on children or other relatives. Social security which now enables a worker to draw on his accumulated reserve at age 65 will gradually change this state of affairs and the percentage of the work force gainfully employed beyond the age of 65 will gradually decline. The percentage of the total male population 65 and over that is still in the work force has fallen nearly one-third in 30 years—from




FIG. II-6.2. Percentages of Males and Females (over 14) in Population That Are 65 Years Old or Older and Percentages of Males and Females (over 14) Gainfully Employed at 65 and Older: 1920-1950. (From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, p. 177.)

60.1 percent in 1920 to 41.6 percent in 1950. But since the percentages of the adult population who are 65 and over have been rising steadily during that period from about 6.5 percent in 1920 to 10.3 percent for males and 11.6 percent for females in 1950, the percentages of the adult work force 65 and over have risen slightly for both men and women, except during the decade of the depression. Figure II-6.2 shows the trend of percentages of males and females 65 and over in the adult population and in the work force from 1920 to 1950. The percentages of men and women 65 and over in the adult work force have risen, but not so fast as the percentages of older men and women

in the total adult population. This means, as the overall decline in the percentage of older males still at work in the total older-age category indicates, that despite the slight increase in the percentage of older men in the work force still at work after 65, relatively more older men are now retiring than was true in the 1920's. The same seems to be true of older women, although the percentage of the older-age categories of females still actively in the work force has held fairly constant at about 7 or 8 percent for a generation, except for a slight decline in the depression decade to 5.9 percent in 1940. On the whole, while the male percentage of the total work force of all ages has fallen from 89.5 percent in 1920 to 72.6 percent in 1950 and the percentage of females in the work force of all ages has risen correspondingly from 10.5 to 27.4, more of the older men have tended to drop out than of the older women. Various factors contribute to this result, among them probably the lifelong income differential between men and women—more men than women have been able to accumulate enough savings, insurance, and social security benefits to *enable* them to retire.

So much, then, for the six periods of the average pecuniary worker's work career from the preparatory period to retirement. What now of the average housewife's work career?

II-6:5. The Work Career of the Housewife

Figure II-6.3 shows the differing expectancies of men and women at different ages above 14 with respect to employment, marriage, and bereavement. Three sex contrasts immediately stand out:

1. The curve of the percentage of male participation in the labor market forms a rather symmetrical dome from 13 percent at age 15 and 37 percent at 17 to its top point, 94 percent, at age 40 and then bends down almost to its age-17 rate (41 percent) at age 70. In contrast to this arching symmetry, the curve of female participation in the labor market forms a sort of river-bluff, sloping-hitherland figure that climbs steeply like the male rate to age 19, where female participation at 43.6 percent approximates two-thirds of the male rate at that age (67.8 percent), but from there on, instead of arching up to age 40 as does the male curve, slopes gradually down through a long plateau between ages 30 and 50 at about 33 percent to a final low of only 7.6 percent at 70, a little less than one-fifth of the male rate (41.6) at that age. In middle life, when more than 94 percent of men are in the labor force, only about one-third (34.6 percent) of women in their childbearing years are competing for jobs.




FIG. II-6.3. Percentages of Each Sex in Work Force, Married and Widowed at Each Age from 15 to 70 in United States as of 1950. (From *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1953*, pp. 49 and 185.)

2. The second sex contrast appears in the age distribution of the percentage married in each age cohort. Both sexes reach the highest percentage married in the age range of highest male employment, about 40 years, but the female distribution leads the male distribution up to that point—as the male distribution of percentage in the labor market had tended to lead the female up to age 19—and then after 40 slopes rapidly down till at age 70 it is only a little less (36.3 percent) than the percentage of males still in the labor market (41.6). The male percentage married, however, holds up after age 40 even better than the male work curve, passing that curve at age 60 and winding up at 70, when more than two-thirds of the old men are still married. Only a little over one-third of the old ladies of that age, however, are still married (36.3 percent). One of the reasons for this contrast appears in a third characteristic of these data.

3. This third characteristic is the much greater incidence of bereavement among women over 40 than among men in the later years. Up till age 30 for women and age 60 for men divorce, which never much exceeds 3 percent in each female age cohort and never quite reaches that percentage in any male cohort, is nevertheless slightly more of a marital risk than is the death of a marriage mate, but, beginning with age 40 among the women and age 60 among the men, death of a mate becomes statistically more likely than divorce. From age 50 on, the gap between the two sexes in the percentage bereaved widens rapidly until at age 70 more than half of that cohort of women have lost their mates (54.9 percent), as against only one-quarter of the men (24.4).

What all this means, as we all know, is that the major pecuniary work burden of the economy is carried by men at all ages, but that, until they marry in their late teens and early twenties, a large percentage of each age cohort of women is also in the labor market. Marriage progressively reduces their relative contribution to the labor market until at age 60, instead of contributing about two-thirds as many workers of their age cohort as the men—the proportion at age 19—they are contributing only about one-fourth, and at age 70 their relative contribution is less than one-fifth. Women tend to marry younger than men and up until age 40 a larger percentage of each age cohort of women is married than among the men. After that, bereavement and, to a declining extent, divorce decrease the percentage of women in each cohort who are married and decrease the percentage faster as age advances than the same factors decrease the percentage of older men who are still married. Between 60 and 70 widowhood becomes statisti-

cally prominent enough among women to make it a type of experience at least coördinate with the terminal years of an unbroken marriage.

If, now, on the basis of data of this kind and what we already know about the careers of housewives, we attempt to distinguish periods in such careers somewhat analogous to the periods in pecuniary work careers noted by Miller and Form, we come out with eight such periods: (1) the preparatory period; (2) the transitional and mixed period; (3) the period of marriage and establishment of a home; (4) the period of marital adjustment; (5) the period of settled domesticity; (6) the period of divided interests; (7) the period of increasing biological risk; (8) the period of retirement, or widowhood.

1. THE PREPARATORY PERIOD

This is the period during which the young girl, like her brother who is to take up his work career in the pecuniary labor market, acquires the orientation toward sex, the social values, the life goals and the adjustment skills that are to serve her in approaching, entering, and carrying on her life career as similar attributes are to serve her brother in his life career in the economic field. We have already noted the relatively larger role that the home plays in preparing the girl for her work career than it plays in preparing her brother for his. And we need not repeat what we have already said about the cultural inadequacies of the modern home as a preparatory agency for its daughters. We need only add that science and technology have been more systematically applied to the arts of production and physical distribution in our society than to the arts of distributing claims to income and to the arts of domestic consumption.

But the home is not the only agency that prepares the young girl for her future career as a housewife. It is, of course, usually the most effective agency, for it provides the first and for years the most intensive training the child receives. But it is constantly reinforced and supplemented by the entire culture: the mores of the community; the attitudes, values, goals, practices, etc., carried along in the feminine subculture; the expectations and customs of friends, neighbors, the peer group; and the sanctions of education, religion, and the economy itself. The little girl learns to help her mother around the house—she is much more likely under urban conditions to have domestic chores than is her brother; and what is more, she learns that, even if brother does on occasion have to help, cooking, bedmaking, washing, cleaning, and so on, constitute “woman’s work” rather than man’s. She learns

halo effect of the honeymoon fades, we shall deal with the business of organizing and running a household in this section and consider personal adjustment to marriage as a separate period.

What does organizing and running a household involve?

What is a household?

The census defines a household as including "all the persons who occupy a house, an apartment or other group of rooms, or a room, that constitutes a dwelling unit"; a group of rooms occupied as separate living quarters is a dwelling unit "if it has separate cooking equipment or a separate entrance"; and a single room is a dwelling unit "if it has separate cooking equipment or if it constitutes the only living quarters in the structure. A household includes the related family members and also the unrelated persons, if any, such as lodgers, foster children, wards, or employees, who share the dwelling unit."¹¹

A household, in short, is the cultural device by which man's domestic needs are satisfied. It is thus the unit of domestic consumption, on the one hand, and the production unit of domestic services, on the other. Typically, a household is simply a family organized within a dwelling unit to service its own needs for food, sleep, intimate association, mutual aid, and all the rest, and to form the service base, as it were, of each individual's broader social activities. If the typical private family household is thought of as forming the mode of a distribution of agencies for providing domestic services, the households of hermits and solitary old maids would fall at one extreme of the distribution and quasi-households such as hotels at the other.¹²

According to the census definition, 2.5 percent of the population of the United States was living in quasi-households in 1950, the other 97.5 percent in normal households. Private households in 1950 totaled 43,468,000, of which approximately 34,000,000 were households managed by housewives.

¹¹ 1950 *United States Census of Population: U.S. Summary—General Characteristics*, p. xiii.

¹² Logically, since a quasi-household is any nonfamily agency which provides domestic services to individuals, monasteries, prisons, college dormitories, and army barracks would rank with hotels as quasi-households. The census, however, seems to confine the term to "institutions," hotels, large lodging houses, and perhaps a few other such agencies in the small number (about 80,000 in 1940) of domestic service agencies that it classes as quasi households. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1952, p. 3. If one includes hunting camps, college fraternities and sororities, all kinds of custodial institutional organizations, military barracks, the domestic arrangements of troops in the field, school and college dormitories, and every other agency for servicing the domestic needs of men and women outside of the family, the number of quasi households must run considerably above the number listed by the census.

Now how does one organize a private household?

Obviously, by first finding a place to live and then either renting or buying the necessary material traits—beds, dishes, furniture, etc.—for carrying on the normal activities of such a household. Note that the census definition of a household is in terms of all the persons who occupy a separate or distinct dwelling unit and identifies the distinctness or separateness of the dwelling unit in terms of either separate cooking equipment or a separate entrance. To set up a private household, therefore, one finds a separate and distinct place in which to live, (private living quarters) and rents or buys the necessary domestic equipment. After that, organization is a matter of arranging and coordinating the activities of those concerned in time, in space, and in the structure-of-living patterns of everybody involved. Most of the responsibility for all this devolves upon the wife, and in about 95 percent of all households most of the actual household work—cooking, bedmaking, cleaning, food buying, etc., plus some of the maintenance work that hubby can't bother with—devolves upon the wife also. In 1950 there were only 1,457,000 private household workers, i.e., paid servants, for nearly 44,000,000 households, so it is obvious that, if each servant-employing household hired one only, more than 42,000,000 households, or 95 percent, had no servants at all. While baby-sitters and other workers not listed as private household servants may provide a good deal of part-time help to housewives, the average wage earner's wife cannot afford, and the average white-collar worker's wife cannot find, men or women to do all their housework for them. The trend in this country is toward fewer private household servants (the number in 1950 was 30 percent lower than in 1940) and toward more and more household gadgets to speed up and ease the burden of housework. Establishing a household on a middle-class level today means, therefore, not merely getting the bare essentials for domestic living—a bed, a few chairs, a table, a cookstove, and a bathroom—but in addition equipping the home with \$2000 to \$5000 worth of modern doodads from automatic toasters and waffle irons to vacuum cleaners and expensive refrigerators, gas furnaces, hot-water heaters, electric washers, deep-freeze outfits, electric dishwashers, and the like, and then, to keep up with the Joneses, radio and television sets to boot. The young middle-class housewife, whether in a rented apartment or in a mortgaged house, has to have, just to maintain status, an amount of household equipment equivalent in cost to an entire house and lot two generations ago. The desire of middle-class youth to start their

married lives on the level at which their parents leave off immediately imposes on them, therefore, a burden of striving and often of debt that may ease the housework but does nothing toward easing the economic and personal strains of their early married days.

4. THE PERIOD OF MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

The first five years are the danger years for any marriage in terms of possible divorce; the years after age forty, the danger years in terms of possible bereavement.

Two persons undertaking to live together as intimate associates face inescapable tensions and readjustments. Each has to learn to give a little if together they are to make a go of the joint enterprise. But for the wife, these tensions and readjustments are often more difficult than for the new husband. This is true for four reasons: (a) She is less well prepared for the intimate sexual readjustments required than is her husband; (b) she cannot escape from the domestic scene for long hours each day as he can; (c) if she has not held a job before marriage—and more than half, remember, have not—she has had less experience than he in handling money; and (d) she must learn the limitations and responsibilities of her new role as a wife, and possibly eventually the limitations and responsibilities of an even more confining role as a mother, and this in the face of two decades or more of habituation to a cultural tradition which for two generations has been drifting toward more and more feminine independence and expectations of personal happiness in marriage.

a. Personal and sexual readjustments are more difficult for the wife.

We have already noted some of the inadequacies of the average girl's preparation for organizing and running a household. Here we need only add that her preparation for the intimate personal and sexual relationships of marriage is likely to be even less adequate. As a woman in what is still largely a man's world, she has had to learn to adjust herself to situations more often by indirection than has her mate; by avoiding Yes and No answers, if possible, and by playing the psychological angles rather than the logical. Habituated more than he to adjust to persons in primary association, she is usually more skilled in the emotional nuances of face-to-face situations than is her husband. *In this respect she is better prepared than he.* But she will probably know less about sex itself and the techniques of intimacy than will her husband, although he will have little skill in such matters either, despite the probability that he has had some previous experi-

ence. If the two vary widely in sexual desire, as many couples do, the potential of emotional trouble due to unsatisfying relationships can rise dangerously. Because the wife's whole cultural preparation has taught her to regard sex as a means to an end rather than an end in itself, as most men regard it, she may easily relapse into indifference, once the novelty has worn off and once the end, marriage and motherhood, has been achieved. This breeds cumulative dissatisfaction on the man's part which will underlie most of the quarrels and recriminations that seem to center on quite other and often trivial things.

Next to problems arising from sexual maladjustments and often even more basic are those which stem from ethical differences—differences in life values and conceptions of the nature of personality. It is impossible to generalize here about which partner to the average marriage is more poorly prepared to play the game according to the rules of civilized decency and regard for others. Our culture prepares the man to be more self-assertive and aggressive, but it also prepares the woman to demand more consideration as a person now than her great-grandmother was prepared to demand. It also prepares both to look on modern marriage as a secular adventure in personal happiness, not as a lifelong, religious partnership for economic and social coöperation that might incidentally yield some happiness along the way. While the vast majority of all marriages are still sanctified in church ceremonies, for millions who have lost the imminent sense of the supernatural the religious sanctions of marriage have largely lost their old meaning. The Catholic Church still forbids divorce and strict Protestant divines accept it only with reluctance, but increasing numbers of all faiths are resorting to it when under the strains and tensions of modern life the partners in marriage fail to achieve the personal happiness which their culture has led them to expect. When happiness does elude a married couple, the wife is usually less able to lose herself in other interests than is the husband.

b. The wife is less able to escape the domestic scene.

The great majority of married women in their twenties and thirties, unlike their husbands, are not working outside the home. This means that their day-to-day world of immediate experience is more limited than that of their husbands. They have more time and opportunity to brood over their marital situation and to feel sorry for themselves, if feeling sorry for themselves is part of their personality pattern. Hence, the average wife actually needs more *internal* resources for interesting herself and keeping a normal perspective than does her husband. For

him, the outside world is more of a competitor for attention and activity. As a matter of practical adjustment, he has to subordinate domestic matters in his consciousness for eight or ten hours a day. It is easier for him, therefore, to "get away from" domestic unhappiness for part of the day at least than for his wife. And one of the great sources of marital unhappiness, the divorce experts and the marital counselors tell us, is money.

c. The wife has had less experience with money.

Disagreements over money constitute one of the major causes of domestic woe. Most young housewives come to their jobs without ever having earned any income of their own. Many of them have handled money before marriage only as it was doled out to them by their parents in an allowance or otherwise. They don't know what it costs to earn money in the competitive labor market. And most of them at the same time set up housekeeping wanting to do it well—keenly desirous of maintaining status among their friends, eager to make the new household the lovely home of their dreams, and also constantly tempted by the "\$1-down-and-a-year-to-pay" importunities of all kinds of charitable characters who profess to be yearning to give them everything for nothing. It looks so easy, and John is always so busy with other things! Before she knows it, the new housewife has been "sold" on a new coat, a new sweeper, or a new icebox, and fortunate is the husband who can then convince her before it is too late that his insurance policy or that hunting trip of his really must have priority. Often he discovers the problem only when the bills arrive, which is a trifle late for the preservation of domestic tranquillity.

Many husbands evade the problem by vetoing charge accounts, on the one hand, and concealing their incomes, on the other. How to handle money together, frankly and honestly, is often a major problem for newlyweds. The new wife's inexperience with money is always a handicap.

d. The tradition of feminine independence is not in accord with the actualities of being a wife and mother.

All this would be complicating enough were wives still supposed to be the subordinate partners and submissive creatures envisioned by Biblical tradition and American law. But actually, of course, for two generations the entire drift of American culture has been toward a degree of feminine independence not seen in the world before since the disorganizing impacts of the Punic Wars emancipated the women of the Roman upper classes. The result is that most American women normally expect to be treated as persons, not mere members of a sex

or occupants of a protected status. This introduces two kinds of difficulties into the household: It severely cramps the style of the would-be domestic Hitlers; and it raises the frustration potential of the new wife and mother. A wife who expects her husband to treat her as an equal is a formidable mate for a husband whose inferiority feelings and frustrations demand an Oriental slave fanning his fevered brow. They rarely make a go of it. On the other hand, the lady who marries in the romantic expectation that wedded bliss is one unending round of gaiety and free delight usually wakes up on the morning after the honeymoon with a headache consisting of all those dirty dishes in the kitchen sink—more probably, on the dinner table—and time for another meal for her lord and master coming up. She discovers, not without some heartburning sometimes, that former swains are now off limits and that, when Little Junior arrives, not only must his paternity be unimpeachable, but his mother will be expected to see to it that his bottle agrees with him and that it reaches him with reasonable regularity, even at the anguish of a postponed shopping trip or a canceled appointment at the beauty parlor. Occupation housewife turns out not to be oriented wholly toward feminine independence. It imposes obligations along with its privileges. To many women, the obligations may seem to cancel out the cultural promises of feminine freedom. The contrast between the expectation and the reality may take a bit of readjusting to, a process which in the nature of the case is bound to be somewhat more distinctively the wife's problem than the husband's.

The process of settling down, or adjusting to marriage, may be managed in a few months; it may run on for years. In the end, the great majority of the nation's housewives move on into the period that is usually the longest in their occupational careers, the period of settled domesticity.

5. THE PERIOD OF SETTLED DOMESTICITY

This is the period in which the most vital readjustments to marriage have been completed. Each now knows within reasonable limits what to expect from the other and what to count on. A certain tempo of sex relations, domestic living, and so on, has been worked out, and if there are children, the day's routine includes getting them off to school and welcoming them back again, or getting them out to play and off to bed at night. Probably there are still occasional disagreements and disputes between husband and wife, but the technique of living with these flare-ups has been perfected. The household now provides the

economic base for whatever home life the family has achieved. The successful housewife has transformed the dwelling place into that sentimental and psychological social base which we call a home. The less successful housewife has merely managed to keep it going as a household. The minority of failures have called it quits with their divorces and desertions.

If there are no children, the period of settled domesticity tends in a few years in many households to merge into a slightly more complex period of divided or diversified interests on the part of urban housewives. The household alone isn't enough to use up all their energies. They join clubs, get involved in church activities, participate in union or fraternal doings, possibly find jobs outside the home.

Children delay this process until they have completed school and leave home on their own. By that time the average housewife is passing beyond her childbearing period and as the children go she finds herself, like the childless wife at an earlier age, casting about for outside interests.

6. THE PERIOD OF DIVIDED OR DIVERSIFIED INTERESTS

Millions of middle-aged urban housewives, especially on the lower levels of income and education, settle so completely into the routine of domesticity in their fifth period that even the departure of the children fails to jar them out of it. But other millions, either because they have no children and do have broader perspectives than the domestic routine or because with the children gone the home is no longer so all-satisfying as once it was—for whatever reason, other millions do reach outside for new activities and new stimulations. Some of them get jobs, but more of them provide the woman-power for church socials, ladies' aid societies, the Eastern Star, the Rebeccas, the book clubs, the D.A.R., the tens of thousands of little groups searching for sociability, culture, lecturing celebrities. They run for the school board, sit on community chest boards, manage the affairs of local charities. A few even go into politics or business on a larger scale—get on state committees, set up as insurance or real-estate brokers, open dramatic or music schools, go back to teaching, busy themselves in all sorts of enterprises. They become full-time outside workers by becoming part-time housewives. But all the while as age creeps on, past their forties all housewives whether they work at it part time or full time are living into a final period of their occupational career, the period of increasing biological risk.

7. THE PERIOD OF INCREASING BIOLOGICAL RISK

This is the period in which the statistical probability of widowhood is slanting sharply upward; the period in which more and more marriages are being broken by death and more and more households are becoming households of one surviving partner only.

In 1950 the census listed 7,084,000 widows in a female civilian population over 14 amounting to 57,946,000. Divorced women totaled 1,200,000, or slightly over one-sixth of the number of widows. But 60 percent of all divorced women were under 45, whereas only 9.2 percent of all widows were under that age. Over 90 percent of the families broken by death are broken after the housewife passes 45, and of all women 45 and over, more than 28 percent are widows, only 2.1 percent divorced. Beyond 65 the incidence of widowhood in the total female population approximates 55 percent, and if the 486,000 single women 65 and over be excluded from that age cohort, the percentage of widows approximates *three-fifths* (59.5 percent) of the total female population of that age married or divorced! The number of widows 65 and over—3,460,000—exceeds the number of married women of that age—2,286,000—by more than 1,100,000, or 51 percent, and this excess of widows over married women 65 and over almost equals the total number of divorced women in the United States of *all ages*. Widowhood is not only almost six times as likely as divorce to break up a family sometime, but if the family has lasted beyond the housewife's forty-fifth birthday, the probability rises steeply until past 65 it reaches a ratio of nearly 60 to 1. Of the women 45 and over who have ever married, the probability of widowhood rises from about 1 chance in 8 during the 45 to 54 decade to about 3 chances in 5 from 65 on.

From the point of view of occupational risk, widowhood rather than divorce is the major threat to the housewife's occupation, and from 45 on, widowhood becomes an increasing threat to the stability of her family. When death does take away her husband, the widow does not ordinarily cease to be a housekeeper, but obviously she ceases to be a housewife. How she meets widowhood is, therefore, not an occupational problem but a problem in personal adjustment.

8. THE PERIOD OF RETIREMENT

For nearly three-fifths of the women 65 and over who have been married or divorced, widowhood ends their occupational career and retires them as housewives. For lesser percentages at earlier ages the

same thing happens. The difference is that at earlier ages, especially before 35 or 40, many of the bereaved ladies remarry and reënter their occupation as housewives. After 45 remarriage becomes increasingly rare until after 65 it very seldom happens.

With remarriage increasingly unlikely as the age of family breakage advances, the widow must either find a job, live on family savings or the insurance, move in with the children or with some other relative, or wind up in a charitable institution for the aged. She can no longer support herself as a housewife.

The number of widows working outside their homes is not known, but a rough estimate indicates that the great majority of those over 45 at least are not so working.

In 1950 the total number of females 45 to 64 in the work force totaled 1,352,479. The number of widows in that age cohort was 1,102,000, leaving only about a quarter of a million single women in the work force if *every one* of those widows had a job. But there were more single women and divorcées in that age cohort than widows—1,196,000 single women and 418,000 divorcées, a total of 1,614,000 non-widows, most of whom without any question did have jobs. At best, therefore, it is unlikely that more than 300,000 or 400,000 of those 1,102,000 widows could have been at work outside their homes. And when one moves up to the widows 65 and over—3,460,000 of them—it is a bit difficult to find very many of them competing with the 486,000 single women of the same age and the 60,000 divorcées—546,000 in all—for the jobs held by a grand total of only 196,900 females of all varieties 65 and over still in the work force. For those 196,900 working women 65 and over, there were 2.7 non-widows for every job, and widows themselves outnumbered the *total number* of all old female workers by more than 1,600,000. It is quite impossible then that more than a very small fraction of the widows 65 and over had any jobs at all, and reasonably certain that most of the middle-aged widows were not working either. Savings, insurance, relatives, and homes for the aged support the great majority.

II-6:6. Summary

So much, then, for the work careers of pecuniary workers and of housewives. By and large culture makes more rational and more adequate provision for preparing pecuniary workers for their terminal careers than it does for housewives. The process by which a pecuniary worker gets into his work is much more straightforward and rational

than the process by which the average girl finds a husband and gets into her terminal occupation as a housewife. Yet housewives constitute by far the largest single category of American workers. The work they do adds more than one-fifth of the economic values of the entire economy over and above the total national income as measured by total production. The life careers of pecuniary workers as compared with those of housewives show certain similarities, but the housewife faces two occupational risks that do not menace the *occupational* career of the pecuniary worker: (1) divorce and (2) widowhood. Of the two, widowhood is about six times as likely as is divorce.

Problems of Stratification

II-7:1. The Nature of Stratification Problems

Since by definition it is the system of stratification that determines from family to family the inequalities of access to the means of life satisfactions available in a culture, the nature of the stratification system has a profound effect on the way people feel about the social system in which they live. The literature of social criticism since the days of the Hebrew prophets, the great revolutionary upheavals of history, and current evidences of social unrest all stem from the same source—dissatisfaction with the stratification system of the time.

Social discontent is the signal that a discrepancy of some kind exists between prevalent social values and the values actually operative in the stratification system. They have ceased to be identical. For practical purposes this lack of identity may be measured by (1) the extent of the discrepancy, (2) the relative number who recognize it, (3) the intensity of their feeling about it, and (4) the extent and character of organized resentment.

To attempt any such measurement of current social unrest is quite beyond our resources, so we shall limit ourselves merely to pointing out some of the obvious discrepancies in the American system, noting some of the ways in which Americans have attempted to meet such conditions, and indicating the major programs of social reorganization which have been proposed.

II-7:2. Discrepancies Between Democratic Values and Extreme Statuses

Belief in the inherent dignity of the individual and in his right to an increasing share in determining the conditions of his life is the

value complex that the American Revolution let loose in the world. It inspired the author of the Declaration of Independence, motivated the demand for the Bill of Rights amendments to the original Constitution, and forms the common faith of the great majority of Americans who in one way or another hold the American Creed. The privileged have frequently flouted that belief, chattel slavery repudiated it, and masses of common men have not always acted out its implications, but underneath the vagaries of national history and the inconsistencies of caste, industrial autocracy, and social snobbery the belief itself persists as the ethical binding force of the American people. A man's a man for a' that—and the social system is to be judged accordingly.

How does the status system square with human dignity and the demand of the individual for an increasing share in controlling his own life?

In the nature of the case, we can do no more than suggest some of the points of widest divergence between the values and the system. This can best be brought out, perhaps, by simply listing some of the advantages of the upper statuses and some of the disadvantages of the lower.

Parallel Column Comparisons of Advantages and Disadvantages of High and Low Statuses in American Stratification System

Business Status Characteristics	Wage Status Characteristics
1. Economic power and security	1. Economic weakness and insecurity
2. Political cohesion and power	2. Political incohesion and weakness
3. Advantages under law	3. Disadvantages under law
4. Great influence in manning, employing, and directing the professions	4. Little influence in manning, employing, and directing the professions
5. High prestige; highly valued in mores of society	5. Low prestige; given low rank value in mores of society
1. <i>Economic power and security</i>	1. <i>Economic weakness and insecurity</i>

Businessmen control and largely own the means of production in urban centers and by dominating the financial structure of the economy they also dominate the mar-

Wage workers individually have relatively little property and for livelihood depend on access to jobs by means of an interactional transaction called a wage bargain. We shall

kets and the credit facilities open to farmers and others. In mentality, however, most farmers are in reality agrarian businessmen, seeking profits in a profit-oriented economy.

The economic power of the businessman as against the relative economic weakness of wage earners registers most directly in the individual wage bargain, in which the businessman acts as the would-be employer and the wage earner as a job-seeker. (See Section II-7:3 below.)

Every comparative inferiority of the job-seeker carries a correlative superiority for the employer. When to this economic advantage enjoyed by the employer is added the relatively free hand in the management of his own business which this process of dealing individually with his workmen gives him, it is easy to understand why businessmen generally have fought so bitterly and persistently against unions and collective bargaining. Unions mean interference with the employer's business, and collective bargaining means an end to many of the economic advantages which the employer enjoys in the old individual wage bargain. Unions to date have been powerless to check the drift of the American economy toward greater and greater concentration of economic control, and some top-flight economists, such as Sumner Schlichter, claim they have not actually affected the distribution of wealth. But at least they have begun to build a structure of rights for wage earners in industry and

note some of the peculiarities of this transaction later (see below, Section II-7:3).

At the moment we are concerned merely with the facts that wage workers, for whatever reasons, have far lower incomes, far less dependable incomes, and accumulate only negligible amounts of property as compared with the incomes and property accumulations of people on the business status. As the data in Appendix I show (see Table 8), the median incomes of the blue-collar occupations as a whole are considerably below the median incomes of urban proprietors and managers. Whether the economy *could* pay equal incomes to blue-collar workers and proprietors and managers or whether it *ought* to be rewarding equally services of different economic value is not the question. We are merely pointing out the *fact* that blue-collar status carries with it lower income than does the business status.

In the same way there can be no manner of question that business income and especially property income is more dependable than is income from wages. Wage income depends on getting and holding a job, processes which depend on specific human judgments. Business income, on the other hand, derives from a whole series of processes (transactions) which tend to become institutionalized, to acquire a continuity and a social momentum of their own. True, this continuity and momentum depend in the last analysis on specific human judgments, and

have begun to challenge the political power of wealth.

hundreds of thousands of small businessmen do fail every year (360,000 in 1940; 181,000 in 1946—Department of Commerce data, *The Economic Almanac for 1948*, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, 1947, p. 65).

But the point is, not that human judgments have nothing to do with business income, but that *single* judgments by others have less effect on the continuity of business income than do single judgments by others on the income of a wage earner. At any given time *the average wage earner's income is more dependent on the judgment of one or two individuals than is the income of the average businessman.*

Moreover, the wage worker is more exposed to the vicissitudes of the economy than is the possessor of property. A depression drives hundreds of thousands of businessmen out of business, but it throws *millions* of wage workers on relief. There were some ex-businessmen on relief in the depression of the 1930's, but they were comparatively few as against the 12,000,000 or 14,000,000 wage workers out of jobs.

The weaker economic position of wage workers is reflected further in such contrasts as the following: higher infant mortality rates in wage workers' families; cheaper and more substandard housing; shorter educational period for children; earlier entrance into the labor market; earlier marriage; larger families; higher mortality risks as evidenced by higher insurance premiums; etc.; etc. That fewer sons and daughters

from working-class homes go on to college than go on from business-class homes is not due to any scarcity of brains on the working-class level. Years ago Lehman and Stoke found that most of the A and B brains in this country were in the blue-collar occupations, yet Woody and Keeler and others have shown that most of the college students come from the business, professional, and clerical occupations.¹ Education, like health protection, size and security of income, and scores of other means of life satisfactions, is limited on the wage status by economic handicaps that do not apply to the average family on the business status.

2. *Political cohesion and power*

Since the days of Alexander Hamilton (and before) businessmen have tended to act together in furtherance of their political interests. Until the War Between the States they were checked to some extent by the rival agrarian interests of the great plantation owners. But when those interests were destroyed by

2. *Political incohesion and weakness*

Wage earners have never been able to organize a labor party of any consequence in this country and have shown little interest in the Socialist and Communist programs that have attracted working-class support abroad. The so-called "dirty shirt" parties of the 1830's, i.e., the workers' parties of the time, advo-

¹ Harvey C. Lehman and Stuart M. Stoke, "Occupational Intelligence in the Army," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1930, p. 15. Applying Army test percentages of World War I to the actual numbers in each major occupation produced 2,010,000 A and B men among farmers, artisans, semiskilled and unskilled workers in the 1920 census while professional and clerical categories produced only 1,372,000.

Clifford Woody and L. W. Keeler in an unpublished study in 1929-30 found that out of 5715 Michigan students attending the University of Michigan, Michigan State College, and all the other institutions of higher learning in the state, including the normal colleges, the farmers, artisans, and semiskilled occupations contributed 33.3 percent while the business, professional, and clerical occupations contributed over 53 percent. The G.I. Bill of Rights after World War II brought these percentages somewhat closer together, but as the Lynds found in Middletown and other investigators elsewhere, economic factors rather than differences in intelligence were the major selective factors determining who should and who should not go on to college in each occupational category.

that war, urban businessmen became the dominant political interest at Washington. By the end of the nineteenth century, despite the revolt of the farmers, Populism, and the bitter protests of wage workers in the great strikes, business had fashioned a political system so dominated by wealth as to merit the name of a plutocracy. Not until the Great Depression of the 1930's did reformers muster enough popular support seriously to challenge this power. Whatever else it did, the New Deal did attempt to redress the balance somewhat between the power of wealth and the power of poorer sections of the nation. For this, of course, Roosevelt drew the denunciations of other wealthy men as a "traitor to his class."

By and large, since the days of Mark Hanna and William McKinley Big Business has tended to identify its interests with those of the Republican party.

Property interests generally are able to exert political influence beyond that of ordinary citizens partly because of the power of wealth as such in a community and partly because of the way in which Americans finance their political campaigns. Regarding these as private matters, in a sense, and making no provision for paying for them out of taxes, the ordinary citizen displays a charming naiveté in his dismay when he discovers that he who pays the piper calls the tune. In the nature of the case, it is the possessing classes that pay the piper since they are the ones with the wherewithal

cated citizenship objectives rather than narrow class programs. In other words, they demanded free public schools, abolition of imprisonment for debt, the right to force payment of wages by means of mechanic's liens, etc. They, like most of the early unions, fell to pieces in the panic of 1837, but not until most of their citizenship objectives had been reached. For generations, however, political issues proved too explosive for trade unions to deal with as unions; attempts to take sides split the unions. One of the cardinal principles laid down by Samuel Gompers, the founder of the American Federation of Labor in the 1880's, was that labor must reward its political friends and punish its enemies but *stay out of politics as an organized movement*. Until the campaign of 1952, when the A.F. of L., the C.I.O., and the United Mine Workers' leaders all endorsed the Democratic candidate, the Gompers principle largely dominated union policy. What this means is that in contrast to the tendency of Big Business and the northern farmers to back the Republican party and of Southerners, Little Business and many urban wage workers to affiliate with the Democrats, working people as such remained so divided in political loyalties that even the minority of them who were organized in the trade unions could not afford to take sides as organizations.

In election after election the returns demonstrated that even the union leaders could not successfully

to pay and with the immediate specific motivations for calling the tune.

But the political power of organized wealth still remains preponderant over that of any other single interest in America. Whether this is good or bad for the society is not the point. The point is that, as compared with the wage status, the property status (and especially the Big Business status) swings a disproportionate amount of political power at Washington and in most of the state capitals. *Vide*: the struggle for tidelands oil, etc. This is so much taken for granted, so much a part of our economic mores, that merely to point it out is often taken as indicative of hostility to private capitalism. But facts have no politics. One businessman is more influential politically than one wage worker, and the bigger he is the more the disparity. *That is the fact.*

3. *Legal advantages*

a. Despite the Bill of Rights, property in the United States has always enjoyed a higher legal status than does a wage worker. Under the natural-rights philosophy of John Locke, which inspired the founders of the American government, the right to property is a natural right which is older than civil government and is therefore beyond the power of government to alter.

b. Governments are set up to protect property, according to the natural-rights view. No American government has yet been authorized to draft property in wartime.

advise their own followers how to vote, much less lead them into a separate labor party like the British.

In contrast to the unified front that businessmen usually presented against any threat to business interests—*encroachments* by government, “sops to the labor vote,” and so on—wage workers down to mid-century at least had remained so divided politically as largely to nullify the potential power of the so-called “labor vote.”

Only by organizing and mobilizing numbers can wage workers hope to match the political influence of a billion dollars!

3. *Legal disadvantages*

a. The wage status is legally more insecure and more poorly protected than is the property status. No one has a right to a job. He has a right only to seek a job. The “right to work” is not at all *the right to an income* like the right to interest or rent.

b. To protect government a man may be drafted into the armed services. Capital is exempt from draft, although it can be filched by inflation.

c. For generations men with capital could legally combine into a business organization called a corporation, which the law now regards as a legal person. Corporations are purely legal creations and theoretically could all be abolished by the legislatures that created them—except for the little detail that such action would be unconstitutional. Nobody even suggests it.

Compare the solid, universal acceptance of the corporation with the halting, reluctant, and partial acceptance of the union. Billions of dollars and the entire business world support the concept of the corporation. American economic life is built upon it. Nothing but the labor movement is built on the concept of the union! Middle and upper classes think they could do without that.

In the nature of the case, corporations and unions are formed for different purposes—corporations to make money and unions to advance the interests of wage workers. In other words, corporations are instruments by which businessmen advance their interests and unions are instruments by which wage workers hope to advance theirs. That corporations may control agencies of production while unions merely “interfere” with those agencies is not of the essence of the present point. Unions are essentially reactions by wage workers to the power of property, and their standing at law still reflects the fact that property interests beat them to the legal draw by several centuries. Two hundred years ago the wage status in the Western world was far lower at law than it is today in Britain and America. Relative to his great-great-grandfather the wage worker is climbing. Relative to modern financiers and captains of industry, he still has a long way to go, and may not even be holding his own. (See below, pp. 529–532.)

4. *Great influence on the professions*

The upper and middle classes are the best “customers” of the physi-

c. For generations attempts by wage earners to combine into unions were regarded as conspiracies. Only with the passage of the Wagner Act, 1935, did wage earners win the legal right to form unions through which to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Later the Taft-Hartley Act imposed restrictions which indicated all too clearly how partial and insecure the acceptance of unionism still was under American law. Proposals to abolish unions are still voiced occasionally by unreconstructed conservatives, and thousands of businessmen who are less vocal still secretly cherish the idea. They have no such ideas about corporations.

4. *Little influence on the professions*

Having less to spend, fewer controversies to adjudicate, and nar-

cians, lawyers, dentists, engineers, and ministers who form the recognized professions. Not only can they pay higher fees to the self-employed professionals, but they also dominate the various agencies that employ professional services. Engineers work for businessmen. Teachers are hired by superintendents, who are appointed by boards of education composed mainly of businessmen. Only in the smaller sectarian churches is one likely to find in the Protestant faith that control is in other than middle- or upper-class hands. Catholic churches do serve a larger percentage of wage workers and because of the nature of Catholic church organization and certain papal encyclicals are more able to criticize upper-class values.

Another factor is the high cost of professional education, which tends toward the recruitment of the professions from the classes that can best afford to pay for the extended period of economic dependence of sons and daughters. The upper and middle classes thus not only provide most of the income for the professions but most of their new members.

The same probably holds true for the younger officers of the armed services. West Point and Annapolis, of course, draw from all classes but impose a distinctly aristocratic training on them once they get there. Since the services have had to expand to meet the needs of the Korean War and the nation's global responsibilities, the service schools have been contributing a smaller

lower budgets on which to live, wage earners have less to offer the professions. Despite their numbers in most communities, they seldom win proportionate representation on any of the local boards and control agencies. School boards are notoriously middle class in composition and the same goes for hospital boards, community fund boards, and the like.

Facing the high costs of a professional education under modern conditions, relatively few working-class children can hope to work their way into the established professions. Medicine, the law, dentistry, engineering, and perhaps to some extent the established Protestant ministry thus are tending to fall more and more into the hands of upper- and middle-class recruits.

percentage of the new officers. Hence, the colleges have been supplying relatively more, and these are mainly boys from middle- and upper-class backgrounds.

There is little indication that wage earners as a class will contribute more heavily to the personnel of the professions, civilian or military, in the immediate future than they have in the past.

5. *High prestige*

Business success is success in the minds of most Americans. High income is the index. High income means ability to support a high standard of living, and the aim of every ambitious youth has been to work his way up the social gradient if he has not happened to be top-bracket at the start. All along the line the level of spending has been regarded as the clue to individual and family standing. The big car outshines the cheap one, and the family able to frequent the country club and take off in midwinter for Miami or Bermuda has been the envy of all the salary and wage earners in town. Expensive leisure is the sure mark of "class."

Urban high school youths—more middle-class than eighth graders—tend to rank business and the professions above government service and scientific pursuits in their rating of occupations, and almost anything above factory work, farming, and manual labor.

That expectations among many young people have been higher than their chances of realizing them seems indicated by such data as the Lynds' finding in Muncie, Indiana,

5. *Low prestige*

Wage earning ranks low in the occupational choices of most Americans. This has gone so far that a concerted propaganda drive has begun to induce young people to enter the skilled crafts. As of 1952 there was an acute shortage of skilled bricklayers, carpenters, machinists, and various other skilled workers. Many blue-collar jobs, in fact, were now paying far better wages than most white-collar clerical, sales, and service jobs. Yet the white-collar jobs still carried the prestige, and office workers continued to regard themselves as "better" than production workers.

Yet factory surveys revealed a considerable number of workers in every plant content with their status as operatives and unwilling to accept promotion to a foremanship. The middle-class stereotype of insatiable striving for higher social status did not accurately mirror the minds of millions of American wage workers. They would grant the prestige and desirability of higher status, but many shunned the responsibilities entailed by the first step upward in the industrial hierarchy.

This means, apparently, that so-

in the 1920's-30's, where high-school youths overwhelmingly agreed that "failure to succeed is the individual's own fault" at a time when the rate of promotions in Middletown factories was such that ordinary workmen would have had to live about four centuries for all to have had a chance at a foremanship! The glittering peak of the social pyramid blinds many to the inexorable fact that it is still a pyramid—smaller at the top than at the bottom.

cial unrest is not necessarily correlated with differences in status. It may issue as much from expectations frustrated as from superiority-inferiority comparisons. Apparently there are great numbers of Americans who do not resent low status so long as it does not mean insecurity and frustration. And there are some of medium or high status who resent the gap between the demands of the American Creed and the realities of the stratification system.

These inequalities as between high status and low status in the American stratification system can be duplicated, of course, in every other stratification system in the world. By definition a stratification system is a system of inequality and every social system above the jungle displays some kinds of inequality. The peculiarity of the American system is that it coexists in a society with a social value system that not only sanctions inequality in the differential rankings that it gives to various occupations and statuses but also at the same time demands respect for the individual personality and equality of opportunity for all—demands that run counter in many ways to *any* kind of system of inequality! Thus, the American value system is at odds with itself. We value occupations and functions that carry with them wealth, power, and prestige, but at the same time we also value the rights of the person, equality of opportunity, freedom, and so on—rights, opportunities, and conditions whose attainment wide differences in wealth, power, and prestige are constantly jeopardizing if not blocking altogether. *The American Creed and the American stratification system are thus at war with one another.*

II-7:3. Inequalities of the Individual Wage Bargain

The deprivations and inadequacies of the wage status as compared with the statuses of business and professional people can be traced in large part to the nature of the individual wage bargain. As an instrument for distributing wealth and thereby indirectly affecting status, the individual wage bargain leaves a good deal to be desired. In this

interactional transaction the parties face each other with six distinct advantages on the side of the employer, six kinds of inequality handicapping the job-seeker: (1) inequality of roles; (2) inequality of physical involvement; (3) inequality of waiting power; (4) inequality of need; (5) inequality of market positions; and (6) inequality of ease of need satisfaction.

1. INEQUALITY OF ROLES

The respective roles of employer and job-seeker in the individual wage bargain are not at all the same and not of equal importance to the individuals involved. The role of the employer is solely and purely to make a decision: to hire or not to hire this man. The role of the job-seeker, on the other hand, is to gain access to the means of livelihood controlled by the employer. The employer's decision is of relatively little importance to the employer himself as an individual. The job-seeker's success or failure in getting the job is of relatively great importance to him as an individual. The role of applicant obviously subordinates the job-seeker to the decision of the potential employer, whose role is thus determinative, not supplicative. In the vast majority of cases the job-seeker seeks the job, the job does not seek him.²

2. INEQUALITY OF PHYSICAL INVOLVEMENT

The decision to hire or not to hire requires little physical involvement on the part of the employer. He can make it over the telephone and, having made it, go on to something else. But accepting the decision immediately involves the job-seeker in direct physical consequences. If the answer is "No," he must go elsewhere. If it is "Yes," he must report for work. The job when he takes it obviously requires that he be there in person to deliver the labor power he has contracted to deliver. The man is inseparable from his labor power. You cannot hire his labor power without hiring him. This is an obvious distinction between labor power and a physical commodity. A physical commodity is detachable from those who produce it. Labor power is not. This means that the conditions under which labor power is delivered are of prime importance for the man. He is physically involved in his work. The employer making the decision to employ him is involved physi-

² This is still true even when the employer has notified an employment agency that he has need of so many workers of such and such a type. It is the agency functionary who now makes the decision, but it is the worker who seeks out the agency. The man in need of a job always poses a tentative issue for someone else to decide.

cally only to the extent necessary to say "Yes" or "No." At the moment when the wage bargain is struck the job-seeker is physically involved to a far greater degree, actually and potentially, than is the employer in his own person.

3. INEQUALITY OF WAITING POWER

Employer and job-seeker face each other in the wage bargain situation with very different capacities for enduring the consequences of failure to come to terms. The employer has capital; the job-seeker has none. By and large, the average job-seeker, as every strike demonstrates, can maintain himself debt-free without a job for only a few days or weeks. The employer, *relative to any particular individual job-seeker*, can wait indefinitely. This means that the pressures which play on each party to consummate the deal are of a very different order of urgency and compulsiveness. The employer has a freer hand.


4. INEQUALITY OF NEED

The employer needs any particular job-seeker merely to add to the labor force at his disposal. His need is an organizational rather than a personal need—a need of adding one more individual to his organization, of gaining another small increment of labor power. The potential loss which he faces if he fails to hire any particular job-seeker is usually insignificant, remote, indirect, and highly contingent.

The job-seeker, on the other hand, needs that particular job as a means of individual and often family livelihood. His need is immediate and highly personal. The potential loss which he faces if he fails to get it is considerable, immediate, direct, and inevitable. Instead of sitting comfortably in an office waiting for the next applicant, he must turn about and seek out another potential employer. This takes time, effort, and continued uncertainty. It also jeopardizes the sale of that day's labor power, which he cannot possibly save over for sale next day. In effect, in every wage bargain the job-seeker is bargaining against time, against foreclosure by sundown. His need is to sell that day's labor power before it becomes unsalable in a matter of hours. As compared with the timetable of the employer, who seldom needs any particular job-seeker as urgently as that, the job-seeker is selling at forced sale labor power which the employer has no equally compelling reason for buying against time. The loss of one day's labor power of one particular individual is no great loss for the employer. It is a very considerable loss for the individual himself. Thus, employer and job-

PLATES 41-54

Plate 41. Public Education in America—the gamut from the “little red school house” (in this case not so red) to . . . a specialized high school for music and art.



Godsey from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

The crude facilities of a log school house in the Ozarks.





Lanks from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

A modern rural school—the consolidated school at Donelson, Tennessee, with one of the county's school busses picking up youngsters from the elementary grades for transportation to their homes, some of which are ten to 15 miles away from the up-to-date school building.

Parker High School, in Chicago, one of more than forty such schools in America's second city.

Bloom from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.





Gregor from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.


The High School for Music and Art on West 135th Street in New York City.

Plate 42. Protestantism in the Big City at Mid-Century. The congregation leaving services at the First Methodist Church, Dallas, Texas, on a typical Sunday. This urban church has 5300 members and its Sunday school, 2700. Varied activities challenge membership participation every day in the week, as in most Protestant churches in our great cities. Such organizations have long since outgrown the lone individual pastors of the declining rural churches, and require staffs of ministers and assistants. The Dallas First Methodist staff, for example, includes four ministers, a director of Christian education, one "minister of music," and three organists—not to mention two missionaries maintained in the Belgian Congo. The head pastor, Rev. Dr. Robert E. Goodrich, Jr., typifies leading ministers elsewhere, Catholic as well as Protestant, by conducting a weekly TV program over one of the TV channels allocated to a local station. (Data, courtesy of Rev. Dr. Goodrich and Mr. W. H. Painter, Dallas, Texas.) For a typical urban Catholic church see Plate 19.

Plate 43. The Mormon Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah. This is the ceremonial center of the Church of the Latter Day Saints in the United States. For ordinary church services smaller buildings called *tabernacles* are used. Note tourists in the foreground taking snapshots of the Temple. The Temple is not open to public intrusion.



*Davis from Monkmeyer
Press Photo Service.*




*Hibbs from Monkmeyer
Press Photo Service.*

Plate 44. Where Gambling Has Been Legalized. A night scene in Las Vegas, Nevada. In a state which in 1950 had only 160,000 people, Las Vegas ranks second among its cities with 24,624 population, exceeded only by Reno, the nation's divorce capital, which counted 32,497. Thanks largely to its gambling industry, Las Vegas increased by 192 percent during the decade before 1950, Reno only 52 percent. Because of the frequent close tie-up of the underworld with gambling in this country, most experts on law enforcement regard the legalization of gambling by Nevada as a mistake in public policy. The scene shown is at Fremont Street and Second.

Plate 45. A Conflict of Codes. Tourists who normally would not countenance gambling in their own states try a roulette game in a gambling establishment in Las Vegas, Nevada. Thousands are attracted every year to try their luck at roulette, dice, and other "games of chance" in the Nevada gambling town. Some establishments display floor shows and Hollywood celebrities to add to the lure.

In the nation at large in other states, the Kefauver Committee investigation (1951) revealed that organized gambling outranks even prostitution and the traffic in narcotics as the source of billions of dollars of underworld income. As unlawful activities, all three of these services—gambling, prostitution, and "dope peddling"—can flourish only as the underworld buys "protection" from corrupt politicians. Yet the great bulk of the money with which to buy this protection comes from otherwise "respectable" citizens who demand these services!




Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.



Ellinger from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Plate 46. Scientific Aids to Law Enforcement. A radio operator at WFBQ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation radio station in the Justice Building, Washington, D.C. All big city police departments in the United States are now equipped with their own broadcasting stations to keep in constant touch with their own radio-equipped police cruisers and with police departments in other cities. This enables most departments to place a policeman at the scene of any crime within five to eight minutes of the report, and to alert other departments in a matter of minutes. Likewise, transmission of photographs by telephone lines enables departments in distant cities to coöperate in identifying crime suspects, lost persons, and the like, almost as quickly as though they were in the same building.

Plate 47. Science Aids Law Enforcement. A fingerprint expert from the Los Angeles Police Department identifies the fingerprint of a defendant in a criminal case in court. As of April 1, 1953, there were 127,098,774 fingerprint cards on file in the F.B.I. Identification Division in Washington, the vast majority, of course, being prints of ordinary citizens who worked in war plants, and so forth. The number of criminals fingerprinted in the United States is estimated at over 6,000,000.




Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Courtesy, Los Angeles Police Department.




Plate 48. Science Aids Law Enforcement. A statistical sorting machine in the crime laboratory of the Los Angeles Police Department running through thousands of cards, each of which records significant characteristics of some reported crime. By setting the controls to sort out cards punched like the card which records the particular crime under investigation, the machine brings together all similar crime records in the Department's files in a matter of minutes, and enables the police to run down the unknown criminal in terms of the known "signatures," or peculiarities, of perpetrators of past crimes. By revealing similarities of time and place in a series of crimes the machine has occasionally made it possible to anticipate future crimes so that policemen can actually be waiting in the right place for the burglar or hold-up man to show up. The Los Angeles police have carried this method further than any other department in the United States.

Plate 49. Science Aids Law Enforcement. A polygraph, or "lie detector," being used in the crime laboratory of the Los Angeles Police Department to test reactions of a suspected lawbreaker. The polygraph records variations in blood pressure, breathing, and electrical conductivity of the skin. Under emotional stress produced by guilty knowledge and the subject's attempts at concealment, the three needles trace a curve somewhat different from the subject's record when responding to questions unrelated to his crime. The "lie detector" is by no means infallible, cannot be used except with the subject's consent, and must be interpreted by an expert, but it is as useful for clearing innocent persons of suspicion as for revealing the duplicity of actual lawbreakers. All big city police departments now use it.



Courtesy, Los Angeles Police Department.

Courtesy, Los Angeles Police Department.




a 20th Century Fact



The average worker in the United States loses seven-and-a-half work days a year because of temporary illness, reports a Twentieth Century Fund study.

Plate 50a.

a 20th Century Fact



Arbitration to settle labor disputes began in the United States in the late 1880s. It was first practiced in the building and printing trades and in interstate steam railroads and urban street railways, reports a Twentieth Century Fund study.

Plate 50c.

a 20th Century Fact



The trend of recent years toward an increase in the number of American women who go to work is largely due to new opportunities in industry, the decrease in the size of families, the simplifying of housekeeping and the increase in urbanization, according to a new report of the Twentieth Century Fund.

Plate 50b.



Black Star.

Plate 51. A Contrast in Statuses. The winter home of an upper status family on Indian Creek, Miami Beach, Florida, and the year-round shelter of a Kentucky coal miner's family of eight near Combs, Kentucky. The company-owned house of the miner and his family rented for \$7.75 a month. The Miami Beach mansion was not for rent.

Acme Photo.




Plate 52. Visible Indexes of Stratification. Some of the houses of the lower strata of Washington society—a slum a few blocks from the nation's capital. Washington's slums are populated largely by Negroes, but similar firetraps ornament the slums of other cities in which the population is predominantly white. Left to themselves, the weakest bargainers in the stratification scale must take what is left in the scale of housing in any given community after other bargainers are satisfied. If what is left has been left long enough and neglected badly enough, the result is inevitably a slum: an area of self-perpetuating poverty, wretched living conditions, and self-perpetuating social breakdown. Slum-dwellers produce many times more cases of crime, disease, and vice than do the occupants of other social statuses elsewhere, and the areas in which they live, the slums themselves, fail by considerable margins to pay the costs of the protective, educational, health, welfare, and other services provided by the community. A slum, in other words, is an economic and social parasite on its community.



Operations of a Typical Great American Corporation. The Ford Motor Company's foreign subsidiary companies and manufacturing, assembly, and service plants are on five continents. This helps to visualize the enormous scope of modern capitalist organization and could be matched with similar maps for General Motors, the Standard Oil Company, and other great American concerns whose business operations extend around the globe. No existing labor organizations have similar scope.





Plate 54. Union and Management Terminate a Bargaining Conflict. President Marion Mallory, owner of the Mallory Electric Company, and Walter Reuther, President of the UAW-CIO, put their signatures to a new agreement which among other things provided pensions of \$160 a month for retired workers. Thousands of such agreements are signed every year between unions and company managements. On the average, collective bargaining breaks down in about one-fourth or one-fifth of the cases, leading to work stoppages or strikes. In ten years, 1942-1952 inclusive, strikes in the United States involving over six workers and lasting more than one day averaged 4386 a year, affected 2,750,000 workers a year, and cost an estimated loss of total working time of slightly over one-third of one percent (0.37). (See *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1953, p. 222.) In the picture, the men at the desk, left to right, are President Mallory, President Reuther, and Edward Cote, co-director of UAW Region 1A.



seeker face each other in the wage bargain with needs which are very different in urgency and compulsiveness.

5. INEQUALITY OF MARKET POSITIONS

The job-seeker is not only selling something which is much more perishable than an ordinary commodity but selling it in a market which does not protect price (wages) against cost of production. The employer, on the other hand, operates not only in the labor market but also and mainly in the commodity market. The employer makes his money by selling commodities—coal, automobiles, refrigerators, and so on—or service “commodities” such as transportation, telephone service, and the like. It is a distinctive feature of commodity markets that price is protected in such markets by cost of production. When the price of a commodity falls below cost of production the high-cost producers are forced out of the market, supply falls, and ultimately a level is reached at which price covers the costs of the more efficient producers. Price tends to be governed by supply and demand—unless it is manipulated by government controls, monopoly, etc. But the point is, in a free commodity market cost of production protects price, and when prices fall, the supply declines.

In the labor market reverse tendencies operate. When wages (prices) fall, women and children are forced into the market to help support their families. The supply of labor power actually increases. What stops this process and begins to force wages up is not any curtailment of supply—we do not kill off workers in a depression to curtail supply—but an increase in demand, the increased willingness of employers to hire job-seekers.

Thus, the employer operates in two markets: In one the prices on which he depends are protected by the cost of production; in the other he is buying a product, labor power, one of the important elements in *his* total costs, but an element that is not protected for its producer by cost of production in the same way. The job-seeker depends for livelihood, not on a commodity market like the employer, but on a market that does not protect his cost of production. Relatively his market position is far weaker than that of the employer.³

³ Wages are protected not by the cost of production but by the level of community tolerance of human suffering, by the level of working-class respect for law and order, and, since the New Deal, by government minimum wage standards in certain industries. Theoretically, during a depression it would be unnecessary to pay even subsistence wages to employees. Demand is so far below supply that the employed could be starved out in successive relays until the “surplus” labor-power of the community had been used

6. INEQUALITY OF EASE OF NEED SATISFACTION

Not only is the labor power need of the employer less urgent and less compulsive than is the job need of the job-seeker, but it is more easily satisfied. If the job-seeker refuses the proffered job, the employer need only sit back and wait for the next applicant, or advertise for applicants. He can be reasonably sure of getting somebody although possibly not as many somebodies as he would like.

The job-seeker, on the other hand, if he turns down this job or is turned down by the employer, must seek another possible employer. As we have said, this involves more physical effort, usually more waste of time, and inevitably more anxiety than the correlative burden imposed on the employer to fill the job. The cost of refusal is higher for the applicant than for the employer.

In six ways, therefore, the parties to the individual wage bargain do not meet as equals and in all six the inequality favors the employer: The role of decision making is superior to that of job applicant; the physical involvement of the applicant is greater and puts him at a disadvantage as compared with the employer; the applicant has less waiting power than the employer and more urgent need of a job than the average employer has of one more employee; the commodity market on which the employer depends for his income protects *his* prices by cost of production, whereas the labor market on which the job applicant depends for his income gives his wages no such protection; and finally, it is ordinarily much easier for the employer to find someone else for the job than for the applicant to find another job, even if jobs are as plentiful as applicants. All in all, the individual wage bargain gives the employer the upper hand, a decisive bargaining advantage which operates continuously in every wage transaction and cumulatively skews the distribution of wealth through the years toward the man of property as against the man who has only labor power to sell.

The net result, as we have seen in our parallel comparison of the business and wage statuses, is a higher level of power, consumption, security, and prestige for the business class as compared with the wage class.

How have Americans reacted to this marked difference in the two statuses?

up. But no modern society in the Western world will tolerate such a callous adherence to the laws of supply and demand.

II-7:4. Escape, Unrest, and the Struggle with Privilege

In the beginning, when George Washington took office as President, 3,000,000 farmers and villagers faced a continental wilderness of hundreds of millions of acres waiting only to be appropriated and developed. It was possible for men like Thomas Jefferson to envisage a nation in which every normal citizen could attain economic independence and security by his own efforts on the land. A generation after the Revolution 80 percent of Americans actually were their own bosses; only 20 percent worked for others.

Came the factory system, the railroad, and settlement from coast to coast. The frontier vanished. By 1920 more Americans were living in urban places (2500 up) than in the smaller villages and the open country. By 1940 only 20 percent were their own bosses; 80 percent worked for others. The employment proportions of a century before had been reversed. Instead of standing on a broad base of small property owners as in Jefferson's day, the stratification pyramid now stood on a status base composed of millions of wage and salary earners, each one dependent on someone else for access to his means of livelihood. For the wage earner the road to propertied independence had become steeper and narrower. As against the wide-open spaces of opportunity in Jefferson's day, now there were only the shrinking spaces of the upper levels of the stratification pyramid, narrowing toward its peak. Geometrically determined, only a tiny fraction of those born on the wage level could ever hope to find places on the upper levels, and even to win those levels many of the climbers might have to compete with the sons of upper-status families already in possession. It might be possible to bulge the sides of the pyramid somewhat, to make more room up above, but from the evidence of all history it would not be possible to change the basic form of the stratification system—to turn the pyramid into a cube or to stand it on its point. Even revolution could not do that.

For in every society there are fewer power and control functions to be performed than there are ordinary service and production functions. Hence, the practical question in every stratification system that has passed its pioneer phase of development is not, How can every status be made equal to every other? but rather a twofold question: How *open* are upper functions to competitive achievement from below? and How and to what extent can the holders of these upper functions be *held accountable* to the many below?

The question of the openness of upper statuses to competitors from below is in reality two questions: (1) What obstacles stand between the aspirant and the status? and (2) What proportion of possible aspirants can hope to make the grade?

Thanks to a continent of free land and the increasing diversification of an expanding economy, and thanks to the absence of a hereditary upper class, the obstacles in America have always been far fewer and weaker than those that stand between wage workers and upper statuses in Europe. As compared with the caste-ridden, narrow-market economies of Europe, America has been a land of open classes. This has meant that a higher percentage of wage workers have actually risen in this country than have made the grade during the same period in the Old Country. But when one compares the relative number who have risen with the much greater number who might have risen, the conclusion is inevitable that only a minority have escaped from the disabilities of the wage status.

That this minority consisted of the more aggressive, shrewd, and economically far-sighted—the more “competent,” in this sense—does not change the fact that it has been a minority. That millions could rise in this way has been of the most transcendent importance for American society. For other millions this has been the meaning of opportunity in this country, even if they themselves could not attain it. They *hoped*, at least, that their children might. Thus, dazzled by the possibility of change of status, Americans generally have persuaded themselves that “America is a nation without classes.” If they meant that America had no hereditary classes as in Europe, they were substantially right. But if they meant that there were no differences in social statuses and that all Americans had an equal probability of being able to rise on the social gradient, they were demonstrably wrong. As the stratification system shaped up more and more definitely into the familiar stratification pyramid, the statistical chance that any given wage earner chosen at random might become a store owner, factory owner, or professional man shrank accordingly. There are still opportunities for wage workers to forge ahead. The class system is not closed. But the obstacles are greater and the probabilities for the average man are less than in the days of Thomas Jefferson.

From all this it should be clear that certainly since the passing of the frontier, about 1890, individual escape from the wage status has been no solution for the problem of the relative disabilities of that status as compared with others. For every individual who could escape

upward there have been two, three, or a dozen others who could not. For every poor boy who rose to head a steel company or boss a bank, there have been dozens who have had to keep on carrying their dinner pails. And in so far as wage workers have been dissatisfied with their condition—a dissatisfaction attested through the years by strikes, labor turnover, and the like—individual escape has provided no answer. The problem of labor unrest cannot be met by a solution available only to a minority. The problem is the problem of the man in the ranks.

What, then, have Americans done about the dissatisfactions of the great majority?

Mainly three kinds of things: (1) The dissatisfied themselves have tried to organize for self-help in coöperatives, unions, or political parties; (2) employers generally have opposed and resisted and tried to ignore or belittle all expressions of labor unrest; and (3) increasingly, government has been forced to intervene in the struggle of the underprivileged against the privileged.

As background for our consideration of some of the tensions in the modern world, we sketch briefly the reactions to labor dissatisfaction in the United States.

II-7:5. Efforts at Self-Help by the Dissatisfied

In the United States as in England dissatisfied wage workers have tried to combine in various ways to better their condition. Three forms of combination have been tried: (1) Coöperation—producers' coöperatives and consumers' coöperatives; (2) unions; and (3) political organization.

1. COÖPERATION

Attempts of wage workers to take over the employer's function by forming producers' coöperatives were among the early reactions of English workers to the impact of the machine. They failed there as they have almost universally failed in this country.

Successful consumer coöperatives, i.e., organizations for collective buying, are usually dated from the Rochdale coöperators in England, 1844. In Britain and in Scandinavia consumers' coöperatives have flourished and have become important elements in the respective economies. In this country, in so far as they have succeeded at all, their success has been mainly among farmers and among middle-class urban residents rather than among wage workers as such.

In general, coöperatives have failed to make much impression on the great basic industries—manufacturing, mining, transportation, banking. Coöperative credit unions have enjoyed some success and there was some development of the coöperative principle in the early days of the telephone and electric power industries. But by and large, coöperation in this country presents no real challenge to the continued capitalistic control of banking, the utilities, and other basic industries.

2. UNIONS

Attempts of wage workers in the United States to bargain collectively with their employers are older than the factory system in this country. The first strike cited by Commons in his history of American labor occurred in Philadelphia in 1786, when journeymen printers went out in a dispute with their "masters" over a minimum wage of \$6 a week.⁴ This, Commons says, was the first authentic organization of a single trade discoverable in this country. Others soon followed as the various craft masters evolved into merchant-producers who found themselves forced by competition to beat down wages in order to make a profit. With the coming of the factory system, the decline of the old master-journeyman relationship, and the widening of the competitive market by improvements in transportation, the divergence of interests between employers and employees became more marked and attempts of the latter to deal collectively with their employers more numerous and extended. First, wage earners in different trades in single cities began to recognize common interests *as wage earners*. Again it was in Philadelphia that this recognition first appeared, and the year was 1827. That is the year which Commons takes as marking the beginning of the American labor *movement* as distinct from mere scattered attempts at unionization. By the decade of the 1830's financial control of production was beginning to pass into the hands of men who came into industry from the outside, men who could advance capital for machines. Simultaneously the building of railroads and improvements in ocean transportation were expanding the labor market far beyond the immediate locality of the shop and factory. Competition for jobs increased at a time when the employers were developing more prospects for profit and more advantages in the individual wage bargain. The struggle of wage workers for improvement in their condition broadened. So-

⁴ John R. Commons and associates, *History of Labour in the United States*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921, Vol. I, p. 25.

called labor parties appeared in the 1830's, and in reaction to the growing dominance of the merchant-capitalist, attempts were made by printers and a few other trades to form regional or district alliances of "locals."

We cannot trace in detail the evolution of American unionism: how grim experience gradually forced wage workers into wider and wider forms of organization, clarified their organizational objectives, and disciplined them into stronger and stronger union loyalty. Trial and error eliminated organizations that aimed at too broad a target—organizations like the "secret" Knights of Labor in the 1870's and 1880's, gunning for "the money power." Observing how attempts at political action by unions had weakened unions without reaching political objectives, Samuel Gompers, first president of the American Federation of Labor, organized in the mid-1880's, laid it down as a fundamental rule that Federation policy would aim at trade unionism, i.e., economic rather than political pressure, "pure and simple."

But against employer resistance, legal handicaps, the ups and downs of a laissez-faire economy, and above all a tremendous flood of job-seeking immigrants from Europe that rose to over a million a year on the eve of World War I, trade unionism pure and simple made only halting and almost negligible progress until the Great Depression of the 1930's gave the reformers in the New Deal a chance to underpin the movement with a legal flooring of rights embodied in the Wagner Act of 1935.⁵ Under this act most of the old union-busting practices of employers were outlawed as "unfair labor practices," and specific procedures were set up whereby employees in any plant might choose their own representatives through whom to bargain collectively with their employer. The essentials of these gains were retained twelve years later in the Taft-Hartley Act, although many details of procedure were changed to the detriment of the unions.

Even as the Wagner Act was becoming law, the head of the miners' union, John L. Lewis, and a few other forward-looking labor leaders

⁵ Not all labor advances came from the New Deal. Restriction of immigration under Coolidge in the mid-twenties because of conservative fear of Bolshevism and racialist fallacies concerning the supposed superiority of Nordics as compared with Alpines and Mediterraneans—southeastern Europeans—in effect gave labor a "protective tariff" at long last somewhat equivalent to the economic tariffs which had so long fostered "infant industries" whose combined assets now totaled many billions. And one of President Hoover's last acts as President was to sign the long-sought Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act barring federal injunctions in labor cases except as a protection against clearly impending irreparable damage not due to a strike as such. Yet by and large, the change wrought by the Wagner Act of 1935 was so important as to justify the claim that it constituted a kind of labor "Magna Carta."

were taking the initiative to force the American Federation of Labor, predominantly a federation of craft unions, to broaden its base of organization by forming industrial unions, which would include the unskilled wage workers. Resistance by the "aristocrats of labor," the skilled workers, blocked action by the Federation. Lewis and his cohorts thereupon proceeded to change their Committee on Industrial Organization into an independent organization, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the C.I.O., whose constituent unions then proceeded to win striking union victories in previously unorganized automobile, steel, and other industries.

By 1953, as against a union membership which had numbered in 1920 no more than 5,000,000, or about 21 percent, of organizable nonagricultural wage workers, mostly in mining, transportation, and the building trades, the A.F. of L. now claimed 8,000,000, the C.I.O. about 6,000,000, and the railroad Brotherhoods and other unions another 1,500,000 to 2,000,000—a grand total of nearly 16,000,000 out of approximately 27,000,000 to 30,000,000 potential union members. In other words, as against 21 percent of potential members in 1920, American unionism in 1950 claimed between 53 and 58 percent of nonagricultural workers.

While distinguished economists like Sumner Schlichter of Harvard contended against some of their professional colleagues that unions had made no appreciable difference in the distribution of wealth in the United States—a strong argument for political action by wage workers, if true—one investigator at least found union wage rates for bricklayers, carpenters, and common laborers in 1936 ranging from 39 to 50 percent higher than nonunion wage rates in the same occupations, and even Professor Schlichter admitted that unions had forced management to improve its own efficiency in many ways and to institute the beginnings of a structure of workers' rights in industry in the form of recognized grievance procedures.⁶

Broadly speaking, unions seemed to be working toward three major objectives: (1) to improve the organized wage worker's economic condition; (2) to establish a structure of workers' rights in industry—a code of rights which management would be bound to respect;

⁶ For effect of unionization on hourly earnings of union and nonunion bricklayers, carpenters, and common laborers, 1936, see Maurice Leven, *The Income Structure of the United States*, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1938, as cited in *The Economic Almanac for 1948*, New York, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1947, p. 352. For the effects of unionism on industry in general, see Sumner Schlichter, *The Challenge of Industrial Relations*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1947.

and (3) to raise the status of wage labor in the American culture. Down to mid-century unions remained the major kind of organization by which American wage workers were seeking to change their condition by collective action.

They were of two kinds relative to scope of organization and of two kinds also relative to instrumental objectives.

In scope of organization there were *craft unions* like most of the unions allied in the American Federation of Labor, organizations whose members had some special skill in common as their criterion of membership, and *industrial unions* like the United Mine Workers, all of whose members regardless of their separate skills or lack of skills worked in a common enterprise. Craft unions, which had originated in the days of craft shops, still dominated the field on the railroads, in the construction industry, and in many forms of manufacture. Advocates of the industrial form of union organization contended that craft organization was out of date for industries employing masses of semiskilled and unskilled workers and tended to pit the "aristocracy of labor" against the masses of wage workers. They claimed also that, in a strike, merely to call out one or two crafts employed in an industry instead of all the employees regardless of their level of skill was a less effective conflict technique than to strike the whole plant or industry. Whatever the merits of these claims, the fact remained that the great mass production industries had never been effectively unionized until the advent of the C.I.O. industrial unions.

In terms of instrumental objectives, there were business or *bargaining unions*, which accepted the wage system and sought merely to secure by collective agreements better wages, shorter hours, etc., and *revolutionary unions* such as the old I.W.W. of World War I days, which repudiated the wage system and sought to drive the employers out of business and to substitute some form of syndicalism, the I.W.W. objective, or a Socialist or Communist system.

From the vigor with which, after World War II, A.F. of L. leaders like William Green and C.I.O. leaders like Philip Murray and Walter Reuther rooted Communists out of their organizations, and from the scanty interest that radical political programs have ever been able to arouse among American wage workers, the conclusion seems to be justified that wage workers in this country still overwhelmingly accept the wage system and hope for betterment mainly in three ways: (1) by escaping from the wage status themselves or by

proxy through their children; (2) by the normal democratic processes of the two-party political system and the gradual lifting of economic and legal handicaps; and (3) by direct economic action through their bargaining unions.

Before turning to the nature of political action open to wage workers as such, a further observation may be in order concerning the obvious split among wage workers on the question of union organization. Some of this is directly due to employer resistance and to fear on the part of wage workers of reprisals in case they listen to the tempter. But a great deal of it and possibly most of it seems to be due to quite other influences. Many wage workers, as we have noted, hope to escape from the wage status—either to become foremen, to set up “a little chicken ranch,” or to go into some kind of small business for themselves—a filling station, a garage, a lunch counter, and so on. And many of them do. Even among the vast majority who don’t, the hope may linger on. They have an essentially middle-class mentality, a desire to get ahead individually, to get higher wages by higher productivity regardless of group attitudes, to “take orders from nobody,” etc. These are the people who disregard a work group’s bogey, or production norm, cross picket lines to hold their jobs, take other men’s jobs during a strike. They not infrequently announce that “No goddam union So-and-So is going to tell me what to do.”

To men who on occasion collectively risk their livelihood to improve the status of the jobs they hold, behavior of this sort seems the rankest kind of disloyalty to a common cause. They call the sturdy individualist “scab” and whatever other opprobrious names they can lay tongue to. On occasion they beat him up or even murder him as a common traitor.

The middle-class community, on the other hand, tends to regard the picket-line violators and the scabs as temporary heroes. They are exercising their democratic “right to work” against the autocratic “interference” of a horde of “goons,” “labor autocrats,” and “un-American radicals.” To suggest that this union-defying and union-defeating behavior serves middle-class interests, the victory of the employer over the union, and that middle-class approval may be motivated by something other than pure idealism is to risk indictment as a materialist and a cynic. Yet the curious fact has often been observed that the very same strikebreaker whose “right to work” excites such middle-class enthusiasm during a strike seems to have no such right the moment a depression hits town. The very same

people who during the strike eulogized this "right to work" as of the very essence of Americanism now speak defensively of "business as business" and of "some people having to make sacrifices" to get things going again. The "right to work," it seems, is a right *only* against union strikers, not against middle-class employers!

In the interests of clear thinking about problems of stratification there is need to deflate a lot of class-inspired propaganda and buncombe on both sides—a lot of stereotypes that have grown up in the struggle between wage workers and employers during the last century and a half. If union men are not always striking for justice and liberty and the rights of man, it is also true that a would-be strikebreaker is no more of a community hero than is any other ordinary chap who is willing to chisel in on whatever gains his fellows have won at no cost to himself. The country club member who insists on enjoying the privileges of the club without paying dues and submitting to the rules of the organization soon ceases to grace the golf course and the cocktail bar. Nobody eulogizes him as a sturdy individualist asserting his right to make his own way! Yet no less a person than President Eliot of Harvard did in an article in *Harper's Magazine* in 1905 eulogize as a kind of cultural hero the man who takes another man's job while the original holder of the job is out on strike *to improve the conditions of that job!* On President Eliot's own social level that kind of behavior was commonly called snide. But when it occurred on a different social level to the benefit of Dr. Eliot's kind of people it could only be described in glamour words reserved for deeds of derring-do!

Union men are not always right and employers always wrong, nor are employers always right and unions wrong. Taking human dignity and social rationality as our criteria of judgment, industrial relations cannot be described in clichés and stereotypes.

The fact that strikes occur at all—or at least that they occur in the number and magnitude that they do (93,418 of them in 35 years, 1916–1950, inclusive, with more than 50,000,000 workers involved)—is prima-facie evidence that something fundamental is wrong in the relationships of employers and employees in American industry. Unquestionably unions "interfere" with management, hamper management's freedom of action, give workers ideas of their own importance, and put pressure on profits. Why employers resist unionization is perfectly understandable.

But here we come back to the second of our basic questions faced by every stratification system: How and to what extent can the holders

of upper functions (power and control) be held accountable to the many below?

We have seen that the American answer to the first question, the question concerning openness of classes, has been distinctively successful for a considerable minority through the years. A great many wage workers have risen to higher statuses.

The American answer to the second question has been even more successful *in the political field*. American voters can and do hold their political rulers to accountability in every election. But in the economic field the answer has been far less adequate. Broadly speaking, the consuming public may be said to hold every business enterprise accountable in the market: If goods, services, and prices cannot justify themselves in the long run against those of competitors, the business goes to the wall. So far so good. But there is much more to economic responsibility than that. The decisions of industrial executives have social repercussions in these days of giant corporations more far-reaching and more important for employees than 90 percent of the decisions of political officials. When General Motors decides to cut its pay roll or to move an auto plant to another city halfway across the continent, the social consequences of such decisions hit the pocketbooks and living habits of tens of thousands of people harder than do most of the decisions of their state legislatures and governors. Yet these people have no recognized way by which to challenge the wisdom or expediency of such decisions. If they don't like the decisions of their political officials they can vote them out of office, but if they don't like the decisions of their industrial executives there is nothing much they can do about it. *They have no recognized way to force a social, as distinct from a mere economic, accounting from the industrial stewards of the nation.*

It is to fill this gap in the democratic process that unions come in. Inconvenient as they are to management, disrupting as they may be to the submissiveness of a work force, and corrosive as they would like to be to profits, the unions do provide a means, a channel, a device, by which the people most directly affected by industrial decisions, the men on the floor, can challenge those decisions, force management to justify its wisdom, call for a minimum at least of social accountability. To some extent they constitute a check on the possible social irresponsibility of Big Business.

Naturally, as they have acquired power, unions have created their own problems of social responsibility. Frequently they have followed the pattern set by the less socialized types of management. All too

often to win rights for themselves unions have disregarded the rights of the public. Strikes to force a rival union out of an industry, to block technological improvements, to force employment of unnecessary men, and so on, are obvious abuses, but they are abuses brought about largely by the failure of American society to develop more adequate machinery for defining and protecting human rights in industry.

Actually, as technology makes urban dwellers more and more dependent on the uninterrupted operation of transport services, public utilities, hospitals, food deliveries, and so on, it becomes more and more of an anachronism for the public to permit either employers or unions to disrupt such services in order to settle their own "private" grievances. That the unions are apparently the ones that do the disrupting should not blind anyone to the fact that it is frequently the employer who has created conditions to rectify which society has provided no remedy for the affected workers except the strike. In these circumstances it is hardly equitable to outlaw such strikes or to crack down with injunctions against the strikers. A more fundamental remedy would be to set up some kind of grievance machinery *to handle grievances against whole industries*, not merely the grievances of individuals within an industry.

But the weakness of this suggestion is that it proposes a judicial approach to what is still a political question, namely, the whole status of labor in our industrial society. Every attempt so far made to set up boards or commissions or tribunals to deal with the relations between employers and unions has resulted immediately in a political struggle, a power struggle, to control the agency. Regulation of wages, the control or adjudication of strikes, the outlawing of "unfair labor practices"—questions of this kind are only partially susceptible to impartial administrative or judicial treatment. Fundamentally they are still issues in the underlying power struggle between the possessing classes and wage workers.

So far in the United States, wage workers have relied mainly on their unions to carry on this struggle although they have not kept wholly aloof from politics.

This brings us to the third kind of self-help attempted by wage workers, namely, political action.

3. THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN POLITICS

Despite the hullabaloo about equality and equal rights during the Revolution, the states of the young republic severely restricted the ballot to gentlemen of property. It required the so-called Jeffersonian

revolution at the turn of the century to sweep away these restrictions and give American wage workers the vote a full two generations before European workers were to reach the polls.

In the 1830's the first workers' political parties in history appeared in the cities of the eastern seaboard. They campaigned for free public schools, abolition of imprisonment for debt, and laws giving wage workers the right to slap mechanic's liens on the property of employers who had failed to pay their help. With the attainment of some of their demands and the collapse of the early unions in the panic of 1837, workmen lost interest in separate political activity and from then on until well into the present century took little part in American political struggles in any organized way. The various Socialist, Socialist Labor and other splinter parties that ultimately appeared attracted comparatively few votes. The high-water mark of labor protest as such probably came in 1912 when Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist candidate for President, received over 900,000 votes, or about 6 percent of the total popular vote.⁷ By and large, American wage workers have tended to confine their political interests to those represented by the two-party system—since 1865 the Republican and Democratic parties.

This does not mean that wage workers have not sought to advance their interests by political means. It was the deliberate policy of the leaders of the A.F. of L. under Samuel Gompers to "reward labor's friends and punish its enemies," although to what extent the leaders could actually deliver the labor vote was always a moot question. In the campaign of 1952 the leaders of the big unions, A.F. of L., C.I.O., the railway Brotherhoods, and the United Mine Workers, all declared for Adlai Stevenson—and the returns strongly suggested that in New York City, Boston, Chicago, and a good many other places where organized labor was strongest a majority of the wage workers voted for General Eisenhower! All of which indicates that as a class American wage workers have never regarded their interests as sufficiently distinct from those of other classes to take more than a trivial concern in distinctively working-class political programs, or even in the occupation-oriented advice of their own union leaders. American wage earners at mid-century were still more nation-oriented—middle-class-minded, if you please—than they were class-oriented.

⁷ In 1924 Senator La Follette, running as an Independent, Socialist-Progressive, received about 16 percent of the popular vote, but this included millions of rural and urban middle-class votes, as well as labor protest votes.

The distinctively working-class programs to which they had turned deaf ears for two generations had all come out of labor unrest abroad. At mid-century the two radical programs that had made the most stir in the world were Socialism and Communism. Both had been formulated for wage workers by upper- and middle-class intellectuals during the nineteenth century and both had captured control of important governments in recent years: Socialism by democratic methods in Sweden and Britain; Communism by revolutionary violence in Russia. Since in both Sweden and Britain democratic Socialism had retained existing civil and political liberties, both could be replaced by peaceable political processes (as the British Labour party was replaced in power in 1951 by Winston Churchill's Conservative party). But in Russia, since the victorious Communists had destroyed their leading opponents and had instituted a one-party totalitarian dictatorship, there existed no practical possibility for the Russian people to vote the Communist regime out of power. The Revolution had simply exchanged one corrupt, feeble, and inefficient autocracy for another less corrupt and far more powerful and efficient—and far more dangerous to the nations of the Western world.

Although up to mid-century neither Socialism nor Communism had had much impact on American wage workers, millions of Americans of all classes were watching with interest the Socialist experiments going on in Britain—the nationalization of the mines, railroads, banks, health services, etc.—and all Americans were living under a cloud of anxiety generated by Soviet imperialism on the international scene and by disturbing evidences of Communist infiltration into various areas of American life. It is, therefore, impossible to ignore foreign radicalism in any discussion of the labor movement in politics in America.

We shall confine our discussion to the two leading movements, Socialism and Communism. Both emerged from the same conditions and originally from the same men.

II-7:6. Self-Help by Collectivization of Production

We need not recall at this point the long history of economic development and working-class protest: the communistic elements in primitive economies; the religious communism of early Christians and of monastic orders; the common fields and collective activities of English villages on the eve of the Enclosure Acts; the utopian projects of the Brook Farm idealists and of Robert Owen here. All this and a great

deal more may be traced down, by anyone who is interested, in the works of anthropologists, historians of the early church, historical economists, and in the various histories of the nineteenth century. We need only note that no realistic challenge to the capitalist system, the successor to feudalism, had appeared on behalf of working people until Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels issued their famous *Communist Manifesto* during the turmoil of the bourgeois revolutions of 1848. Ending with the words, "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!" the *Manifesto* sounded the tocsin of working-class revolt. In the sixties Marx published *Das Kapital*, the book which did for the labor movement something of what Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* nearly a century before had done for capitalism: provided for labor, as the *Wealth of Nations* had provided for business, a point of view and a philosophy of its own.

As Harold Laski, the British Socialist, said: "Marx found communism a chaos and left it a movement."

In *Das Kapital* Marx developed a philosophy of history, an economics, a theory of knowledge, a theory of social processes, a method of forecasting the future, and an eschatology or theory of last things: a tremendous intellectual synthesis devoted to *changing the world* for the benefit of the working classes. We need note only four of his main ideas: (1) The materialistic interpretation of history held that economic factors have been the determining forces in world history. Ideas have been mainly rationalizations. Philosophies, religions, codes of ethics, etc., are merely the frosting on the cake. (2) The surplus value theory of labor came about as follows: Starting from Locke's proposition that labor is the source of all value, which Locke believed was a matter of natural law, Marx concluded that since the laborer does not get the whole of what he produces, he must inescapably be the victim of a gigantic swindle. The "surplus value" produced by labor over and above what is returned in wages is appropriated by the capitalist. But since labor is the source of all economic value, the capitalist thus produces nothing! Property is nothing, therefore, but the proceeds of capitalist expropriation of the worker—theft. Hence the conclusion—the workers must expropriate the expropriators! In other words, steal it all back again! (3) The theory of the class struggle is another main point. Properly interpreted, history, as Marx saw it, is only the record of the struggles of exploiters and exploited. The names and the forms of exploitation have changed from slavery to serfdom to wage labor,

but the process and the results have been essentially the same: exploitation and poverty. (4) The theory of increasing misery is based on Marx's argument that, by the law of their own existence the rich must keep on getting richer, the poor poorer. In the end, the working class will be driven to revolt to fulfill its "historic destiny," the capture of the state, "the executive committee" of the possessing classes. Once the state has been captured in a bloody revolution and all class distinctions wiped out, since all will now be workers, there will be no further need for a state at all and it will "wither away." This is the anarchistic element in Marxian Communism—the eventual disappearance of all political coercion. Obviously this is an eschatological prediction somewhat like the Book of Revelations. Its acceptance depends on faith.

Before noting briefly the fortunes of Marxism, we might as well point out that while Marx did social scientists a great service in focusing attention on social classes, in stimulating interest in the economic conditioning of ideas—the beginnings of the sociology of knowledge—and in providing an ideal model for the study of revolutions, his materialistic interpretation of history overemphasized economics; his economics ignored the actual contribution of nonlabor factors to production; his theory of the class struggle slurred over a lot of history that isn't class struggle; and his theory of increasing misery has been disproved by the rising standard of living of industrial workers in the last two generations. *Das Kapital* remains, however, one of the most significant books in the world.⁸

What has happened to this tremendous challenge to the capitalist world?

In 1864 Marx and his friends organized the First International, i.e., the first international association of social radicals. This was wrecked in 1873 by the secession of the anarchists under Bakunin. Sixteen years later came the Second International, which went to pieces at the outbreak of World War I when the workers in the warring countries heeded the call of the fatherland instead of the call of the international working class. It was later revived as the organization of the Socialists as distinguished from the Communists, who in 1919 formed their own Third International. This, in turn, was "suspended" by Stalin during World War II to manipulate world opinion toward

⁸ As Communism represents one pole around which society may be organized, complete collective control of everything, so Anarchism represents the other pole: no collective control of any kind. In between these extremes in the order of their retreat from complete collectivism toward complete anarchism would come Socialism, syndicalism (worker control without the state), laissez-faire individualism, then anarchism.

less suspicion of the Soviets, and was later revived to aid in the "cold war."

Meanwhile, after the defection of the anarchists in 1873, the radical labor movement developed differences of opinion concerning ways and means. In some countries where workers had by this time acquired the ballot, certain leaders began to doubt the need of violent revolution. In Britain the Fabian Socialists began to educate the public along socialistic lines in the expectation of taking power by peaceful elections as the British Labour party eventually did. Thanks to the support of the Liberal party, the British Labour party under Ramsay MacDonald did take office in January, 1924, the first Labour government in the history of Great Britain. Actual power did not come to the party, however, until it unseated Winston Churchill at the end of World War II in 1945 and Clement Attlee became the first Labour Prime Minister with a Labour parliamentary majority. The Attlee government proceeded to nationalize the coal mines, the railroads, the Bank of England, medical services, and the steel industry. It was voted out in 1951 but most of its reforms seemed beyond recall.

The First Russian Revolution, meanwhile, in 1917 had swept away the czarist autocracy in Russia. Attempting to temporize with the demands of peasants and soldiers for peace and distribution of the aristocratic estates, the moderate regime of Kerensky was overthrown in November by the Bolsheviks under Nicolai Lenin, who promptly set about "the building of the Socialist state." We need not trace the fortunes of Communism in Russia since. As everyone knows, Lenin died in 1924; a bitter struggle ensued between Trotsky, Lenin's right-hand man in the Bolshevik seizure of power and in the civil wars, and Joseph Stalin, the secretary of the Bolshevik party under Lenin. Stalin won and liquidated his enemies, including Trotsky, who was eventually murdered in Mexico. Stalin thereupon set about preparing Russia for the war with Western capitalism which Marxism foretold must come. It did when Hitler attacked in 1941. Delighted to have help against Germany, however, Churchill welcomed Russia as an ally, and when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Hitler declared war on the United States, the United States, although fighting two wars, also routed millions of tons of supplies and munitions to the Soviets.

The Russian defense of Stalingrad and the ultimate expulsion of the mighty German war machine from Russia won the admiration of the world. It is probable that had the Russian dictator played his cards

with the cunning usually attributed to Soviet diplomacy, Communists could have won control of Italy and France in the postwar years. Instead, he threw away his moral prestige by seizing Poland and the Baltic countries, taking over the Balkans, and maneuvering a Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. Communism lost face throughout western Europe, could win nothing unless backed by the Red Army. Then in 1950 came the Russian-inspired attack by the North Koreans on the Republic of South Korea to gain the strategic "doorway to Japan," and a few months later, to prevent the imminent defeat of the North Koreans by the U.N. troops under General MacArthur, came the Russian-supported intervention by the Communist regime that had at last won out in the long internal struggle to control war-exhausted China.

Reluctantly the world realized finally that it was facing a new imperialism, Soviet Russia on the march—an imperialism far more powerful, ruthless, and uncompromising even than Hitler or any previous would-be world tyrant. From a mere revolutionary threat within the nations, an economic heresy, Communism had now become a world-wide conspiracy, the psychological spearhead of Soviet power to soften up intended victims. And again, as when the Roman legions set out in pursuit of the vanquished Hannibal and wound up masters of the Mediterranean world, human freedom had its back to the wall. Like that other religion, Islam, in the first century after Mohammed, Communism, riding Russian bombers and Chinese bayonets, was out to conquer the world with the sword. In sober truth the long-gone abuses of the early factory system had spawned the most grisly Nemesis in all history. With H-bombs, intercontinental bombers, and long-distance rockets giving these new fanatics the power to deliver a Pearl Harbor knockout anywhere from London to San Francisco at the push of a button, Britain and the United States greeted the death of Stalin in 1953 with a highly significant case of jitters. For the first time since Christendom beat back the Turks at Vienna in 1683 the Western world again faced deadly peril from the East—and recoiled in horror from this new Frankenstein monster. Under the shadow of 20,000 Russian warplanes the world waited for the day of expiation for the sins of the fathers. Thanks to Marx, Lenin, and Stalin—and the stupidities of two generations of Western statesmen—the problem of social unrest had become the problem of world peace and the survival of human freedom.

Race Relations

II-8:1. The Problem

“When we say that there is a Negro *problem* in America, what we mean is that Americans are worried about it. It is on their minds and on their consciences.”¹

To Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish author of the most authoritative study yet published in this field, the essence of this problem is the fact that American practice in race relations, as in so many other aspects of American life, fails to square with American hopes and ideals. The caste system in the South and the discriminatory attitudes that have diffused out of it to all parts of America flatly repudiate the values of the basic value system of American life, the American Creed. Those values—the essential dignity of the individual human being, the fundamental equality of all men, and the inalienable rights of freedom, justice, and fair opportunity—stand to the American people as “the essential meaning of the nation’s early struggle for independence,”² the utopian myth for the realization of which American society exists. If they are to be true to their own ultimate ideals, therefore, Americans must behave to one another in terms of those creedal values, and yet nothing could more flatly contradict those values than the racial caste system of the South and the widespread tendency in all sections to relegate the Negro to second-class citizenship. By this contradiction, this conflict between their own ideals and their actual practices, Americans bedevil themselves with their greatest social problem.

¹ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

It meets them everywhere. There is no escaping the logical and the moral conflicts which it engenders and the compromises which it forces them to accept. In the South the caste system imposes itself on everybody twenty-four hours a day. In the North, although Northerners do their best to forget their colored minority, caste attitudes are constantly cropping out in politics, the schools, the churches, residential segregation, discrimination in industry, in recreation—wherever Negroes and whites associate. The white South is frank and open in its assumption of its own racial superiority and its determination to maintain control. The white North is divided and confused. There is a complex and curious contrast between the sections in the legal, economic, and ritualistic status of Negroes, on the one hand, and the associational acceptance or quasi-acceptance of Negroes, on the other. Southern whites, outnumbered in scores of counties sometimes 8 or 9 to 1, fear Negro mass power and Negro resentment of caste subordination. Hence, they have granted even limited political rights only grudgingly and under northern pressure and they flare up instantly and often violently at the slightest overt action by a Negro that seems to challenge the caste system and its ritual of white superiority and Negro subordination. In the past, Negroes have been lynched for "getting uppity," failing to get off the sidewalk for a white man, and so on. But lynching is only the most violent extralegal device for keeping the Negro "in his place," i.e., subordinate to the whites.³ The whole machinery of segregation, deference, and underprivilege works to the same end. Yet so long as the Negro "keeps his place," southern whites welcome him as an employee and personal servant, and many of them treat him with a kindness and warm helpfulness unknown in the North. In contrast, northern whites, knowing the Negro only as a minority, feel little concern about Negroes in the mass, hence have granted them full political rights. With almost no Negroes to associate with and still imbued with some of the idealism of the Civil War days, Northerners back in the 1880's reacted to a Supreme Court decision invalidating federal civil rights laws for the South by enacting state laws of their own penalizing discrimination in restaurants, theaters, and other public places. These laws are still on the books, but for

³ The traditional rationalization of lynching as a necessary means for protecting white womanhood against Negro rapists hardly explains the fact that only a minor fraction of all racial lynchings have been for the traditional reason and that more than forty Negro women have been lynched. That lynchings have dwindled from 155 in 1892 to none in 1953 can be attributed less to any decline in white willingness to use violence to assert white supremacy than to the threat of a federal antilynching law and to a salutary stiffening of backbones among southern rural sheriffs.

years their enforcement in most communities has been a dead letter. The curious fact emerged that so long as Northerners had to associate with only a few exceptional Negroes in schools, etc., they accepted and even lionized the exceptions—by way of demonstrating that *they*, in contrast to the wicked Southerners, were quite above race prejudice! But when Negroes appeared in considerable numbers to compete for jobs, mostly poor and ignorant sons and daughters of recent slaves, this apparent broad-mindedness vanished. It was all very well for Negroes to vote—there weren't enough of them in the beginning to make much difference anyway—but who wanted to sit beside them in streetcars, watch them eat their food in the same restaurants, or mingle with them in theaters or churches? The middle classes found themselves as averse to associating with black *workers* as they were to associating with white workers; even more averse, in fact, for the blacks were poorer, more ignorant, and often dirtier. As for white wage workers, the blacks competed for jobs, sometimes helped to break strikes, had lower standards of living, and degraded whole neighborhoods into which they moved. Only slowly did a Negro middle class begin to develop, and by that time the North had stereotyped the Negro as undesirable and a threat to property values. Unofficially and outside the law, the North thus developed a social segregation system of its own, less inclusive, less rigid, and less powerful than the system in the South, but a segregation system just the same. And unlike the South, the North extended this even to employment. The Negro became the "last one hired and the first one fired." By the time the exigencies of World War II led to a presidential order banning discrimination on war work and a few eastern states backed this with fair employment practices acts of their own, the northern Negro was actually in danger of becoming an economic outcast. Increasing numbers of Northerners, in contrast to their southern compatriots, didn't want to hire any Negroes at all, even for personal service and unskilled labor jobs.

Yet for all its inconsistencies and derelictions from its own legal and social principles, the North still offered the American Negro more political power, more educational facilities, more economic opportunities, a higher standard of living, more civic security, and more human dignity than did the caste system in the South. For this reason it continued to draw southern Negro migrants in excess of its Negro re-emigrants to Dixie Land. This means that increasingly northern

whites faced the problem of adjusting themselves to the presence rather than the absence of Negroes and to the presence of increasing numbers of middle-class, and not mere working-class, Negroes.

This fact, plus the fact that a racial caste system is only nascent and not already entrenched in the North, makes a third fact even more significant for the American future than it would be if the Negro problem were wholly confined to the South. The third fact is a paradox: The Negro problem is not the problem of the Negro at all. It is the problem of the white man's attitudes toward Negroes, the problem of racism as a trait of the American culture. Institutionally, in the South this has developed into caste. Psychologically, everywhere it is "race prejudice." Culturally, from coast to coast it is racism. And ethically and socially, all over the country it is the tragic gap between the American racial facts and the American Creed. Unbuttressed by a complete caste culture as in the South, this fact that the American race problem is a problem of white attitudes rather than Negro characteristics as such offers the hope that as the white man understands himself better he may gradually acquire more capacity to reduce his own conflicts and inconsistencies.

As it is, these racial conflicts and inconsistencies in the white man's own psychology and culture ramify into every aspect of our national life. There is a "Negro" aspect, i.e., a white supersensitiveness to the Negro, in every American social problem: housing, unemployment, labor organization, crime, disease control, education, political corruption. The census counts one in every eleven Americans as a Negro. If we may posit that there are moral inevitabilities in modern human civilized association as inescapable as many of the inevitabilities in physical nature, then it is obvious that until the other ten of us admit that one Negro to the equal enjoyment of our own ideals in action, as those ideals themselves demand, we shall continue to be bedeviled by our own divided consciences and by the tragic social consequences of our own inconsistencies. Deny or ignore this as we may, man cannot forever escape the backlash of his own irrationalities. Man himself demands a moral order. He cannot in the long run wholly escape the consequences of disorder. And the fact that he himself creates the disorder cannot save him. Actually, it offers him his one hope of salvation. For if the white man himself has put the Negro where he is, till he rides the white conscience like some Old Man of the Sea, only the white man himself stands in the way of getting the Negro off his back:

He has only to repudiate his own repudiation of the highest ideals of his own race. He has only to act out consistently his own social vision before it is too late.

But to point this out is not to "solve" the Negro problem. It is not even to indicate a practicable way of solving it. For men do not change deep-seated attitudes and sentiments at the mere showing that such attitudes and sentiments are irrational and socially harmful. And they cannot change the customs and institutions that embody such attitudes and sentiments without long-continued individual and social conflicts—tremendous struggles of individuals with their own consciences and social reformers with conservatives. As we have noted in Book I, every culture and every society has an inertia of its own, a resistance to change that is as inevitable as it is natural. Any given cultural complex such as a caste system is not only a way of life for individuals and supported therefore by habits, sentiments, and values but an integral part of an entire social system, which bulwarks it with customs, institutions, rights, and laws external to the individual and functionally interdependent one with another. You can destroy an institution like slavery by superior military power, as the North did with its military victory in the 1860's, but if you permit the society itself to survive, you cannot by any means now known to man prevent the psychological and social consequences of such an institution, and the consequences of its abolition, from projecting themselves through time. You cannot stop the historical processes of human life, so long as there are people to carry them on.

You cannot even bend them infallibly to your will. The North tried that in Reconstruction—with results that every decent American prefers to forget. The United States tried it after World War II in Germany and Japan—again with no notable success. Cultures change, piecemeal and without predetermined direction in ordinary times and radically and erratically during revolutions, but we simply have no scientific way, no scientific technologies, for changing a great cultural complex like the southern caste system or the trait of racism in a predetermined direction, deliberately and to order. The caste system is changing necessarily in a changing society. It will continue to change under the impacts of industrialization, modern communication, education, and the uncontrollable forces of local, national, and world events. It cannot possibly stand still. But all this will inevitably be gradual, piecemeal—the slow working

out of thrust and counterthrust; pressure, conflict; advance and retreat.

In the South as in the North men will not change their minds overnight or change their basic customs and institutions by next sundown. The great upthrust of caste and race prejudice is far too rocklike for that. The race problem, the white man's confusions and inconsistencies, can be counted, then, as one of the permanent features of the American social landscape. Like the Rocky Mountains, which will some day be flatter than the Ozarks today, this particular protrusion may be undergoing considerable erosion at the moment, but there seems to be enough granite in it to insure its prominence for quite a while. Nobody is going to make much impression with a few squirts of moral indignation or legislative hosing. Changes in the social climate will probably break it down faster than anything else.

II-8:2. The Foundations of Racial Stratification

The racial stratification system as it exists in this country is the highly complex outcome of centuries of historical development and the interplay of innumerable social forces. In Book I, Chapter 8, we sketched some of these developments and forces. We described the emergence of the racial concept in Western culture as a result of the Great Voyages and the conquest of the bow-and-arrow peoples by gunpowder. We noted how the emerging science of biology was turned to the advantage of the privileged classes by Count de Gobineau's invention of racism a century ago, an idea that neatly initiated the economically underprivileged social classes of western Europe into the blood aristocracy of a "superior" race and provided a "scientific" rationalization for white exploitation of colored races everywhere. We cited some of the grotesque exaggerations of this idea that issued from the minds of Richard Wagner, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, American racists, and eventually Adolf Hitler. We pointed out some of the anthropological, genetic, and sociological evidence which utterly discredits racism. Meanwhile, we also traced the history of the Negro in America from indentured servitude in the seventeenth century to slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth and social subordination in the twentieth. We presented a few of the salient facts about the resulting inequalities as between whites and Negroes today: the vital, educational and economic handicaps under which 15,000,000 Negroes live. All these things have helped to build,

and now condition, the great complex which is racial stratification in America today.

The net result of all this is white dominance and privilege, Negro subordination and disadvantage.

The Communists seem to be right in their contention that one of the basic foundations of the present racial stratification system in the United States is the white man's vested interest in dominance and privilege. Deny this as we may, rationalize it as we can, there it is. The white man does dominate and the white man does have a privileged status as against the Negro. Whether he claims these perquisites of whiteness by historical right, superior might, biological excellence, or anything else, he has them and they are tremendous factors in the determination of millions of whites never to share them or give them up. For the upper classes, North and South, they mean added wealth and power. For the millions of wage earners and poor whites, they constitute one of the few claims to personal dignity that they have in the world. No matter how poverty-stricken or degraded they themselves may be, there are always millions of other men, men easily identifiable by their black skins, who are more poverty-stricken or more degraded than they. For the upper caste, racial stratification, thus, pays the strong and flatters the weak. What it does to the members of the lower caste we have already seen. In effect, it puts the impervious flint of self-interest into the great range of racial stratification and makes it capable of withstanding the eroding forces of years. Had Eli Whitney's cotton gin not turned slavery from a losing into a profitable institution at the end of the eighteenth century, American race relations would have followed a very different course. Now industrialization, hostile as it is to the rural stability in which caste flourishes, still opens profits and advantages to the white employer and the white worker as against the socially disinherited Negro. So economics of itself will not eliminate caste. But economic forces today are not alone.

II-8:3. The Forces of Erosion

At least six kinds of economic and social forces are at work to wear down caste in America. Against them, of course, stand all the forces of tradition, narrow white self-interest, social inertia, and embattled conservatism.

The forces of erosion include: (1) the white man's own con-

science and the intellectual, social, and political pressures aimed at narrowing the gap between the American racial realities and the American Creed; (2) enlightened southern leaders who see the caste system as hampering the economic and intellectual development of the South, a blight on the progress of the section; (3) far-sighted southern industrialists who need Negro labor and can get enough of it only by encouraging migration from the one-mule farms and big plantations—this plus the increasing mechanization of the plantations themselves, which is forcing hundreds of thousands of field hands off the land; (4) the steady impacts of modern science on educated Southerners who can no longer regard racism as intellectually respectable; (5) the hostility of the Negroes themselves to the caste system and the increasing effectiveness of their protests as they acquire the vote, develop an indigenous middle class, and “vote” even more effectively against it with their legs by migrating north; and (6), last and possibly least, the pressure of world events and the growing realization among white leaders that intransigent racism may be a fatal handicap on the United States in its world struggle for the minds of men. A word on each of these six forces.

1. THE GAP BETWEEN THE RACIAL REALITIES AND THE AMERICAN CREED: THE WHITE MAN'S UNEASY CONSCIENCE

We have already discussed this in Book I, Chapter 8, and need not elaborate on it further except to suggest that uneasy consciences differ widely in their distribution, uneasiness, and social influence. They differ most of all, perhaps, in their sensitiveness to racial injustice. Most white men both North and South find it much more comfortable to think as little as possible about race relations until some unusual incident attracts their attention. Then, if the thing can possibly be rationalized under their code for such occasions, they forget again. If it can't be so rationalized or explained away, their uneasiness finds expression: They protest, intervene, or take sides against the offending white man, not necessarily in the name of justice to the Negro but rather to uphold their conception of *noblesse oblige*, the white man's own code. Few white men except those directly and professionally concerned with problems of this kind—clergymen, social workers, social scientists, literary men, and the like—are really very conscious of the moral issue in race relations except in unusual circumstances. Hence, while most whites in a pinch will admit that the Negro gets the worst of it most of the

time, and that this isn't quite what American ideals of fair play would sanction, most probably feel that they can't do much about it anyway under normal conditions, so why bother? The white man's uneasy conscience is uneasy mainly among the socially sensitive and among those who happen to encounter some unusually flagrant violation of the white man's own conception of racial justice. As for the rest, it seems to sleep rather soundly.

2. THE ROLE OF ENLIGHTENED SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP

At mid-century not only were the South and the Southwest the two areas in the United States that were offering young men probably the best economic opportunities in the Union, but the South itself was beginning to stir with *white* discontent at the economic as well as intellectual handicaps imposed upon it by the caste system. More and more white leaders in such progressive states as North Carolina and Texas were pointing out that white self-interest, if nothing else, demanded the easing of the old rigidities of the caste system: more education for Negroes, more economic opportunities, more justice in civic relationships.⁴

The admission of Negroes to white colleges in the South after World War II, following a Supreme Court decision outlawing their exclusion, caused hardly a ripple on the campuses. The younger generation of educated Southerners seems far more tolerant and relaxed about the whole question of race relations than do their elders. Since depression days instances have been multiplying of joint racial conferences, coöperation in civic activities, and so on. Young Southerners in northern colleges often surprise their instructors by showing more open-mindedness in discussions of race and race relations than do their northern classmates.

More and more southern leaders seem to be realizing that the preoccupation of the South with race relations for 200 years has acted as a brake on both economic and intellectual development. Economically, it is becoming apparent that, as the late Julius Rosenwald, northern philanthropist, once remarked, "You can't keep a man in a ditch without staying there with him." Cheap Negro labor, while an advantage to some employers, has curtailed mass buying power and hampered economic progress for others. Intellectually, the South

⁴ Despite Mississippi's proposal to abolish public schools to avoid the thrust of the Supreme Court's decision (1954) declaring unconstitutional all racial segregation in public schools, most Southern leaders accepted the decision as pointing the way toward something that seemed inevitable sometime: namely, decreasing discrimination against Negroes. They differed mainly in their ideas of how and how fast.

has not only denied itself the benefits of exceptional Negroes like George Washington Carver, the Negro scientist, but shackled its own creative minds to one view of life, one mental ball and chain, the inescapable question, "Would you want your daughter to marry a Negro?" If many northern communities cannot escape the racial aspect of most local problems, medical, political, and social, no southern community whatever can possibly escape the caste impact on every social relationship, from breast feeding of babies to disposal of the dead. Whatever proposal comes up, the inevitable first question *must* be, "What will this mean for race relations?" Good and bad, desirable and undesirable have thus had to mean good or bad, desirable or undesirable *for the caste system*. Novels, plays, movies, books of social criticism have had to stand or fall not on their merits as works of art or contributions to social reporting but solely on the question of whether they tended to strengthen the caste system or weaken it. And not infrequently such books as *Strange Fruit* and *Native Son* have been banned altogether. Textbook writers in history, sociology, and social problems have sometimes faced pressure for denaturing their products to suit the climate of southern opinion. Preoccupation with race relations, in short, has forced Southerners to look at their social world from a sectionally slanted point of view and has tended to shut out other points of view. All of which has not been conducive to what is called intellectual freedom.

Considering the nature of caste and the terrific emotional involvement of masses of Southerners in its implications, this is understandable, and the thing to be explained is not why caste has acted as a set of mental blinders on most Southerners but rather why so many, especially of the younger generation, have been discarding those blinders and looking at their world anew.

3. SOUTHERN INDUSTRIALISTS

The movement of textile and other northern industries to the cheaper and less unionized labor market of the South, plus the development of southern industrial resources themselves, has inescapably broadened economic opportunity for Negroes in southern cities. Although the better jobs go to the whites, Negroes share to some extent in the new industrial expansion, which is profiting from the flow of field hands and little tenant farmers who are being driven off the land by the increasing mechanization of southern agriculture. And since most white unions still draw the color line, Negro workers constitute a reservoir of potential strikebreakers which

white employers are not averse to tapping when the time comes. Industrialization, therefore, encourages Negro migration from the land, helps to break down rural stagnation, and even favors Negroes on occasion against striking white workers.

4. IMPACTS OF SCIENCE ON EDUCATED SOUTHERNERS

Every social system stands not only on the customs, practices, and institutional organizations which constitute its behavioral reality but also on the beliefs, attitudes, and rationalizations which justify it in the minds of its participants. In this respect, the southern caste system is no different from any other social system. People must believe in it to make it work.

But the entire thrust of all the social sciences today and particularly the thrust of anthropology, genetics, and sociology is directly contrary to the beliefs required to rationalize caste. Anthropology teaches that it is individuals, not races, that show significant differences. Genetics tells us that it cannot verify skin-color and head-type "races," only blood-type races, and that blood-type races do not correspond at all to skin-color, head-type classifications. Sociology finds the allocation of social functions in terms of highly selected superficial biological characteristics (traditional "race") is an inefficient way in which to organize an urbanized, industrial society. Competition, it says, has been demonstrated to be a more efficient method of social selection. Even the psychologists, who at one time in the first flush of mental testing supported the dogmas of innate racial differences, now tend to emphasize individual differences and recognize that individuals cannot validly be compared unless all those tested (a) have been exposed to equal cultural *opportunities to learn* the materials covered by the tests; and (b) have had equal *incentives* for such learning. It is the nature of caste to prevent opportunities and incentives for learning from ever being equal for the great majority of the members of the two races in the South. Valid psychological comparisons of Negro and white learning capabilities are, therefore, impossible under racial caste conditions.⁵

In effect, modern anthropology, genetics, sociology, and psychology

⁵ On the old Army tests northern Negroes made test scores as high as those made by average whites from the more backward southern states. Subsequent researches indicated that this result could not be explained on the hypothesis that the more intelligent Negroes migrated North. Theoretically, the more intelligent Negroes should make better adjustments to southern handicaps than the less intelligent ones, and actually the evidence showed that the longer Negro children were exposed to northern educational and social opportunities the higher tended to be their test scores.

all combine to undermine the rationalizations which in the past have supported racial caste. The educated white Southerner finds it harder and harder to defend the caste system in any rational terms. He can defend it, and does, in terms of practical necessity, white privilege, and so on, but intellectually it makes less and less sense. He *knows* there is an increasing number of Negroes as there are plenty of whites who no longer fit the stereotypes and the social myth. Whether he admits it or not, *the educated Southerner is being forced to realize that intellectually the caste system is obsolete.*

5. NEGRO HOSTILITY AND PROTEST

Despite a few comparatively isolated attempts at slave uprisings during the two centuries preceding emancipation, the great mass of southern Negroes not only never rose in revolt—as all the Pueblo Indians did against the Spaniards in 1580, for example—but demonstrated a loyalty to their masters and a submissiveness to slavery that is probably unmatched in history. The crowning proof of this came in the 1860's. Then, with the South drained of its white man power to defend its peculiar institution, the victims of that particular institution never raised a hand to destroy it from within. Nor did any sizable proportion of them seize the opportunity to join in destroying it from without. Only a small fraction of those who might have tried to join the Union armies ever actually did so. Overwhelmingly, for whatever reasons, the mass of southern Negro slaves accepted slavery to the end.

Against this history of submissiveness, Negroes during the last two generations have been writing a growing record of protest. The southern white man's claim that the southern Negro is content with his lot—"if outside agitators would just let him alone"—ignores the power of white repression and Negro ignorance. The millions of southern Negroes who have migrated to the North are living proof that, given knowledge of something better and a chance to reach it, the southern Negro is anything but content with his lot. How many are discontented and how deep-seated is their discontent, nobody knows. On both counts the reality is probably more formidable than most Southerners admit, but it may easily be less than many Northerners like to think. In the nature of the case, the more education the Negroes get and the more they hear about opportunities in the North, exaggerated though such rumors may be, the more widespread becomes the discontent and the more profound.

Southern Negroes, like Negroes in the North, are sharing increasingly in the social, intellectual, and moral currents of the time. The South, in the face of its own need for literate workers and better Negro citizens and in the face of outside pressures such as liberal Supreme Court decisions in racial cases and the impact of world events, cannot turn the clock back to Negro isolation and social impotence. Some white postmasters in rural villages may still throw Negro newspapers into the wastebasket, but some go through. And there are always white newspapers, the radio, and letters from friends and relatives who have gone North. Negroes have served and are serving in the armed forces, and at mid-century segregation in the services was on the way out. Even the most ignorant southern field hand could not help hearing something of the world outside, could not help finding out that the caste system was not universal, that something else was possible. More and more Negroes even in the South were coming to feel that the "Uncle Tom solution"—acceptance of second-class citizenship—was unacceptable. More and more even in the South were demanding more of an even break with the white man.

Despite their second-class status, however, and the slow pace of reform, few Negroes apart from a smattering of frustrated intellectuals had actually lost faith in the American social system. The great majority still pinned their hopes on the American Creed and turned a deaf ear to the preachers of radicalism. At mid-century Communism had made no appreciable headway among American Negroes.⁶

6. THE PRESSURE OF WORLD EVENTS

It is impossible to measure the extent to which the revolt of the colored races of the world against European colonialism and the terrific racial conflict in South Africa have affected the attitudes and practices of white Southerners. Nor can one measure the impact on southern whites of the world-wide threat of Communist capture of the colored races. The more intelligent southern leaders, however, cannot wholly ignore the significance of these developments. In a life-and-death struggle for survival against the deadly menace of the hydrogen-armed Soviet Union, the United States can ill afford to

⁶ Partly because the comrades had outdone themselves in stupidity in this case. One Communist proposal, for example, envisaged the creation of a Negro state. American Negroes immediately interpreted this as an invitation to segregation, king-size. They would have none of it.

let the dark-skinned masses of the world line up against it. Yet Soviet propagandists had no more effective talking point for the masses in Asia and Africa than America's own treatment of her racial minorities. Lynching and the caste system were worth even more to Moscow than its stock pile of atomic bombs.

The white man's own conscience, his increasing realization of how caste hampers southern social and intellectual progress, the pressures of growing industrialization, the impacts of modern science, Negro hostility to the system, and the ominous trend of world events challenging old traditions of white supremacy—all these at mid-century were slowly softening and wearing away the racial caste system in America. But change was coming neither swiftly nor without conflict.

II-8:4. A Basis for Compromise

It was Myrdal who pointed out the real basis for hoping that the gap between the actualities of race relations in America and the ideals of the American Creed might be narrowed quietly and rationally in the future. That basis consisted in the fact that the two races did not assign the same order of priority to the basic values involved in their relationships.

The white man placed absolute No. 1 priority on what he called biological separateness of races. Verbally at least, he also tended to place exclusive white civic and economic privileges farther down the scale. The Negroes, on the other hand, put economic opportunity and civic security at the top, intermarriage at the bottom. The two races, in other words, did not want the same things with anywhere near the same intensity of feeling. On top priority values neither could compromise; on low priority values each could. Neither race was actually threatening the other's basic values. Hence the possibility of workable compromise.

Admittedly the difficulties of workable compromise would be great and a long period of trial-and-error advance could be expected. But given reasonableness and good will on both sides—and deliverance from demagogues—the economic and individual discriminations of caste could be reduced. Tragic and unsolvable as race relations had seemed in the past, there was in this inverse order of racial value priorities a foundation of hope for the future.

II-8:5. Levels of White Resistance

As we have seen in Book I, Chapter 8, caste situations have three major characteristics: (1) upper-caste sentiment against intermarriage; (2) categorical evaluation of lower-caste individuals, i.e., evaluation of lower-caste individuals in terms of their caste status, not individual merit—hence, refusal to compete; and (3) allocation of economic functions in terms of biological characteristics, not actual competence.

As things have been going in the South, apparently a dominant racial caste under the pressures of erosion discussed above gives ground first on the economic level, then on the direct competitive level, and only last, if ever, on the level of intermarriage, the ultimate citadel of caste, the family. For two generations economic opportunities for Negroes have been expanding slowly, partly through escape to the North and partly through the impacts of the increasing industrialization of the South itself. A Negro middle class has begun to develop both North and South. Negroes have gradually won the right to own property, to go into business for themselves, to enter the professions, to escape the low-caste drudgery of the fields. The developing middle class, in turn, has helped to raise the civic status of the Negro. In Atlanta in 1953, for example, a Negro educator was elected by white votes to the Atlanta Board of Education. Two generations ago there would have been no Negro educator to elect, or if there had been a lone exception, like Booker T. Washington, he would have had no civic status in the eyes of the ordinary white voter. The Atlanta election demonstrated a fact that was already apparent in many other southern communities: on the economic and civic front the caste system was getting porous.

Even on the individual competitive front the system was beginning to crack. Ever since slavery, of course, Negroes had been competing with white men for unskilled jobs, but after World War II competition began to threaten in personal contests of skill. Interracial athletic competition had appeared first, of course, in the North, but by mid-century there were increasing signs of declining southern resistance to the idea. Not all southern teams walked off the field now when faced with a Negro in the opposing line-up. The first break had come in boxing in 1901 when Joe Gans won the lightweight title and Joe Walcott the welterweight. Then in 1908 Jack Johnson defeated Tommy Burns for the heavyweight title and the

South, despite its own refusal to sanction Negro-white matches below the Mason-Dixon line for another generation, had to get used to the spectacle of Negroes fighting their way to the top in all weight classes in the ring. Joe Louis, Ezzard Charles, Jersey Joe Walcott, and Sugar Ray Robinson were among those who demonstrated their superiority over white rivals.

The long-standing cultural taboo against Negroes in baseball broke in 1947 when the Brooklyn National League team put Jackie Robinson in a white man's place at second base. Other teams followed suit and in 1953 the Little Rock team in a minor southern league actually signed a Negro pitcher. The attempt nearly disrupted the league and had to be abandoned, but the significant thing is that it should even have been tried at all. Ten years before no southern baseball manager could have considered the idea.

Changes are coming spottily and unevenly. The Negro is still a long way from economic or competitive equality. A Negro contractor in a Texas city, for example, may get odd jobs from white customers in competition with white contractors, but he usually has to wait for his supplies until his white competitors have obtained theirs. The significant thing is not that he is still the victim of some discrimination but that he can escape at all from the white taboo on Negro enterprise. Two generations ago that would not have been possible.

On the economic and competitive levels, then, the southern caste system seems to be weakening. On the level of social exclusiveness, the level of caste protection at the source, the family, the system shows no signs of weakening at all. Intermarriage is as firmly under white taboo as it was in slavery days. It is a prison offense in all southern states and unlawful in many others.

It is an interesting side light on the psychology of caste that white men rationalize their opposition to intermarriage in terms of "racial purity," i.e., the protection of the white race against dilution with Negro blood. But historically they have actually diluted the blood of both races in millions of sexual unions outside of marriage. Actually white men have been much less concerned with racial purity than with racial caste and the protection of caste at its source, the family. Intermarriage is the ultimate symbol of social equality and social acceptance. It is the utter negation of caste, the repudiation of social distinctions based on birth. Hence, if such distinctions are to be maintained at all, intermarriage cannot possibly be permitted. At the heart of every caste system in the world, therefore, is the taboo

on intermarriage, the ban on publicly admitting a member of the inferior caste to social equality and social acceptance. If racial stratification is to be maintained, everything else can go but not that. Negroes can own land, enter the professions, achieve distinction in competition with whites, even bear children fathered by white men, but so long as the two races cannot intermarry, racial stratification must continue, the whites asserting social superiority over the blacks.

As we have seen, this is the most basic of the white values, the absolute bedrock of white determination. Four centuries of white dominance over colored races have gone into its making. Three generations of slow erosion since slavery have not changed it and there are no signs that it will change in the foreseeable future. North and South, the white man stands firm on his refusal to accept the Negro as his social equal, rationalizing his refusal with a hypocritical pretense that in refusing intermarriage he is motivated by the desire to protect the purity of white blood. Actually he is motivated by the desire to protect white social status and white privilege. To protect status and privilege he outlaws intermarriage in the South, ostracizes interracial sex association by sentiment and custom everywhere, and by law and custom denies his own status to his own children when their mother happens to be black. But six to ten million mixed-blood Negroes in the United States are evidence enough that purity of blood has been far less important in the white man's eyes than his own caste status.

Purity of white blood has never been menaced by intermarriage. The millions of mixed-blood Negroes in the United States, 40 to 80 percent of the 15,000,000 Negroes so identified by the census, originated mainly in sexual unions between white slave masters and Negro slave women during slavery when intermarriage was a crime punishable by death. There were a few intermarriages of white and black indentured servants in the seventeenth century before slavery had been institutionalized; a few intermarriages have taken place outside the South in those states in which such matings have been lawful; and some race crossing has taken place outside of marriage by the dregs of both races. But the great majority of American mixed bloods can trace their ancestry back to the black women raped, seduced, or kept as concubines by white masters during two centuries of chattel slavery. Solicitude for race purity had nothing to do with such unions or with the fact that their offspring could never become the legitimate heirs of their white fathers.

Wherever the concept of illegitimacy has achieved legal recognition it has served to free the male philanderer from the economic costs of his philanderings. The illegitimate child has no legal claim on his father's estate. In the nature of the case, the illegitimate children of white slave masters enjoyed the same disabilities in this respect as white illegitimates. They were frequently used as house servants and given other advantages over black field hands, but they were still slaves—although just as biologically related to their white fathers as were their white half-brothers and white half-sisters, all of whom had all the privileges of the white master status and none of the disabilities of the black slave.

If white men were really so solicitous for the purity of white blood, as they so often profess when retaliating for some black man's sexual aggressions, they would long since have developed the custom of protecting black women as efficiently as they protect white women. No such custom has developed, North or South, and it is only during the last generation that white opinion in the South has begun effectively to condemn white aggressors against Negro women. Inevitably, under any caste system the woman of the inferior caste is more accessible to the superior male than she would be without the differential in social status. The southern caste system, in other words, while outlawing intermarriage, has actually contributed to race crossing by leaving Negro women more at the mercy of white men than they would have been in an egalitarian system. From the point of view of race purity, therefore, the very system that makes intermarriage impossible makes race crossing more possible!

Yet even in states like New York that permit intermarriage the biological importance of it is almost negligible, and such impact as it has on the two races is many times more serious for the Negro than for the white. This is shown by the figures on intermarriage in New York State outside of New York City during the decade 1916-1925, as summarized in Table II-8.1.⁷

Out of more than one-third of a million marriages in upstate New York during this decade, only 200, or 5/100ths of 1 percent, were interracial marriages. Of these interracial marriages, the percentage of black brides marrying white was 27.7 *times* the percentage of white brides marrying black. In other words, *since the mother is always the limiting factor in racial reproduction*, 27 times as many potential Negro mothers deserted pure-blood reproduction as did potential

⁷ See also Milton L. Barron, "Research on Intermarriage: A Survey of Accomplishments and Prospects," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1951, pp. 249-255.

TABLE II-8.1. White and Negro Brides and Grooms Marrying During Decade of World War I in New York State Outside of New York City, with Number and Percentages of Intermarriages

Brides		Grooms		Percentage of Brides Involved in Inter-marriage
White		White	Black	
White	383,421	383,275	146	0.038
Black	5,181	54	5,127	1.053
Totals and average	388,602	383,329	5,273	0.051

Percentage of black brides as a multiple of percentage of white brides in interracial marriages27.7
From New York State Department of Health, *Marriage Statistics, 1916-25.*

white mothers. From the point of view of maintaining its racial purity, the Negro race was hit twenty-seven times as hard by these interracial marriages in New York State as was the white race.

The most recent data available in 1954 from a northern state on interracial marriages are those contained in a special tabulation by the Michigan Department of Health of 53,308 marriages in Michigan during 1953. These are shown in Table II-8.2.

TABLE II-8.2. All Marriages, Michigan, 1953, by Race of Bride and Groom

Race of Bride	Race of Groom						
	Total	White	Negro	Indian	Chinese	Japa-nese	Other non-white
TOTAL	53,308	48,748	4,479	39	19	17	6
White	48,769	48,698	49	10	3	6	3
Negro	4,450	18	4,428	4			
Indian	47	20	2	25			
Chinese	18	1			15	2	
Japanese	15	6			1	8	
Other non-white	7	3				1	3
Not stated	2	2					

Courtesy of Michigan Department of Health, Division of Disease Control, Records and Statistics, F. S. Leeder, M.D., Director, Doris L. Duxbury, Chief Statistical Methods Section.

Analyzing this table in the same form as our analysis of the data from New York, we have Table II-8.3.

TABLE II-8.3 White and Negro Brides and Grooms Marrying During 1953 in Michigan, with Number and Percentages of Intermarriages

Brides		Grooms		Percentage of Brides Involved in Intermarriage
White	48,769	White	Black	
Black	4,450	48,698	49	0.010
		18	4,428	0.040
Totals and average	53,219	48,716	4,477	0.012

In Michigan during 1953 there was even less intermarriage of Negroes and whites—only 1/100ths of 1 percent—than in upstate New York, 1916–1925, where the rate had reached 5/100ths of 1 percent. But the disproportion of Negro brides as compared with white brides involved was somewhat less—only four times as many in Michigan as against twenty-seven times as many in New York State. But the same two conclusions emerge from the two cases: (1) Negro-white intermarriage where it is permitted in northern states constitutes an infinitesimal proportion of all marriages; and (2) when it does occur it withdraws relatively more Negro brides from pure racial reproduction than it does white brides. If either race “suffers,” the Negro race “suffers” more than the white.

This is a rough index of what has been happening through the three centuries of Negro history in America: *Race crossing through all sorts of relationships from intermarriage to concubinage has reduced pure-blooded Negroes to a minority of their own race; but since only a very small number of white women have ever been involved in race crossing of any kind, the Negro infiltration of the white reproduction potential has been infinitesimal.* It is the Negroes who have been “washing white,” not the whites who have been going black. If racial purity is a biological problem for either race, it is obviously a problem for the Negroes, not the whites. And it is a red herring if there ever was one in the matter of intermarriage in the South. The whites have outlawed intermarriage not to protect white racial purity—even where it isn’t outlawed, as in New York State, intermarriage menaces Negro racial purity, not white. They have outlawed it to protect the caste status of the white family.

It is the caste status of the white family that the white man is determined to protect, and it is fear that concessions on other levels such as abolition of segregation, for example, may lead to an increase

in interracial association of the sexes and hence increase possibilities of intermarriage that motivates much of the bitter opposition of southern conservatives to any weakening of caste taboos.

Yet at mid-century the more superficial taboos *were* weakening. The rising curve of Negro achievement in many fields was adding to the forces of erosion already noted. Ralph Bunche in diplomacy; Dr. Laurence Foster, Dr. E. Franklin Frazier, and others in science; Roland Hayes and Marian Anderson in music; Richard Wright in literature; scores of Negro athletes—in dozens of different fields Negroes were pushing to the front. In the South under the impacts of industrialization, of liberal young leaders, and of United States Supreme Court decisions outlawing interstate Jim Crow, educational inequalities, and the like, political and civic discriminations seemed to be decreasing. Hundreds of thousands of Negroes were voting in southern elections by 1954.

In the big northern cities such as New York, Chicago, and Detroit Negroes sometimes held the balance of power as between Democrats and Republicans in local elections, and both parties angled for their votes in national contests. But even there the great majority of them lived exposed to slum overcrowding, discrimination in employment, and limited participation in the amenities of white civilization.

In both North and South, however, many deliberate efforts were under way on the part of the more liberal and far-sighted whites to reduce inequalities and improve race relations. A number of states led by New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey had passed fair employment practices acts, and many cities including Cleveland, Detroit, and San Francisco had set up agencies of various kinds to aid in reducing racial tensions. In a few cities slum clearance programs were beginning to improve minority living conditions, and many southern leaders especially were striving to improve race relations. Lynchings, which had cost the lives of 155 Negroes in 1892 and 106 in 1900—a grim total of 3437 between 1882 and 1951—had finally dwindled to zero in 1952 and 1953. Despite the terrible inequality of conditions inherent in the caste system itself, disparities were slowly moderating on the economic and personal competitive levels and many southern leaders were making determined efforts to improve the average treatment of Negroes. One Texas city in 1953, for example, named as its outstanding citizen of 1952 a Negro physician.

Yet wherever underprivileged whites competed with Negroes for scarce jobs, tension continued, North as well as South.

On the whole, however, despite pockets of reaction and ups and downs as prosperity varied, more community leaders in more communities were more alert to race relations and were actually trying to do more about them in 1954 than had ever been true before. Except on the level of intermarriage itself the caste system was in retreat. The forces of erosion were slowly easing the most grievous inequalities of race relations.

Localism in a Global World

II-9:1. The Little Mind in a Large World

It happened one day a few years after World War II. On a level stretch of four-lane highway crossing a midwestern state, traffic was roaring along in an almost steady stream. Buses, trucks, autos with license plates from half a dozen states were streaking from horizon to horizon, the twentieth century on the move. Then suddenly, without warning, an old farmer driving a collector's item from depression days turned sharply left across three lanes of shrieking brakes and rolled triumphantly to a stop in a maple-shaded driveway. From one of the shining new models that had barely missed the ancient mariner in a screaming skid emerged a well-dressed gentleman with the light of battle in his eye.

"What in hell do you mean, turning left on this road without a signal?" demanded the indignant citizen.

The old farmer looked at him in mild astonishment.

"Why, son," he admonished, "*everybody* knows I live here!"

There you have it—neighborhood man intact in the midst of the twentieth century rocketing by! "*Everybody* knows I live here"—the little mind in a large world.

II-9:2. The Shrinking Planet and Man's Exploding Universe

Astronomers interpret the red bands in the spectra of distant stars as indicating that these giants are hurtling away from each other at millions of miles a second. The physical universe seems to be exploding into billions of light-years of distance.

Something analogous to this process seems to be happening to man's cozy little social world. Within a century it has suddenly ex-

ploded from the neighborhood to the international power field; from dependable face-to-face realities to light-years of psychological distance; from "Everybody knows I live here" to nobody knows who lives where—or cares.

A generation ago a communications survey of a county in southern Michigan turned up a middle-aged housewife on a farm not forty miles from the motor city of Detroit who had never been farther away from home than three visits to a little town eight miles distant. An anachronism in the motor age. But ten years later it was still possible to find a lanky mountaineer on a back road in Tennessee, owner of a little valley sawmill, who could give no road directions beyond the next intersection.

"Stranger," the old man explained as though referring to some natural phenomenon like the mountains, "I ain't never been more'n ten miles away along this gully in my born days."

There spoke the voice of the Middle Ages, the voice of Man-bound-to-the-soil since the agricultural revolution of 10,000 B.C. For the average man, motility, the ability to move about, and mobility, the ability to change one's residence, are very recent cultural freedoms. This side of barbarism most men have never had them. For thousands of years the settled peoples have been tied to their local neighborhoods. Egyptian fellahin, Chinese villagers, medieval peasants—the great majority of the settled masses of mankind in all ages have lived and died within a few miles of their birthplaces. Even the great masses of the Roman Empire, despite its 48,000 miles of slave-built military roads and its fleets of galleys plowing the Mediterranean, must have been shackled to their own neighborhoods. Soldiers, sailors, merchants, proconsuls, and men of wealth did move about; slaves and the vast majority of the free workers of town and country must have moved very little.

Of course, in all ages there have been restless ones—pilgrims, Crusaders, explorers, European colonists, the mountain men of the American fur trade, the American pioneers, the forty-niners, the trail-breakers of the world—but in every age they have constituted only a small minority of the settled peoples. From the New Stone Age until just yesterday most men have had to live out their lives within the narrow confines of vicinage, the localities of their birth.

These localities marked not only the limits of their physical movements but the limits of their social worlds as well, the limits of their minds. Men cannot adjust to what they cannot experience. When

travel was slow and difficult and communication moved only as men did—as in medieval Europe and in America down to mid-nineteenth century—the world beyond the horizon existed for most men only vaguely in the tales of wandering woodsmen, journeymen, occasional travelers, and in the gossip filtering down from the messengers and servants of the rich and well born. The ordinary farmer and villager in early America lived perforce in a social world as narrow as his own locality, a social world dominated by the wrathful God of the Old Testament, an invisible Devil, and a few highly visible neighbors of quite human frailties. For well over 200 years after the founding of Jamestown and the landing of the Pilgrims one's home locality signified for most Americans (1) protection against Indians and (2) isolation from a horrendous Something beyond the horizon known as Government. In short, until well into the nineteenth century the average American's social world was small, local, highly personal, and usually weeks, if not months, behind the events of the outside world.

News like goods and men traveled slowly. The Declaration of Independence was not published in Boston until late in July, 1776, and a generation later it still took an official courier twenty days to get from the District of Columbia to General Jackson at New Orleans. Even high government officials had to spend weeks going places which today can be reached in hours or minutes. In 1820, for example, when Lewis Cass, governor of Michigan Territory, set out from Detroit to meet a delegation of Indian chiefs at Fort Dearborn at the foot of Lake Michigan, it took him weeks to make the trip. To avoid the difficulties of the land trail across Michigan, he traveled by canoe down the Detroit River to the Maumee (Toledo), then by way of the Wabash, the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Illinois, and the Des Plaines—over 1200 miles to cover an air-line distance of 247. Not till 1825 did the government widen the old Fox-Sauk trail so that stagecoaches could begin running two or three times a week from Detroit to the foot of Lake Michigan in the incredible time of eight or ten days. In 1852 the completion of the Michigan Central cut this to less than a day, and a century later the New York Central's streamliners were doing it in five hours and a half. Overhead, of course, the air liners were flying it in forty-five minutes, and Air Force jets from Selfridge Field could make it in twenty!¹

¹ In 1953 a supersonic jet dropped from a big bomber six miles up flew 1650 miles an hour in level test flight over a dry lake bed in Nevada. At this rate, given sufficient fuel, the pilot could have streaked from Detroit to Chicago in about nine minutes—less time than it took Governor Cass to walk from his house to his canoe!

Even before the railroad, the telegraph had linked Chicago to the East. And in 1866 the second Atlantic cable (the first having failed) permanently closed the Atlantic gap in world communication. By mid-twentieth century news of the Korean invasion could reach Washington within the hour and any American diplomatic courier could land on the other side of the world, 12,000 miles away, in less time than it had taken Governor Cass to reach the mouth of the Maumee, sixty miles off. In fact, in 1954 no place in the world was as far away in time from any United States airfield as Philadelphia had been from New York on that April day in 1789 when George Washington took the oath as first President of the new republic. Any United States President now could talk to the American ambassador in any European capital in less time than it had taken President Washington to walk out of Federal Hall, New York, after his inaugural address. By such incredible ratios had science and technology shrunk the globe in a century and a half!

But in shrinking the globe to the range of a jet bomber between meals science and technology had exploded the average man's social world from a cozy little in-group neighborhood that he could see across from his front door to a huge, global immensity that he could not see at all, a monstrosity that now seemed about as cozy as an oncoming tornado. Physically, in news- and travel-time, the *world* had come down to the dimensions of the old-fashioned neighborhood. But psychologically and socially the old-fashioned neighborhood itself had vanished. In its place neighborhood man now looked out into a menacing void in which he could see only the red bands on the international spectrum signaling a disintegrating social universe. Like Matthew Arnold's nostalgic generation, neighborhood man now felt himself wandering in some strange, collective nightmare

as on a darkling plain
Swept by confused alarms of struggle and flight
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

II-9:3. The Values of Littleness and Vicinage

What has neighborhood man lost in the process of becoming willy-nilly a citizen of a world he never made? Mainly, the simplicities, certitudes, and securities of the face-to-face in-group. These were never so simple, so certain, or so secure as they seemed. Freudians and post-Freudians have revealed the complexities of personality

adjustment in face-to-face relationships. *The Scarlet Letter*, *Ethan Frome*, Calhoun's *History of the American Family*, and innumerable clinical case histories have documented these complexities. The simple neighborhood was never so simple as it seemed. But its repressions and anxieties were different in kind from those that afflict the average urban dweller. If there was competition for status in the old neighborhood, it was more personal, more direct, less institutionalized, less keen, and therefore, apparently, more manageable than the struggle in which men find themselves enmeshed today. Sex taboos were more rigid and the penalties for transgression—especially for women—more severe, but religion gave a better rationalization then and the sinner could deceive himself more hopefully before the days of Freud. Certainly, there was less public anxiety about the economy and the possibilities of war.

The certitudes of early America have also turned out to be less certain than they once seemed. No one religion can claim a monopoly on its own interpretation of the Bible with such complete disregard of other interpretations as was once the case, and there are more converts today to such doctrines as pragmatism and relativism than was true before the turn of the century. More people are groping today for a rational philosophy of life than was true when practically everybody accepted traditional beliefs without question. This means that the decay of the old neighborhood has brought with it exposure to competing values, doubts, anxieties.

Despite the fact that average life expectancy has been going up for several generations as modern medicine has won its victories over typhoid, diphtheria, pneumonia, and other infectious diseases, physical insecurity has been replaced by social and psychic insecurities vastly more devastating to individual morale. As urban industry and commerce have replaced the farm as a source of livelihood, millions of wage workers have been forced to cope with the uncertainties of an economy of boom-and-bust. The decline of dogmatic religion has left the individual increasingly exposed to doubt about the ultimate nature of life. The challenge of Soviet Russia for world dominance in an age of hydrogen bombs has spread a cloud of anxiety over every thoughtful mind. Not without justification did a well-known psychiatrist call anxiety the occupational disease of civilization. For his own happiness, for the future of his family, for the future of civilization, the average urban dweller has plenty to worry about, plenty that neighborhood man never even dreamed of. The "organizational

revolution”² that an economist speaks of has swept neighborhood man out of his old isolation, but it has also swept him out of backwaters in which he could drowse in peace and contentment. Whether he likes it or not, in joining up with the rest of mankind he has had to give up the mental and social stagnation of centuries, the values of littleness and vicinage. From “*Everybody knows I live here*” modern man still has to learn how to live in a world in which nobody knows who lives where and nobody cares.

II-9:4. The Organizational Revolution

Electro-communication and more efficient techniques of control have changed the scale of social organization. The organizational revolution is the revolution in the sheer size of social units from the days of the handicraft shop to those of the 70,000-man Ford plant at the Rouge; from the “little red schoolhouse” to the consolidated brick and glass jobs behind arrays of yellow buses; from the pioneer, horse-and-buggy township to the United Nations. It is the revolution that has transformed the upstanding, independent petty capitalist farmer and craftsman into numbers on a time card; the revolution that has turned the crusty civic critics of the New England town meeting into so many yes men; the revolution that has swept neighborhood man out to sea.

Basically, the scale of social organization has changed for two reasons: (1) because the technologies of transport and communication have made it possible to control more and more people from one center, and (2) because such expanded control has given increased power to accomplish given purposes. Just as modern science has increased man’s power to use natural forces to accomplish his purposes, so the technologically expanded scale of social organization has made it possible to mobilize more man-power behind a given purpose.

This means that in every field of human association from the independent farmstead to the independent nation-state littleness has lost the battle. The factory has swallowed up the craft shop; the corporation dominates the petty capitalist; megalopolis overshadows the local community; superstates—the Soviet Union and the United States—bestride the world. At his work, unless the Little Man allies himself with his fellows in a union, he is helpless before the boss.

² Kenneth Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution: A Study on the Ethics of Economic Organization*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953.

Unless the boss, his employer, acts in concert with other employers, he too gets pushed around, by unions and his government. And unless that government allies itself with other governments against the Soviet Union, the Western world faces political extinction. In every field outside the home, the art of mobilizing human power behind special purpose has reduced the "unorganized" independent individual to a nonentity. To achieve anything, even an ordinary living, the average man must either organize others—which few have the ability, capital, or know-how to do—or accept subordination to some organization in which he becomes a nobody: to some business enterprise; some institutional organization (school, church, hospital, government bureau, or what-have-you); or some trade association, union, or professional body that dominates his occupation. Farmers band together to advance their interests as farmers. Even intellectuals—college professors, authors, artists, actors—have their organizations. And that intellectual activity which of all others should be the freest, namely, scientific research, even that is "organized": university executives and foundation functionaries decide which projects shall be financed and which ones ignored!

As a result of all this expansion of social organization, in every field from courtship to the cemetery corporation, the individual faces one crucial question: How does he get along with other people? Hence, how to get along with others, how to fit into an organization, has become of more practical importance to the average man than any question of his initiative, originality, ability, or technical training. The *sine qua non* for holding a job, getting ahead in the world, or making any significant contribution to modern culture is one's ability to get along with others—and to get along with them, note well, not as a mere individual person but as a functionary in an organization.

Is it any wonder that David Riesman is able to point out that the American personality type has been changing from the tradition-dominated man to the inner-directed man and now to the other-directed type?³ Orienting oneself to others has become a basic success-skill in a world of individual-enveloping organizations.

II-9:5. The Devil's Due

What has the organizational revolution given us that we could never have had under the limitations of littleness and vicinage?

³ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.

Mainly, power, reach, impersonality, continuity, higher specialization, and a bleaker social world to live in.

We need not repeat what we have already said about bigger organization mobilizing more social power behind a given purpose. The fact is obvious on the face of it. General Motors is more of a power to be reckoned with economically, politically, and socially in the hundred or more communities in which its plants in America operate than was the village blacksmith in his crossroads smithy. For every single individual that the village blacksmith dealt with in a day—a dozen or two dozen, at the most—General Motors must deal with a hundred thousand.⁴ And the same is true in greater or less degree of every other great aggregation of capital operating in manufacture, transportation, commerce, or finance. The village smith counted his annual sales in terms of a few hundred dollars. The great modern behemoths count theirs in billions.

What is dramatically true in economics is no less true in other fields. In education, religion, health, recreation, government, national defense, great organizations now mobilize vastly more social power, vastly more man-hours, than any similar organizations could possibly have mustered in the days of the stagecoach and the flintlock musket.

Bigger organization means not only more social power; it means longer reach. Contrast the "spread" of American military power after the Revolution, when 84 men guarding the military stores at West Point constituted the Army, with the 3,500,000 men in three services scattered in 1953 in 63 countries from Korea to Morocco and Greenland. Great corporations like General Motors and Standard Oil spanned the world. In New York City stood the skyscraper headquarters of the world's greatest international organization, whose membership girdled the globe—the United Nations. From Moscow the tentacles of history's greatest conspiracy for espionage, sabotage, subversion, and conquest stretched into every nation in the world. At mid-twentieth century social organization knew no physical limits but the stars.

⁴ G.M. reported over 458,000 employees in the United States and abroad in 1952, plus over 487,000 stockholders, not to speak of the hundreds of thousands of suppliers, transport workers, bankers, credit men, garage men, and others involved in the day-to-day processes of manufacturing and distributing General Motors products from Augusta, Maine, to Melbourne, Australia. With net sales of over \$7,500,000,000, General Motors constituted an enormous power structure as well as a formidable economic factor in a dozen or more manufacturing fields—automobiles, Diesel engines, tanks, aircraft engines, refrigerators, etc. G.M., Ford, and Chrysler together have for years turned out about 90 percent of the automobiles regularly registered in the United States, and G.M. made 47 percent of them in 1953.

Inevitably this tremendous increase in size and reach had been bought at a price. The village smith knew his apprentice-helper by his first name as a person, knew his parents, may have known his grandparents. He knew his likes and dislikes, his peculiarities, the girls he was "sweet on," what the lad did with himself on Sundays, what chance he had of becoming a master workman on his own. Small organization means face-to-face, personal relationships, the kind men lived and worked in for ages down to the industrial revolution. Big organization means impersonality, association as special functionaries, exclusion of everything except the job to be done. Who cares what kind of person a taxi driver is so long as he gets his passengers safely to their destinations on time? What difference does it make to the boss or to the ultimate consumer that Steve Spitowski running that punch press over there has two kids in school, likes sauerkraut on Sundays, and no longer gets any letters from his father and mother in Poland? In the plant he's a number on the time-card rack. Even his foreman may not know where he lives or what his kids look like. The superintendent doesn't even know his name and the general manager never heard of him. For the board of directors he's a nameless, faceless zero in that conglomerate instrument of purpose known as "the hourly-rated employees." As a *person* he doesn't exist for any official in the plant, even his foreman, who sees him every workday. And none of the organization functionaries, even his foreman, is anything to Steve but a name and a possible threat to his job. Once men worked together as persons, individuals who knew each other and lived in the same social world. Now they work together only as functionaries, mere parts of personalities, each indifferent to everything except the role the other must play to get the job done.

Functionaries must make decisions not only on an impersonal basis but often regardless of their human consequences. The board of directors of a New England textile company, let us say, which ignored southern competition and mounting losses because of the hardships which removal of its plants from the North would bring upon its workers would be betraying the interests of its stockholders. Each director's function is to see to it that his company prospers, not to act as a wet nurse to its employees. Likewise, the military commander who would let the possible fate of his men deter him from ordering an attack necessary to halt an enemy advance would be endangering the whole army, not merely his own unit. The func-

tionary who lets human consequences rather than the success of his organization affect his decisions is a detriment to his outfit.⁵

Personalities can disrupt organizations and jeopardize success. The fate of the world would have been different had Kaiser Wilhelm II been more of a functionary and less of a personality. Grand Duke Alexander of Russia, brother-in-law of the last of the Romanovs, Nicholas II, insisted that the Kaiser was too much of a person to make a good emperor.

He was a great orator, a super-architect, a warrior extraordinary—and his speeches left Germany without a friend in the world. His artistic aspirations were responsible for the monstrosity of the Siegesallee, and his experiments in strategy, backed by those of his trusted friend von Kluck, immortalized Papa Joffre and saved Paris in the fall of 1914. . . .

His quarrel with King Edward (of England), his dismissal of Bismarck and his declaration of the submarine war—these are the three fatal mistakes of his reign and these are precisely the three things in his life that he enjoyed most. A ward politician would have known better.⁶

But big-scale social organization, despite the perils of greater power, reach, impersonality, and disregard of humane values, does have an advantage that no face-to-face, personality-dominated little organization can have: it escapes the time limitations of individual mortality. When the village blacksmith died his shop closed. When the president of General Motors dies some vice-president gets promoted: "The King is dead! Long live the King!"

The invention of the fictitious legal "person," the corporation, has lifted business enterprise above the limits of one man's savings and beyond the infirmities of ordinary mortality. A corporation may go bankrupt and forfeit its charter, but so long as it can keep the sheriff away from its door, it can live on indefinitely.

Another exclusive advantage of bigness as against littleness is the opportunity which bigness gives for the more complex division of labor and therefore more intensive specialization. The village blacksmith did everything: made horseshoes, shoed horses, made and fitted iron tires to wooden wagon wheels, worked the bellows of his forge, etc. He in his own person was the blacksmith shop: all blacksmithing specialties rolled into one. The modern blast furnace or steel mill, on

⁵ The human consequences are always a factor in the success of any organization, but that is a different problem.

⁶ "Are Royalty People? They Dare Not Be, Says Grand Duke Alexander of Russia," *Detroit Times*, October 30, 1932, Pt. 4, p. 3.

the other hand, combines hundreds of different specialties in the work of different men: the yard crews who deliver the ore or the ingots, the furnace crews, the soakers, the specialists in the rolling mill, and so on. And on beyond basic operations come hundreds of others which transform the raw steel into fabricated parts, sub-assemblies, completed products—autos, railway cars, steamships, what-have-you. Meanwhile at a hundred points between the mines and the consumer scientific techniques have intervened for testing, screening, measuring, inspecting to meet standards and eliminate flaws. Advancing technology has fostered big organization by making production processes more and more complicated, more and more dependent on expensive machinery, more and more precise; big organization in turn has advanced technology by making possible finer and finer division of labor and thus more and more mechanization of the processes of production, plus subsidies for scientific research that no little plants could afford.

The same processes have been at work in every field. The specialist dominates the general practitioner in medicine. A dozen sciences flourish in the field of what was once natural philosophy. A metropolitan police department has a score of separate bureaus for varieties of lawbreaking and traffic control once handled by the village constable. So, along with increasing scale of social organization has gone increasing division of labor, increasing specialization.

This has unquestionably increased productivity, but it has brought a corresponding breakdown of consensus and common understanding in the modern community. Breakdown of consensus began for very different reasons when Christendom broke in two during the Reformation, but added to religious disunity now has come diversity of occupation and technological inability to communicate. With the industrial revolution, industrial man began to differentiate sharply from agricultural man, and industrial man began splitting into workers, managers, and experts—engineers, chemists, electricians—and on beyond that into bewildering specialties called out by modern complexities of social ills: social workers, psychiatrists, penologists. Even education cannot standardize its little bricks any longer beyond a certain point. By the time the university finishes with them they seldom have much more in common than a few nostalgic memories of Old Siwash, a certain prejudice against tan shoes at evening parties, and a deep suspicion of any football coach whose team happens to lose a game. The physical chemist who would shoot the “misfits” in

state prison out of hand no more understands the sociologist than the sociologist understands the test for hydrogen sulfide. And neither can figure out why anybody should waste his time tracing the use of the dative case in Plautus! Technological tenuosity, Stuart Chase once called it—the elaboration of specialisms till the specialists no longer have enough in common to be able to communicate. To this has the organizational revolution brought us!

True, as we have said, all this has increased man's power, lengthened his reach, given him the functionary's impersonality, freed great organizations from the bonds of mortality, and lifted productivity by more intensive specialization. But it has cost us something, a cost which we have not yet finished billing.

II-9:6. Psychic Costs of the Great Society

In many ways the most ominous development of the last century has been the gradual transformation of the social optimism that characterized Americans of the nineteenth century into the prevalent mid-twentieth-century social atmosphere of doubt, fear, anxiety. During the very years in which Western man has been winning his most astounding victories over the forces of nature and building the most productive free economy the world has ever seen, Americans have been losing confidence in themselves and in their ability to master the social world they have been building. What else does the fact mean that month after month the best-sellers in nonfiction carry such titles as *A Man Called Peter*, *The Power of Positive Thinking*, *Life Is Worth Living*? What else does the fact mean that every week 10,000,000 viewers, great numbers of them Protestants, tune in on the television morale-building talks of a high dignitary of the Roman Church? What else does the fact mean that "the return to religion" has driven the *percentage* of church members in the United States to the highest point in its history? *These and a hundred other symptoms indicate that Americans are afraid of something.* That something is not merely Communists and hell bombs, although we are pretty clearly and quite properly afraid of both. It is something much deeper and more difficult to face that we are afraid of—*ourselves; our way of life; the purpose, if any, of life itself.*

Social critics find Americans alienated from—unable to identify with—the work we do; alienated from the great cities in which we live; alienated from great masses of our fellow citizens by race hatreds, religious bigotry, envy, the cruel pressures for success; and alienated

in great numbers from old faiths by modern skepticism, yet clinging to old forms for lack of something better. They find us in ominous numbers isolated, lonely, frustrated, leading empty lives, unable to form warm human relationships. They find us everywhere afraid of the blind vagaries of our own economy but almost equally afraid to give our government the mandate and the power to take the vagaries out of it. They find us divided and confused on the great issues which the twentieth century must decide. We are no longer sure, as the Founding Fathers and the pioneers were sure, that man can make a social world to his own liking. Growing awareness of the moron, the unconscious, the stark irrationalities of human conflict, and the thwarting power of privilege everywhere has corroded the optimism that once saw salvation in the vote. While we still believe in education, even the educators cannot agree on education for what. Two world wars have made it abundantly clear that science and invention can provide the *necessary* conditions for social progress but by no possibility the *sufficient* conditions. They give man power to achieve his purposes, but what those purposes are his social values must determine. If one were to judge by the sadism of the comics and the neo-paganism of Hollywood, American social values still crawl on the level of Roman gladiatorial shows!

The grisly Thing that haunts us in our sleep today is the fear that man's power is outrunning both his reason and his self-control. Man is afraid of *man himself*. Not of some men—in the Kremlin, or in Washington, or wherever—but of *man, the near-ape with the hell bomb!*

Added to that fear, which is beginning to divert population to the suburbs, is our fear of our own way of life, our fear of freedom.

II-9:7. Freedom for Whom? When?

Negatively, freedom is absence of restraint; positively, it is opportunity and facilities for functioning. In all ages the privileged have always feared both kinds of freedom for everyone but the privileged themselves. In fact, until Europeans found a new continent in which to start afresh, freedom had always meant privilege. Only the privileged few enjoyed whatever freedoms their society allowed: freedom from work, from political coercion, from hunger. Even Englishmen who had managed to retain for nobles and men of property certain rights that elsewhere had lapsed to the Crown—even Englishmen were only beginning to broaden their freedoms for privileged

persons when the first settlers reached America. The idea of religious, political, and civic freedoms for common people—tradesmen, field hands, laborers—did not take on much reality even in America till after the Revolution. And even then, thanks to the scarcity of labor and the abundance of land, nobody bothered to spell out any guarantees of economic freedom (beyond freedom of possession), as they did spell out guarantees of religious, political, and civic freedoms. What it all amounted to, as history presently demonstrated, was freedom for anyone to use his religious, political, and civic rights to *acquire* (possess) whatever privileges he could win and then use the same rights to *defend* the possession of those privileges. Thus, there grew up a social system of invidious advantage from the privilege of possessing one marriage mate and whatever job one could legitimately get to the privilege of owning a business, forming a corporation, and possessing a fortune. From top to bottom the American social system became the pyramid of privilege which it is today. Joe Doakes at the bottom resents any threat to his little privileges to home and job as strenuously as Mr. Big at the top resists any threat to his billion-dollar empire. The fact that many of these privileges, especially the little ones at the bottom, are open to all comers and that many farther up can be achieved by hard work, brains, and sufficient ruthless shrewdness has tended to obscure the nature of privilege in America: that, and the even more important fact that the American culture *accepts invidious advantage as practically a law of nature, no more to be questioned than the rising of the sun*. Hence, few think of free America as a system of differential privilege. A few malcontents, indeed, have inveighed at various times against Big Privilege at the top, but nobody has inveighed against little privilege at the bottom, much less against privilege as such.

As we have said before, any social organization at all is impossible without some privilege—the privilege of each functionary to control the operations essential to his function. And in our discussion of stratification in America we have already shown how hierarchies of functions and of privileges grew inevitably out of the pressures and opportunities of a developing social system (Book I, Chapter 7).

But the freedom which our culture gives the possessors of any kind of privilege to defend their privileges tends in practice to counteract or limit other kinds of freedom. This need not necessarily be so, if other freedoms were as highly valued as freedom to defend one's privileges. But in practice defense of privilege usually ranks first. Thus a

white man whose residential privilege (the "exclusiveness" of his residential locality) is threatened by an "invasion" of Negroes tends to disregard the Negro's theoretical freedom of exchange, his right to live where his pocketbook would make it possible for him to live. Unless restrained by law or by the refusal of the courts, under a Supreme Court ruling, to enforce restrictive covenants, the white man in the past has tended to resort even to physical coercion against the Negroes to defend his own privilege of lily-white possession. In the same way, businessmen under criticism for abuse of their privileges have tended to strike back at the authors of the criticism, to boycott their books, drive them out of academic jobs, and so on, rather than merely to answer the criticisms. The critics' freedom of speech, in other words, has been less valuable in the eyes of those attacked than their own freedom to defend their privileges.

What this amounts to in the long run is that there has grown up in the United States a widespread fear of any kind of freedom for others that endangers privilege, and the bigger the privilege endangered, the greater the fear. Hence, in our concern to maintain the system of privilege which exists we have come to fear freedom of speech, freedom of social inquiry, freedom of independent thought. These freedoms still exist in some measure, and in vastly greater measure than in any other country except Britain and most of the British Commonwealths, but they must be exercised with discretion. "Freedom is not license," "Society has other values than free speech," "One can be free only to the point at which his actions begin to harm others"—statements of that kind betray concern about values other than freedom. And what it is that we are concerned about is nearly always privilege of one kind or another.

We betray our concern not merely by words but by actions. In Book II, Chapter 11, we shall cite specific instances of interference with freedom of communication. We shall cite instances of censorship and instances of propaganda. The propagandist does not believe in freedom of the mind. He believes in putting over his point of view. In a world of competitive propagandas and especially a world in which a great government is out to destroy the free mind everywhere, believers in free self-government must fight the devil with fire. There is no other choice, and the United States government is open to criticism for not having done it more effectively to date (1954).⁷ But

⁷ See, for example, criticisms by a disillusioned businessman who felt that political kow-towing by the Administration to economy-minded and other cliques in Congress

within the United States we betray our own fear of freedom not merely by interfering with freedom of communication for special ends that have nothing to do with defense against Communism but by penalizing even law-abiding nonconformers who are not Communists. Again Joe Doakes sets a pattern which he denounces when Mr. Big adopts it. Is Smith, the druggist, a bit outspoken in his advocacy of birth control or in his opposition to some action of the local American Legion post?

"I'll show that so and so. He isn't the only druggist in town. I'll buy my stuff from Jones after this."

Because of a difference of opinion which has nothing to do with the quality of Smith's merchandise or the service in his store, Joe Doakes resorts to economic sanctions; he transfers his trade to Jones. Of course he is free to trade where he pleases, but why does he *want to coerce* Smith in the first place? Why penalize Smith for an unpopular opinion? *In a society of free men can each one be free to coerce anyone else as he sees fit?* If you accept that principle, how can you object when your gas company coerces your local editor into suppressing or distorting news to suit the company? How can you object when a public utility company—as a big one did a few years ago—hires a college professor to slant the facts about public ownership in a high-school textbook to prejudice students against "socialism"? If it is fair to penalize Smith for an opinion you don't like, why shouldn't your boss fire you for wearing the "wrong" party campaign button? Or has the practice gone so far that you are already afraid to show any disagreement with the boss on any subject whatever?

The system of differential privilege and its by-product, fear of freedom, has generated fear of difference and the vicious practice of repudiating the very principle of freedom itself by extralegal individual coercion. It is one thing to oppose and denounce an individual's opinions. It is quite another thing to impose coercive pressures on that individual because of his opinions, and impose that coercion irresponsibly at will.

Ethically, what right has anyone to coerce another human being anyway? No right whatever, except for two purposes: (1) the good of the one coerced, as when one snatches a child from the path of an

sabotaged the efficiency of the Voice of America organization during a crucial period after the Korea war—"My Education in Government: Expediency vs. Efficiency, a Businessman's Misadventures in the Eisenhower Administration," Martin Merson, *The Reporter*, October 7, 1954, pp. 15-27.

automobile, or (2) the public good, as when one forcibly restrains a maniac. Obviously, *free men can remain free only if they refrain from arbitrarily coercing one another at will.* To prevent that kind of thing is precisely the function of limited government under law. All governments claim a monopoly of the power of coercion and claim it in the name of the public good. But to preserve freedom, that power must be limited rigidly by law and used only in accordance with law. That is the whole purpose of our constitutional protections: separation of powers, habeas corpus, civilian control of the military, etc. Protection of the citizen against the arbitrary coercive power of his government functionaries is the essence of due process, the essence of civil liberty.

When government functionaries use the powers of coercion inherent in their official positions without due process and without regard for the rights of individuals for protection against arbitrary coercion by their own government, the whole principle of civil liberty is imperiled. The motive is irrelevant. It may be the purest patriotism or the basest self-seeking. The objective is irrelevant. It may be to protect the nation against Communist infiltration of government or to advance the fortunes of a particular party or politician. The morals of the coercer are irrelevant. He may be the most honest man since Diogenes, or the biggest hypocrite. And the degree of the coercion is irrelevant. To destroy a man's reputation arbitrarily and without recourse is just as reprehensible and dangerous in principle as to destroy the man himself. Motive, objective, personal morality, and degree of coercion are all irrelevant to the issue here: the arbitrary, irresponsible use of coercion by a government functionary against a private citizen outside of, and without regard for, due process of law. That the coercion may be applied indirectly through publicity and collusive pressure rather than directly by the police or the military does not change the ethical or the practical issue, either. Coercion by any other name is still coercion, and when a government official uses the prominence and powers inherent in his office to apply it to a private citizen outside of, and in disregard of, due process of law, it still stinks.

But, someone will say, due process of law under the Anglo-American tradition is no longer adequate to deal with the menace of Communist conspirators. The government, for example, was never able to prove that Alger Hiss actually engaged in espionage. All it could prove was that Hiss lied under oath when he denied having passed government documents to a self-confessed Communist agent. He was convicted of perjury, not espionage. Many suspected Communists and

Communist sympathizers cannot be convicted of anything. The essence of conspiracy is to cover its own trail. If we wait for convictable evidence to accumulate against Communists in governmental offices, irreparable damage may be done before they can be weeded out. Due process is too slow and clumsy to protect the American government against subversive conspirators.

The argument is persuasive and probably valid. Any non-Communist government in these days is justified in taking drastic action against any of its own functionaries on the basis of mere suspicion of disloyalty instead of waiting for incontrovertible proof. If Caesar's wife was supposed to be above suspicion, the functionaries of democratic governments must, in self-defense, be held to a standard at least as high. But the actions of government officials in dealing with their own functionaries are one thing; their actions in dealing with private citizens are something else. No great issue of civil liberties arises in the dismissal of a file clerk or even of an assistant secretary. They knew the risk when they accepted their jobs and nothing requires them to work for government in the first place. If they are unjustly treated, that is a matter of intraorganizational equity and not of basic civil liberties.

The issue of civil liberty arises only between government functionaries and private citizens. For a government functionary to use the power that attaches to the prominence of his office to defame a private citizen *on suspicion only* or to smear some private organization such as Harvard University on the strength of one or two ex-Communists on a faculty of 3,000 is quite a different matter from accusing a government agency of harboring Communists. The arbitrary defamation of private citizens and the smearing of private organizations constitute a clear and present danger to civil liberties. Accusations against government agencies and personnel are merely intragovernmental maneuverings.

Unless the American people can see the dangers to civil liberty inherent in by-passing due process of law and see the difference between that and the purging of Communists from government, there is grave danger that in trying to protect us against the Communist conspiracy our most ruthless defenders will be undermining the very freedoms we are seeking to preserve.

So much for the fear of freedom that poisons the social atmosphere in America today (1954). We are not living under a reign of terror, and as one college president observed, "Anybody who has anything

important to say can say it." But altogether too many people are afraid of freedom—not of freedom for themselves but of freedom for others. Altogether too many people are perfectly willing to apply coercion—economic, social, psychological coercion—to other persons whose opinions they don't like. *An atmosphere of coercive pressure for conformity is not the atmosphere of freedom.*

II-9:8. The Fear of Social Criticism

Unfortunately, however, this atmosphere of fear and coercive pressure for conformity is likely to grow more oppressive rather than less as the struggle for survival against the Soviets intensifies our internal tensions and our fears of one another. The world-wide Soviet conspiracy has given fear of Communists in America definite survival value. Communists and Communist sympathizers are no friends of the American way of life. The trouble is that nobody can spot a Communist by the color of his eyes, by the way he dresses, or by the job he holds. You can spot him only by words or deeds that betray his hostility to the United States.

But is not anybody who criticizes anything in the *status quo* betraying hostility to the United States? Only the intelligent can distinguish the criticisms of the disloyal who want to destroy the American way of life completely from the criticisms of the loyal who want to make that way of life more rational, more humane, more equitable—more consistent with its own system of values. The less intelligent and the less sophisticated tend to fall into the trap of fearing all criticism and thus trying to freeze the *status quo* as it is with all its obvious inconsistencies as they are. But these inconsistencies—race prejudice, abuse of privilege, inequality of opportunity, and so on—are precisely the ammunition the Communists need for their propaganda campaign against us. Thus, in effect, when we let our fears of Communists stifle all social criticism of the *status quo*, we play directly into the hands of our deadly enemies. We supply them with the ammunition they have to have.

Fear of nonconformity cannot be traced to the disappearance of the neighborhood and the submergence of neighborhood man. The most conformity-ridden and stagnant societies in the world are the face-to-face societies of primitive man. The free mind has been a product of clashing cultures and large-scale association.

But the fear of nonconformity that has been developing in the United States is a fear not so much of transgressors against tradition

as of critics of privilege. We fear social nonconformers not because they challenge the ways of the fathers but usually because they threaten the inconsistencies of the sons. They make us uncomfortable by reminding us of the gap between our national ideals and our practical performances. This is the point at which the disappearance of the neighborhood becomes important. There always was a gap, but the industrial and organizational revolutions and modern megalopolis have widened it to the dimensions of a chasm. A lot of people are so afraid of looking into that chasm that they would rather let it widen still farther than permit anybody to tell them it is there.

So we are afraid of ourselves and afraid of our own way of life. We are also afraid of something else: our own doubts about the nature of the universe.

II-9:9. Does Life Have a Purpose?

In the days when men believed that man was a special creation of a very personal God who was preoccupied with the affairs of this planet, they naturally felt that life did have a purpose and that they knew what that purpose was. All the great religions profess to know that purpose.

But Darwinism shook the belief of millions in man as a special creation. If the theory of evolution is correct, man is not a special creation at all but the end product of biological and other processes which are still at work—an end product that differs from other organisms not in origin but in the kind and degree of its specializations. Then, astronomers presently revealed the fact that not only was the earth not the center of the universe, as Copernicus had demonstrated four centuries before, but it was only an insignificant speck in a universe of perfectly incomprehensible dimensions. Our whole solar system turns out to be only a little light-dab in a gigantic galaxy of millions of other little light-dabs, many of them including other specks like the earth; and even more unsettling still, our entire galaxy is only one among *billions and billions of other galaxies* scattered throughout immensities of space beyond human understanding. Light reaches the great Palomar telescope from stars 2,000,000,000 *light-years away*.⁸ In a universe 4,000,000,000 light-years across, with billions and billions of suns and planets—most of them too hot, or too cold, or too airless, or too

⁸ A light-year is the distance light travels in a year, at the rate of 186,000 miles a second. The light reaching Palomar tonight from the most distant stars has been on its way hundreds of millions of years *longer* than life has been evolving on earth!

poisonous to support any life at all, life itself seems less important than once it did when men knew only their own world. That the Ultimate Power in such a universe is primarily concerned with the behavior of creatures crawling about on one infinitesimal speck in one tiny light-dab in one minor galaxy among billions and billions of other galaxies, *including at least 1,000,000 other worlds like ours*—that change in perspective has thrown all old ideas about the purpose of human life out of focus. Few writers have expressed the spiritual shock of such discoveries better than Matthew Arnold in “Dover Beach”:

The Sea of Faith

Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.

Retreating? When never so many of us claimed church membership? When 88 percent of Detroit were members? When the Revised Standard Version of the Bible ranked as a best-seller? When Bishop Sheen's hour on television outdrew the all-star programs? When even the intellectuals in such books as *Human Destiny* admitted the inability of science to solve the mystery that engulfs the human race? When all the isms, materialism to existentialism, only postponed the unanswerable question?

Perhaps Matthew Arnold spoke too soon. There were evidences of faith aplenty at mid-twentieth century.

Yet he had not been wholly wrong. By contrast with the blind credulity of the Middle Ages this was a new kind of faith—a faith aware that faith itself was under challenge; a faith too strident in its denials and reassurances, too eager to pretend man has no grounds for doubt. If millions were still fundamentalists, Protestants and Catholics, other millions took their religion either in the attitude of “After all, what else is there?” i.e., as a last resort, a chance against the odds, or as an investment and insurance policy, a “share” in helpful contacts here, and perhaps (who knows?) Hereafter!

As compared with the simple certainties of prescientific ages, doubts and questions about the purpose of human life loomed large in the American scene at mid-century.

Such doubts and questions the Great Society had generated and diffused. They were not the products of the neighborhood. And to the individual's numbing sense of social insignificance imposed upon him by the organizational revolution, the scientific revolution had added a haunting fear of the cosmic insignificance of life itself. Unsure of itself and afraid of many things, the little mind found itself at mid-century adrift in a vastly larger world of experience than it had ever bargained for. Neighborhood man was out of his depth and out of sight of old familiar headlands. Instead of feeling that everybody must know where he lived, he now wasn't even sure where he lived himself! Or why!

Problems of Metropolitan Living

II-10:1. The Nature of Metropolitan Problems

Given our value assumptions that the desirable society is a society that maximizes human dignity, opportunity, and rationality and minimizes their opposites, the major problems of metropolitan living may be regarded as problems of integrating individuals, associational processes, and culture in the metropolitan centers and metropolitan areas into unified or harmonious social systems that will maximize the values named. This is a tidy little chore which we can perhaps best approach by asking at once what we mean by integration. To integrate is to make one; or in nonmathematical terms, to unify. The task, in short, in our metropolitan centers and regions is to unify the personalities, activities, structures, and cultural components of these local social systems so as to maximize human dignity, opportunity, and rationality. But we are dealing here with wheels within wheels. Every local social system is a system of systems. Each individual personality is itself a system of physical and psychological energy, and every family, factory, school, church, business enterprise, and governmental agency is an associational system. On top of all that we have systems of thought, systems of law, systems of values, and so on. The problem of integrating a metropolitan center, then, is one of integrating its component systems and also integrating the totality of systems.

In Book II, Chapter 5, Part B, we dwelt at some length on the importance of personality integration and socialization as the basis of law and order. Personality integration is the unification of impulse, purpose, and character into a consistent, or well-adjusted, personality. Socialization is the integration of this personality with the values of

the community, the internalization of cultural values. The failure of either or both of these integrating processes may result in behavior which the community stigmatizes as delinquency or crime. The very mass scale of metropolitan living plus other complexities which it brings with it increases the difficulties of personality integration and socialization.

It also increases the difficulties of keeping interpersonal relations, interactional processes, and associational structures internally unified and integrally related to one another. Crowds, traffic jams, the impersonality of urban living—these and other conditions have their disrupting impacts on human association.

Added to all that is the greater mass and complexity of urban culture itself. As compared with a rural neighborhood or small town, the metropolitan center not only confronts the individual with a greater sheer volume of old, familiar culture traits—houses, automobiles, stores, and so on—but challenges him constantly with new things: inventions, discoveries, ideas, life philosophies, unfamiliar values; and with all these as well as with the greater mass of familiar traits he must come to terms.

Fortunately, every metropolitan center has, of course, evolved organizations and routines of its own, a structural and associational momentum that tends to carry the individual along. He has only to find his own functional niche in the system to be able to find his way about. Outwardly he conforms, but what happens to him mentally? What happens to the values which guide his day-to-day preferences and choices? And exposed to a welter of possible choices as metropolitan populations are, how much community of choice comes out of it? What values do they have in common? What order of priority do they give to those values? And how intensely do they hold whatever values they do have?

In trying to answer questions like that one begins to get some inkling of the problem of metropolitan integration.

II-10:2. Integrating and Socializing Personalities in Metropolitan Centers

How personalities become integrated and socialized is a problem primarily for social psychologists and psychiatrists. The sociologist is concerned with it only (1) as personality disorders impinge on association, i.e., on situations and social structures; and (2) as situations and social structures affect personality integration and socialization.

In Book II, Chapter 5, Part B, "Crime and Delinquency," we have touched on the impacts of personality disorders on the routines established by law and custom. And in Book II, Chapters 2 and 3, we noted some of the impacts of situations and social structures on personality formation.

At this point we need only consider the impacts of metropolitan living on personality.

This problem has attracted the attention of moralists, literary critics, and social theorists since the days of the Sophists in ancient Greece. In general, the verdict seems nearly always to have been unfavorable to the big city. Many modern social scientists come to about the same conclusion: As compared with the simple, face-to-face, unhurried, and little-specialized life of the rural neighborhood and village, the complex, impersonal, tension-ridden, highly interdependent life of the modern metropolitan center has been indicted as producing a higher percentage of less integrated and less socialized personalities, a higher percentage of immoral, vicious, and criminal people. There can be no question, of course, that on the various indexes of personality and social breakdown—suicide, vice, crime, mental disease, vagrancy, and the like—the big cities show up worse than the farms and villages. But *post hoc, propter hoc* has often been the logic by which these facts have been interpreted.

How much of all this personality breakdown has the big city itself *produced*, how much has it merely *attracted*, and how much has it simply *dramatized* by sheer volume, better recording, and better publicity? Nobody knows.

There is, of course, a vast deal of evidence to show that the slum at its worst is a product of the big city. There are "depressed areas" in the country; in 1950, as compared with urban dwellings, relatively over three times as many farm dwellings were in a dilapidated condition and *twenty-seven times as many* had no piped-in running water.¹ But rural poverty and substandard housing are dispersed and relatively free from the cumulative urban contaminations of tenement overcrowding, street recreation, shady businesses, and the prevalence of criminal occupations. The big-city slum *concentrates* poverty, moral obliquity, substandard housing, vice, crime, and economic waste. It acts not only as a catch basin for the unfortunate, the incapable, the vi-

¹ Percentages of dwellings dilapidated in 1950: urban, 5.9; rural farm, 20.8. Percentages without piped-in running water: urban, 2.0; rural farm, 55.5. Rural nonfarm data on same characteristics: 11.7 and 28.2 percent, respectively. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952*, p. 739.

cious, and the criminal, but also as a center of antisocial infection for the entire community as well as for those within it. It produces, it attracts, and it dramatizes personality breakdowns. In comparison with this big-city product, the open country and the village can show nothing so morally vicious, so socially dangerous, and so economically wasteful. One 333-acre slum in Cleveland, for example, in the 1930's with only 2.5 percent of the city's population turned out 6.8 percent of the city's delinquents, produced 21 percent of its murders, and contained 26 percent of its houses of prostitution. In actual dollars and cents that tiny area of the city cost the taxpayers \$1,750,000 *more* every year for police, fire, educational, health, welfare, and other services than the city received from all the real-estate taxes levied in the district. As a moral, social, and economic investment for the rest of the community, that slum was a total loss.² Yet similar areas with similar moral, social, and economic effects exist in every great metropolitan center in the United States and slum clearance programs are making little headway against them.

There seems to be no escaping the fact that whether it produces, attracts, or merely dramatizes personality breakdowns the metropolitan center must stand convicted at least of concentrating this negative contribution to modern living.

But there is more to the impact of the metropolis on personality than that. If it concentrates personality breakdowns, it also concentrates personality creativity, men and women of distinction. Except for scientists and military men, the top men of the traditional professions will be found in the great cities. The highest-paid lawyers, physicians, clergymen gravitate toward the big cities. In the nature of the case, since the controlling offices of the great corporations are located there, the top industrialists and financiers are there also. It is the big-city newspapers and periodicals that pay the highest salaries to journalists and magazine writers. Dramatists and actors find their only markets in the big cities, particularly New York and Hollywood (Los Angeles). If artists and writers can live anywhere, as many of them do live in Florida, California, and New Mexico, it is also true that many of them prefer the larger centers. With all their standardizing and narcotizing effect on masses of subway riders and middle-class nobodies, the great cities must still be given credit for providing more opportunities than the country and the town for

² Rev. R. B. Navin, William D. Peattie, F. R. Stewart, and staff, Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, *An Analysis of a Slum Area in Cleveland*, 1934.

creative personalities. Whether they are more productive of creative personalities than of personality breakdowns nobody can say. They attract both and dramatize both. But in attempting to appraise the impact of the metropolis on personality one must take account not merely of its disorganizing effect but of its constructive effect as well. And one must also remember that both effects register not merely on the people who live in the metropolitan centers themselves but on all those who come under the influence of metropolitan controls, the metropolitan press, and the products of metropolitan art, literature, and science. A metropolitan newspaper, magazine or radio or television program projects its effects on even more people than does a metropolitan slum.

II-10:3. Integration of Structures and Functions

Considered as an aggregation of social structures, the various governmental units in the United States empowered to levy and collect taxes approximate a crazy-quilt hodge-podge. There were more than 119,000 governmental units in the United States in 1951, from local drainage and school districts to the state and federal governments. Table II-10.1 sums up the multitudes of governments under which Americans live.

TABLE II-10.1. Local, State, and Federal Governmental Units in the United States, 1951

	Number of Units
Federal government	1
District of Columbia	2
State governments	48
County governments	3,049
Municipalities	16,676
Townships and towns	17,338
Special districts	11,899
School districts	70,452
Total	119,465

From *Statistical Abstract of the United States*:
1952, p. 355.

Apart from school districts, there were more than 48,000 units of local government, ranging from 2 in the District of Columbia, 54 in Delaware, and 83 in Nevada to 2961 in Kansas and 4013 in Illinois.

If school districts also are included, the most profusely governed commonwealth in the United States turns out to be Minnesota, with no less than 9309 units of government of all kinds. Illinois ranks second with 8593 and Nebraska third with 8318.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of these governmental units were set up in horse-and-buggy days before the advent of the automobile and the modern metropolitan region. Many states like Michigan find themselves equipped with whole counties that have no modern excuse for being except that they provide jobs for political office-holders. In Michigan in 1950, 28 out of the 83 counties received from half to three-quarters of their total county revenue from the rest of the state, yet the list did not include the smallest county, Keeweenaw, only 46 percent of whose revenue came from the state. The "indigent" counties ranged from Houghton with 39,771 population and 52 percent state support to Oscoda with 3134 and 77 percent state support. They totaled about 5 percent of the state's population and averaged only 11,127 population per county as against the other 54 counties in the state exclusive of Wayne (2,435,000), which 54 averaged 67,115 each. Half a dozen district or regional governments could have governed northern Michigan more efficiently than did the 28 little county governments and could have done it with a lower percentage of state aid. That is one extreme of the picture, in a state with population units varying from Detroit and Wayne County with over 38 percent of the state's total to Keeweenaw on Lake Superior with barely $\frac{4}{100}$ of 1 percent. Too much local government for the sparse population in the north.

For the dense population in the Detroit metropolitan region, on the other hand, in Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw, and Wayne counties, local government was again too plentiful but in a different way. What was needed here was not four different county governments plus more than two dozen different municipal governments and some seventy-eight different townships but a single regional authority competent to handle the entire area as one ecological and functional unit. The ecological and functional structure of the metropolitan region, in other words, no longer corresponded to the governmental structure. Hence when General Motors or the Ford Motor Company built a factory in Livonia Township, for example—now an incorporated municipality—Livonia and not the entire area reaped the tax benefit. But the workforce for that factory lived all over

the metropolitan area and had to be serviced by the schools, the police, the public health officials, and so on, of the various governmental units in the area. True, the individuals paid taxes directly or indirectly where they lived, but the plant itself which occasioned the presence of these individuals paid local taxes only to Livonia.

More important still, a growing metropolitan hinterland develops needs which can be met only on an area, not on a local municipal, township, or even county basis. Water supply, sewage disposal, transportation routes, and the like, to say nothing of the problem of land usage and conservation, can better be handled on an area or regional basis than in any other way. This would be apparent enough if the area were developing *de novo* and there were no already-existing township, municipal, and county governmental units in the way.

Since the Tennessee Valley Authority has demonstrated the social and economic values attainable by dealing with an entire river valley as one region with all its interrelated problems of land usage, soil conservation, flood control, transportation, and so on, as the problems of one social structure instead of half a dozen different problems for a hundred or more different social structures—since that demonstration has been made, it has become obvious that no sanctity whatever attaches to horse-and-buggy political structures devised for the simpler problems of a less interdependent age. The only real question for the future is how long the vested interests in littleness and inefficiency will be able to stall off the reorganizations demanded by modern techniques of regional development.

Another aspect of metropolitan growth is the migration of leaders from the big cities to the suburbs and to nonfarm rural homes. Metropolitan cities are plagued by cultural lag, on the one hand—the refusal of rural-minded legislatures to grant them full autonomy to manage their own affairs and the disparities between ecological-functional relationships and governmental boundaries—and by the migration of factories and civic leaders beyond the corporate limits, on the other. The migration of the factories cuts into the tax revenues. The migration of the “natural” civic leaders cuts into the leadership potential of the center. The suburbs and the open country may gain—although frequently urban-centered families participate only partially in local affairs—but the urban center certainly loses. There may still be considerable reserves of leadership ability in the great centers, but the trend points toward more troubles a generation hence.

· II-10.4. Disharmonies of Culture Traits and Complexes

That the great cities constitute the entry ports through which new gadgets and new ideas make their way into a culture is, of course, implicit in the nature of civilization as a product primarily of cities. The inevitable consequence is that life in the metropolitan areas involves more unsettlement of routines and more constant readjustments than does existence anywhere else. Moreover, the mere concentration of population itself necessarily means more competition for space and more friction and tension in getting to and from work, in shopping, in carrying on whatever routines do develop—more than one finds in smaller places and in the open country. City living inevitably involves more social contacts than rural living and therefore puts a higher premium on social adjustment skills than does the simpler life.

Because of its greater impersonality of association and more superficial personality involvement per contact, megalopolis also encourages association in terms of special interests rather than mere vicinage or locality and surrounds devotees of deviant practices and ideas with a protective wall of relative indifference. Broadly speaking, the bigger the city, the less one knows about one's spatial neighbors. And the less one cares about what other people do. This means that so long as an individual minds his own business and avoids transgressing the mores of impersonal association he is free from gossip, free from the coercive opinions of the folks next door. The folks next door are merely figures in the near distance, not in-group personalities whose surveillance one must respect. Hence, the big city is the breeding ground of all kinds of iconoclasm, deviant ideas, crackpot causes. Not only can the individual go off the beam with less restraint from those around him than in simpler social systems, but the sheer number of people collected in a great city increases the probabilities that, whatever may be the deviation, somebody can be found to accept it and support it.

Even new religions, which seem to appear more often under simpler conditions, spread more rapidly in cities than elsewhere. This was certainly true of Christianity in the Roman Empire. The very term *pagan* originally referred to a countryman, a rustic, a person loath to give up the old religion for the new.

Big cities, then, are the arenas in which ideas clash—the fountain centers of cultural innovations and new things. Metropolitan living,

therefore, means constant exposure to intellectual challenges, tension, friction, strain for readjustment.

II-10:5. The Problem of Moral Integration

From everything that we have said up to this point it should be clear that metropolitan living under modern conditions necessarily involves a greater clash of more different social values than does rural and small-town living. A problem of great practical as well as theoretical importance emerges, therefore, in the question of what values, if any, big-city populations hold in common, what percentages hold what values with what degree of intensity, and what order of priority they assign to the values they do hold in common.

Literary critics, clergymen, and sociologists, to say nothing of newspaper editors, advertising men, and politicians, have all told the world from time to time just what it is that Americans cherish—everything, it would seem, from the memory of George Washington to the horsehair sofa—but few have bothered to try to measure these imputed attachments. When Parrington traced the hegira of the American mind from the pessimistic Puritanism of colonial days to the scientific skepticism of the 1890's, he drew his conclusions mainly from the written and printed records of each period of American history: from published sermons, essays, books, newspapers, advertisements, political propaganda, and the like. How many people agreed with Cotton Mather that man is a sinner in the hands of an angry God or agreed with Herbert Spencer that the ultimate reality in the universe is unknowable, Parrington like other investigators could not demonstrate. He could only infer and impute from the record of words and from the historical course of events. In the same way, when Cargill showed the impact of Zola, Freud, and other Europeans on the American mind, his evidence was mainly literary. He could demonstrate that such and such writers seemed to show such and such effects, but how many Americans had absorbed the values of naturalism or had accepted the scientific approach to the study of the personality neither he nor anybody else to date has been able to answer.

The same infirmity afflicts Myrdal's analysis of the American Creed.³ How many accept the values of the American Creed, how

³ Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1927-30. Oscar Cargill, *Intellectual America: Ideas on the March*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944.

intensely do they hold them, and how consistently do they act upon them? Nobody knows. By and large, political action and national policy through the years seem to have some relation to those values, but there have been many yawnings off course, many hesitations and backslidings. Nothing, for example, could have been more abhorrent to the American Creed than slavery, yet even Lincoln did not make the abolition of slavery the prime objective of the North in the War Between the States. Months after the war began he did make emancipation a means to his main objective, the preservation of the Union, but at the start he like many others had been willing to subordinate creedal values to preserve the political system that many of his fellow citizens regarded as morally reprehensible unless and until it repudiated human slavery. The Great Emancipator and the abolitionists thus entered the war with a different order of value priorities concerning slavery and the Union. And the same problem of value priorities confronts every student of moral integration. People may have the same moral values but at any given time may not hold them in the same order of priority.

Nor do they necessarily all hold them with the same degree of intensity or devotion. Notoriously, not all the early Christians, facing persecution, had the fortitude to reject opportunities to renounce their faith to compromise with paganism. Not all were devoted enough to endure martyrdom. There are individual differences in devotion to common values as there are individual differences in other characteristics. Every great crisis has brought this out. Consider the contrasts in a few examples: the heroism vs. cannibalism in the Donner party, starving amid the snows of the High Sierras in 1847; the bootlicking vs. the heroism in the Nazi extermination camps, in the Soviet slave camps, in the prison camps in Korea; the looting vs. the self-sacrifice among Londoners under the air raids; and so on. Attachment to common values varies apparently in any aggregation of human beings much as other characteristics vary.

Thus, the problem of moral integration is at least three inter-related problems: (1) What values do people have in common? (2) What order of priority do what people give to these common values at any given time? and (3) What distribution of devotion to common values does one find among those who profess to hold them, under what conditions, when?

Scientifically, we do not yet know the specific answers to these

questions for very large segments of the American people, but modern research is beginning to show the way to some answers.

II-10:6. The Modern Attack on the Problem

Although Carlyle, Le Play, and others raised questions about the moral impacts of the industrial revolution early in the nineteenth century, it was probably Emile Durkheim, the great French sociologist, who first directed the attention of sociologists to the problem of moral integration as such in his studies of *Suicide* and of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. As Durkheim saw it, modern urban living with its breakdown of primary association tends toward *anomie*, or disorientation: masses of people without common values. Interdependence, in short, is no guarantee of integration.

At about the same time American publicists were beginning to react to the tremendous flood of immigrants streaming into the United States in the early years of the century, a flood that exceeded 1,000,000 a year on the eve of World War I. The first misgivings about the ethnic diversities of these newcomers were met with the easy optimism of Zangwill's *Melting Pot*—democracy was turning everybody into good Americans! World War I exploded that myth with the discovery of the hyphenate Americans of divided loyalties: German-Americans, British-Americans, Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and so on. Then came concern about subversives, prohibition lawlessness, increasing divorce, industrial morale, Fascism, anti-Semitism. In families, factories, and communities moral integration emerged as a practical problem of some importance. Social scientists began to worry about it. True to the American tradition of individualism, psychologists and psychiatrists led the way for the sociologists, and the study of moral integration in small groups developed faster than the study of moral integration in communities. Elton Mayo's studies of the conditions of productivity at the Hawthorne plant of the General Electric Company revealed the importance of informal groupings and of emotional tensions on the job. Industrial psychologists began to apply psychological techniques to personnel problems and sociologists suddenly began to show some interest in the sociology of modern industry. In 1939 Wilbert Moore offered at Pennsylvania State College the first college course in industrial sociology and followed this with the first textbook on this subject in 1946: *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*.⁴ Mean-

⁴ New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946; rev. ed., 1951.

while, Kurt Lewin at Iowa State and later at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began those studies in group dynamics which were presently to be carried further by his followers when the Center for Group Dynamics was transferred after Lewin's death in 1947 to the University of Michigan.

L. L. Thurstone at Chicago invented his method for scaling differences of verbal indexes of attitudes, a way of measuring moral diversity in selected populations. Opinion pollers like Rensis Lickert and the staff of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan began applying polling techniques to the study of industrial problems, problems of morale, etc. E. L. Thorndike, although not directly concerned with moral integration, contributed some indirect evidence with his "goodness of life score" for 310 larger cities reported in *Your City* and in *144 Smaller Cities*. Angell, feeling this index inadequate as a measure of moral integration, went further in a statistical study of indexes of welfare effort and crime in forty-three cities and further still in a more intensive interview case study of four cities. The results of this investigation we shall summarize in a moment. Meanwhile, out of the war, in the researches of Stouffer and his associates, came evidence of the dependence of fighting morale on the pal relationships developed in combat teams. And from the studies of the American Jewish Committee's investigators concerning the psychiatric origins of the authoritarian personality some of the sources of moral disintegration in a community began to appear.

II-10:7. The Moral Integration of American Cities⁵

What Angell found in his statistical study of forty-three big cities was (1) that when the per capita amount of local money spent on welfare services (Welfare Effort Index) was combined in a weighted formula with the amount of crime known to the police in a municipality, the crime rate being given double weight and reversed to become a positive factor, the resulting indexes of moral integration for the major cities of 100,000 and over varied widely from 19.0 in Rochester, New York, to 5.1 in Miami, Florida, and 4.2 in Atlanta, Georgia; and (2) that 63 percent of this variation between cities could be accounted for by two variables only: (a) heterogeneity of population and (b) mobility, the percentage of a city

⁵ Robert Cooley Angell, "The Moral Integration of American Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1951, Pt. 2, pp. 1-140.

moving in and out during a given period. Other factors, such as the rate of a city's growth, percentage of married women working, and the spread (or extent of variation) in rentals, had some relation to moral integration, but it was a relation apparently measured by the two key indexes—heterogeneity and mobility. Four factors seemed to have no relationship to the index of moral integration: size of city (above 100,000), church membership, income levels, and percentage of small businesses among all businesses in the city. Table II-10.2 shows the variations in the Adjusted Crime Index, the Adjusted Welfare Effort Index, and the Integration Index, as used by Angell in ranking his forty-three cities of 100,000 or more.⁶

In this list a number of cities had integration scores which seemed to be out of line with the two key factors turned up by the statistical study, namely, heterogeneity and mobility. In other words, other factors than heterogeneity and mobility were probably more important in determining their integration indexes. So after eliminating cities whose population had changed by more than one-sixth between 1940 and 1946, Angell chose "two that were unaccountably high in moral integration and two that were unaccountably low" and, using the services of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, which has developed special techniques of sampling, had approximately 100 householders of all social classes in each of the four selected cities carefully interviewed to discover the bearing of factors other than heterogeneity and mobility on the Integration Index.⁷ The interviewees were also asked to name outstanding community leaders and in each city the twenty-five most frequently named individuals were then also interviewed to find out how leadership actually functioned in each city.

On the basis of all this, Angell tried to evaluate three things: (1) the compatibility of the moral norms in his four cities, (2) the adequacy of their moral norms, and (3) the efficiency of the processes working toward compatibility and adequacy.

Relative to compatibility, he pointed out four kinds of incompatibility: (1) "two sets of people living in the same community but

⁶ For the explanation of how the cities were selected, why New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., were omitted, and how the adjusted indexes were constructed, weighted, and combined into the Integration Index, see the various appendixes to Angell's report, p. 123 and following. The table itself is given on page 14 of his report.

⁷ Although he concealed the identity of his selected cities under the fictitious names of *Bellevue*, *Gorge City*, *Bordertown*, and *Mediana*, certain data presented indicate that three of the four were Syracuse and Rochester, New York, and Louisville, Kentucky.

TABLE II-10.2. Indexes of Social Welfare Effort, Crime, and Moral Integration in 43 U.S. Cities over 100,000 Each

Rank	City	Adjusted Crime Index	Adjusted Welfare Effort Index	Integration Index
1	Rochester	17.3	22.4	19.0
2	Syracuse	17.1	16.9	17.0
3	Worcester	14.8	19.6	16.4
4	Eric	15.0	18.6	16.2
5	Milwaukee	18.4	10.5	15.8
6	Bridgeport	15.6	14.8	15.3
7	Buffalo	17.8	9.9	15.2
8	Dayton	13.4	16.1	14.3
9	Reading	14.2	14.2	14.2
10	Des Moines	14.5	13.4	14.1
11	Cleveland	12.3	17.4	14.0
12	Denver	14.8	12.0	13.9
13	Peoria	14.4	12.5	13.8
14	Wichita	15.6	9.7	13.6
15	Trenton	12.6	13.7	13.0
16	Grand Rapids	14.5	9.3	12.8
17	Toledo	11.5	15.0	12.7
18	San Diego	15.5	6.5	12.5
19	Baltimore	14.2	7.6	12.0
20	South Bend	12.7	9.9	11.8
21	Akron	12.0	9.8	11.3
22	Detroit	12.4	8.6	11.1
23	Tacoma	13.3	6.1	10.9
24	Richmond (Va.)	7.4	16.4	10.4
25	Houston	9.4	12.0	10.3
26	Fort Worth	10.4	9.8	10.2
27	Flint	11.7	6.0	9.8
28	Oklahoma City	9.8	9.6	9.7
29	Spokane	9.7	9.4	9.6
30	Chattanooga	7.2	13.4	9.3
31	Seattle	8.9	9.2	9.0
32	Indianapolis	7.5	11.4	8.8
33	Nashville	8.2	9.5	8.6
34	Birmingham	7.9	8.7	8.2
35	Columbus	6.2	11.7	8.0
36	Dallas	9.4	5.2	8.0
37	Louisville	4.1	15.0	7.7
38	Portland (Ore.)	6.7	8.1	7.2
39	Jacksonville	6.2	5.5	6.0
40	Memphis	3.8	8.7	5.4
41	Tulsa	3.7	8.5	5.3
42	Miami	5.8	3.6	5.1
43	Atlanta	2.5	7.6	4.2

possessing different sets of common ends and values"—for example, native born and foreign born; (2) overlapping of regional mores as one finds in cities marginal between the North and the South; (3) the divergent moral codes of Negroes and whites in the same cities; and (4) Myrdal's conception of incompatible norms in the white conscience as the crux of the difficulties in race relations in the United States. "The incompatibility of norms in the white conscience produces a situation of great insecurity and frustration for Negroes. . . . By the terms of the social situation in which they live, then, Negroes are unstable persons."⁸

Relative to inadequacy of norms, failure of common values to produce an integrated community. Angell cited Mediana as a city suffering from "delayed adaptation." Since this city had grown but "was not challenged during the depression to the extent that others were," the rank and file of its citizens have retained their "small-town" orientation. This makes the group goals inadequate to the situation. He concludes, "Any process of change without challenge would tend to bring about inadequacy."⁹

As for the efficiency of the processes working toward compatibility and adequacy of moral norms, he concludes that this is affected by three factors: (1) the rate of population mobility, high mobility decreasing efficiency; (2) the degree of community orientation of schools, churches, and other character-building agencies; and (3) the effectiveness of community leadership.

"The best leaders would be men who can keep salient in their consciences the larger loyalties required for community-wide moral integration and can inspire others to do likewise." Education and social realism are particularly important. Those who recognize the importance of effort exerted through informal organization make the best leaders: "Devotion must be dynamically expressed through personal relations if it is to be effective."¹⁰

Despite its reliance on crimes known to the police as making up more than half of its index of moral integration—a component which is much affected by police efficiency, omits white-collar crimes altogether, misses most sex offenses, and is produced by a small and inadequately representative segment of the population—despite its very unsatisfactory index of moral integration, this study at least illumi-

⁸ Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

nates some of the complexities of moral integration in American metropolitan centers.

II-10:8. Incompatible Norms and Antidemocratic Factors

Americans are operating a social system that includes a considerable degree of incompatibility of moral norms and a long tradition of hostility to the democratic philosophy and way of life.

Scores of opinion polls and attitude studies have long since demonstrated the existence of highly incompatible norms in the United States as between native born and foreign born, Protestants and Catholics, Gentiles and Jews, whites and Negroes. We have already noted how these differences in values enter into the social classifications of Americans (Section I-7:2). At this point we need only add that incompatibility of norms—caste values, for example, vs. the American Creed—obviously weakens moral integration.

Particularly significant, as the struggle with Soviet Russia continues and as many people continue to find an escape from present tensions in Fascistic patterns of thought and action, is the amount of anti-Semitism in the United States as revealed by recent surveys. Since Hitler demonstrated its usefulness in Germany, anti-Semitism has become the Fascist agitator's Sunday punch, the psychological wedge with which the reactionary enemy of democracy in other countries has succeeded in splitting the loyalties of masses of people. Many observers have noted that despite the centuries-old tradition of anti-Semitism in Germany as against hardly two generations of it in this country there is more open anti-Semitism in the United States today than there was in Germany before Hitler. Estimates based on more than twenty opinion polls classify almost 10 percent of Americans as outspokenly anti-Semitic and from 30 to 60 percent as passively anti-Semitic. The *Fortune* survey of February, 1946, less than a year after the war against Fascism, found 8.8 percent of the nation's population strongly hostile to Jews, and results of more than twenty opinion polls indicate that from three to seven times that many will make anti-Semitic responses when directly questioned about that religious minority.¹¹ (Approximately 5,000,000 Jews were included in 1950 in a population of 151,000,000.)

Anti-Semitism is, however, only one expression of a considerable range of ideas, attitudes, and values hostile to the American Creed

¹¹ Samuel Flowerman and Marie Jahoda, "Polls on Anti-Semitism," *Commentary*, April, 1946, pp. 82-86.

and the democratic way of life. *In toto* these can be viewed simply as modern expressions of an age-old conflict that has taken protean forms: the conflict of privilege with the common good. In the United States this conflict broke into the open even during the Revolution; it flared into open revolt in Shays' Rebellion, and actually motivated the call for the convention which drafted the Constitution. In the Federalist reaction against the disorders under the Confederation and against the excesses of the French Revolution democracy became a smear word on a par with Red or Communist today. But Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln each became a symbol of the common man's protest against privilege of various kinds, as did Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the 1930's. The conflict of privilege vs. the common good has been perennial since the beginnings of civilization and goes on today.

Two aspects of this conflict today have a particular bearing on the problem of moral integration. One is the intellectual rationalizations which privilege develops and adopts and the other is the emotional mechanisms that underlie and motivate these rationalizations.

II-10:9. Intellectual Rationalizations for Privilege

Perhaps the best analysis of the antidemocratic subterfuges by which privilege seeks to justify itself is that recently published by David Spitz of Ohio State University.¹² Spitz points out that there are two main lines of argument against democracy: one, that it is *impossible*; the other, that it may or may not be possible but in any event is *undesirable*.

There are two major types of theory based on the *belief* that democracy is impossible and two major types plus six subtypes based on the *belief* that it is undesirable.

1. IS DEMOCRACY IMPOSSIBLE?

The two major types based on belief in the impossibility of democracy are (a) the theory that a ruling class is an organizational necessity; and (b) the theory that it is essentially a conspiracy of power. Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* expresses the theory of the ruling class as an organizational necessity, the managers now being on the way to displace property owners as a ruling class, according to Burnham. Certain theorists of Fascism like Lawrence

¹² *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948.

Dennis express the theory that the ruling class is simply those who seize opportunities to control others.

Spitz has no difficulty in showing that the crucial question for both theories is not so much who rules but how responsibly he rules and whether the ruled can get rid of him by lawful political procedures. That a few must manage every organization is beyond dispute. The only question is how can the few be held accountable for the way they manage and can they be replaced for cause? Democracy in the sense of accountability of rulers and the right of replacement is no more impossible than limited monarchy or dictatorship. It is simply harder to operate and can be operated at all only under certain limited conditions. It is not something that you can set up anywhere at any time and make work.

2. IS DEMOCRACY UNDESIRABLE?

Theories that democracy is undesirable take us back to another conflict in basic values. The fundamental belief of the antidemocrat here is that the average man is incompetent to govern himself and that democracy can only make a mess of things. One set of theorists proposes to get around these weaknesses by letting various varieties of aristocrats, i.e., the "best" people, do the ruling; another set sees the only hope in imposing authority on the bumbling masses, but like the seekers for the best people these yearners for authority can't get together on one variety. They suggest no less than three.

We shall discuss the ideas of the advocates of aristocracy first.

Rule by the best people always sounds hopeful, until one asks who are the best? Our antidemocrats have three answers: (a) the racially best, (b) the biologically best, and (c) the "naturally" best.

a. The racially best people, of course, merely represent our old enemy racism, dressed up this time in political clothes. We have already exposed the intellectual bankruptcy of racism in Book I, Chapter 8. Anybody who is still a racist in the face of the accumulating scientific evidence is either a prisoner of a cultural myth, intellectually retarded, or emotionally incapable of scientific thinking. Not infrequently he enjoys all three incapacities at once.

If the racial aristocracy theory is discredited, what about the theory that the biologically best should rule?

b. The theory of rule by the biologically best differs from the racist theory in recognizing that there are wider differences in ability, etc.,

within races than between races and simply proposes that the biological aristocracy do the ruling.

This theory assumes in the first place that biological heredity alone is the *sufficient* condition of social competence and distinction. Actually it is only the *necessary* condition. The sufficient conditions include maturation, association, and acculturation.

It assumes in the second place that biological excellence is self-perpetuating, thus ignoring the tendency of all types to regress toward the mean. We have already noted Jennings' statement that biological mediocrity tends to produce more biological excellence and more biological subnormality than either the biological aristocrats or the subnormals themselves produce.¹³ A biological aristocracy thus could not remain a social or ruling aristocracy with hereditary status without defeating the very principle of biological aristocratic rule itself—after a few generations there would be more biological aristocrats *not* in the ruling aristocracy than there were in it!

But if social rulership is not to be hereditary, and yet is to be a function of biological excellence, there must obviously be specific techniques for doing two things: identifying biological superiority as such apart from actual achievement, since achievement is a function not only of heredity but of maturation, association, and acculturation; and getting the biologically elite into positions of power. To identify biological superiority as such we must first define it—know what we are looking for—and then devise methods which will reveal it either prior to, or at least apart from, actual achievement. What purely hereditary traits are relevant to rulership? Aside from racial characteristics, most people would probably accept high intelligence, disease immunity, a sound nervous system, and longevity as four hereditary characteristics that certainly would be desirable. Unable to get all four in equal degrees of superiority, they might settle for two: high intelligence and a sound nervous system.

Then would come the little matter of getting these individuals of high intelligence and sound nerves into positions of power. In 6000 years no civilized society has yet been able to devise a way of doing that except on the basis of inheritance (caste), which as we have seen will not give us a biological elite beyond a single generation, or on the basis of competition and conflict. But competition and conflict are precisely the processes by which democracies select their

¹³ Section II.4.11.

rulers now. What the biological aristocracy theory would propose, then, since a hereditary aristocracy would be self-defeating, would be in effect to select rulers not on the basis of political ideas, economic interests, policies, and personalities, since these are all acquired, but solely on the basis of the hereditary excellences of the candidates.

But this is, of course, absurd. Imagine voting only on the issue of which candidate has the highest I.Q. and the soundest nerves! These qualities are hereditary. And they are relevant to rulership. But they are not adequate as a basis for selecting even a bowling partner, to saying nothing of a member of the ruling elite. If that were all that you or anybody else knew about the officers of a new bank and if you knew that those men had been selected absolutely on that basis alone with no questions asked about past experience, reputation, personal habits, financial competence, or honesty, you wouldn't deposit ten cents in that bank. And neither would our eugenic friends. Sad as the news may be to the advocates of biological aristocracy, we do not associate merely as biological organisms, human animals. Neither do we select either associates or rulers merely for their various excellences as biological organisms. We associate and we select *as persons*; and we repeat again, a person is not something that grows out of the genes without help. Maturation of a human infant requires social protection and a certain normality of physical and social environments for normal results. If you don't want the child to grow up an idiot, he had better have a certain amount of association with other persons. And in the nature of the case, if he is to fit into any kind of human society at all, he must take on, learn, the culture traits of the society. The genes give us bodily structure, the electrochemical biological processes of the body, and certain aptitudes and potentials. Beyond that, everything else that makes us persons and personalities—our habits of speech, of thought, of action; all our specific ideas; all our skills; all our sentiments—everything we are above and beyond mere biological organisms, we get from *experience*, not from the genes.

The theory of rulership by a biological aristocracy is unworkable if the rulers are to form a hereditary caste and equally unworkable as well as absurd if they are not.

c. We are left with the theory of rule by those who are "naturally" best. As Spitz points out, "From that fountainhead of anti-democratic thought, Plato's *Republic*, there is to be derived still another of the several dissents from the democratic principle. This is the concept

of natural aristocracy, the doctrine that men are by nature variously unequal and that a wise state—one that is founded on justice—will be so constituted as to reflect in its social and political order a hierarchy rooted in the natural inequalities of mankind.”¹⁴

There have been many exponents of this idea down through the ages. Spitz calls attention to two “groups” and one Catholic philosopher as outstanding modern advocates of natural aristocracy. The “groups” are the New England humanists like Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More and the conservative Catholics are represented among others by Ralph Adams Cram and Bishop Fulton J. Sheen.¹⁵ The Catholic philosopher is the late George Santayana, the Tory aesthete who after quitting the Harvard University faculty resided until his death in Italy and made no concealment of his admiration for Mussolini.

In general all these advocates of natural aristocracy indict democracy because in the first place mankind is *believed* to be incapable of self-government and in the second place, when mankind attempts it, invariably it disregards “nature’s pattern” of hierarchy and order, levels all to the mediocre and the commonplace, and destroys true freedom, “the freedom to obey traditional values.”

Of course it is obvious that here again we have a theory based on men’s differences and not on their common needs. And of course it should be equally obvious that in emphasizing differences the theorists of natural aristocracy are setting up as their ultimate value something other than human personality itself. They are taking tradition, order, hierarchy as superior to the principle of personality. In other words, the theorists and the privileged assume that they are in possession of a truth superior to the truth of personality. As Spitz says in refutation, “We are led to the reaffirmation of our primary principle, that unity inheres in the common, not in degree.”¹⁶ In other words, democracy builds on commonness of need, not on differences of function.

The practical difficulty inherent in the theory of natural aristocracy is that it cannot identify these preordained elite except in terms of privilege and cannot give us a road map that leads to any “naturally” organized society.

So much for the three varieties of aristocratic theory of the un-

¹⁴ Spitz, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 194–218.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

desirability of democracy: racial aristocracy, biological aristocracy, and so-called "natural" aristocracy. All are pretty clearly rationalizations for privilege of one kind or another.

What now of the authoritarian theories concerning the undesirability of democracy? Spitz distinguishes three varieties of these also: (a) The concept of the right man; (b) the concept of the right class; and (c) the concept of the right principle.

If the theorists of aristocracy are intellectual snobs, those of authoritarianism are intellectual bullies. They are all for imposing *their* way of life on other people. The only difficulty is that they cannot agree whether their way of life is to be expressed through the right man, the right social class, or the right social principle.

a. The concept of the right man is the concept not of monarchy as such but of dictatorial personal rule as exemplified by Caesar and Napoleon. The dictator rules either because he is the right man to get things done regardless of ideology or party or because he is the embodiment of an idea. This second notion of The Leader as the embodiment of an idea inspired the exaggerated eulogies of Adolf Hitler which reached a pinnacle of absurdity in Goering's tribute, "The Leader is in all political and other respects concerning the national and social interests of the people simply infallible," and in Baldur von Schirach's famous prayer for the Hitler Youth:

Adolf Hitler, we believe in Thee. Without Thee we would be alone. Through Thee we are a people. Thou hast given us the great experience of our youth, comradeship. Thou has laid upon us the task, the duty and the responsibility. Thou hast given us Thy Name (Hitler Jugend), the most beloved Name that Germany has ever possessed. We speak it with reverence, we bear it with faith and loyalty. Thou canst depend upon us, Adolf Hitler, Leader and Standard-Bearer. The Youth is Thy Name. Thy name is the Youth. Thou and the young millions can never be sundered.¹⁷

Mussolini and Hitler set the modern pattern for personal dictatorship, but the outcome was hardly successful enough to make it necessary to discuss this particular type of antidemocratic theory any further.

b. Beginning with Plato's conception of philosopher-kings, rule by or in the name of a particular social class has bemused the minds of many antidemocrats. Calhoun upheld it in his theory of a "Greek democracy" for the South, Spengler insisted that "class-States are the *only* States," Franco's Spain exemplifies it in the dominance of

¹⁷ As quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 223-224.

army, church, and Falange, and the Soviet Union in theory is ruled by the proletariat although the proletariat usually takes orders from its masters in the Kremlin.

c. From the theocratic absolutism of John Calvin in Geneva and the theocratic pretensions of the clergy in Puritan New England to the "turgid rhetoric of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel" and the nontheological puritanism of Irving Babbitt the idea of a society ruled by the right principle has also intrigued the minds of men who cared more for their own conception of the world than for the happiness of others.¹⁸ Of course they have always professed to be concerned about others, but only if others lived according to the ideas of the high-minded. Puritan divines, indeed, thought so highly of their own interpretations of the Bible that they regarded popular enactments not merely as expressions of the carnal desires of the natural man but almost as insults to God, "implying as they did the insufficiency of the Scriptures."¹⁹

This like the other varieties of authoritarianism obviously implies that a few people always know better what is good for other people than the others do themselves—again the assumption that the average man is incapable of governing himself—plus the intellectual arrogance of a privileged minority. Authoritarianism in whatever guise—rule by the right man, the right class, or the right principle—makes no better showing than do the three varieties of aristocracy. Those who regard democracy as undesirable all argue, in effect, that it is undesirable to *us*, a privileged minority, which after all rather gives the case away. If it is undesirable to the privileged, one might legitimately conclude that it would be highly desirable to the unprivileged.

In the end, all the arguments against democracy as impossible in itself or as undesirable to the privileged minority come down to more or less subtle and elaborate rationalizations for the right of a few to control the destinies of the many. And in every case antidemocratic theory denies the ethical ultimacy of the principle of personality.

So much then for the intellectual factors weakening the moral unity of American cities. What now of the emotional factors?

II-10:10. Emotional Factors in Moral Disunity

Social critics like Lancelot Hogben and psychiatrists like Dr. Franz Alexander, Dr. James S. Plant, Karen Horney, and others have been

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 225–233.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

pointing out for years that the peoples of the Western world, Americans among them, have been developing an ominous trend in individual behavior and social movements during recent generations. Hogben pinpointed it in the title of one book as *The Retreat from Reason*. Dr. Alexander traced it in *Our Age of Unreason* through five phases from the zenith of political rationality in Locke to the nadir of rationality in Fascism. The second phase of the retreat came when Hume made reason the servant of practical needs. Then the Benthamites stressed self-interest as all-powerful, and presently Marx made violence (revolution) the sovereign key to social justice. The final phase in our own generation saw Nazism and Italian Fascism throw social justice overboard and declare "violence an aim in itself and the rule of force the only valid principle in society."²⁰

Modern society, in other words, has been developing more and more emotional pressures for a moral order hostile to the values of the American Creed and the dignity of personality. Thus, the frustrations and insecurities of industrial society have been helping to break down moral integration. They do this through the psychological mechanisms by which individuals adjust to frustration and insecurity. There are many ways of adjusting to frustration and insecurity; two among them are particularly dangerous to the moral integration of a society. These are *regression*, or reversion to a simpler and more dependent level of adjustment, and the various ways by which an individual induces in himself *a false sense of adequacy by belittling others*. Regression may take the form of giving up the struggle to deal rationally with a situation and of trying to meet it with an outburst of temper or outright force. The search for adequacy may induce acceptance of aristocratic or authoritarian ideologies which, as Karl Mannheim observed concerning Nazism, give "a sense of achieving distinction without attainment."

There is a formidable literature on this whole subject from the laboratories, clinics, and guidance field which we cannot attempt even to summarize. But it will perhaps make the problem somewhat more concrete if we note some of the findings of one recent study which concerned itself with the emotional factors underlying anti-Semitism. Obviously, anti-Semitism implies values hostile to those of the American Creed, to the intrinsic value of personality, and to the democratic philosophy of life. Hence, whatever contributes to

²⁰ *Our Age of Unreason: A Study of the Irrational Forces in Social Life*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1942, p. 55.

the spread of anti-Semitism contributes to the weakening of moral integration in American communities.

II-10:11. The Emotional Roots of Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism can be studied as a culture trait, external to and largely independent of any given individual or local social system. It has been a culture trait in the Western world for twenty centuries.

But it is also an emotional-ideological trait of individuals. As such it is characterized by fear, suspicion, hostility, and stereotyped thinking directed at other individuals identified as Jews and at the entire category of individuals classified as Jews. There is evidence, as we have said, that from 10 to 60 percent of Americans manifest this trait to some degree. If we ask why, in general, anybody in America should manifest anti-Semitism, the answer must be, Largely because of cultural diffusion—the transfer of the trait from one person to another through personal contact, or transfer through contact with objective expressions of the trait such as anti-Semitic passages in the Bible, anti-Semitic literature, anti-Semitic practices and customs, and so on. To become anti-Semitic, rather than merely antagonistic to certain individuals, one must at least be aware that there is a category of people called Jews. And that awareness is a culturally transmitted thing.

But when we ask why anti-Semitism appears in certain individuals and not in others, we must consider factors other than cultural diffusion. We must consider personal factors as well as cultural. What personal factors? Undoubtedly personal factors like high intelligence, liberal education, and general sophistication would tend to retard the spread of anti-Semitism, if all other personal factors in a population were equal. But they are not equal and the most fundamental factors of all, emotional adjustment patterns, vary widely from person to person. Tendencies to regression and willingness to belittle others vary greatly in any given population. What relationship is there between the distribution of such tendencies and the distribution of anti-Semitism?

There are two ways of answering that. One way would be to take an adequate sample of a population and then determine the distribution of regressions and tendencies to belittlement, etc., in that population as compared with the distribution of anti-Semitism. If the two were found to correspond, case studies could then be made to determine why. Logically, this would be the most satisfactory

method of answering our question. But unfortunately it not only would be very expensive but would tax existing techniques for measuring regression and tendencies to belittlement, etc., in a large population.

A second way of going at it is, therefore, more feasible. This is to determine the distribution of anti-Semitism in sample populations, study its correlates, and study intensively the relationship of anti-Semitism to emotional maladjustment in small, clinical samples. This is the method used by the investigators for the American Jewish Committee in their *Studies of Prejudice*, 1945-50.²¹ These studies have contributed some of the best evidence available on the relationship between emotional maladjustment and anti-Semitism.²²

Of the five published studies of the Committee three are most immediately pertinent to our problem: *The Dynamics of Prejudice* as discovered in interview studies of 150 non-officer veterans of World War II in Chicago; psychoanalytic evidence on anti-Semitism from forty clinical and social agency cases in Chicago (*Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder*); and a mass of data from over 2000 men and women, mostly members of the middle class in California and Oregon, data obtained by a variety of tests to determine personality type anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and politico-economic ideology and by 100 clinical interviews with selected cases (*The Authoritarian Personality*):

In general, these studies reveal the fact that *anti-Semitic personalities are inadequate personalities*—people who are afraid, worried, unable to handle internal conflicts in a normal manner. For them anti-Semitism is no accident: it serves a definite purpose for their personalities. It helps bolster their deficient sense of adequacy. Through it they project upon the Jews their own internal shortcomings and conflicts: Their lack of success is due to the Jews, who

²¹ These studies were edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman and were published by Harper & Brothers, New York, in five volumes in 1949 and 1950, with other volumes in preparation. The first five volumes were: *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany*, by Paul W. Massing, 1949; *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator*, by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, 1949; *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans*, by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, 1950; *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation*, by Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, 1950; and *The Authoritarian Personality*, by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford, and others, 1950.

²² The evidence on the historical development of anti-Semitism in Germany and on anti-Semitic agitation in America has its bearing on anti-Semitism as a factor in moral disunity but is not immediately relevant to the problem of emotional maladjustment and anti-Semitism.

"have all the money and control things"; their defective sense of identification with their own in-group is strengthened by emphasizing the Jew as different. By stereotyping the Jew they no longer have to struggle with the actual diversity of that reality. Most of them feel deprived, cheated, blocked, apprehensive.

But anti-Semitism is only one facet of these inadequate personalities. It is part of a syndrome of conservatism, ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, rigidity, secret dependence, and fear of weakness. When all these combine in marked degree, we have what the investigators called the authoritarian personality, the individual who has to hold people at a distance to preserve his own threatened ego, dares not let go of conventionality for fear of failure, and, projecting his own unconscious emotional impulses outward, feels that wild and dangerous things (especially sexual) go on in the world, a world that he meets with hostility and with an overexaggerated insistence on dominance-or-else. The authoritarian is a man who overcompensates for his own sense of inadequacy by overemphasizing power and toughness. Sympathy, kindness, even real respect for others all smack of weakness, which he fears and repudiates.

How does he get that way?

By growing up in a home in which he was deprived of real affection, was rigidly disciplined, had few of the emotional securities of a normal childhood. Cold, rigid parents not too well adjusted sexually themselves and unable to accept a child for himself apart from what he could achieve to enhance their egos—characters like this populate the domestic backgrounds of most of the prejudiced. Full-grown, the product of such a home looks on the world as a hostile place and repays it with hostility of his own. As it happens, anti-Semitism fits the emotional needs of this type of personality like a glove. It provides a scapegoat and an infallible ego-inflater. Blame all the ills of 151,000,000 people on one-thirtieth of their number, insulate your reality sense behind a categorical stereotype that has been kicking around for centuries and is now approved by some of the "best people," rationalize it all with racism or Fascism or what-have-you, and the shivering little ego can face the world once more secure in "distinction attained without achievement."

The process illustrates the way in which emotional maladjustment contributes to moral disunity and the difficulties of making democracy work in American cities.

Inadequate homes productive of emotional maladjustments that

predispose the victimized personalities to antidemocratic ideologies in general and anti-Semitism in particular, then, add their bit to the other factors touched upon in this chapter contributing to the moral confusions of our metropolitan centers. How to integrate individuals, associational processes, and culture in our metropolitan centers into harmonious social systems that will maximize the values of human dignity, rationality, and freedom remains a task of formidable complexity.

Mass Communication and Democracy

II-11:1. The Problems We Face

As we have repeatedly noted, every person, organization, and social system continues as a social entity only in and through constant expenditure of energy in adjustment and readjustment to the changing pressures of the physical and social environments. Thus, adjustment and readjustment are essential processes of every social entity and social situation. And as we have noted in Book I, Chapter 11, adjustment and readjustment to distant situations are in large part dependent on the flow of information about the world "out there" provided by distance communication and the agencies of mass diffusion—the press, the radio, television. By information we mean *verifiable facts, interpretations of facts* (situational definitions), and *evaluations of the interpretations*.

In so far as this flow of information is continuous, comprehensive, and reasonably objective, untainted by propaganda, censorship, and the distortions of special interests—to that extent may it be called a basis for rational adjustment and readjustment.

We have also noted that every society tends to develop certain social myths, or superrational beliefs and values, concerning itself, its purposes, and the way it solves its life problems. We have noted that one of the major components of the American social myth is what we have called the American Creed—belief in the dignity of the individual, in the obligation of American institutions to serve the individual, in freedom, in equality of opportunity. It should be obvious at this point that if individual, organizational, and systemic adjustments and readjustments are to realize the values of the Ameri-

can Creed—human dignity, freedom, equality of opportunity, social rationality—they must be based on a flow of information which on the whole and in the long run is *not* screened, distorted, or manipulated by *conditions* or *forces* hostile to those values. That such conditions and forces do exist and do affect the flow of information reaching the American public should be sufficiently evident from the facts presented in Book I, Chapter 11.

How these conditions and forces bear on the struggle in America to realize the values of the American Creed in actual living constitutes the subject of this chapter. By conditions we refer to those factors affecting mass distance contacts that are over and beyond immediate control or manipulation by individuals: such factors as the psychological limitations on individual attention, the nature of publics, the social myth of the democratic process. By forces we refer to the tendentious impacts of human purpose on the processes of mass distance contacts: propaganda, censorship, privacy, editorial policy, and the like.

The values basic to this discussion are those implicit in the American Creed and in the common moral code. The question always is, How do these conditions and forces square with the values of human dignity, freedom, equality of opportunity, fair play, rationality, common decency?

We shall raise such specific problems as the following: What are the social implications of the breakdown of the myth of the democratic process? What are the moral implications of the pauperization of the newspaper reader vs. the privileged position of the newspaper publisher? What are the limits of publicity as a social value? Or to put it in another way, What are the social values of privacy and secrecy? How preserve the rationality of adjustment-readjustment processes in the face of Freud, propaganda, and censorship? What do present trends mean for the future of freedom?

II-11.2. The Myth of the Democratic Process

The Puritan Revolution, 1642–49, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 destroyed English absolutism and introduced the principle of the supremacy of Parliament. It thus became necessary for political philosophers to rationalize, or explain, what had happened and to develop theories of government in some accordance with the facts. In the days of royal absolutism Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) had held that a people, once having entered into a contract to establish

civil society by relinquishing the freedoms of a state of nature in which existence had been "nasty, brutish and short," could never overthrow their lawful rulers without also destroying civil society. Unfortunately for the logical Mr. Hobbes, however, the illogical English did just that in the Puritan Revolution and again in 1688, and English society did not revert to the jungle. Why not? Well, obviously, as John Locke (1632-1704) presently pointed out, a government is not the same thing as civil society, so the people can dispense with a king without reverting to bows and arrows. But if that is so, who has the ultimate power in the state? Who is sovereign, if the king isn't? This question had never bothered philosophers in the days of divine right, but it bothered them considerably after an English squire named Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) had had Charles I's head gathered up neatly in a basket. But by the end of the eighteenth century, thanks to various people such as the old Roman Stoics with their ideas of natural law, the leaders of the French Enlightenment with their deification of reason, a Swiss-born Frenchman named Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), an American colonial planter named George Washington (1732-99), a Scotchman named Adam Smith (1723-90), and sundry others, certain ideas began to get about to the general effect that "the people" themselves were the sovereigns in a state and that, since they were essentially very rational characters whose interests were essentially all the same, "the public" ought to control the government. Of course at this time in the minds of all right-thinking people the public consisted of gentlemen of means who could read and write. So it was a simple matter for an English jurist and philosopher named Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), to formulate the great myth of self-government. By this myth the people govern themselves by means of (1) the public opinion (2) of highly rational citizens (3) whose basic interests coincide (4) because in the nature of things (natural law) (5) there is a preëstablished harmony of human interests which (6) right reason can easily reveal. This typical product of eighteenth-century rationalism Bentham bequeathed to the nineteenth century, which in turn bequeathed it to the twentieth.

When Bentham formulated that myth one person in every six in the United States was a slave. At least one of the remaining five could not read or write. Four-fifths of all the gainfully employed worked for themselves and nearly all of those were farmers.

Ninety percent of the population lived on farms or in small rural

villages: in other words, in face-to-face neighborhoods. Distance contacts—travel, correspondence, newspapers, books—were the prerogatives of the rich and well born. Below the social level of the rich and well born there were actually no publics that could not have been spanned within a radius of ten miles. Only Philadelphia and New York had more than 50,000 inhabitants, and outside of New England, access to education still depended largely on family affluence. Not a single newspaper circulated within the means of an ordinary workman.

Bentham's conception of self-government by public opinion was not a conception of democratic process but a conception of the free exchange of ideas among those fit to govern. In America the "Jeffersonian revolution," however, early swept away property qualifications for voting in most northern states, and within another generation the effective public here included not only the "best people" but ordinary farmers, mechanics, and petty tradesmen. Lacking any other concept of the way in which public opinion operated, Americans took over Bentham's scheme as the *myth of the democratic process*. It has persisted ever since—to the befuddlement of theorists and the frustration of the man in the street.

The myth rests on assumptions which can be demonstrated to be false; and predictions based on it don't come true.

II-11:3. Breakdown of the Myth

There are two troubles with the Bentham myth: (1) all five of its assumptions are false, and (2) it doesn't work. Otherewise it is a pretty good myth, as myths go!

What are its assumptions?

1. Society is rational.
2. Each individual is not only rational but makes his social adjustments on the basis of reason.
3. Preëstablished harmony unifies all individual interests.
4. Right reason can reveal this harmony.
5. Once revealed, this existing harmony must inevitably form the basis of successful adjustment.

Let's examine those assumptions one by one.

1. Society is rational. Well, obviously it is and it isn't. Certain aspects of it such as science and technology are highly rational indeed. But other aspects such as certain customs and even institutions (war) are anything but rational. What could be more irrational than shak-

ing hands with a stranger just before sitting down to a meal? What more irrational than English spelling? How rational is the settlement of international disputes by means of mankind's oldest institutionalized process, war, now that scientific war can destroy civilization and possibly the human race? How rational is tradition? How rational is the American sex code? It is needless to keep on asking such questions. Every society is a hodge-podge of rationality, irrationality, and non-rationality. To assume that reason exhausts the nature of society is to reveal the naïveté of the eighteenth century.

2. Every individual is rational and adjusts socially on the basis of reason. Dynamic psychology and modern psychiatry have long since shown that human beings use reason for only a minor part of their affairs and that they adjust to social situations more often in terms of habit, custom, personality crotchets, emotion, and the like.

Of course every normal human adult *can* reason on occasion, provided he isn't too tired, too habit-bound, too prejudiced, too drunk, too excited, or otherwise too incapacitated. But the notion that we go around reasoning about how to behave vis-à-vis an attractive dance partner or about what to say in a family argument is too unrealistic to require comment. Freud long ago demonstrated that instead of reason controlling emotions, the relationship is usually the other way around. Instead of being the precise thinking machines that eighteenth-century philosophers fancied they saw around them, the human race turns out to be made up of people whose emotions frequently override reason. Millions, for example, know that it would probably be more healthy for them not to smoke, but they go right on smoking anyway. Other millions have intelligence enough to pound sand, period. Millions more are the slaves of their own stereotypes, sentiments, prejudices. The unconscious, the moron, the stereotype, the warped and crippled personality—these pretty well dispose of the eighteenth-century thinking machine.

And if we are not thinking machines, then obviously we do not adjust socially like thinking machines. This entire packet of assumptions is patently false.

3. Preëstablished harmony unifies all individual interests. This is a philosophical or religious concept rather than one derived from empirical evidence. Even if one assumes with Aristotle that man is a social being (and not, as with Hobbes, a wild beast partially domesticated), it does not follow that socialization means a preëxisting harmony of individual interests. Quite conceivably it might mean—

as it seems to mean—that divergent and often conflicting interests need somehow to be harmonized in and through the processes of socialization and social adjustment themselves.

The concept of preëstablished harmony fails under two conditions—which are the conditions that often prevail in human affairs: (a) It fails when people do not have common interests; and (b) it fails when divergent interests override common interests.

a. The crew of a sunken submarine have a common interest in air, but not in the particular supply needed by each man. What one man breathes the others cannot. Two suitors of the same girl have her as a common object of attraction, but they do not have a common interest in marriage. When she marries one, she cannot simultaneously marry the other. When you come down to the specifics of any case involving individual appropriation which deprives or excludes others, there is not and cannot be common interest in the object of appropriation. Men slowly smothering in a sunken submarine have a common interest in escape or rescue, but whenever such escape or rescue entails the salvation of one by the sacrifice of another, common interests disappear. If I am to live and you are to die, it is foolish to talk of common interests. Conceivably we might both have an interest in *somebody's* escaping to warn the fleet, and in so far as that were true, we would have a common interest. But that is not a common interest in something that is appropriable and cannot be shared. Whatever can be appropriated by individuals can be the object of common interests only so long as there is so much of it that appropriation inconveniences nobody. The moment appropriation by one means deprivation of another, common interests no longer exist: Each then has an interest in a share which cannot be shared in common with another.

So much for the impossibility of preëstablished harmony of interests when an interest cannot be common.

b. Interests which can be common still may not be in harmony. Members of the Continental Congress during the American Revolution, for example, certainly had a common interest in the success of the Revolution. All knew that if it failed they would land in a British prison or on a British gibbet. But there has probably never been a supposedly responsible governing body so rent by dissension, jealousies, and private conniving as was the Continental Congress. With Washington's army nearly starving at Valley Forge and practically destitute of everything, Congress squabbled about inconse-

quential. Never did the controlling body of a government at war give such a pitiful exhibition of futility. Yet all its members had a common interest in victory. It merely happened that divergent interests overrode their common interests. There was certainly no pre-established harmony in the Continental Congress despite common interests.

In the nature of the case, all the members of any great society have many common interests in societal survival, normal functioning, and so on. But to assume that because all have so many common interests all must, therefore, be functioning on the basis of some pre-established harmony of interests is utterly unrealistic. There are, as we have shown, many interests which in their specific application cannot possibly be common, to say nothing of being harmonious. And for those that are common, harmony is not preestablished at all; it has to be achieved.

Again, as in the case of the rationality of society and the rationality of the individual and his social adjustments, this assumption of the Benthamite myth fails to grip reality.

4. Right reason can reveal the preëxisting harmony of interests. If there is no preëxisting harmony, right reason in the nature of the case can hardly reveal it. At best, reason may perhaps be able to indicate some of the conditions that must be fulfilled if anything approaching harmony of interests is to be achieved.

5. Revealed harmony of interests must inevitably form the basis of adjustment.

This is an assumption based on further assumptions that morality is essentially right reason and that when men reason rightly they must necessarily follow its dictates. From everything that we now know about the nature of morals and the psychology of behavior these assumptions are false. Morality is largely traditional, and its relation to reason is that reason is frequently called into play to rationalize, explain, and justify it. Many moral ideas can be defended rationally—given the value system of a particular society. But many others are simply cultural vestiges of a former level of culture and cannot be rationally defended at all. Given existing limitations on food supplies, for example, unlimited human breeding in places like China and India is no longer moral. It is positively immoral. But many people still defend such behavior in moral terms. As for men inevitably following the right when reason has shown them what it is, we need only point to any skid row in America by way of refutation.

So much for the five assumptions underlying the great myth of democratic process. All are false.

In addition, the myth doesn't work. People don't behave as the myth says they should. They are never so rational as the myth requires, and important interests seldom harmonize without deliberate efforts to make them harmonize. Preëstablished harmony can be found only on such abstract and general levels as to have no meaning for specific situations. Conflict turns out to be just as natural and almost as prevalent as coöperation. Moral law binds the individual not because it is revealed to him by reason but because he has become habituated to it and finds that obedience is expected of him by those around him.

The American people may be sovereign in the sense that they elect their own legislative and executive officers of government, but that such elections proceed on the basis of rational opinions, preëstablished harmony of interests, *and nothing else* is pure moonshine. There *are* such things as political parties, political machines, pressure groups, propaganda, stereotypes, prejudice, sentiments, censorship, social movements, waves of popular hysteria—a dozen or more factors completely outside the purview of the Benthamite myth of rational public opinion.

Yet as recently as 1931 a responsible statesman in the League of Nations, Sir John Simon to wit, could actually appeal to "world public opinion" to expel the Japanese from Manchuria! Sir John, speaking for the British government, solemnly assured the Assembly that the League of Nations need do nothing about the Japanese invasion of Manchuria—the actual beginning of World War II—because "world public opinion" would inevitably dispose of such aggressors! Poor Sir John! Within a few years Hitler and Mussolini joined the Japanese militarists in demonstrating the real power of "world public opinion." Against the will of ordinary people the world over—including the masses in Japan, Germany, and Italy—World War II decimated civilization!

II-11.4. The Heritage of Liberalism

The Benthamite myth has left a dangerous heritage of belief in the power of reason to control events. It is quite generally assumed, for example, that to change a person's behavior all that is necessary is to change his information; to demonstrate to him the reasonableness of a different course of action. Of course religious exhorters, politi-

cians, salesmen, and public relations experts have no such naïve conception of the relation of ideas to behavior. But nearly everybody else seems to have.

For example, during World War II and immediately after, many employers became convinced that it would help production if they could improve the relations of supervisors and workers in their plants. So they proceeded to subject their first-line supervisors and sometimes even higher echelons to organized courses in human relations. These courses were taught in the orthodox manner of college courses, with lectures, readings, visual aids, discussion sessions, and so on. And the results in terms of changed behavior turned out when actually measured to be much like the *behavioral* results of ordinary college courses—practically zero. The industrial relations instructors, like college professors, changed the information of their students considerably, but they did not change their habits of feeling or acting. The authoritarian foreman came out of such a course *knowing* that more considerate behavior by a foreman had been *demonstrated* to get higher productivity out of a work group. Almost invariably he professed his intention of acting more considerately from then on. But check-backs with his men a few months later turned up the disconcerting fact that, if anything, the authoritarian foreman was now even more authoritarian than ever! He now felt more closely identified with management and acted as he presumed a manager was supposed to act. Mere information had not changed his habits of defining situations (sensitivity) or his actual behavior by one iota. Management had simply wasted its money buying more information for its foremen instead of buying what it supposed it was getting, namely, new patterns of feeling and acting.

How, then, does one make ideas functional in human behavior? One way is to change the situation so that the individual himself accepts the idea as a necessary adjustment on his part to the changed situation. Another is to induce those who do accept the idea to act coercively to remove the obstructionists. In either case the naïve reliance of the Benthamite rationalist on the power of an idea alone goes down the drain. It is an idea *plus action*, not an idea alone, that gets results.

As an example of the first type of idea-plus-action, namely, changing the situation, let us return to our foreman whose behavior was so impervious to a mere information course on human relations. Experimenters from the University of Michigan found that when

they could change the expectations of that foreman's superiors, his fellow foremen, and his own workmen so that any given foreman now found himself in a less authoritarian atmosphere of expectation, *then* the foreman accepted the idea of being more considerate of his workmen and acted accordingly. His behavior changed not merely because he *knew* more considerate behavior could get higher productivity but because he *felt* that more considerate behavior was now called for by the changed situation, the new climate of opinion in which he had to work. In other words, to change his behavior it was necessary to go beyond the mere formal process of teaching him the demonstrated facts about the greater efficiency of more considerate foremanship; it was necessary to create what was in effect a new situation, a situation that forced him to redefine his own role as a foreman. It was not the idea alone but the idea plus the action of the experimenters in changing the situation that changed behavior.¹

The second method of making ideas functional in behavior is illustrated by what happened in a midwestern city a few years ago when various civic leaders became dissatisfied with the workings of the local juvenile court. First, they called in the National Probation and Parole Association to collect the facts which would specify the shortcomings of the court. These facts were then presented to the juvenile court judge. According to the rationalist myth, the judge, faced with this incontrovertible evidence and being a highly rational individual, should then have acted to correct the inadequacies of his court.

Instead, and quite inexplicably, according to the myth, he announced that he saw no reason to change anything and pigeonholed the report. Had the reformers been consistent rationalists, this would naturally have ended the matter. Their idea had been rationally presented, buttressed with the facts for the information of the judge, and nothing had happened. What more could a consistent rationalist do?

What these particular reformers did was to scrap the rationalist myth altogether and organize such an effective publicity and political campaign that the judge was decisively defeated at the next election. Again, as with the authoritarian foreman, it wasn't the idea

¹ The experimental work cited here was carried on by Dr. Floyd Mann and other members of the staff of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, in midwestern utility and industrial plants between 1949 and 1952.

alone that got results but the idea plus action. In this case the action took the form not of changing the climate of opinion within the subject's own organization, as with the foreman, but of changing the opinions of the voters outside and thus forcing him out of office. Action did not force the judge to redefine his own role in a changed situation, as it had the foreman; it pushed him out of the situation altogether. In this case—and unprovided for in the myth—the rationalist approach had simply stiffened the resistance of an official committed to the *status quo* and without social action on the part of the reformers would have accomplished nothing.

Naïve reliance on the myth of the democratic process all too frequently accomplishes just that—nothing. Hence the practical as well as theoretical need of scrapping the myth and facing the facts of life.

Among those facts, as we have already pointed out in Book I, Chapter 11, is the weakened economic position of the newspaper reader as against the strengthened position of the privileged publisher. What does this disparity in economic power mean for the morals of journalism and the role of public opinion in American life?

II-11:5. The Pauperized Reader vs. the Privileged Publisher

The basic economic fact underlying all criticisms of the morals of the American press is the pauperized position of the average newspaper reader. He gets his news as a handout from the advertiser. He no longer pays his own way. That no newspaper can survive without advertising pretty well demonstrates the fact that the ordinary reader will not pay the cost of keeping himself informed about current events if somebody else will pay that cost for him. He would rather take his news as a handout from the advertiser than as a commodity purchased on its own merits.

Our system of government presupposes an informed electorate, but we leave the actual process of informing the electorate to the mercies of business enterprise and to the competing propagandas of rival candidates. True, we subsidize newspapers and accord them various privileges from the invasion of privacy to protection against libel on the theory that they are agencies of public information and thus essential to the operation of self-government. The theory of newspaper privilege regards them as *educational agencies*, but the hard facts of economic life force them to behave as *business enter-*

prises. And the even harder facts of political life make them *engines of political power*—power over public attention and public behavior on crucial issues and crucial occasions. As we have already noted, the trend of technological change and business organization in the field of mass communication as in other fields of our economy is concentrating power in fewer and fewer hands and is thus rendering competition less and less effective as a protector of the public interests. There is still competition in information and ideas, but it is harder for the ordinary individual in one-newspaper towns and four-network radio and television areas to find it. *The whole trend of concentration of control in the mass communication industries is making it harder for the poor and the unorthodox to get their ideas and demands before the public.* The pressures for conformity in American society are going up. This is not merely a consequence of international tensions and the threat of Communist infiltration and the military menace of Soviet aggression. Intolerance is a characteristic of all situations of uncertainty and insecurity. Inevitably some of the pressure for conformity at mid-century was due to the very real menace of Communism and Soviet Russia. But much of it was also due to the technological and organizational trends in American society toward bigger and bigger organizations and more and more concentration of power in fewer and fewer hands. In every field the individual as individual counted for less. In art, education, the professions, business, politics, religion, even labor, the individual, *to succeed*, to make himself felt in American society, had to function through an organization. Even scientific research was organized to the point at which college, foundation, and government *administrators* determined what problems were worth studying and what ones should be ignored. Yet the sad fact remained that from Galileo down practically all the great scientific discoveries had been made by individuals working on their own with a minimum of administrative control and often with a bare minimum of physical resources. And most of the great inventions had not come out of huge research laboratories or out of some corporation's concern with protecting a "patent situation." The instrument of discovery and invention was still the untrammelled human mind.

The upshot of all this is the conclusion that a society tightening its machinery of social control and conformity is not likely to be a society of maximum creativeness and high independent thinking. Nor on the average is the pauperized newspaper reader likely to be able to enforce his educational and moral demands on a mass communication indus-

try of concentrated control and dominating capital investments. The independent mind was at a discount in American society at mid-century.²

Under these conditions is the mass communications industry an agency of light and leading or an instrument of conformity and coercion?

II-11:6. The Limits of Publicity

The theory of democratic self-government rests on the assumption that the electorate not only has a right to be informed about public affairs but must be so informed if it is to make intelligent choices at the polls. This immediately raises all sorts of practical as well as theoretical questions. How well informed is the electorate in actual fact? Using the *New York Times* as our best index of what daily information on public affairs can be, how well do other newspapers measure up? How realistic is the current assumption that the ordinary citizen will on his own initiative make the effort necessary to inform himself on current affairs? Is competitive propaganda—the usual political campaign—the best way to inform the electorate on the issues at stake in an election? What are public affairs and to what extent does the right to know about them conflict with the rival claims of privacy and practical expediency?

In general, experience seems to indicate that the American public tends to decide issues more in terms of personalities than of facts; can deal with only one or two issues at a time; cannot deal intelligently with technical details of any subject at all and with the technical details of foreign policy least of all; and possesses little skill in defending itself against the subtleties of propaganda. It may, indeed, be true that you can't fool all the people all the time, but that is seldom necessary. There have been plenty of instances in which special interests have been able to fool enough of them long enough to decide an election and determine public policy. One notorious instance was the "bloody shirt" Congressional campaign of 1866. The real issue was the tariff—whether to subsidize northern manufacturers with a protective tariff

² See, for example, such testimony as Arthur Miller's "University of Michigan," in *Holiday*, December, 1953, pp. 68–71, that students were less openly critical of the *status quo* than in the 1930's, or the series in *Harper's Magazine*, November and December, 1953, by Harry Henderson on the conformity pressures in the new middle class suburbs that had been built since World War II. C. Wright Mills in *White Collar*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, offers even more substantial evidence of the increasing interdependence of modern society and the blight of caution that has descended on the middle class.

or not. But the high-tariff advocates won not on the merits of that issue at all but on the slogan, "Keep the Rebels out of office!"—an issue that had been decided at Appomattox! Another example was supplied by a recall election in San Francisco in the early days of the notorious Mooney case between 1916 and 1918, when it was beginning to appear that a corrupt district attorney had dishonestly manipulated evidence to obtain a death-sentence murder conviction against a radical labor agitator who had incurred the hatred of powerful California corporations. On the eve of the recall election—but in ample time to make all the editions before the opening of the polls—somebody opportunely blew up the *porch* of the governor's mansion at Sacramento, whereupon the alarmed citizenry promptly reelected the crooked district attorney on the phony issue of protecting San Francisco against the nonexistent "Red menace"! So susceptible are all publics to this kind of technique that it has become standard practice for both Communists and Fascists abroad to prepare the way for totalitarianism by stampeding the public with some sudden, dramatic exposure of a desperate "plot" against the government. The totalitarians then pose as the saviors of the fatherland and round up the real friends of freedom on trumped-up charges of treason. The Nazis used this method when they accused the Communists of having burned the Reichstag building in 1933, a crime which the Nazis themselves had perpetrated as a first step toward Hitler's planned destruction of civil rights in Germany. The Communists used it in Czechoslovakia in 1948 to "cuckoo" the liberal Beneš government out of power in that "model democracy" so they themselves could transform it into a Soviet police satellite.

In this country some years after World War II the very real problem of rooting out Communist infiltration of the federal government generated the fear among many liberals of all parties that American reactionaries might use the same technique to discredit liberalism and stifle legitimate social criticism. Liberals were so afraid of creeping Fascism, in fact, that many of them managed to give the impression of being more concerned about the security of liberalism than about the security of the United States.³ They thus contributed to the very

³ A rough definition of Fascism would identify it as a political and social theory (or movement) dedicated to maintaining the inequities of the capitalist stratification system by means of force, violence, and the destruction of self-government and the welfare state through the creation of a totalitarian, one party regime without civil liberty, the right of habeas corpus, or due process of law. Although Fascist leaders in Italy, Germany, and Spain organized mass followings by appealing to the discontented and frustrated youth

trend that they professed to fear. The problem is obviously one that goes far beyond the role of mass communication and the understanding of distant situations. It involves the loyalties of a people to the basic values of their civilization and the efficiency of the social problem-solving techniques of a culture. But in so far as values and social problem-solving are affected by and find expression through the agencies of mass communication, we can hardly escape the issue here.

It has two immediate aspects: (1) the relation of mass communication agencies to intellectual freedom and (2) the problem of propaganda in a democratic society.

II-11:7. Mass Communication and Intellectual Freedom

Intellectual freedom is not merely freedom to use one's mind without coercion or restraint to seek, question, and formulate ideas without accountability to anyone. It is also freedom to make the most of one's mind; freedom to develop, to learn, to communicate and discuss; freedom to breathe a mental atmosphere of freedom. In a purely negative sense one can be intellectually free on a desert island, but only in a free society that opens to the mind the best thought of the world and of the ages and *encourages independent thinking*—only in such a society can one enjoy intellectual freedom in a positive sense. Even then, when all external restraints have been removed and every facility and encouragement has been provided to encourage independent thinking, how many will still remain slaves to their own preconceptions, their own sentiments, stereotypes, and prejudices, their own built-in barriers to a new look at the world?

The truth is, of course, that real intellectual freedom in more than a merely negative sense has hardly ever existed in the world at all, and even the mere negative freedom to "test all things and hold fast that which is true" has been granted only to a few men in a few societies during a few years. Throughout the ages there have been exceptional individuals from Socrates down who have surmounted the coercions of their own place and time, but the number is comparatively small. Most men have had to submit to the taboos and pressures of their time. And those taboos and pressures have always been very considerable.

of the middle classes in the name of a rebirth of national or racial virtues, it was the financial support of such leaders by the privileged classes in each country that enabled the leaders to come to power. If revolution tends to widen the distribution of privilege in a society, Fascism must be classified as counterrevolutionary.

In primitive societies and down almost to yesterday even in the Western world men have feared the mysteries of nature and of their own imagining. In most societies men who denied the gods or questioned current beliefs about any vital matter led precarious lives. The early Christian Church introduced the concept of heresy into the ancient world, but the fact of social rejection of unbelievers and non-conformers is as old as organized society. In fact, the concept of tolerance itself dates only from the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe, and it has been completely rejected by the new religions of totalitarianism that are now threatening freedom all over the world. One need only read of the perils and persecutions endured by the pioneers of modern science to realize how grim has been the long struggle to free the human mind from the dead weight of tradition. And one need only recall yesterday's abominations of Nazi "science" or listen to the muted echoes from behind the Iron Curtain today to realize how precarious is even the little toehold on freedom so hardly won. All the pressures of modern technology, gigantism, and social insecurity are dead against the great ideal of independent thinking. Only the tradition of free inquiry, institutionalized in our universities, offers a few individuals an uncertain shelter against a new glacial age of creeping intolerance—and the hatchet men of reaction have been doing their best since World War II to demolish that shelter with the rest.

The masters of mass communication while trumpeting loudly their claims for freedom of the press, i.e., the right to run their businesses to suit themselves, have shown little understanding of the value of intellectual freedom. That value rests, of course, on an assumption, a belief, and a demonstration. The assumption is that rationality, or understandability, is a fundamental characteristic of the universe. The belief is that human reason can solve life problems more adequately than other powers at man's command. And the demonstration has been provided by the achievements of physical science, the major product of the free intellect, during the first four centuries of its career. Man has other ways of "solving" his life problems: by force, by mysticism, by wishful thinking, by escape, by tradition, by emotionalism—many ways. But only by the rational control of cause-and-effect relationships has he been able to raise his standard of living, to treble his life expectancy, to outfly sound, to conquer the atom. No other power of his for dealing with reality has done all this. Only the free intellect. And yet every authoritarian in the world from the aver-

age foreman in the local factory to the masters of the Kremlin regards the free intellect as the deadly enemy of the social world he lives in. Not all of them would go so far in suppressing or shackling it as Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, or Malenkov, but all of them are afraid of it. Every authoritarian in the world is afraid of it because the free intellect must inevitably challenge everything, including all authority, to justify itself before the court of human reason. And from that court there is no appeal—except to force and irrationality.⁴

What has all this to do with distance communication and mass diffusion?

Nobody can argue that newspapers, the radio, television, and the movies are in themselves enemies of the free intellect. Again we are dealing with instruments of human purpose, and as we have pointed out before, instruments are always rationally and morally neutral. It is the purposes that are rational or irrational, moral or immoral. What these particular instruments add to human purposes is neither rationality nor morality, or their opposites, but *power*—the power to reach masses at a distance; the power to slant news and manipulate opinions. The question, then, becomes one of the rationality or irrationality, the morality or immorality, with which this power is being used relative to freedom of the intellect.

Perhaps no clear-cut answer to that question is possible. Few aspects of modern society fall neatly into dichotomies of black and white. By their very existence newspapers, the radio, television, and even the movies contribute to intellectual freedom; they break down the iron limitations of space and time. But by the nature of their technological limitations and of their concentrated control they often threaten that freedom. And in so far as they become engines for multiplying the effect of authoritarian purposes or of anti-intellectual biases they contribute to a climate of opinion inimical to intellectual freedom. The very rarity of a newspaper like the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, which still carries on in the Pulitzer tradition of crusading in the public interest, evidences the subtle influence of *most* of the press toward creating an atmosphere of *incuriosity* and mental stagnation. Most of the time the American press is not openly hostile to intellectual freedom—in-

⁴ Beware of identifying force with irrationality. Force is neither rational nor irrational. It may be used to serve either kind of purpose, just as it may be used for moral or immoral purposes. The point is, man's long climb up from the jungle has been successful in the main in so far as he has been able to understand and utilize relationships of cause and effect. In so far as such relationships have eluded him, his adjustments have failed or attained only partial success.

deed, many papers have protested against "witch hunts" and disregard of individual rights by Congressional committees, state legislatures, and other authoritarians. But the prevailing tone of the press is one not so much of hostility to intellectual freedom as of indifference to it. By and large, the mediums of mass communication in America express the mores of their communities, and the mores of most American communities accept intellectual freedom as possibly good *in the past and in the abstract* but gravely suspect now and in any actual instance. There is a widespread belief, for example, that college professors are paid to teach not what their professional search for truth may reveal but what the leaders in the community or in the state want them to teach. Two generations ago, when the Darwinian controversy was at its height, professors of philosophy were the targets of coercive pressure. One great state university, for example, never dared to appoint a non-clergyman to head its philosophy department until 1894, and then its appointee was a devout church member. Even within recent years the president of one institution has been under pressure from certain church groups to get rid of a member of the anthropology department who somewhat too frankly compared modern religious practices with those of primitive tribes. On the whole, however, the hot spots of modern controversy are no longer in religion or philosophy but in economics, labor problems, history, political science, sociology. It is in these fields that the pressures for conservatism now come to a sizzling focus and press hardest on intellectual freedom. Unlike conditions early in the century, when an iconoclast like Thorstein Veblen, denouncing classical economics as "pre-Darwinian in method" and "capitalist apologetics" in effect, could simply be ignored at promotion time, the contemporary social scientist cannot prepare a lecture or write a book without constant awareness of the lurking surveillance of powerful forces of repression. Does he assign readings in Marx and Sorel and Lenin to students of labor problems? A great corporation may protest and force the withdrawal of the course. Does he attack racial segregation as contrary to American ideals? An opinionated millionaire may change his mind about honoring the author's college with a badly needed new medical building or research laboratory. Does he write a book debunking the myths of American history? Superpatriots denounce him as a Red and stampede ignorant school boards into banning his book from high schools and libraries. Indiscretions of his youth, when it was high sport to gang up at a lecture by Emma Goldman or sit up till morning explor-

ing the possibilities of the Russian Revolution, may even be dug out of college newspaper files as damning evidence by solemn patriots who never questioned anything in their lives except the loyalty of independent minds. Under the pressures of vested interests, professional patriots, and the anti-intellectual heritage of the frontier (and of contemporary crypto-Fascism)—under these pressures intellectual freedom at mid-century was definitely at a discount in American culture.

II-11:8. Do Radio and Television Menace Academic Freedom?

Incidentally and without the deliberate intention of anyone the progress of invention in mass communication was also adding to the difficulties of intellectual independence. College courses by television which a number of universities were putting on the air by 1954 were unquestionably broadening educational opportunity for millions of laymen, but they were also opening new possibilities of intellectual repression at the source. Not courses in "Shakespeare," "Elementary Statistics," or "Health Hints for New Mothers." Not courses in non-controversial fields. But imagine the pressures that would descend on the luckless instructor indiscreet enough to offer a radio or television course in "Labor Problems" or "Social Stratification" or "Contemporary Political Philosophies"!

Every lecture delivered to a college class is delivered to students who have a common background in that particular subject—students who have selected the course, have followed the development of the instructor's analysis of the subject matter from the first class meeting and expect to stay with it to the end. Every television lecture, on the other hand, must be delivered to a heterogeneous audience ranging all the way from illiterates to Ph.D.'s in chemistry, mathematics, or English phonetics—a heterogeneous audience with no common grounding in the subject matter of the lecture at all, no common perspective for evaluating either the lecturer or the readings he assigns, and no common intention of following the subject through to some logical conclusion. Despite the fact that such a series of lectures would be offered as a course for which individuals might enroll and obtain credit by following instructions, doing the readings, and passing an examination, there would be no way of barring out the frivolous, the fanatical, the ignorant, the prejudiced, the self-seekers, and the anti-intellectuals in general. All these would tune in at will, would tear statements and demonstrations out of context, and with no commitment whatever to

intellectual integrity or to evaluating the course only after it was over, would be free to denounce, high-pressure, and bedevil the instructor and his college on partial evidence and emotional snap judgments. Extension work by radio or television, therefore, will add to intellectual freedom only as it is confined to courses in noncontroversial fields. If and when a college attempts the dubious task of trying to teach courses in controversial fields by radio or television academic freedom will immediately come under pressure to "tone things down," "slur over conflicts," "try to avoid giving offense." But unfortunately, it is the essence of real education in such fields not to tone things down, not to slur over conflicts, and to try not to avoid but to understand the causes of offense. There is an irreconcilable conflict between intellectual freedom on the campus and exposure to the pressures of the practical world. Academic detachment is one thing; concern for maintaining or changing a practical situation is something else.⁵

In the last analysis intellectual freedom, in so far as it has been achieved at all in American society, depends on the maintenance of the conditions of academic detachment. Academic detachment means freedom to examine ideas without immediate concern for their practical results, without immediate concern for their implications for maintaining or changing a practical situation. Such freedom is possible only in a protected environment, one in which teachers and students deliberately isolate themselves from the pressures of the practical. This does not mean that they can have no concern with the practical, as every college class that tours a slum, visits a prison, or observes a factory in action well knows. But it does mean that their concern with the practical is limited to the attempt to understand it, not to change it or prevent its being changed. And the reason why radio or television instruction in courses in controversial fields is perilous to academic detachment is precisely that, unlike the students in such courses on the campus, the radio or television audience cannot be screened down to those interested only in understanding the world. Courses in noncontroversial fields do their own screening, for by definition a noncontroversial field is one in which people either have

⁵ Nearly a hundred educational institutions have increased their TV offerings since the Federal Communications Commission reserved 250 television channels for non-commercial, educational use in 1952, and several thousand college teachers are now involved in "telecourses." Edward Stasheff, of the University of Michigan television staff, reported in *Senate Affairs*, October, 1954, a regular bulletin to the faculty, that "educational TV will not displace the instructor on any level, not will it overburden him." But he also noted that television teaching required about thirteen hours of rehearsal and preparation for each half-hour on the air!

no immediate practical concerns or, if they have, agree overwhelmingly on what they are. Hence, such courses constitute no threat at all to intellectual freedom. But until some way is devised for screening out all radio listeners and television viewers who *are* interested in practical outcomes about which people differ rather than *solely* in *understanding* the problems about which they differ, so long will radio and television courses in controversial fields constitute another threat to intellectual freedom on the campus.

Mass communication serves intellectual freedom, then, in so far as it frees the minds of men from the limitations of time and distance. It hampers or limits intellectual freedom in so far as it gives mass impact to the purposes of the ignorant, the self-seeking, the prejudiced, the bigoted, and the anti-intellectuals of all kinds. And willy-nilly the advent of college instruction by radio or television can become another factor imperiling academic freedom if and when such instruction is extended to controversial fields in which the listening or viewing "audience" must inevitably include great numbers of individuals interested in anything and everything except merely and solely better understanding of their social world. Intellectual freedom is possible only in a protected environment, an environment in which it is possible to examine ideas on their own merits without immediate concern for their practical implications. The existence of such freedom anywhere constitutes a standing threat to authoritarians everywhere, for intellectual freedom means inevitably a standing challenge to all authority to justify itself in the court of reason—or admit its irrationality.

II-11:9. Propaganda and Other Forms of Influence

We have already, in Book I, Chapter 11, defined propaganda as the projection of conclusions by any and all means. In other words, propaganda is simply another instrument, or tool, of directive initiative; a means for influencing the behavior of others. As such it might well be left for further consideration until we take up problems of social readjustment in Chapter 13. But since it enters so largely into mass communication and is used in almost every major controversy to slant American definitions of distant situations such as the Chinese Revolution, Communist infiltration at Washington, and proto-Fascism in the United States, we may as well come to terms with it here.

The first problem that confronts us is to distinguish propaganda as such from other ways by which individuals (and organizations) de-

liberately influence the behavior of others. There are at least eight forms of such deliberate influence and each shows at least six distinct characteristics. Table II-11.1 shows the relationships among these forms and characteristics.

In any attempt on the part of one person to influence or affect the behavior of another six questions always arise: (1) What is the purpose of this attempt? (2) What kind of result is sought? (3) What psychological means are used—argument, demonstration, or persuasion? (4) What communicative means are used—mere person-to-person communication, mass communication, or manipulation of the environment? (5) What control, if any, is maintained at the source over the identity of the source, i.e., how secret is the attempt at influence? and finally, (6) To what extent, if at all, does the subject know who or what it is that is trying to influence him?

The most important of these is, of course, the purpose behind the attempt. The educator's purpose is to contribute to the development of the student's own capacity to direct his own life intelligently. The propagandist's purpose is simply to control the behavior of others to further the interests of whatever cause he serves. In this respect the propagandist is no different from the personal advocate, the salesman, or the advertiser. But his objectives are usually much broader, the means he uses more inclusive, and his approaches much subtler than those of the others. If he sometimes comes into the open and frankly espouses a given cause, like the personal advocate, he goes beyond the personal advocate in supplementing or reinforcing personal advocacy with manipulations of the environment or the creation of situations that seem to require the acceptance of his conclusion without any intervention on his part.

Consider, for example, the difference between the straight-out appeal of a public prosecutor urging a jury to convict a participant in a strike riot and the multiplied, indirect psychological coercions of the jury which the same prosecutor could apply by camping a company of militia on the courthouse lawn, having the soldiers search everyone entering the courtroom for deadly weapons, and then conducting the case as though there were imminent danger that some menacing, unnamed accomplices of the accused were about to snatch him from the hands of justice to the deadly peril of the community. The first type of appeal is simply personal advocacy, the kind of thing that one can hear in any courtroom in America during any term of court. The second is propaganda, the deliberate reinforcement of personal advocacy

TABLE II-11.1. Forms and Characteristics of Nonauthoritative Behavior Directed Toward Influencing the Behavior of Others

Typical Characteristics	Forms							
	Education	Avowed Personal Advocacy	Unavowed Personal Advocacy	Salesmanship	Advertising ^a	Propagandized Education	Educational Propaganda	Propaganda
Purpose at source	Subject's own development	Advocate's own cause or advantage	Advocate's own cause or advantage	Salesman's own advantage: a sale	Advertiser's own advantage	Subject's own advantage	Propagandist's own advantage	Propagandist's own advantage
Kind of result sought	Self-directed behavior: understanding	Other-controlled behavior on anything	Other-controlled behavior on anything	Other-controlled behavior: sales	Other-controlled behavior: sales	Other-controlled behavior on anything	Self-directed behavior on an issue	Other-controlled behavior on an issue
Psychological means	Reason: distinctions of likeness-difference; truth	Persuasion: conclusion given	Persuasion: conclusion given	Persuasion: conclusion given	Persuasion: conclusion given	Persuasion	Reason: truth, fact	Persuasion: conclusion given
Communicative means	Person to person	Person to person	Person to person	Person to person	Person to mass	Person to mass, organized spread	Person to mass; organized spread	Organized spread; manipulation of environment, etc.
Control at source over identity revelation	No	No	Yes	No	No	Usually no	Yes or no	Yes
Subject's awareness of identity of source	Complete	Complete	Restricted	Complete	Complete	Usually complete	Restricted: purpose veiled; identity not always	Restricted: purpose veiled; identity usually
Examples	Solve: $x = y$ $r = 3 - 2y$ Distinguish education from propaganda.	Face to face: "Vote for me."	Anonymous letter: "Vote for Jones."	Face to face. "This is a good buy."	Mass Medium: "Switch to king-size Cofin-nails."	"Swat the fly!"	To Germans in 1918: "330,000 U.S. troops landed in France last month" (the truth)	"All liberals are Reds."

^a Note that the term *advertising* refers to two things: (1) a form of salesmanship and (2) a means of communication, i.e., paid white space or radio or television time. As a means of communication "advertising space or time can obviously be used for any of the other forms of communication listed in this table.

with such manipulation of the environment as to create an atmosphere of suggestion which tends to force the victims of it to accept *of their own accord* the conclusion that the propagandist wants them to accept, namely, that they are dealing with desperate men who are part of some menacing conspiracy against public order. That kind of psychological coercion was actually applied in at least one labor case in America, and the method itself is the stock in trade of all professional propagandists. On a larger scale, it has been used here to swing public elections and abroad to stampede electorates into abdicating sovereignty, as we have already noted.

So much for the differences between personal advocacy and propaganda. Now for the distinction between salesmanship and advertising, on one hand, and propaganda, on the other.

Salesmanship may be defined as personal advocacy of an economic transaction, a sale; and advertising, *as a process*, is simply salesmanship impersonalized and mass diffused. But one can "sell" anything, including ideas and attitudes, and advertising is not merely a process, or form of communicative influence. It is also an objective *means of communication*, a way of communicating any kind of influence from education to propaganda. An example or two will serve to illustrate these distinctions.

First, a case of personal advocacy, or "salesmanship," which borders on propaganda but doesn't quite qualify: An old farmer, noted among his neighbors for his rough ways with his wife, was finally sued for divorce by his long-suffering spouse. Barred from his house pending the hearing of the case, he began dropping in at the office of the judge who was to conduct the hearing—an unethical procedure which a more scrupulous judge would have stopped immediately. This particular official, however, fancied himself charged with responsibility for "preserving the family" in his jurisdiction, so he permitted the visits to continue—and his own head to fill up with purely *ex parte* testimony concerning the old farmer's domestic tribulations. The upshot of it was that the judge finally called in the wife and practically ordered her to drop the whole thing. The case never came to hearing.

Had the old farmer organized a barrage of suggestions in his own favor to encompass the judge he would have been guilty of making propaganda. As it was, his whining personal complaints of domestic hardship amounted only to a sentimentally persuasive kind of personal advocacy which won the judge's sympathy (1) because that official violated his oath of impartial administration of justice by listening to

the old fellow in the first place, and (2) because the judge was himself incapable of considering any divorce case on its merits, given his preconceptions about his duty "to preserve the family."

Two examples will point up the distinction to be drawn between propaganda and advertising. A few years ago a strike in the building trades hit a small midwestern city. The striking carpenters and bricklayers promptly began to buy advertising space in the local afternoon daily, asking anyone interested in hiring such workmen to telephone the local Trades and Labor Council hall. In other words, they began to advertise for work.

The contractors, on the other hand, not only began to buy even more advertising space but began using it to present their side of the strike dispute—to picture themselves, in short, as fighting a battle for all local householders by resisting "unjustified attempts to raise building costs," by standing unselfishly between the local citizenry and the horrendous prospect of damage suits if privately hired workers happened to be injured on the job, and so on. Instead of advertising for contracts, their normal type of appeal to the public, the contractors now used advertising space to make propaganda on a public issue. The strikers used advertising as a *form* of communicative influence to contact potential employers. The contractors used advertising space as a *means* of communication to disseminate propaganda.

A second example illustrates the distinction even more clearly. Soon after World War I there was some public agitation in this country for governmental investigation and possible control of the meat-packing industry. Before this agitation arose the usual ad of a meat packer read like this:

USE BLANK'S BACON—BEST ON THE MARKET

When governmental action had become an issue, the big packer's ads changed to read something like this:

OUR PROFIT LAST YEAR WAS ONE-TENTH OF A CENT PER SALES DOLLAR

What did the rate of packer profit have to do with selling bacon? Nothing, nothing whatever. But it had a great deal to do with the public issue of possible packer profiteering and governmental action. After a few months of this kind of advertising the great meat-packer inquiry dropped out of sight.

Urging the public to Buy Blank's Bacon was straight-out advertising: the use of advertising space to stimulate ordinary economic trans-

Not at all. When you set out to twist the definition of a situation for your own purposes, you do not alert your victims to the twisting. On the contrary, you do everything that your own native shrewdness and modern psychology can suggest to make the victims think that this is the way things are. You conceal your motive and so far as necessary you conceal your own connection with the whole thing.

But sometimes it may suit your purpose to do the exact opposite: to let your victim know that you have an advantage and he'd better act accordingly. In that case you reveal the source and you tell the truth, as the United States government did in World War I after we had begun to build up the decisive reserve in France and the desperate German high command was scraping the bottom of the German manpower barrel. Then, with the advantage in our hands, we publicized the truth: we were rushing more than 300,000 American soldiers across the ocean every month. In other words, "Here it is, Hans. The jig is up. You'd better quit." For our own propaganda purpose we set out to educate the Germans to the facts of life. In such cases, with the advantage on your side, the truth is good propaganda and there is no point in concealing the source or lying about it. When he holds all the aces, the propagandist can afford to be honest. The rest of the time the less the victim knows about the source and the motivation, the better for the propagandist and the more effective his propaganda. All of which obviously distinguishes propaganda from education, and from the frank attempts of advocates, salesmen, and advertisers to advance their own interests.

As just noted, propaganda can make use of the truth for its own purposes. But when it does, it is still using truth as a psychological weapon and not as the educator uses it—as a means for the benefit of the student. The point is, the educator works always within the logic of reality, the propagandist within the logic of special purpose. This means that for the educator truth is ultimate and his only purpose is to develop the capacity of his students to find it for themselves. For the propagandist truth is merely another weapon to put across his foregone conclusion. If the truth happens to serve that conclusion, he uses it. If it doesn't, he ignores it.

The propagandist always works with the psychology of persuasion. Persuasion differs from argument in this way: In argument the implicit assumption always is that either contestant may be right; otherwise why argue? But persuasion starts with its conclusion given, and the entire process is carried on merely to get that conclusion across.

That is the assumption in all propaganda: the conclusion is given in advance and the whole function of the propagandist is to get that conclusion across. If truth will serve that purpose, well and good. If not, then something else will. But in any event no propagandist worth his salt can ever even suggest a conclusion contrary to the one he is trying to "sell." Hence, it is poor propaganda to try to answer an opponent's arguments. That implies that he might have a case. Ignore him, discredit him, smear him, but never even suggest that there is any conclusion possible other than the "true" conclusion of the propagandist himself.

Propaganda and education, therefore, have obviously opposing purposes, work with different psychological means, and produce quite different results.

Which immediately, of course, raises the question of the relationship of propaganda to democracy and intellectual freedom.

II-11:10. Propaganda and the Free Mind

We have already noted that in any controversy of public importance propaganda by one side or both is almost inevitable. And in the greatest controversy of all, the struggle to determine whether freedom shall survive in the modern world, propaganda is not only inevitable but continuous. Totalitarians of every variety from proto-Fascists to Communists maintain a steady stream of suggestion, innuendo, and slanted interpretations of the world. Ministers of the "Protestant underworld," as the Reverend Ralph Lord Roy calls one segment of the Protestant clergy, plus their Catholic counterparts, bombard their congregations and the public with anti-Semitism, anti-Negroism, anti-Darwinism, anti-intellectualism.⁷ At least one oil multimillionaire and many other wealthy reactionaries have contributed liberally to these "prophets of deceit" to spread dissension and hatred in the name of religion and in the interests of a laissez-faire philosophy that was already obsolete in 1896. At the other pole of economic myth-making, agents and dupes of the Soviet regime denounce proposals for world control of atomic weapons as "threats of atomic war"

⁷ See *Apostles of Discord: A Study of Organized Bigotry and Disruption on the Fringes of Protestantism* by Ralph Lord Roy, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953. The Reverend Mr. Roy is an ordained Methodist minister. The epithet quoted appears in the title of his second chapter, "The Protestant Underworld vs. Dwight D. Eisenhower," p. 11. See also *A Mask for Privilege: Anti-Semitism in America* by Carey McWilliams, Boston, Little-Brown, 1948, and *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator* by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

and solemnly refer to police-terrorized Soviet satellites as "people's democracies"! Every move on the international chessboard has become a move not merely to meet an actual situation, to gain a factual advantage over an opponent, but a propaganda move to make friends and influence people. And within the United States unscrupulous politicians do not hesitate to adopt the Hitler technique of psychological terrorism and the Big Lie.

Men have made propaganda on occasion since before the dawn of written history. Both sides used it in the American Revolution, and the venerable Benjamin Franklin even proposed to write a school textbook portraying the "incredible cruelties" of the British. Later myth-making about the virtues of the Founding Fathers did not altogether escape the taint of patriotic propaganda. Propaganda is nothing new in the world. What is new in the present situation is the volume, continuity, and psychological skill of contemporary propaganda—the boxing of entire populations in a barrage from which there is no escape. When this mental drenching is joined, as it is in totalitarian countries, with a rigid censorship which shuts out all competing interpretations of the world, and with high privileges for docile myth-makers and concentration camps for the skeptical, even the dream of independent thinking vanishes from one's world. It is a dream hard enough to keep alive even in the self-governing nations of the West. What the thoughtful observer sees around him in the United States is a continuous battle of competing propagandas, deliberately organized at intervals into something called an election campaign, but raging willy-nilly between campaigns every hour of every day. Good Democrats and Republicans joyfully smear one another as "Reds" or "Fascists," Communists turn courtrooms into propaganda forums, and reactionaries trumpet the dangers of "creeping Socialism" at every proposal to raise the school tax or control floods in a river valley!

Mass opinion-manipulation has, indeed, progressed since the days of the old-time circus publicity man. It has become not only an art but a lucrative occupation. Public relations experts vie with corporation lawyers in affluence and with corporation presidents in influence. One of the early practitioners turned John D. Rockefeller, Sr., from a monopolistic ogre of the 1890's into a kindly old gentleman who gave ten-cent tips to caddies on the golf course. It cost a whole brand-new university at Chicago and a few hundred-odd millions in far-sighted philanthropy, but the trick was done—to the lasting benefit of Mr. Rockefeller and the country.

The contemporary public relations counsel may be called upon to put over a political program in California or salvage a bond issue in New York; transform an ambitious politician into a statesman or advise a government bureaucrat on psychological warfare. He has long since learned to supplement the good-fellow techniques of the circus advance man with the latest contributions of the behavior sciences and the latest findings of the opinion pollsters. The modern public relations propagandist is a skilled practitioner who needs only to develop a code of ethics comparable to the code of the minister or the physician to merit regard as a professional man. He already merits serious regard as another hazard to intellectual freedom. In a free society he can hardly be expected to attain the stature of the late Dr. Paul Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment in the government of that other propaganda expert, Adolf Hitler, but as a skilled manipulator of men's minds with services for sale to the highest bidder, the modern public relations counselor definitely complicates the problem of public understanding of distant situations. On the basis of past experience, one may expect that the highest bidders will be men with special privileges to seek or to maintain rather than men of mere disinterested public spirit. The public relations counsel, therefore, is in danger of becoming another servant of special privilege against the public, another factor to be discounted in the process of making up one's mind about the issues of the day. As we have already indicated, there are enough such factors already. The public relations counsel adds to the complexities of self-government in a world of mass communication, mass publics, and mass propaganda.

II-11:11. Propaganda and Self-Government

What problems does modern propaganda pose for self-government?

Mass propaganda seems to be having three disturbing effects on the political process in the United States and one even more disturbing effect on the international struggle for survival between the United States and the Soviet Union. Internally, it tends (1) to decrease the rationality of the political process; (2) to increase the role of the less intelligent and the less stable: the role of the psychological underworld—the lunatic fringe, the demagogues, the fanatics; and (3) to increase the power of the Big Purse. Internationally, (4) its skillfully organized use by the Soviet Union in psychological warfare and the cold war tends to handicap the democratic peoples in their struggle for survival against the creeping totalitarianism of the giant police state.

1. HOW PROPAGANDA DECREASES POLITICAL RATIONALITY

Essentially, propaganda is a technique of mass persuasion, a technique for putting conclusions across *without subjecting the conclusions to critical discussion and analysis*. In the nature of the case, therefore, the more propaganda is used in a political campaign, the more irrational factors are introduced into the process. It is a process which at best has always involved a tremendous amount of persuasion by way of hokum, baby-kissing, "sloganeering," appeals to sentiment and prejudice, and the like. Modern propaganda organizes all this and steps up its potential by using (a) more sophisticated psychological techniques and (b) modern electro-machine communication to box in a larger percentage of the electorate at a given time than was ever possible before. In other words, it manipulates the average voter's weaknesses more skillfully and creates about him a more extensive atmosphere of identical suggestions. The net effect must be to increase the relative volume of irrational factors in a campaign and to decrease the relative volume of the critical and rational factors.

2. HOW PROPAGANDA INCREASES THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERWORLD

Propaganda increases the role of the psychological underworld in two ways: (a) by enabling the demagogue and the fanatic to put across the kind of message that intelligent discussion would instantly discredit and to put it across on a mass scale, and (b) by arousing masses of the stupid and the unstable who would be left cold by rational argument and debate. The demagogue and the fanatic have always used propaganda to appeal to the stupid and the unstable. But modern propaganda gives them sharper psychological techniques and mass diffusion facilities that they never had before.⁸ Anti-Semitism on the air reaching tens of millions simultaneously, for instance, would be a graver menace to the rationality of political processes than anti-Semitism whispered person to person. By print and radio millions of Americans have been sensitized to hate other Americans by a small minority of Protestant and Catholic

⁸ It is a bit hard to see how there could be more irrational factors in a campaign than were introduced into the famous "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too" orgy of 1840 or the "bloody shirt" Congressional campaigns of 1866. But that was irrationality of a rather primitive, direct kind, not the calculated hysteria of a contemporary "Red hunt" via press, radio, and television all at the same time. After all, the level of popular education in 1840 and 1866 was lower than today.

clergymen mouthing the language of religion but spewing hatred in every article and broadcast. Some other tens of thousands have also been exposed to clerical fellow travelers, a tiny minority of all clergymen, who innocently or otherwise have disseminated the Communist line for "peace" whenever anybody opposed Soviet aggression. They have prattled happily of the "iniquities of capitalism" without bothering to mention Russian purges and slave camps. Propaganda via mass communication increases the role of the psychological underworld by giving the demagogue, the fanatic, and the fuzzy-minded more power to stir up *masses* of the stupid, the unstable, and the frustrated.

3. HOW PROPAGANDA INCREASES THE POWER OF THE BIG PURSE

Propaganda costs money. You do not publish pamphlets by the hundred thousand, run sectarian newspapers, or pay for radio time (or the actual operation of a radio station) merely with pin money. Even the contributions of the dupes usually fail to pay all the bills. You have to tap big contributors—seekers of special privilege, fuzzy-minded millionaires, Hollywood guilty consciences, even Moscow itself. It has been the same in Europe. Industrial magnates and big landowners subsidized Mussolini. The steelmakers and the Junkers underwrote Hitler. The banks, the big estates, and the Roman Catholic Church backed Franco. And Communist propaganda everywhere has always had the moneybags of Moscow to draw on when the local comrades couldn't swing it.

This high cost of mass propaganda is particularly serious in the United States because the American public has never officially recognized the cost of political campaigns as a legitimate charge against the taxpayer. The present raucous method of selecting our political rulers was never, of course, envisaged by the Founding Fathers, who accordingly neglected to provide for it in the Constitution. Nobody has officially provided for it since. The political parties have to finance themselves. This necessity leads to interesting methods of shaking down the rich, or if one prefers, to interesting methods by which the rich stake out claims on the generosity of successful candidates. Debarred by the Constitution from the pleasant British practice of rewarding generous brewers, publishers, and shipping magnates with knighthoods and the like, American politicians have had to content themselves with passing out cabinet posts, ambassadorships, tariff laws, and slices of the public domain to those appreciative citizens

who have most liberally supported the democratic process. Having contributed nothing to the democratic process himself except his usual apathy, the taxpayer marvels no end at those laws of chance by which governmental favors fall with such profusion into the laps of the boys who pay the campaign bills. That his own interests may not always be foremost in the minds of executives and legislators dependent on such manifest laws of nature is one of those radical ideas that seldom obtrude in the taxpayer's mind—what with the comics, the latest Hollywood scandal, and the burning question of which crooner is going to tie up with which network! After all, a fellow can't think of everything, can he?

Quite so. But the obvious result, given the high cost of political propaganda as it is, necessarily increases the political weight of the Big Checkbook. This in turn increases the wear and tear on the American politician's delicate nervous system. For obviously, to win you need not merely the Big Checkbooks but the *Big Votes*, and the sad fact is that the Big Checkbooks cast very, very *small* votes indeed—only *agate* or *diamond*-sized votes in fact. To get the *Big Votes* you must do something handsome—or at least promise to do something handsome—for the chaps with no checkbooks at all. But to get the money with which to carry this gladsome message to these chaps, you have to keep the good will of the *Big Checkbooks*. When the interests of the *no-checkbooks* and those of the *Big Checkbooks* happen to clash, the life of the American politician becomes even less happy than that of Gilbert and Sullivan's policeman. The politician then becomes an object worthy of the sympathy of almost everybody except the average American taxpayer. The average American taxpayer had better save his sympathy for himself. His stupidity in maintaining such a system of privately subsidized political campaigns certainly merits the sympathy of someone.

4. HOW SOVIET USE OF PROPAGANDA IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND THE COLD WAR HANDICAPS THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

Propaganda and psychological warfare are weapons of conflict which antedate Communism by thousands of years but which have been used by Communists with increasingly deadly effect since the beginnings of their movement. Propaganda we have already defined. Psychological warfare is simply the use of propaganda *and every other means*—economic, diplomatic, political, and military—to win

military gains without military force.⁹ Cold war is a conflict carried on by two or more powers by every means short of actual military combat between the forces of the chief contenders themselves. It includes psychological warfare, espionage, sabotage, political conspiracy, subversive propaganda, satellite wars, diplomatic maneuvering, and any other kind of operation that can injure the prestige, economic interests, internal morale, international position, military power, and chances of ultimate survival of an enemy power. There have been cold wars before, as between czarist Russia and the British Empire during the latter half of the nineteenth century, for example; but the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II was the first to see the concepts of total war applied to this form of international conflict and the first to see the world-wide use of modern propaganda techniques by a government that not only made propaganda one of its major weapons of conquest but elevated propaganda-making itself to the status of a diabolically fine art.

Disregarding American advantages in a struggle of this kind—freedom, American productive capacity, the creativity of free men—our handicaps in the use of and defense against propaganda are mainly of five kinds: (a) historical, (b) attitudinal, (c) political, (d) governmental, and (e) communicational.

a. Historically, we had no precedents for fighting a cold war. We did not know what a cold war was. When you got into a conflict with a foreign power and there was no other way out, you were supposed to fight and that was war. Then when the fighting was over, that was peace. England had carried on a kind of cold war against the United States from the end of the Revolution till the War of 1812, but traditionally and officially nobody had recognized that as cold war and as a form of international conflict intermediate between actual combat and real peace. You fought a war when you had to and when it was over supposedly you had peace. There were no concepts in the American language and no laws on the statute books for a conflict that was neither peace nor war. Hence, for years after World War II ended in Tokyo Bay, despite Soviet aggressions in eastern Europe and the Far East and Communist conspiracies within the United States, millions of Americans persisted in thinking that the United States was at peace.

⁹ Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1948, p. 40.

Not only did we have no precedents for fighting a cold war; we had no living precedents for having to live behind live frontiers. In the days of Indian wars the pioneers did have live frontiers and knew what it is to expect an attack at any moment. But for more than a century and a half the East and the Middle West had known no such thing. Protected by two oceans and with neither the Canadian nor the Mexican border offering anything more formidable than invitations to tourists, Americans readjusted very slowly to the menace of Soviet atomic attack.

b. Attitudinally, also, Americans were utterly unprepared. Overwhelmingly, they wanted the rest of the world to let them alone. Fortunately, one of the lessons at least of the preceding generation had sunk in: Enough people did recognize the need of organizing collective security on a world scale at long last to enable the United States government to join with the other governments of the allied world in organizing and supporting the United Nations. But there were still millions, including the owner of a great Chicago newspaper, still so far back in the nineteenth-century, pre-air age that they clung tenaciously to isolationism, denounced the U.N. as anti-American, and even succeeded by 1953 in intimidating the school authorities of one of the big far western cities into barring discussions of it from the classroom! Obviously, the rulers of the totalitarian Soviet Union had no such attitudes to contend with among the docile Russian millions so carefully shepherded by the Communist elite and the political police.

c. Politically, under a two-party system there is no assurance that politics will actually stop at the water's edge. Foreign policy may easily become a political issue, as it was under Wilson and as Senator McCarthy sought to make it under Eisenhower.¹⁰ The instant foreign policy becomes a political issue there is danger that the political advantage of the politicians rather than the best interests of the United States will decide the matter. In the easygoing days of the nineteenth century continuity of American foreign policy was not a matter of life and death. The United States was not facing one-

¹⁰ Late in 1953 Senator McCarthy in press interviews and by radio attacked the State Department for sending what he called "perfumed notes" to allied governments whose nationals were trading with Communist China, which was still holding hundreds of American prisoners of war and was still threatening, in actions if not in words, to renew the attack on South Korea. He urged the members of his radio audience to write or wire the President if they agreed with McCarthy's proposals to high-pressure our allies into boycotting China.

third of the human race, incited to hatred and organized against it. But half a century and two world wars later the situation was slightly different. Now against the cold, calculated determination of the masters of the Kremlin to make the world safe for Communism it was almost literally a matter of life and death for the United States to keep its guard up and maintain a policy of meeting strength with strength. Yet such a policy depends on the support of public opinion and in a democracy public opinion is subject to manipulation by propaganda. Not only can a dictatorship or autocracy such as the Soviet Union pursue a given foreign policy with more single-mindedness of purpose than can a democratic republic like the United States but its rulers can manipulate and control the opinions of their people by means utterly beyond the power of any party or government administration in the United States. Any American government can make propaganda for its own policies among its own people only under the critical eyes and ears of its political opponents. It has no censors or political police with which to enforce its policies. And its people under their own laws must remain exposed to all the propaganda that Soviet agents can slip into the country or force American newspapers to publish under the guise of legitimate news from abroad. When it comes to making propaganda the Soviets hold most of the aces. The United States is not organized politically either to defend itself against foreign propaganda so effectively or to make foreign propaganda so efficiently as is the Soviet government. In terms of governmental structure the same contrast holds true.

d. America is also beset with governmental handicaps. Cold war in the Soviet manner calls for three things: secret formulation of policy; complete centralization of authority over propaganda; and complete coördination of propaganda with diplomatic, economic, political, and military operations. A totalitarian government can formulate a policy without having to confide it to millions of people. It can stick to that policy without too much concern for what Tom, Dick, and Harry may think. In fact, Tom, Dick, and Harry will go along when they hear about it—or else. There is still plenty of room in Siberia.

American foreign policy, on the other hand, may be formulated in secret but it has to be debated in public and it has to carry the assent of enough voters to keep the administration in power.

But even in power, every administration faces the complexities of the American system of checks and balances, and the unceasing sus-

picion of its political foes. Its political foes can't be disposed of by the simple process of having the F.B.I. ship them off to Alaska some morning before dawn. They have to be endured and answered somehow. So instead of one central control of all propaganda we have scores of official propagandists, each operating in magnificent independence of all the rest and each plugging his own line. A cabinet officer, to prepare the public, intimates that American foreign commitments are due for curtailment. The State Department explains hurriedly that this doesn't mean the United States is about to pull any troops out of Europe. Not at all. But before that ruckus dies away the Budget Department says the military budget is going to be slashed and the Joint Chiefs of Staff get quoted to the quieting effect that if the military budget is slashed any more a lot of American soldiers will *have* to come out of Europe. All of which bucks up our European allies no end and amuses the commissars more than a mass deportation order.

It would seem that this method of defining budgetary policy and military commitments is not exactly the most efficient that could be devised. Imagine official Soviet lucubrations about the Russian budget and possible reductions in military occupation forces in East Germany getting broadcast to the world in this scatterbrained, blabbermouth way. Special trains with special passengers would be rolling toward the Siberian gold mines before noon! But this method of handling the heavy ammunition of the cold war seems to be built into the American system. We simply do not have any single fire-control center. Consequently instead of all firing only "When ready, Gridley" our masterminds pop off all over the place and not infrequently mow down more allies than Russians. Our European friends had the jitters for months after that particular salvo.

Not only is there no central control, planning, and directing of the entire cold war effort; there is nothing remotely resembling coordination of diplomatic, economic, political, and military operations all over the world with a consistent line of American propaganda. A United States Senator demands the economic coercion of our allies at the moment when the United States State Department is trying its darndest to convince them that the United States intends to respect their independence, dignity, and sovereignty. With the Communist enemy openly using the truce talks as a screen for building up his air force and replenishing his ammunition dumps in Korea, the American press ballyhoos for peace.

The cold war goes on. Nothing is settled. And the inability of the American system to organize itself to coördinate American propaganda and all other American operations to bring all of them to a focus on the cold war bull's-eye goes on also.

Nobody planned it this way and certainly nobody in particular seems to be at fault. The condition has grown up and it continues to exist regardless of the party in power at Washington and regardless of how distinguished may be the men in charge of American foreign policy. George F. Kennan, State Department expert on Russia who was appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952, points out in his cogent analysis of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1950 that some of the ablest men in American public life have been struggling with these problems for half a century or more.¹¹ Although he does not deal with this particular aspect of affairs—the difficulty of coördinating American governmental behavior toward foreign powers—it is apparent that these problems stem not from the wickedness or witlessness of American statesmen and politicians but from the complex nature of a democratic republic whose basic governmental structures, political processes, and guiding principles were laid down in a simpler age, an age of relatively greater American security and of less insistent foreign pressures. What we have here, in short, is another instance of cultural lag, a delay in the adaptation of American governmental structures and practices to meet the challenges of a new age.

But the net effect is that the Soviet use of propaganda in psychological warfare and the cold war handicaps the United States. The Soviets make a business of laying all their guns on one target at the same time. The United States makes a business of firing one or two guns at the target—and then knocking off to go duck hunting!

e. Communicational handicaps are likewise evident. Under a democratic system, government cannot control the communications that reach its citizens; under a totalitarian system the government can come very close to controlling them. The Iron Curtain not only cuts Americans off from news of what is going on in Russia; it also cuts Russians off from news of what is going on in America. But it leaves the Soviet government perfectly free to deluge Americans with millions of copies of Soviet propaganda publications, perfectly

¹¹ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. New York: A Mentor Book published by The New American Library of World Literature. Copyright 1951 by the University of Chicago. First printing December, 1952.

free to feed American news editors all sorts of concealed propaganda, and perfectly free to make propaganda within the United States through its own agents, fellow travelers, and non-Communist dupes. The official Voice of America and the privately supported voice of Radio Free Europe may manage to pierce the Iron Curtain to some extent, so that the Russian people are not wholly cut off from Western propaganda despite the Soviet efforts to jam the air waves, but the relative proportion of propaganda that gets through into Russia as compared with the proportion that gets through into the United States is fantastically unequal. This is a basic inequality of freedom vs. totalitarianism.

The West is forced to fight Soviet Russia psychologically in the position of a man exposed unshielded to hostile radioactivity while his opponent is safely shielded from any counterradiation whatever. In a purely physical contest of such a character we all know which contestant would win: the unshielded warrior would die as certainly as uncontrolled radiation rots bone marrow! It would be no contest at all—like Caligula forcing gladiators to fight him with leaden swords. Yet communicatively that is very nearly the position of the West. Exposed to all the evil radiations from Moscow, we find most of our own counterradiations glancing harmlessly off the Iron Curtain.

We do have armor of sorts in the success of our own system, but let that armor fail at some point in a depression or in the defection of some ally such as Italy or France or Japan and the invisible arrows will begin to strike home. Defense alone never won a war—especially when the defenders were helpless to hit back. The very nature of democracy exposes it to psychological peril from an enemy who fights from behind the shield of totalitarianism. To date the communicative battle is not being fought on equal terms.

II-11:12. Defenses Against Propaganda

Exposed as we all are to a continual barrage of propagandas from all kinds of people with axes to grind, from the local community chest to native proto-Fascists and foreign Communists, what can the ordinary American citizen or college student do about it to retain some freedom of judgment in defining situations beyond the horizon? Unlike the great sources of modern propaganda—business interests, governments, religious leaders, political demagogues—he cannot make counterpropaganda to defend himself. He can only use what common sense God gave him and supplement it as far as he can with four

types of attitude and action: (1) an acute awareness that every controversy or conflict in the modern world tends to generate propaganda; (2) a realization that any pronounced sentiment or strong feeling that an individual has about anything makes him vulnerable to propaganda; (3) a continual search for the best *scientific* evidence on the issues at stake in any given situation; and finally, (4) multiplication and cross-checking of sources of information.

1. AWARENESS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROPAGANDA

Merely to know that propaganda is to be expected in a given situation is not enough in itself to protect anyone against propaganda. Even if the students who were exposed to those utility-subsidized textbooks introduced a few years ago into many high schools had known that the public controversy over public ownership of electric power plants was likely to generate propaganda, they could not possibly have detected the propaganda slant of those books. Like other beginners in social science, they lacked the background for critically evaluating their textbooks. The books themselves professed to be scientifically impartial introductions to civics, economics, or whatever. The utility company slant on public ownership was simply slipped into one or two chapters buried among twenty or thirty other chapters that really were impartially done on matters that had nothing to do with public ownership. Unaware that the professor-author had been paid by the private utility interests to plead their case under the guise of scientific impartiality, the ordinary reader could not possibly protect himself against the propaganda in those crucial chapters.

This, of course, is a characteristic of effective propaganda when its source is concealed: it cannot be detected from the muzzle end by the average victim. Nobody can be sure that any single communication from any source is or is not propaganda *unless he knows the purpose of the communicator at the source*. Perfectly innocent people may thus transmit stories and rumors about issues, events, persons, without any awareness whatever that what they are transmitting actually is propaganda. Hence government warnings in wartime against repeating rumors.

How, then, does one identify propaganda?

One doesn't unless he can (a) identify the source and (b) reasonably infer the purpose behind the communication. For any single news item or radio broadcast this may be impossible, but when

items accumulate and broadcasts continue, the purpose if not the source can be inferred from two things: the pattern, or trend, of the communications and the timing, or relationship of the communications to external events. Thus, from the continual teaching of Marxism, with its emphasis on violent revolution, by Communist agitators, the courts have inferred that Communists, despite their protestations to the contrary, actually do hold the purpose of overthrowing the American government by force. The pattern of their communications (teachings) justifies that conclusion. As for timing, former President Truman discerned a propaganda purpose in the peculiar conjunction of two things in 1953: Republican defeats in two Congressional elections, one of them in a district in Wisconsin that had never gone Democratic since the War Between the States; and the immediately subsequent charges by Attorney General Brownell that the Truman administration had retained known Communists in office.

"Trying to divert attention from the elections and from the evidence of Republican unpopularity," said the former President.

Following his lead, other prominent Democrats insisted that the charges had been timed to affect another Congressional election that was to be held in Los Angeles a few days later. Despite Democratic cries of "Propaganda! All propaganda!" the Republicans won that election. The timing of a communication, then, is one of the indexes to be considered in evaluating it as propaganda or non-propaganda.

2. EMOTIONAL VULNERABILITY TO PROPAGANDA

Any sentiment or prejudice may be manipulated by a propagandist to control his victim. The sentiment may be as noble as the Christian's desire for peace or as ignoble as anybody's race prejudice or anti-Semitism. Everytime the Soviet propagandists set out to slow down or weaken the defense preparations of the West by ballyhooing the virtues of peace between 1946 and 1954—without reducing their own gigantic armaments—thousands of well-meaning idealists flocked to the conferences or joined in the public demonstrations for turning guns into plowshares, always in the potential path of the Red Army! Like Hitler's well-known encouragement of "peace" among his intended victims, Soviet "peace" was strictly for export only. Internally, Soviet citizens who couldn't see the difference between "peacemaking" by Soviet arms and "warmongering" by Poles, Finns, South Koreans, and Americans trying to defend them-

selves against Communist "liberation" promptly wound up in one of those great barbed-wire universities maintained in Siberia expressly for the education of "bourgeois deviationists"!

If noble sentiments can be so misused for the shady purposes of the propagandist, what about the ignoble ones, ready-made for his manipulations? Race prejudice has been the meal ticket of the demagogue and the Kluxer for generations; anti-Semitism furnishes the ugliest and most potent shield that privilege has been able to invent. Any sentiment, uncritically held, and any prejudice in the nature of the case are simply so many handles on one's mind inviting the propagandist to grab hold and swing his victim in any direction he pleases.

Size up the members of any group you happen to be with. What invisible handles are sticking out of their heads? More important still, what invisible handles are sticking out of yours? What hand-holds do your sentiments and prejudices offer to anyone who cares to grab them and pull you his way? An interesting question to think about.

3. SEARCHING FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Most of us are aware by this time that for nearly all our physical ailments medical science has accumulated a vast arsenal of verifiable knowledge. Nobody needs to guess or to accept a mere opinion about whether he has tuberculosis or pneumonia or an allergy to cat fur. Objective methods exist for determining such questions Yes or No beyond the shadow of a doubt. And anybody who is in doubt about such matters and fails to seek out the best scientific answers is obviously ignorant, stupid, or both. There are still many problems on which medical science does not have final answers, but such answers as it does have are a lot better than the guesses of the layman. On questions concerning their own health, then, most people agree that the intelligent thing to do is to seek out the best scientific evidence obtainable.

But on questions concerning the economic and moral "health" of a community or a social system only a comparatively few professional men and intellectuals have yet come to recognize the importance of doing the same thing—seeking out the best scientific evidence obtainable. On such issues as crime control, economic stabilization, labor relations, and the like, the customary pattern is to accept, and accept rather uncritically at that, opinions and old wives' tales. How

many have read even one book on Russia, even one book that professes to present facts, gives verifiable references for its facts, and handles opinions with due regard to differences? How many have checked one author against another and both against a third? How many actually do anything specific to protect themselves against propaganda?

There is no way of answering such questions from existing data, but the indications are that the number cannot be very large.¹²

4. MULTIPLYING AND CROSS-CHECKING SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Nobody can be an expert on everything. Few can be experts on anything. But the rest of us can at least refuse to put all our information eggs in one basket, refuse to rely on any one source of data and one only. The trouble is, of course, that in a world of fast-moving events it is impossible to keep up with the pace of events themselves, and nobody can develop a background of verified information on all the areas of controversy in the modern world. All even the best of us can do is to inform himself on a few questions and then search out those particular mediums of contact and discussion that seem on the whole and in the long run to be doing the best job of providing dependable coverage of world events. Among newspapers the *New York Times*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* probably stand at the head of the list; among weeklies and biweeklies, the *Reporter*, the *New Leader*, the *New Republic*, and the *Nation*; and among monthlies, *Harper's*, *Commentary*, and the *Atlantic*. For particular problem areas such publications as *Foreign Affairs*, the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, the *Journal of Criminology*, *Criminal Law and Police Practice*, the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social*

¹² How difficult it is to protect oneself against propaganda, even when one recognizes a conflict situation and expects propaganda, may be illustrated by the way in which two college professors were taken in by U.A.W.-C.I.O. propaganda during the famous sit down strike against General Motors in Flint, Michigan, in 1937. During the strike General Motors obtained an injunction against the strikers from Judge Paul V. Gadola of Flint. At once charges that the judge was himself a stockholder in General Motors began to circulate and received considerable publicity. The judge's denial, the fact that his injunction stood, and the further fact that the union's able lawyers made no move to raise the question of the judge's bias in any court all failed to make the impression on the public mind, apparently, that the charge itself made. At any rate, *more than fifteen years later* two members of a college faculty in the state were challenged by Judge Gadola for having repeated the old story to their classes during discussions of labor and the law, and both had to retract and apologize. Neither had realized that what he was repeating was propaganda, *not fact*. One of these men was himself a lawyer and the other a sociologist, familiar with the techniques of propaganda!

Science, *Federal Probation*, and similar journals are obviously indicated. There is no sovereign road to intellectual independence except the road of everlasting alertness.

In the end, propaganda can be no more effective than the willingness of its subjects to accept it. This is a matter not merely of individual sophistication and attitude but of objective conditions as well. Communist propaganda never makes a dent on contented middle-class people and very little on wage workers fully employed at good jobs. It does appeal to men who are unemployed, frustrated, insecure, and going nowhere, just as Fascist propaganda does. The best defense in the long run against any kind of subversive propaganda, Communist or Fascist, is to make the American system work. Perhaps the strongest propaganda pull of Communism today is its claim that the Soviet system will end two of the modern world's greatest insecurities—mass unemployment and war. And Fascism's Sunday punch is that it promises privilege to maintain the existing stratification system against the threat of both Communism and the welfare state, on the one hand, and promises the frustrated, lonely, insecure and confused masses, on the other, a new brotherhood of American nationalism—rulership by men of one blood and a common faith.

In the end, men who would retain their freedom must not only defend themselves against propaganda by their own alertness and insight into their own weaknesses but set themselves to the task of counteracting and removing the economic and social conditions that foster selfish privilege and breed mass discontent. Defense alone never wins any wars.

Social Change and Social Values

II-12:1. The Problem of Social Changes and Social Values

The great majority of human beings in all previous ages and in all cultures preceding the development of Western civilization have feared and hated social change. Primitive man regards his social world as static. Only a tiny minority in the ancient world felt that change was anything but harmful to the ways of the fathers. As a matter of fact, most ancients placed man's golden age in the past and considered their own times as degenerate echoes of a once happier day. The early Christians, of course, demanded the destruction of paganism but once that had been accomplished discouraged further change more efficiently than had the pagans. Until the papacy itself became corrupt, most medieval thinkers saw no reason to question either the doctrine or the social system. Most peoples distrust change.

Even today in the United States, while material inventions are subsidized and encouraged, innovations in morals, customs, institutional practices, and social values are usually penalized and discouraged. The adaptive culture must be kept stable.

In other words, in most societies routine, stability, absence of change, is a value in itself. And most Americans attach considerable value to the routines of their lives.

Yet not too much routine. Too much routine is as stultifying as not enough is disorganizing. The modern urbanite has come to value mild disturbances of routine almost as part of his routine—vicarious new experiences, at least, if not actual ones. Hence, one of the major deprivations suffered by the newspaper-reading public

during the great newspaper strike of 1953 in New York City was precisely this: neither radio nor television could give the same thrill of vicarious new experience that the front pages and the comics could. In large part this eagerness to hear of some new thing is a product of urban conditions, but these conditions in turn are the fruits of what we may call institutionalized curiosity.

As we have noted before, the ancient Greek philosophers over twenty-five centuries ago were the first human beings apparently to recognize the value of intellectual discovery. Disregarded by the practical-minded Romans and sternly discouraged by the early Christian Church, this value was never again wholly lost. We find it coming to expression again among the Jewish thinkers in the Mohammedan world when western Europe was still ruled by semibarbarians who ate with their fingers, and we find it cropping up in an English monk's cell in the thirteenth century.

A few years later (1316) King Edward III of England did a momentous thing, a thing as fateful in its way as the Greek discovery of discovery: He granted to one of his faithful subjects a monopoly on a new way of compounding the philosopher's stone. Now the philosopher's stone was the imaginary, sovereign substance sought by the alchemists to transmute baser metals into gold. But the importance of the monopoly granted by Edward III consisted not in any greater effectiveness of that particular philosopher's stone over all the other failures of its kind but in the fact that here for the first time in human history a government officially *gave its endorsement to invention*. The English monarch didn't know it, but he was founding the first patent system in the world's history. If the Greeks had been the first people in human history to recognize the social values of discovery, the English now became the first to recognize the social value of invention.

The tradition of intellectual curiosity presently—with the help of the new universities, a Pole named Copernicus, an Italian named Galileo, two Englishmen named William Harvey and Isaac Newton, and a few score other inquiring minds in various countries—flowered into the beginnings of modern physical science, which eventually was to give the world atomic fission and a bad case of the jim-jams. Edward III's philosopher's stone, meanwhile, thanks to a bit of encouragement from Queen Elizabeth to strengthen her island kingdom against the Catholic powers on the Continent and thanks also to the practical needs of the rising business class, transformed no

baser metals into gold but did by way of the English patent system transform so many new ideas into spinning jennies, power looms, steam engines, and fancy dividends as to induce the imitative Founding Fathers of the new American republic across the ocean to give Congress the power forthwith "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries."¹ America, like Britain, thus institutionalized the encouragement of invention, as the continuing development of the scientific laboratory was institutionalizing the encouragement of discovery. Together, science and the patent office have now become the most powerful engines of internal cultural disturbance that any civilization has ever seen. Each exists only to produce some new thing, and from the industrial revolution to the theory of evolution and the hell bomb, the new things they have conspired to turn out have pretty well stood old social adjustments on their heads.²

In the process, most of the instrumental values of Western society have been transformed and even the intrinsic values have been given new meanings.³

But as we have already seen in Book I, Chapter 12, inventions and discoveries, i.e., new culture traits, are not the only kinds of disturbances that impinge on social routines. Disasters, population changes, changes in the relationship and functioning of organizations and social processes, and the indirect consequences of readjustments elsewhere all contribute to the dynamics of change in any given locality, along with the impacts of new traits and the disappearance of old ones. What happens to social values in a dynamic society, therefore, is a function of many things: the source or kind of disturbance itself and its intensity, scope, and meaning; the nature of the value affected; the rationalizations and other defenses that the culture provides; the climate of opinion; the social structures affected;

¹ Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 8.

² The British patent system was of course by no means the only factor in the coming of the industrial revolution. A great many factors including the commercial revolution, the growth of the town and early metropolitan economy, the agricultural revolution with its Enclosure Acts, the English political revolutions of 1642-49 and 1688, British military victories over the Spaniards, the Dutch, and the French, technological improvements in transportation—all these as well as the patent system and other variables contributed to the shift in productive technology from domestic manufacture and the workshop to the factory system.

³ An intrinsic value is a good in itself, like life, health, freedom, love, etc. An instrumental value is a value cherished because it contributes to the realization of an intrinsic value.

the categories involved; and so on. In the space at our disposal it is quite impossible to do more than call attention to some of the problems raised by the impacts of various forms of disturbance.

II-12:2. The Impact of Disaster

We have already noted, in Book I, Chapter 12, that disaster may be defined either as (1) the breakdown of cultural protections against the forces of nature, or as (2) the consequences of such breakdown.⁴ Here we shall consider briefly the impacts of the social consequences of such cultural breakdowns on social values, i.e., the impacts of death, destruction, and social disorganization on the values of the surviving victims.

Depending, of course, on the intensity of the disturbance, its scope and meaning, disaster seems to affect survivors everywhere in much the same way.

First, there is usually a sharp increase in emphasis on intrinsic values and a corresponding decrease in emphasis on instrumental values. Men suddenly realize that life, health, and loved ones are vastly more important than possessions, social status, or social privileges.

Second, along with this shift in values comes a corresponding rise in the value of human coöperation, mutual aid, succor in distress. The first reactions of survivors in all disasters are directed toward (a) self-survival or (b) saving those near and dear, then (c) aiding other victims and (d) widening the area of mutual aid by calling for help from outside the stricken locality.

Third, there is usually a heightened sense of human weakness and dependence, a heightened sense of the value of alcatory, or chance, factors in human life and a corresponding tendency to propitiate, rationalize, or otherwise control such factors, according to the devices provided by the culture. Magic, prayer, inquiries into "how it happened" express this sense of dependence and fear of the unpredictable.

Fourth, most categorical values lose their force. Rich and poor, Negroes and whites help each other, share common refuges, associate

⁴ For clarity of reference the actual breakdown of cultural protections under natural pressures should perhaps be called catastrophe, the consequences disaster. Thus, the plane crash, the train's plunge from a bridge, the collapse of houses in the tornado, the desiccation of pastures, etc., would constitute examples of catastrophe; the deaths, injuries, property losses, etc., would be the disasters. In the case of the Plains Indians in the 1880's, the disappearance of the buffalo was the catastrophe; the effects of that disappearance—the disorganization of the Indian society—constituted the disaster.

merely as human beings while the danger and disorganization last.

The devaluation of instrumental values, the increased appreciation of mutual aid, the realization of human dependence, and the decline of categorical social values are four of the most marked effects of disaster on its surviving victims in the immediate aftermath of catastrophe.

But if the deprivations resulting from disaster approach the limit of human endurance and especially if they continue for long periods at this level while hope of aid sinks toward zero, the veneer of culture begins to wear thin. Personalities begin to disintegrate; to lose one by one the other-regarding values inculcated by socialization from infancy up; to revert nearer and nearer to the purely biological, bipedal beast.

As in all other aspects of human life, individual differences dominate here also, determine who cracks first and how far back to the beast he goes. Somebody in the lifeboat begins to steal more than his share of the vanishing store of food or water. Somebody in the famine-stricken village hoards his pitiful handfuls of rice and lets his neighbor die. Some mother in the desperate Korean retreat throws her baby off a bridge—American troops counted *dozens* of infant bodies floating downstream. Somebody in the snowed-in emigrant train, starving in the High Sierras, begins to eat his comrades *before their bodies can freeze*. One new arrival at Auschwitz disowns her own screaming child at the mouth of the furnace *in the frantic hope that only the less useful one will be burned alive!*⁵

Individuals differ as much in their capacity to remain human under deprivation, suffering, torture, and despair as they do in I.Q. scores, height, or weight. But it is obvious that, regardless of individual differences, disasters as such take their toll of human values. If not too destructive, like the eruption of Vesuvius that blotted out

⁵ Cheating in lifeboats and hoarding during famines have been too familiar down through history to need documenting. The Korean incident is from the personal observations of an American officer well known to the author. For cannibalism in the Donner party, see Bernard De Voto, *The Year of Decision*. For the horrible incident at Auschwitz, see Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953. *The Captive Mind* is perhaps the most frightening picture of the mental servitude imposed by Soviet totalitarianism that has come out of the twilight behind the Iron Curtain. The Auschwitz incident which Milosz relates illustrates human breakdown under totalitarian terrorism—in this case Nazi terrorism instead of Communist.

The Korean retreat and the Nazi persecutions were not natural disasters, but in the sense that deprivation and suffering resulted from the failure of culture in each case to protect the victims from the elements and from man's use of natural forces, they were disasters just the same.

Pompeii and Herculaneum in 79 A.D., or too intense and long-drawn-out, like the Nazi persecutions, they may strengthen social values by demonstrating human fortitude under adversity. But if they impose too much suffering too long, the usual cases of heroism may well be counterbalanced by the number of personalities driven down to the level of the beast.

II-12:3. The Impact of Population Changes

Perhaps before talking about population changes we should note the relationship of social values to population conditions. The most obvious relationship seems to appear when the condition is one of overpopulation, as in the Orient. Centuries of overpopulation in India and China have reduced the average individual to a social cipher. Life is cheap and replaces itself so fast that even the great decimators, famine and pestilence, cannot reduce the pressure on resources. Of course the relationship is not all one way. Ancestor worship, the value placed on continuity of the family, i.e., on children, the economic value of children in an agricultural economy, the subordinate status of women, the dead weight of tradition—factors of this sort all contribute to the high birth rate and consequently to population pressure. Population pressure in turn tends to perpetuate the cheapness of human life and this very cheapness then becomes another factor tending to maintain the low standard of living and the high birth rate. The vicious circle repeats itself generation after generation.

Traditionally, the typical Oriental solution has been an escape into mysticism and ethical and religious admonitions to the individual to *decrease* his demands on life until in Buddhism the highest goal attainable to man becomes nirvana, the complete elimination of all desire. Under the impact of Western ideas, Western technology, and Communism, however, millions of Orientals, instead of renouncing all desire, have begun to demand a higher standard of living here and now. Down to 1954, however, the practical implications of this demand in the way of lower birth rates had not yet begun to affect population pressures in the Far East or to enhance the value of the individual life.

In the United States, on the other hand, the man-land ratio has never been a problem except in city slums. During most of our history population has been so sparse, especially on the frontier, that the average individual for a long time had a good statistical chance

to rank as somebody in his community. Thus, the condition of population has favored those cultural values in Christianity and in the democratic tradition that dignify the individual and endow him with social significance as a person.

Unfortunately, these conditions are passing away, if, indeed, they have not already passed in most of our cities. Social giantism is threatening to engulf the average American as the human swarm long ago engulfed the average Oriental. What this will mean for the human values implicit in the American Creed nobody can foretell. But we can hazard a guess that the change will tend to decrease the ethical value of the average individual in American society unless definite steps are taken by families, schools, churches, and other agencies of control to resist that tendency and counteract it. The objective conditions of ethical individualism are changing, and changing for the worse.

Specific evidence of this trend can be found wherever overcrowding occurs—in city slums, in war production localities like Willow Run, in all kinds of situations in which human beings are herded together. The chances of being treated as a person, as an end in himself, go down for the average human being the more the objective conditions of population approach the mass, the herd, the swarm.

II-12:4. Impacts of Changes in Culture Traits

It is impossible even to begin to list all the new culture traits and culture complexes whose addition to the culture base or subtraction from it have affected American social values since the landing of the Pilgrims. We would have to include such additions as the sawdust icehouse, the factory system, the sewing machine, the Colt revolver, the theory of evolution, birth control, the surfaced highway, the sciences, the telegraph, the telephone, new religions, the automobile, the steamship, trial marriage, anesthetics, aseptic surgery, the wonder drugs, vaccination, the horse and buggy, slavery, democracy, labor unions, the inside toilet, the multiple-unit dwelling, newspapers, comic strips, the canoe, the theater, the canal, the railroad, the cigarette, plastics, the public school, woman suffrage, the airplane, movies, television, the typewriter, the business office, the corporation, the chain store, electric lights, refrigerators, the elevator, the skyscraper, steel, the Constitution of the United States, log cabins, the juvenile court, the penitentiary, probation, the atomic bomb, and tens of thousands of others. Meanwhile losses, complete or partial, include: dogmatic Puritanism, the belief in witchcraft, bundling,

whale-oil lamps, leeching, dueling, allegiance to the British Crown, the town watch, sun time, urban hitching posts, one-horse open sleighs (except on the old back road), old time excursion trains, colored globes in drugstore windows, cigar-store Indians, McGuffey Readers, slates and slate pencils, the flintlock musket, the horse-drawn canal boat, open-fireplace cooking, hoop skirts (at least for the time being!), the chaperone, four-hour sermons, the sun-to-sun workday, wooden false teeth, the frontier, chattel slavery, stagecoaches, knee breeches, imprisonment for debt (except in two states), the law of conspiracy (as applied to unions), beaver hats, and hundreds of others that once composed the simpler, more uncomfortable, more unhealthy, and more leisurely world of our ancestors.⁶

Every one of these additions and losses probably had some impact on values. The net effect seems to have been at least sixfold: (1) to increase man's self-confidence in his power to manipulate nature for his own purposes; (2) to shake his confidence in his own place in the scheme of things; (3) to enhance the desire for comfort in the daily routine as against the old-time acceptance of hardships as unavoidable; (4) to enhance utilitarian and existential (truth) values at some *relative* cost to religious values, i.e., preferences for material goods and scientific truth as against preferences for self-denial and spiritual gains are probably more prevalent in relative proportion today than in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; (5) to increase the role of aesthetic values for more people than under Puritanism; and (6) to force more critical interpretations of moral values than in colonial days.

1. THE INCREASE IN MAN'S SELF-CONFIDENCE

Science and invention have given twentieth-century man vastly more power to effectuate his purposes than his ancestors possessed. He can communicate faster and farther in a unit of time and trans-

⁶ Just as the introduction and spread of new culture traits usually goes through a number of phases, so the loss of traits is usually a gradual process. First, use becomes less frequent or less prevalent in a given locality but the *expectation* of use may remain. Gradually this expectation dies away but the *memory* of the trait still remains and some *evidences* of the trait may still be found in museums, ruins, etc. When memory of the trait fades out and no further evidences of it remain, the trait has been lost to the culture. This is what happened to such traits as obstetrical instruments in ancient Rome. Instruments almost modern in design have been found in the ruins of Pompeii, but all memory of them faded out of western European culture for centuries, and modern physicians had to invent their own. The above list of traits of American culture that have largely passed out of use undoubtedly omits many, the memory of which has been lost or is retained only in museums and in historical records not generally known to the public.

port himself at a rate inconceivable little more than a century ago. He can command more brute energy in his machines and atomic bombs than anyone in 1620 or 1789 could dream of. More people have a higher standard of living than ever before, and the average life expectancy has gone up from the colonial average of twenty-five or thirty years to seventy or more. Hence the increase in the prestige of science and invention as instruments of adjustment to life problems and the decline in the prestige of tradition and religious practices as adjustment instruments for the here and now. In other words, science and invention have thrust the sense of the too-bigness of life out of the daily routine and relegated it to the extreme crises of life and death. Facing the ordinary tasks of life, more people today feel that they can manage on their own without any supernatural aid than was true in preceding centuries. Facing the threat of scientific warfare, however, they aren't so sure—and the rising totals of church membership express that insecurity. But by and large, science and invention have driven the theological pessimism of colonial days out of fashion. For several generations in the nineteenth century optimism replaced it. But even while the average American was accepting material progress as the law of his social world, many of his intellectual leaders began to lose confidence in the status of life in general and human life in particular in the increasingly impersonal universe that science was revealing. Human power was rising, but what did human power amount to in the total scheme of things?

2. THE SHRINKAGE OF MAN'S CONFIDENCE IN THE UNIVERSE

Even while science was demonstrating the validity of the assumption of the dependability of the universe, the universality of cause and effect, and thus was enhancing man's power here and now, the very demonstration itself raised unsettling questions about the why, whence, and whither of human life. (Also discussed in II-9:9.) Evolution destroyed the theory of direct creation. It did not necessarily destroy the concept of a personal God, or even of a personal creation, but it introduced a roundaboutness of process not included in Revelation. And the cumulative results of all the natural sciences seemed to require drastic revision of old ideas about the intimate personal relationship of human beings to the Ultimate Power in a universe of almost infinite littleness at one extreme and apparently infinite bigness at the other. Materialism, agnosticism, atheism flourished for a period. Even as the superficiality of such answers gradually became apparent

to many of the doubters, however, it proved impossible to restore completely the old confidence. Whatever might be the ultimate answers, the universe of science was obviously different from the world of pre-science. Man could no longer be so sure of his own origins and destiny.⁷

3. COMFORT VS. HARDIHOOD

Running water, the inside toilet, the electric light, the gas furnace, and the electric blanket index the march of comfort in the American home. Even those hardy souls who set out on occasion "to rough it" for a few days or weeks in the mountains or the woods usually expect to do it with as many modern conveniences as possible. If they revert to packsaddles in place of automobiles and find it inconvenient to carry inside toilets with them, at least they can take thermos bottles, electric flashlights, portable radios, and canned heat! Even the old straight-edge razor, whose hazards so notably advanced the prevalence of whiskers during the War Between the States, has given way to the safety and to the electric mowing machine. Nobody any longer prefers an open fireplace to a cozy steam radiator for anything but decorative purposes. Bed warmers have retired to the antique shop.

All this aversion to traditional discomfort, however, has not too notably softened the American soldier in the field, to the disappointment of the human pack-train school of military thought, but it has certainly changed the relative weights of comfort vs. discomfort values in civilian life.⁸ However toughening may have been the old-fashioned tub in the kitchen or the steaming kettle thawing out the pump on winter mornings, nobody is leading any crusades to bring them back. Hardihood is regarded in these effete days as more a matter of psychological conditioning than a life of goose pimples and red-flannel underwear.

4. USEFULNESS AND TRUTH VALUES VS. TRADITION AND SUPERNATURALISM

During the Dark Ages an angel is reputed to have appeared on the battlements of Hadrian's Tomb in Rome to assure the Pope,

⁷ The very stridency with which fundamentalists of all faiths insist on the validity of Revelation would be interpreted by Freudians as evidence of a sense of insecurity.

⁸ However, recent tests of physical stamina in a sample of school children in the United States and several samples in western European countries turned up the disconcerting fact that 56 percent of the American children failed the tests as against only 8 percent of the European. *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954.

leading a procession of worshipers during a visitation of the plague, that the pestilence would presently abate. The plague like a hundred other visitations did abate, but the vision sufficed to change the name of the ancient relic from Hadrian's Tomb to The Castle of the Angel. Modern physicians find that the mere extermination of rats and fleas works equally well on the plague and requires no castles or miracles.

For uncounted generations the Sioux Indians used to assure themselves a supply of meat by luring wandering buffalo within range with the Buffalo Dance. This method of replenishing the larder proved infallible until the white man killed so many buffalo all over the Plains that the chance wanderings of the handful of survivors, now in Canada, could not bring them within 500 miles of the dancing Sioux. The baffled red men thereupon took up the Ghost Dance, another form of hocus-pocus, guaranteed to bring the spirits of the dead ancestors riding gallantly back on the spirits of their dead ponies to exterminate the white man. This worked fine as a morale-booster until the white man's Gatling gun medicine proved more potent at Wounded Knee than the red man's ghosts. The surviving Sioux had to go back to the reservation while the white man went on to develop even more powerful medicine at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos.

Moral: it is unprofitable to confuse morale-boosters with Gatling guns—or A-bombs!

In practically all cultures before the rise of modern science and technology the average man solaced himself for his obvious helplessness in the face of nature with the *belief* that unseen powers were on his side in his struggle for survival. This belief was an invaluable support to his morale. Without it, millions of men would have given up the struggle. Tribes, empires, nations would have gone down without a fight. Perhaps the most familiar example in all history is the belief of the Jews, recorded in the Old Testament, that they are the chosen people of God. Others, like the Nazis, have phrased the same belief in other terms, but no people have clung to such a belief so tenaciously through so many vicissitudes of fortune for so many centuries as have the Jews. Religion, in other words, can be a key factor in morale. And without morale all battles are lost before they are fought.

But as many a war has demonstrated, victory depends on more than morale alone. Morale is a necessary condition of victory; it is not by itself a sufficient condition. One must have weapons and know-how as well.

The same is true in civilian life. It is not enough to believe that unseen powers are on your side in the battle against disease, poverty, internal dissension, and the other perils that beset individuals and societies. Without morale we cannot make much of a fight. But without equipment and know-how, without coming to terms with the actual cause-and-effect relationships implicit in our problems, even the most courageous struggle is doomed to defeat. This is the shift in values that the rise of modern science and technology has brought about—the shift from excessive reliance on morale factors to a predominant reliance on equipment and know-how; the shift from blaming the Devil for the straying of one's cow to blaming the quality of one's fencing, from merely praying for higher prices to highpressuring the administration at Washington, from relying on the Lord to cure one's afflicted son to calling in a doctor and subsidizing modern medicine, from exhortations to the nations to beat their guns into plowshares to appropriations for the United Nations and bigger budgets for defense.

So marked has this shift become that it is now an open question whether it hasn't gone too far. If the Sioux relied too much on the ancestors and not enough on learning the ways of the white man, the white man is in danger of relying too much on technology and not enough on the morale values in his own culture, too much on mechanism and not enough on the inspiration implicit in a social system honestly striving to maximize the value of personality, too much on destruction and not enough on democracy. Everyone recognizes that the way to control disease is to control its causes. But not everyone recognizes that the way to control the spread of values that deny the dignity of personality is to confront them not merely with superior military and economic power but with a morale based on the actual enhancement of personality in daily living. The morale values of the great religions may still be the necessary conditions for survival even though they cannot be the sufficient conditions.

5. THE RISE IN AESTHETIC VALUES

Puritanism distrusted beauty. Protestantism distrusts beauty. The early reformers saw that candles, sonorous masses, swinging censers, towering cathedrals, beautiful murals, paintings and statues not only expressed the faith of millions of Catholics down the ages but, what was more important to the rebels, served to intensify the identification of the worshiper with his church by flattering all his senses, not

merely his mind. So, down with such adventitious temptations of the Devil! As the modern tourist looks at the stark wooden benches in John Calvin's stark little chapel in Geneva he cannot help wondering at the stark anatomies that could have sat through the endless Seventhlies, Eighthlies, and Tenthlies of the stark Calvinistic theology. Beauty serves only to beguile. Away with it!

The Puritans imported this bleak austerity into America, and many a lesser sect has followed after them. Then as the dogmatic theology of damnation gradually softened into Arminianism, deism, and later varieties, the taboo on beauty softened also, but Protestantism has not yet recovered the beauty of worship against which it rebelled. Nor has the American scene recovered from the Puritan's scorn of beauty and the pioneer's indifference to it. Everyone has seen some of the horrors of domestic architecture perpetrated in mid-Victorian cities and the horrors of the slums that defaced those cities. Perhaps the ugliness of the early factories could not have been avoided in the age of steam and coal, but the only answer that Americans, like the British, could think of at the time was to live as far away from the atrocities as wealth permitted and then to let the Devil take the poor devils who had to live near them. The rising middle class in America as in Britain had little sense of the aesthetic and made poor use of what sense it did have.

Electricity, improved technology in glass, the new architecture, the power of dispersion brought by the surfaced highway and the automobile, the renaissance of taste, the growing leisure of more people, the spread of the New Paganism delighting in the things of this world—all these and more contributed to the rebirth of beauty in American homes and the beginnings of it in American cities. Along with this came increased interest in, and appreciation of, music following the diffusion of the phonograph and eventually the radio. Urban Protestant churches even began to hire professional organists and to spend money on their choirs.

Appreciation of natural beauty spread also as the national parks developed and the automobile opened them to millions.

The technology of transportation and diffusion thus contributed directly to aesthetic values from the late 1880's on.

6. IMPACTS ON MORAL VALUES

The rise of cities has forced a revision of the morals of the open country. The increasing interdependence of modern life has forced

moralists to broaden the intensely personal morality of the Bible. If the sense of sin has declined, the realization that man is indeed his brother's keeper has been brought home to more and more people by the newspaper, modern problem novels, the rising crime rate, the germ theory, the labor movement, social work, modern social science, two world wars, the interdependences of a complex economy. Even urban bankers and politicians show some concern now when farm prices fall.

But birth control has been, perhaps, the most revolutionary new trait of all in its impact on moral values. From an idea that aroused only loathing and hostility when proposed early in the nineteenth century to counteract the hopeless pessimism of Malthusianism, it had become a hush-hush device for roués, seductionists, and sophisticates by the dawn of the twentieth. Then within a few more years, while Margaret Sanger dragged the issue into the open in her fight for controlled parenthood, the rapidly falling birth rate testified to the fact that millions of upper- and middle-class families were actually practicing birth control, and eventually, while the Catholic Church continued to denounce "artificial" methods, some of the Protestant churches guardedly accepted what so many of their members were already doing. For millions of Americans, in other words, the value of automatic parenthood dipped below that of voluntary parenthood.

Birth control has probably contributed also to the apparent decline in the value placed by women on virginity. The increasing power of modern medicine to control the ravages of venereal disease may also be a factor along with the rising independence of women and the greater freedom of intersex association.

All of which by no means exhausts the impacts of science and invention on social values in America. But at least it suggests something of what has happened.

II-12:5. Functional-Relational Changes: The Great Depression

Morris in *The Encyclopedia of American History*⁹ lists twenty-two depressions in America from 1762 to 1938, inclusive, an average of one every eight years. The total "depression time" during those 2112 months amounted to 671 months, or nearly one-third of the span.

⁹ Richard B. Morris, *The Encyclopedia of American History*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, p. 508.

On the average, that was two and a half years to a depression, but there were two that lasted only nine months each (1833-34 and 1890-91) and one (1837-43) that lasted six years. By all odds the greatest, however, if not in *technical* duration—only forty-two months from 1929 to 1933—at least in its scope and total impact on the economy was the Great Depression of the 1930's.

World War I had dealt the world economy a blow from which it never really recovered. Inflation in the early 1920's practically wiped out the German middle class, parts of England constituted permanently "depressed areas," and foreign trade was badly disorganized. One of the first victims was the American farmer, whose productive capacity, overexpanded during the war to help feed the Allied world, now produced surpluses that neither the domestic market nor the reduced foreign demand could absorb at normal prices. From 1921 on, American farmers struggled with a depression of their own. Curiously enough, this seemed to have little effect for almost eight years on the inflationary expansion of credit in the cities. But by the spring of 1929 signs of trouble were beginning to appear in agricultural countries all over the world: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the Orient, Poland, the Near East. Then in October, 1929, the bubble of American speculation burst in the spectacular crash of the stock market in New York. Within a week \$15,000,000,000 in market values had vanished and in three months approximately \$40,000,000,000. Sluggishness of demand, which had been affecting a number of industries even before October, suddenly began to spread. Factories began laying off employees, stores dismissed clerks, railroads reduced working crews. Unemployment, which had climbed to the ominous total of 1,800,000 in a work force of 45,000,000 now headed for the ceiling. Within three years it had reached 15,000,000. Every third worker in the United States was out of a job. National income plummeted from \$81,000,000,000 in 1929 to \$41,000,000,000 in 1932. The low point came in March, 1933, when the bank crisis blanketed the nation with bank holidays after the governor of Michigan had closed the banks in his state in mid-February. Industrial output, which had recovered by 15 percent from July to October, 1932, sagged again to half of normal. One-third of the nation's work force was in the streets and one-third of its railroad mileage was in bankruptcy. In parts of the Middle West farmers were taking shot-guns to resist widespread mortgage foreclosures. The private yacht of more than one New York millionaire waited in the harbor—to carry its master from the clutches of the revolution!

While technically recovery began soon after the Roosevelt administration took office in 1933, thus "ending" the depression for the statisticians, actually the economy had not yet recovered its stride six years later when the war orders from Europe began to prime the pump more effectually than had the New Deal. There were still over five times the number of predepression unemployed looking for work when the war boom arrived. Millions who had been out of work for from four years to ten would never again recover their old confidence in themselves or in the American economy.

Nobody knows how many hundreds starved to death before the federal government moved into the relief picture in 1933—in New York City "at least 29 persons are known to have died of starvation in 1933, while 110 such fatalities, chiefly children, were reported for the nation at large prior to 1934"—but millions went undernourished, ravaged by deficiency diseases, and scarred for life by the humiliations of selling apples on street corners, haunting relief offices, and seeing their children hungry, wearing school shoes patched with blotting paper, or going without decent clothing at all.¹⁰

In scope, depth, duration, and social consequences the Great Depression of the 1930's ranks as the most serious collapse of the American economy in its entire history.

And its effects, of course, were not confined to America. World War I had transformed the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. Instead of having to ship an overplus of gold, goods, or services abroad each year to balance foreign accounts, Americans now had to accept such shipments from other nations if trade was to continue in a normal way. Part of these accounts due consisted of interest payments on the \$11,000,000,000 war debts of Britain, France, and other Allied nations. Since there was not gold enough in the world to pay these debts in that medium and not enough in the gold reserves of European nations even to pay interest in bullion, the only practicable way such payments could have been made at all would have been in goods and services (shipping, etc.). But paying in goods and services meant competing with American businessmen in the American market, and most American businessmen, with their eyes glued to their own narrow interests in that market, strenuously opposed any such competition. Hence, throughout the 1920's while European nations were struggling to reestablish their own solvency and to maintain the soundness of their own currencies, the American

¹⁰ Dixon Wechter, *The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948, p. 39.

government insisted on draining away European gold reserves by requiring debt payments to be made in gold, which it then promptly deprived of all further value for international trade by stacking away in underground vaults at Fort Knox, Kentucky. American investors, meanwhile, were increasing their stake in foreign countries from the \$3,000,000,000 of prewar days to \$14,000,000,000 by 1932. When the depression came, America now contributed an enormous factor toward the further unsettlement of foreign economies by closing the American market almost completely to foreign goods. The Hawley-Smoot tariff of June, 1930, put a 40 percent barrier between the foreign manufacturer and the American consumer, thus making it impossible for foreigners to recoup themselves in the American market for the payments which they were expected to make on the war debts and on American foreign investments. This trade-killing tariff was immediately interpreted abroad as a declaration of economic warfare. Within a year twenty-five foreign governments had so effectively boycotted American goods that our foreign exports dropped 50 percent, thus intensifying unemployment in the United States. To add to the same trend still further, American manufacturers, to evade the foreign boycott, began building factories abroad—258 by 1932—thus exporting capital at a time when American workmen needed the jobs which that capital might have provided right here at home.

The dislocation of world credit and international trade set going a chain reaction of economic and political events that led straight to World War II. It unleashed the Japanese militarists in Manchuria (1931), brought Hitler to power in Germany (1933), and put economizers and appeasers in office in Britain and France.

Within the United States, meanwhile, the economic catastrophe drove the Republicans from control of Congress for fourteen years and from control of the presidency for a full twenty. It gave the Democratic New Deal a free hand to transform the legal status of labor; to extend government control over banking, the security market, and many other aspects of business; to introduce the policy of deficit financing; and to accustom the American people to regard the federal government as the great agency for partially redistributing wealth through high income taxes, social security, agricultural subsidies, and other advances toward the welfare state.

What did this great economic catastrophe that brought the New Deal to power do to American social values?

It did plenty. It destroyed the prestige of the American business-

man as the avatar of American progress and prosperity. It shook the faith of millions in the value of hard work and thrift. Why work hard and deny yourself to accumulate a nest egg for a rainy day when a deluge like this could smash it all overnight? It turned millions into cynics about the value of education. With thousands of ministers, lawyers, physicians, and engineers in the relief lines, what price college? It stripped the robe of inviolability from many cherished beliefs and institutions. *Laissez faire*, hitherto regarded by all but a handful of intellectuals as the brightest diamond in the diadem of the national mythology, suddenly turned out to be only imitation glass—alum or something worse. Technocrats talked of transforming the unruly economy into an engineers' well-ordered paradise with money based not on gold but on unchanging energy-units—and distinguished conservatives listened respectfully without mentioning the word Bolshevik. The country-club set, smugly ignoring 15,000,000 unemployed, still reassured themselves with the tawdry lie, "Anybody can get a job who really wants one," but there were those even among the most eminently respectable who voiced a certain impatience with American institutions. "You can't eat the Constitution" expressed a preference for action, and it was a preference not confined to the unemployed.

Demagogues from Huey Long to radio prophets of anti-Semitism fattened on the bewilderment and discontent. Nobody knows how many Americans actually lost faith in the American way of life and moved left. But it was nowhere near as many as the number of those who talked the language of disillusionment and occasionally acted like red-eyed radicals while still secretly expecting American institutions to work if given a chance. If many traditionally Republican midwestern farmers behaved in the face of threatened eviction like so many anarchists, they still voted when the time came like so many Democrats. And if thousands of disgruntled depositors of closed banks declared that they were through with all banks, what they really meant was that they were through with certain, particular bankers. Reopened and with deposits federally insured, banks proved as popular as ever. Despite Communist leadership and radical slogans, most of the thousands who marched on the Ford plant at Dearborn in the midst of the depression really wanted jobs, not revolution. If, as some theorists of revolution contend, it takes three generations of disillusionment with the institutions of a society to produce a revolutionary situation, America was very far from a revolutionary

crisis in the years of the depression.¹¹ For one thing, every great revolution has occurred only in a society in which people had a doing government and had lost confidence in the political process itself. Such was certainly not the condition in the United States in 1929-33. Another symptom of impending political upheaval is the appearance of a utopian myth, an emotionalized picture of a new and different society that is to replace the old. Except among a tiny minority of left-wingers, no such new utopian myth could be found even among the masses of the unemployed. The utopian myth to which the vast majority clung was the American way of life—to be restored intact after the unsympathetic politicians had been swept out of the way. They were swept out of the way in the election of 1932. If the millionaires ordered their yachts when the banks closed, they merely displayed their usual inability to sense the mood of ordinary people.

But if Americans were not revolutionary in 1929-33, they were at least puzzled, confused, profoundly dissatisfied, and willing to consider new ways of meeting social problems. Without the terrific shock of the depression, old customs, habits, and traditions would never have accepted the National Recovery Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and scores of other new governmental agencies. Of course, without the depression most of them would never have been needed. But it is still probable that during the first Hundred Days, when the new administration was giving the economy its first shot in the arm, Roosevelt, had he been anything but a country squire intent on salvaging the American way of life, could have carried the nation a long way toward real Socialism. The rich whose investments he was saving would probably have kept as mum as they did until he violated that holy of holies, the value of the dollar. For if there was no revolution in the air in 1933 there was certainly panic and inexpressible gratitude for a few brief weeks for the cocky assurance with which the new President went at his job. During those brief weeks Roosevelt had what amounted to the nearest thing any American President ever had to a blank check on economic innovation. He tore it up and settled for the New Deal and the devaluation of gold.

It is impossible to trace all the impacts of the depression on the American scale of values. Son affected all aspects of life from the birth rate, which dropped in 1933 to its lowest point in history, to the

¹¹ See Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927, pp. 16-19.

coffin industry, which sold more plain caskets and fewer gold-embossed ones. It downed the sale of religious books and upped the sale of books on economics and sociology. It set more novelists to writing about social problems and nearly destroyed the theater. It forced families into closer comradeship and pushed down the rate of juvenile delinquency. It turned millions into the cozy warmth of public libraries at the same time that it was putting new books beyond the reach of cramped library budgets. It kept newspaper publishers and cigarette manufacturers happy and nearly ruined the book publishers. It kept thousands of social workers jumping and millions of other workers loafing. It drove married women out of the schools and millions of other married women out of their homes to hunt jobs. It shook America to the core as nothing else since the War Between the States had ever shaken it. It was the No. 1 social catastrophe of the twentieth century. And as the greatest functional-relational disturbance complex to hit American routines between Fort Sumter and Pearl Harbor it took its toll of values.

II-12:6. Functional-Relational Disturbances: War

War has been defined by the greatest American academic authority on it as "the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force."¹²

As a challenge to national existence, war nearly always acts on a people at first as an integrating rather than a disintegrating force. In other words, it produces results almost directly opposed to the results of a depression. Instead of unemployment and weakened morale, it stimulates employment and heightens morale. At least those have been among its major effects on peoples in pre-atomic warfare. Eventually, of course, if long drawn out, war begins to wear down morale. War weariness succeeds morale invigoration. Integration weakens. Appeasers and compromisers begin to crawl out of the woodwork, and unless there is drastic repression of defeatism, more and more people begin to talk openly of negotiating with the enemy.

At this point it has always been helpful for morale purposes if the enemy declares for unconditional surrender. Nothing bucks up the sagging morale of a people like assurances from the enemy that most of them ought to be shot.

¹² Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942, p. 13. Wright uses the term *groups* to refer to politically active, organized population units and their controlling personnel, not to a distinctive form of association such as we have tried to designate by the term throughout this volume.

Of course war has always forced civilians drastically to shift moral gears. Many of the values required for peacetime living suddenly become nonadaptive in wartime. Members of the armed services have to learn to devalue one of the basic values of their civilian lives—respect for human life. They have to learn killing as an occupation, but with modern gadgets for long-distance mayhem this may be less difficult than learning how to drive a bayonet into another man's bowels. They have to learn to regard themselves as expendable and to submit to deprivations and regimentations that would be unendurable in peacetime. Even civilians have to learn to live with rationing, chronic shortages, bureaucratic blunderings. In Detroit, for example, during World War II thousands of gallons of milk, badly needed by the children of newly arrived war workers, were poured down the sewers for one entire week because the allocation of the milk supply happened to be based on an out-of-date census count of the area in question. There wasn't *supposed* to be that much milk for that area, so down the sewer it went!

How many compromises with old values may be required will be determined by the degree of disorganization of old routines imposed by the war. A war that is fought across the ocean is one thing; a war that comes down through the roof with every bomber raid and rumbles up the street with each invading tank is something else.

What World War III, if and when it comes, will do to American values is a large question mark. Such previews as military experts have been able to mock-up strongly suggest that vaporizing bombs, bacteriological attacks, and other niceties of scientific warfare may easily make ultimate victory depend on which handful of survivors on either side can cling the longest to the illusion of victory and to the irrational determination to die rather than surrender. In other words, with New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, and a score of other cities wiped from the map and perhaps 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 Americans dead, will there still be enough left who value freedom enough *under those conditions* to keep on fighting? On the answer to that little question may depend the survival, not of the American way of life, for that is bound to be the first casualty of World War III, but of the United States and of what little of Western civilization may be left.

II-12:7. Impacts of Previous Readjustments

For theoretical and observational purposes it is useful to distinguish previous readjustments, i.e., readjustments by individuals, groups,

organizations, and so on, to disasters, population changes, changes in traits, and functional-relational disturbances as disturbances in their own right in any given space-time segment under analysis. But it is unnecessary at this point to attempt to distinguish the impacts of such disturbances on values themselves. In effect such readjustments nearly always change the meanings of specific situations, and the effect of new meanings on the values of those involved will naturally depend on what the new meanings are. Thus, the readjustments of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation to the corruption of the papacy took the form of a new and different kind of Christianity. What this amounted to was a new culture complex which diffused rapidly under certain conditions and not at all under others. Two centuries later the readjustments of John Wesley and his associates to the stodginess of the Established Church of England created still a different type of Christianity, Wesleyanism, or Methodism. Tens of thousands of poor workers accepted it in England; tens of thousands of poor peasants in Ireland rejected it. The leaders of the Established Church readjusted to this new culture complex by driving the Methodists out of the Church of England into a separate church of their own. But one can hardly draw any useful conclusions from a few examples of this sort concerning the impact of prior readjustments as such on social values. The obvious qualification always is, "It all depends."

II-12:8. Summary

Perhaps the best summary of what we have been saying in this chapter of the effect of disturbances of routine on social values may be conveyed by merely outlining the major stages in the great hegira of the American mind from Puritan days to the mid-twentieth century. Students of this field have distinguished periods in the atmosphere of opinion in America.

1. THE PERIOD OF THEOLOGICAL PESSIMISM—COLONIAL AMERICA FROM THE LANDINGS AT JAMESTOWN AND PLYMOUTH TO THE REVOLUTION

While Virginians were more Church of England than Puritan in their theology, the great intellectual currents of the time swirled rather around the dogmatism of New England than the more liberal ideas of the planters. To the Puritan, as his greatest divines assured him, man was a sinner in the hands of an angry God, far more likely to wind up in hell than in heaven. The coldest New England Sabbaths could

always be tempered by minute descriptions of the heating arrangements awaiting shivering worshipers hereafter. But as the physical hardships of the colonists moderated, as the retreat of the frontier reduced the imminence of scalping, and as Quakers and other heretics multiplied in the colonies, milder theories of man's destiny gained ground. Political problems, in fact, began so to overshadow problems of the hereafter that on the eve of the Revolution church membership in the Colonies was estimated at not more than 4 percent of the adult population. Thus, the period of theological pessimism passed gradually after the Revolution into a period of political and economic optimism.

2. THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPTIMISM

This was the period from Washington's inaugural to the 1860's. Life continued to be precarious. On the westward-moving frontier the Indians took their toll of the pioneers and in the more settled regions infectious diseases proved even more deadly. Pneumonia and diphtheria flourished in winter; typhoid, dysentery, and malaria in the summer. Intermittently, yellow fever, cholera, and smallpox swept through the cities. From August to October, 1793, Philadelphia, stricken by yellow fever, suffered the worst epidemic in the history of any American city. Cholera, which killed the German philosopher Hegel in 1831, invaded New York City the following year and even struck down many of the soldiers of General Winfield Scott's command on their way across Lake Erie to the Black Hawk War in Illinois. The same disease struck the South in 1849, the Middle West in 1850. Smallpox, typhoid, and typhus appeared at frequent intervals.

More deadly in the long run than any of these epidemic diseases, however, was lung fever, or tuberculosis, which in 1840 was killing 400 in every 100,000 Americans every year. Small wonder that life expectancy rose only a few years during this period from the Massachusetts average of 1789—34.5 years for male infants and 36.5 for females. By 1900 these averages had climbed to 48 and 51, respectively, and by 1950 had practically doubled. But since men had never known anything better, the years from Washington's inaugural to the inauguration of Lincoln seemed the acme of men's hopes. Independence, the expansion of the nation to the Pacific, abundance of cheap land, the steady growth in population, the beginnings of industrialism, and above all, the widespread belief that now at last here in the United States man had achieved the ultimate in self-government and

individual opportunity all combined to produce a climate of opinion that saw boundless possibilities in the future and no insuperable obstacles until near the end of the period. Then the slavery issue began to divide the sections and frighten thoughtful Americans. From Fort Sumter to Appomattox the nation fought for its life.

3. THE PERIOD OF TRIUMPHANT MATERIALISM, SPENCERIAN OPTIMISM, AND EMERGING DOUBT: 1865-1914

Appomattox left northern capitalists masters of the nation. They proceeded to appropriate natural resources, expand the factory system, and concentrate control at a rate never seen in the world before. In a generation the United States passed from a nation predominantly rural and agricultural to one predominantly urban and industrial. The middle-class ideal of economic striving and social climbing obsessed the public mind. And while the Vanderbilts, Jim Fiske, and John D. Rockefeller set the patterns of ultimate success—and the slums spread their stench in American cities and Pinkertons shot down steel strikers at Homestead and United States soldiers smashed the Pullman strike at Chicago—distinguished economists and social philosophers assured the world that this was not only the apotheosis of natural law but all part of an inevitable and uncontrollable progression from the amoeba to the millionaire. *Laissez faire* sanctified unlimited appropriation. Herbert Spencer, who condemned both the public school and public milk inspection as foretastes of the coming slavery of Socialism, proclaimed progress as the law of evolution. Among the American middle class there were almost no doubters that *laissez faire* was the Law and Herbert Spencer was its Prophet.

The doubters at first were mostly working people, a few clergymen, some social settlement workers, fundamentalist agrarians like William Jennings Bryan, and eventually a particularly dubious type of journalist dubbed by the highest authority, President Theodore Roosevelt, to wit, "the muckraker." The doubts and the muck, however, aided by a few depressions along the way, sufficed to cloud the bright face of natural law and do-nothing government. When Theodore Roosevelt split his party in 1912, Woodrow Wilson took office with a popular mandate for action against economic inequality and growing injustice.

Meanwhile, there were other kinds of doubters—scientists and philosophers—who challenged the adequacy of Mr. Spencer's interpretation of evolution. How could Mr. Spencer, with his little trick of pick-

ing positive evidence to support his thesis and ignoring negative, be so sure that the processes of nature were working out to suit human values? To many observers it seemed more evident that they were working out regardless of human values; that human values, in fact, seemed rather irrelevant in the scheme of things. Then came the German invasion of Belgium, and in the brutal blotting out of the Victorian afterglow, no matter what men had thought before about the place of human life in the universe, nobody could believe any longer that evolution was grinding out automatic progress. World War I destroyed forever the easy Spencerian confusion of increasing human power with increasing human good. The period of triumphant materialism, Spencerian optimism, and emerging doubt gave place to a period of world dislocation, cultural pessimism, and growing fear.

4. THE PERIOD OF WORLD DISLOCATION, CULTURAL PESSIMISM, AND GROWING FEAR: 1914 TO DATE

Even while the Victorian afterglow still lasted and before the field-gray legions poured into Belgium, Spengler had penned his *Decline of the West*. As Emerson's self-confidence and Browning's cosmic optimism had typified the dominant mood of the mid-nineteenth century, Spengler's cultural pessimism may be taken as typifying the dominant mood of the first half of the twentieth. Few people agree with Spengler's conception of civilization as a kind of psychosocial organism with inevitable and uncontrollable life stages from infancy to old age, but fewer still have escaped the pessimism about the future of Western civilization that Spengler expressed. The old world order based from Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium on the gold standard, the self-regulating market, the balance of power, and the preponderance of the British Navy has gone forever. What is to succeed it is not yet clear. A generation of struggle including a second world war has not yet given the answer.

The one thing that is clear is that whatever does succeed it will be the product not of some mystic inevitability implicit in the processes of nature but of man's own choices, his own wisdom, stupidity, or blundering. Yet at a time when never in the history of the race did he hold such command over the forces of nature, man was never so unsure of himself, so afraid of man himself.

Readjustment Lag and Revolution

II-13:1. Disturbance vs. Readjustment

Why does readjustment, the readjustment of social structures, social processes, culture complexes, tend to lag behind the disturbance of such structures, processes, or complexes?

The answer is not merely that the disturbance must obviously precede the readjustment for readjustment to occur at all and it is not merely that readjustment usually encounters so many resistances—psychological, institutional, political, economic, and functional. The same resistances also oppose disturbance itself. There is a massive inertia in every social structure, social process, cultural complex. Western societies have institutionalized science and invention, true enough, so that they are under a continual bombardment of new ideas and new things, but the new ideas and the new things always have to run the gantlet of old ideas and old things. The theory of evolution did not replace the theory of special creation automatically just by being published by Darwin and Wallace in 1859. The automobile did not drive the horse off the highways in the United States just by being invented. The new idea or the new gadget always has to spread, always has to be *selected* in competition with old ideas and old gadgets, before its disturbing effects become evident. And this process of selection and spread takes time. In the nature of the case the process obviously must precede the dislocations which the new idea or the new gadget introduces and therefore must precede readjustments to those dislocations or problems. But it is a peculiarity of readjustment, as of all behavior guided by ideas, that it can be a readjustment not merely to a past or present condition or problem but to a projected future as

well. Theoretically, readjustment *could* anticipate problems as well as merely catch up with those current. Why, then, does the adaptive culture—customs, institutions, laws—why does the social control aspect of society so frequently lag behind other aspects of it?

There would seem to be many reasons, some of them inherent in the nature of things and some of them peculiar to the readjustive processes themselves.

For one thing, the universe seems to be so ordered that it is always easier to tear down and destroy than to construct or create. It is easier for a youngster in his playpen to knock blocks about than to pile them up into some sort of tower or house. It was easier for a Roman soldier at the siege of Syracuse to put Archimedes to the sword than for Archimedes to devise the catapults and other weapons that had already defeated one Roman attack. It is always easier to destroy than to create. It takes nine months to produce a human being. His life can be snuffed out in a split second.

For us this means that in terms of human activity it is easier to disrupt a routine than to reestablish it or devise a new routine. In two minutes a broken water main can disrupt the flow of traffic along a thoroughfare. To reestablish that flow may take a repair crew two weeks. One act of infidelity can destroy mutual confidence between husband and wife that years of strict rectitude cannot restore. The social structures, social routines, and culture complexes of a society can always be disrupted or destroyed more easily than they can be put together again. A few hours of all-out scientific warfare can destroy more than a century of constructive effort can replace. Humpty Dumpty's sad fate merely highlights an inescapable condition of human life: destruction is always easier than construction or reconstruction.

This, then, would seem to be one of the built-in handicaps of readjustment. The impact of disturbance, whatever its source, is nearly always destructive—otherwise, no problem; readjustment must always be constructive—otherwise, no problem-solving.

On top of this handicap, readjustment suffers from another. A single individual alone and on his own can discover or invent;¹ to readjust social structures, social processes, and culture complexes to a

¹ This is purely a relative statement. Of course the discoverer or inventor is never purely on his own. He uses the devices of his culture and he must have the usual protections afforded by culture. But relative to the leader or social organizer he is more on his own, i.e., needs relatively less cooperation from others for his achievement, than does the leader or the organizer.

discovery or an invention, on the other hand, will always require the coöperation of many individuals. Not only is destruction (disruption of routine) easier than construction or reconstruction, by some law inherent in the nature of things, but the social processes by which disruption occurs seem to be simpler than those required for readjusting society to such disruption. The Wright brothers virtually alone at Kittyhawk could bring the airplane into being. The efforts of seventy governments and the United Nations have not sufficed to readjust the world order to the impact of the airplane on modern living. A stock market crash can signalize the partial breakdown of an economic system. Years of readjustive effort by millions of men could not put Humpty Dumpty together again. Readjustment always takes more doing than the disruptions that make it necessary.

An additional element is the undoubted fact that it is always harder to visualize the problems of the future than it is to see those of the past or the present. Thus, readjustments to the automobile have almost never leaped ahead of current problems. Usually they have not even kept pace with those problems. At mid-century traffic experts were estimating that merely to bring American highways up to the needs of the automobile age *at that time* would cost over \$10,000,000,000. With 35,000 or 40,000 dying on the highways every year and television coming with a rush, how many states had had foresight enough to outlaw in advance television distractions in the driver's compartment of an automobile? How many had had foresight enough to protect the democratic process by outlawing private armies patterned after Hitler's Brown Shirts? How many were preparing then (1954) for the far-reaching dislocations that would come with the advent of the automatic factory?² The problem of social foresight and adjustment to the future belongs in a later chapter. But we cannot at this point overlook the fact that inadequate projection of current trends is a continual factor in the failure of readjustments to keep pace with current problems.

Over and above the resistances in any *status quo*, therefore—psychological, institutional, political, economic, and functional—which tend to retard readjustments, account must be taken of three other kinds of handicaps that seem to affect readjustment even more than they affect the processes of disturbance and disruption: The universe

² Already a portent on the industrial horizon somewhat bigger than a man's hand. See John Diebold, *Automation: The Advent of the Automatic Factory*, New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1952.

makes destruction easier than construction; social processes of readjustment are inevitably more complex than those of disruption; and readjustment to the future and thus anticipation of problems to come is always more difficult than readjustment merely to the past or present. Together, all these resistances and handicaps create an almost constant condition of readjustment lag even in self-governing societies supposedly as flexible as our own.

II-13:2. What Happens When Resistances Dominate?³

The general answer, of course, is that social pressures for readjustment tend to rise. But the result isn't automatic or inevitable. One historian, for example, notes that in the fifteenth century, when criticism of the church was growing acute in England, the clergy induced the young king, Henry V, to divert public attention from the church and its inordinate privileges by making another attack on the hereditary enemy, France. This delayed the ultimate settlement with the church for more than a century. It is sometimes possible to discharge gathering social tensions down the wrong lightning rods. William H. Seward, Secretary of State under Lincoln, is credited with having thought up a plan to avert the oncoming struggle between the states by getting the United States involved in a war with England. Fortunately, he never got the chance to sidetrack history so easily. But the leaders of the Spanish republic in the early 1930's did pick out the wrong lightning rod. Instead of attacking the sources of power of their reactionary enemies in Spain—the great landed estates, the Madrid banks, the industrial holdings in Barcelona, and the reactionary control of the Army—they singled out the Catholic Church as the traditional enemy of reform. The reactionaries thereupon concocted a plot with Franco and other disloyal generals to overthrow the government—a plot that succeeded all too well with the help of Hitler and Mussolini and President Roosevelt's strange refusal to permit the sale of American arms to the Loyalists.

When resistances within a social system block readjustments, and rising social tensions are not deflected against the wrong targets, conditions ripen for social upheaval.

II-13:3. The Usual Difficulties of Language

The literature of revolution stretches back for several thousand years. There were revolutions in ancient China and Egypt thousands

³ See Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952.

of years before Christ and there were wise men to record the facts and describe the resulting misfortunes. The books that have been written on revolution merely from Thucydides, Aristotle, and Plato down to Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and the latest apologist for Mao Tse-tung or the Moroccan nationalists would fill a sizable library. But it is symptomatic of the infantile state of the social sciences that modern writers are still using the term *revolution* with at least five distinct and different references.

Sometimes revolution refers to the political processes by which by extralegal or highly unusual means one government, faction, or social class replaces another in control of a state. This reference has nothing whatever to do with the cultural impacts of those processes—the changes in laws, customs, institutions, and so on, that follow. Thus, referring only to the political processes by which power changed hands, we speak of the First Russian Revolution and of the Second Russian Revolution and in each case we are not referring to the kind of social system that resulted but merely to the political processes by which the czarist regime was overthrown and succeeded by the Provisional Government and to the political processes by which in turn the Provisional Government was overthrown and was succeeded by the Bolshevik government of the Soviets.

But when Kerensky summoned the workers of Petrograd to repulse Kornilov's counterrevolutionary *Putsch* in the name of The Revolution, he was not referring merely to the processes by which the Czar had been overthrown. Nobody was going to turn out to get shot at merely for the sake of something that was all over and done with. For the workers of Petrograd in the summer of 1917 The Revolution wasn't a specific set of political processes that had ousted the Czar and installed the Provisional Government, a specific set of political processes all over and done with six months in the past. It was the entirety of living processes by which a new society was struggling into birth at that very moment—the entirety of the *opportunity* which the destruction of czarism had given to the people of Russia. For the Petrograd workers The Revolution was their present opportunity to make the future and to make it in a different image from the one Kornilov stood for. That, then, is a second reference of the term *revolution*: a reference not to specific political processes merely but to the broader meanings of those specific processes, to the new society that revolution (in the narrower sense) is producing or has produced.

But when Harold Laski, the British Socialist, wrote a book in 1943 entitled *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* he wasn't writing

about the political processes involved in an extralegal transfer of power, nor about any specific social system resulting from such a transfer, but about the remarkable changes that had come over the political temper of the Western world since the brave days of laissez-faire private capitalism. From Washington to Berlin and Moscow he could see nothing but the collapse of laissez faire and the revolutionary advances of government interventionism. That he saw the enemy as Fascism rather than Communism may be credited not merely to his own Socialist predilection in that direction but to the fact that he wrote in the midst of World War II when Russia was an avowed ally of Britain and the United States. The point is, the *Revolution of Our Time* is the revolution in men's thinking, not any specific new social system.

When, on the other hand, nearly ten years later an American political scientist drafted an outline for a gigantic research project, *The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research*, the revolution now was not merely the change in men's thinking from laissez faire to government interventionism of all kinds but the ominous advance of Communist totalitarianism all over the world. Here, then, is still a fourth reference of the term *revolution*. Lasswell is not concerned with the specific political processes by which power changes hands in a "revolution," nor with the type of social system that results, nor with the century-long changes in the climate of opinion in the Western world. He is concerned with the political changes going on all over the world, and in so far as these indicate a trend toward Communist totalitarianism he calls them "The World Revolution."

Yet there is still a fifth reference of the term *revolution*, namely, to unusual changes in the nonpolitical culture. The industrial revolution is the most familiar example. But there are plenty more. One can read of revolutions in art, revolutions in English literature, revolutions in science, revolutions in morals, and so on.

The language used by students of revolution is obviously not yet the language of science.

Our concern at this point is wholly and solely with revolution as a complex of political processes by which ultimate power in a state changes by extralegal or very unusual means from one government, faction, or class to another. We are not concerned with revolutionary social systems, revolutionary shifts in opinion, or revolutionary changes in the nonpolitical culture. We shall have to say a word or two about

revolution in Lasswell's sense because in many places the advance of Communist totalitarianism is changing the character of the political processes by which extralegal or unusual shifts in power occur.

So much for the difficulties of language in a field of study still in swaddling clothes.

II-13:4. Approaches to the Study of Social Upheavals⁴

Social philosophers, historians, and social observers for ages have busied themselves trying to explain social upheavals. Explanations have ranged from the vengeance of the gods and the arrogance of the rich and the enviousness of the poor to theories of frustrated instincts, institutional rigidity, the blockage of the normal "circulation of the elite" (able men unable to rise), class warfare, and laws of history to conceptions which see such phenomena as manifesting a natural history of their own.

Undoubtedly the most famous explanation of all is that formulated by Karl Marx, the founder of so-called Scientific Socialism. His theory was intended not merely to explain the upheavals of the past but to predict the upheavals of the future and, more importantly still, to enable his followers, the self-appointed leaders of the proletariat, to align themselves with "the laws of history" so that they could take over the control of society by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if and when the fatal contradictions inherent in all capitalist society should have brought about its inevitable collapse. This theory was based, of course, on Marx's contention that the real engine of history, the real dynamic in human affairs, was the struggle between social classes, the constant effort on the part of privileged war chiefs, privileged slave owners, privileged landowners, privileged businessmen to exploit their captives, slaves, serfs, or wage earners, on the one hand, and the correlative struggle of the exploited to resist exploitation, on the other. From his monumental analysis of the nature of capitalism Marx had concluded that its own contradictions must eventually, especially in industrialized societies, so reduce the relative number of the exploiters and so increase the numbers and miseries of the exploited as to lead inevitably to insurrection and revolution. In a violent uprising the victims of exploitation would overthrow the "executive committee of the capitalists," namely, the government, and

⁴ We shall use the term *social upheaval* to refer to any kind of political process that results in the extralegal or unusual transfer of power in the state. Revolution and counterrevolution are subforms of social upheaval.

by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat establish the classless society. Eventually, with the exploiters all liquidated, there would be no further need of the state, so, according to the Marxist apocalypse, it would presently wither away. All this was beautifully logical, granted certain premises, up to the point of the actual overthrow and the establishment of the dictatorship. Just how the overthrow was to be accomplished and just how the dictatorship would be organized were details not too clear in Marxian theory. Neither did the Master deal with another little detail, a trifle extraneous to the logic of his Utopia but extremely important in the event: the function of personal ambition for power on the part of rival believers.

Marx himself, of course, did not have any clear idea of how the true believers were to create the New Jerusalem. It was Vladimir Ulyanov, better known as Nicolai Lenin, the son of a Czarist school inspector, who implemented the Master's vision with a *party* and a *program*. To bring about the overthrow Lenin organized a small band of professional revolutionists, the Bolsheviks, men who dedicated their lives to the business of destroying capitalism.⁵ It was on the basis of his program of "bread, peace, land" that Lenin engineered the October Revolution in Russia and then organized the dictatorship—a highly centralized government controlled by a top committee of his exclusive Bolshevik professionals and protected against internal enemies by the Cheka, or secret police, and against external enemies by the Red Army. It was Lenin, in short, who provided the political technology by which his selected band of Marxists won a revolution and consolidated their control over Russia.⁶ But he died in 1924 before he could do anything about the growing struggle for power within the Bolshevik party. Out of that struggle Stalin emerged as the dictator and Russia emerged as a land of ruthless purges, slave camps, thought

⁵ Russian Marxists split in 1903 over the questions of how much help the revolution would need from the proletariat and what kind of organization could best give that help. The majority faction under Lenin broke away from the minority faction, or Mensheviks, who contended for a less active role, on the one hand, and for a larger and less well-disciplined revolutionary party, on the other. Lenin's victory in the October Revolution and his successful establishment of the Soviet government gave his theories overwhelming prestige among Marxists all over the world.

⁶ Marx had envisaged the possibility of a revolution in Russia but tended to emphasize the necessity of an urbanized proletariat as a base for any successful revolution. Hence, Russian agents in China during the long struggle of Mao Tse-tung's agrarian Communists against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government refused for years to recognize the possibility that peasants could make a revolution without leadership from the cities and without the aid of an urban proletariat, both of which were lacking in the Chinese Communist movement that eventually took over. Mao Tse-tung, in other words, developed a non-Marxian technique of revolution and made it work.

control, and utter helplessness in the hands of the Man at the Top.

If Marxism was vague on details, it was clear enough on the broad trends of the future. The world was entering the era of the downfall of capitalism. The conviction of Soviet rulers that this tremendous eschatology, or theory of last things, has given them a universal key, applicable anywhere without regard to local conditions, has led them into some grotesque blunders.

Lenin himself saw revolution just around the corner all over western Europe for two or three years after World War I. In the crucial countries in which he expected the most, Germany and Italy, Communism never had a chance, not only because of local conditions but because the victorious Allies were near enough to those countries and powerful enough to have squelched any Communist regime that could have been set up. In the same way Stalin after World War II blundered away Soviet prestige won at Stalingrad and by forcing local Communist parties always to play the Russian game destroyed whatever chance they might have had to win power via the ballot in Italy and France. The scientific character of Marxism resides mainly in its own propaganda.

II-13:5. The Scientific Study of Social Upheavals

Marxists have been interested in revolution for very practical ends: to discover the "laws of history" and to utilize them in the class struggle for the victory of the proletariat; or more specifically, as the Communists see it, for the victory of the Communist party and Russian imperialism. Sociologists, political scientists, and sociologically oriented historians are interested in revolution to develop and verify, if they can, hypotheses concerning uniformities in the processes of social change.⁷

The two methods that have contributed most to present understanding of revolutions are the statistical and the case-study method. On the basis of statistical compilations by Sorokin and others it can be estimated that there have been at least 2000 to 3000 social up-

⁷ As citizens, forced to recognize the menace of Soviet Communism to intellectual freedom all over the world, they also have a practical interest in using whatever uniformities they discover to aid in devising defenses against revolution, the most wasteful and dangerous type of social change, other than scientific war itself. Unfortunately, in Soviet practice, revolution is now a weapon of warfare, a weapon in the cold war. It is doubly important, therefore, for Americans to understand the nature of revolution since American foreign policy must now deal with the possibilities of Soviet-inspired and Soviet-guided revolution in every foreign country but particularly in France, Western Germany, Italy, the Near East, Africa, and the Orient.

heavals within the span of recorded human history from the first Egyptian dynasties, B.C. 3500 to 4000, down to A.D. 1954. Sorokin compiled a list of 1622 revolutions in 13 countries alone from B.C. 600 to 1925.⁸ In addition, he found that there had been no less than 76 *peaks* of internal violence in China from 200 B.C. to 1925. He did not bother with the revolts, insurrections, and revolutions in the New World from 1492 down. That list would include two revolutionary upheavals within the area of what is now the United States, namely, the American Revolution and the War Between the States. It would also have to include hundreds of upheavals in Mexico, Central America, and South America. In Europe since 1925 there have been one or more governmental overturns in Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans, not to speak of the extralegal changes in government directly due to enemy invasion in Norway, France, and other countries during World War II.

In the long view of history Europe has averaged one notable upheaval due to internal violence every five to twenty years, and for the last century and a half every generation has had to face one or more violent upheavals somewhere in the world. In terms of five variables—the extent of the area involved, the classes participating, the violence used, the duration of the disturbance, and the relative international importance of the country—Sorokin found three peaks of disorder in his thirteen countries in twenty-five centuries. One came about 750 A.D. when the feudal system was beginning to establish itself; another centered around 1250 A.D. when the commercial transformation of western Europe was beginning; and finally, the biggest peak of all arrived in our own century of world wars and widespread class conflict. The low point of internal violence in Europe was 1750. If 1750 rates 400 on Sorokin's scale, 1950 rates over 1000. The mid-twentieth century, in other words, is more than twice as disorderly as was the mid-eighteenth, and this is merely in terms of internal violence, not international. If world wars are added to revolutions, the twentieth century ranks as the bloodiest in human history.

All in all, taking the world as a whole, in the entire span of the last 6000 years, it is a safe estimate that there have been at least 3000 internal social upheavals of greater or less extent, duration, and im-

⁸ The 13 countries: ancient Greece, ancient Rome, Byzantium, France, Germany, Austria, England, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Russia. Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. III.

portance. Revolution is thus a phenomenon of prime interest for the understanding of human society.

II-13:6. What Do Revolutions Do to Society?

Probably the broadest summary of the psychological, social, and cultural effects of revolutions is the one made by Sorokin in his survey of the effects of major calamities—famine, pestilence, war, revolution—on human societies.⁹ He finds that revolutions like other calamities have two major effects on the societies involved:

1. They tend to focalize attention and readjustive efforts on themselves, i.e., they force people in the revolutionary societies to devote an inordinate amount of attention and energy to the problems created by the revolutionary processes which are going on, and this impact expresses itself in all aspects of the society and the culture: literature, art, philosophy, morals, etc.

2. They tend to polarize the population, i.e., to drive people to extremes: some go to pieces, degenerate, become criminals or near-beasts; others grow stronger under the test, become heroes or martyrs, sacrifice themselves for their fellows. Some, of course, go on as before; but since revolution sets everything in flux, exposes everyone to new experiences, only the strongest or those accidentally sheltered in some way manage to come through unchanged.

The most drastic test, of course, is the test of lethal selection. Revolutions by disorganizing the routines and ordinary protections of life enormously increase the death rate. Part of this results directly from violence—the executions of political opponents by the rival factions and indiscriminate killings in insurrections and civil wars. But by far greater losses occur as an indirect result of all the turmoil. Revolutions disrupt food supplies, food production, economic activities generally. People are driven from their homes or flee voluntarily to escape violence. Enormous dislocations of population result, with resulting lack of shelter, perils to health, food shortages, and so on. Famine and disease have been frequent accompaniments of major upheavals and have been the major killers.

Executions during the French Revolution are estimated at 35,000 to 40,000, and Sorokin places the number executed by the Communists during the period 1918–22, during which they were establishing

⁹ Pitirim Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1943.

their power and fighting off the White armies, at "no less than 600,000, or about 150,000 per annum."¹⁰ Since that would have amounted to only about 412 a day for all of Russia, it may not be too excessive an estimate. It does not, of course, include the victims of the White Terror, who were also numbered in the tens of thousands.

But the best lethal efforts of the revolutionists and their enemies all together hardly compare with the effects of the decimators that the revolutionary turmoil itself lets loose: famine and disease. *Sorokin estimates that large-scale revolutions kill from 3 to 15 percent of the populations involved.*¹¹ From 13 to 17 millions, or 9 to 13 percent of Russia, died in the first few years of the Russian Revolution. The French Revolution killed from 1.4 to 2.0 million Frenchmen. But probably the most lethal of all social upheavals was the Taiping Rebellion in China that dominated half of the Celestial Empire between 1853 and 1864. No less than 50 million are believed to have perished in that calamity.

In terms of human life alone, therefore, to say nothing of property destroyed, lives ruined, moral disorganization, etc., revolution is obviously a very expensive method of changing a society. Only war compares with it in expense and wastefulness. Yet revolutions have been recurrent calamities in most societies down through the centuries. Time after time despite the potential costs, the readjustive processes of societies have failed to relieve accumulating tensions until the old order exploded in the faces of the repressive regimes.

II-13:7. Uniformities in Revolutionary Processes

Statistical studies give the broad picture of revolutionary activity through the ages, suggest correlations with other social and cultural changes, and indicate possible trends, but they do not reveal the inner dynamics of revolutionary processes. For this, students have been turning to case studies of selected revolutions.

The value of a case study depends on two things: (1) the typicality of the case and (2) the theoretical value of the conceptual scheme used in analyzing the case.

To date the case-study approach to revolution has focused largely on the four so-called great revolutions that have contributed so largely to shaping the modern world: the Puritan Revolution in England in the 1640's; the American Revolution in the 1770's; the French Revo-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

lution at the end of the eighteenth century; and the Russian Revolution of 1917. The typicality of these revolutions of all revolutions, and particularly of revolutions not in preindustrial, agrarian societies but in highly industrialized modern societies, has not yet been established.

Nevertheless, the conceptual scheme of analysis used in these case studies has added considerably to modern insights into revolutionary processes. This scheme—the natural-history concept of social phenomena—derives from the work of Robert Park and E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago sociologists, during the 1920's. It was first applied to the analysis of revolution by Lyford P. Edwards in *The Natural History of Revolution*, published in 1927,¹² and has been amplified and refined by a sociologically oriented historian, Crane Brinton, and a political scientist, George Sawyer Pettee.¹³ Sorokin, Lasswell, and others have, of course, made important contributions to the understanding of particular revolutions, but not in these terms.

The natural-history scheme of analysis orients the student of revolution to seek in each revolutionary case study a *pattern of sequences* in events which can be verified from case to case. The pattern of sequences in revolution discovered by Edwards and verified and amplified by Brinton and Pettee is a pattern of some six phases, substantially as given below.

II-13:8. The Natural History of Revolution

Subject to minor disagreements on details, Edwards, Brinton, and Pettee distinguish the following six phases in the great revolutions:

1. The preparatory, or prodromal, period.
2. The period of increasing tension in the old regime.
3. The outbreak of violence and the overthrow of the old regime.
4. The struggle for the control of the revolutionary society: rise of the radicals.
5. The crisis of the revolution.
6. The return to normality.

1. The preparatory or prodromal period is the period during which people begin to feel dissatisfactions with their society accumulating. In the classical instances in the feudal or agricultural societies of England, the American Colonies, France, and Russia this took about

¹² Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

¹³ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938; rev. ed., 1952. George Sawyer Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*, Vol. V, *Studies in Systematic Political Science and Comparative Government*, Political Science Associates, Carl Joachim Friedrich, chairman. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1938.

three generations. The first generation still had personal memories of better times. The second generation lacked that personal experience but did have testimony from trusted witnesses, the older generation. By the third generation, however, neither personal experience nor direct testimony was any longer available. Whether disillusionment would require three generations to build up in a modern, industrialized society is very doubtful. Certainly it took only a few months of cumulative defeats to disillusion the Germans in 1918.

2. The period of increasing tension is the period in which crucial symptoms of upheaval begin to appear. Edwards distinguishes between preliminary and advanced or crucial symptoms. The preliminary symptoms are not diagnostic. They are simply the same kinds of symptoms that one could find in any society in which things are not going too well but in which no revolution subsequently occurs. Restlessness increases, immorality rises, frustrations accumulate, criticisms fill the air, many emigrate, and many, no doubt, like Oliver Cromwell, are turned back at the ports. If too many get away, of course, the yeast in the rising discontent may be drawn off. Nobody knows how many periods of increasing tension never resulted in revolution. We have only the positive cases.

The most ominous symptom of all in this period of increasing tension before the really crucial symptoms actually appear is "a marked increase of wealth, intelligence and power in the repressed portion of society." As Edwards says, the poverty-stricken and the utterly miserable do not make revolutions. In the classical instances most of the men who eventually made the revolutions were doing very well, and the institutions against which they were presently to rebel were probably less repressive at the culmination of popular discontent than had been true a generation or so before. The difference was that, in contrast to their fathers and grandfathers, these men now felt confident enough to raise a rumpus.

Yet so far all these symptoms can be found in various societies in which no revolutions followed. If we are to do any predicting in terms of the natural-history concept we must find something more distinctively revolutionary than mere increases of restlessness, immorality, grumbling, and of the power potential of repressed classes.

Edwards makes a brave effort to identify such symptoms and Brinton adds a refinement or two. Essentially the symptoms seem to be three: (a) the transfer of allegiance by the intellectuals; (b) the development of a new myth, a vision of a new utopia to replace the

old; (c) and finally, the transvaluation of economic disadvantage or lack of privilege among the repressed into an intense feeling of injustice and moral indignation.

a. The transfer of allegiance by the intellectuals is a crucial symptom because the moral cement that holds a society together is the common store of beliefs and values in terms of which ordinary people define their social world and pitch their hopes and expectations of the future. Broadly speaking, every society consists of rulers, mediators, enforcers, and ruled. The rulers are the top governing officials and the privileged social class from which they are drawn. The mediators are the myth-makers and symbol-users who preserve, interpret, and defend the culture of the society. They are the professional communicators, the ministers, editors, authors, teachers, professors, and others who live by manipulating symbols: in general, the intellectuals. The enforcers, of course, are the police and the military. The ruled comprise everybody else. It is the social function of the intellectuals to rationalize the social system to the rulers as well as to the enforcers and the ruled. In the nature of the case, in any society in which reason as well as tradition plays a part in adaptation to life conditions, a certain amount of criticism on the part of the intellectuals is to be expected. When marked cultural changes occur like the coming of the factory system in Britain, many intellectuals are likely to find the changes unpleasant. Victorian literature is filled with the criticisms and complaints of the intellectuals who didn't like dirty factories, ugly slums, widespread poverty, and so on. But for all their carping, most British writers from Goldsmith to William Morris had certainly not lost their loyalty to British institutions. In a society ripening for revolution, on the other hand, most of the intellectuals become alienated from the institutions of the society. They point out the inconsistencies of the existing regime. They make fun of it, publicize scandal, show how ridiculous many of its old customs and privileges are, and gradually weaken the morale of the rulers themselves by making them doubt their own way of life. Rousseau, Voltaire, and the philosophers of the Enlightenment had this effect on many of the French aristocrats. Some of the leaders of intellectual discontent in Russia like Tolstoy and Kropotkin were members of the nobility.

It is easy enough to point out examples of this kind from the past but not so easy to determine what degree of social criticism and what percentage of intellectual desertion constitute an actual transfer of allegiance on the part of the intellectuals in a contemporary society.

For years after the appearance of social criticism in American literature, starting with Sinclair Lewis' *Main Street* in the early 1920's, a considerable percentage of the most distinguished novelists and playwrights professed profound disillusionment with America, and some of them spent as much time as they could abroad. As someone has pointed out, if Hitler had read the outstanding American authors of the 1920's and 1930's he would have concluded that American society was falling apart. How far such an impression actually was from the truth, American G.I.'s demonstrated in Normandy and the Bulge. Even most of the starry-eyed seekers after the Soviet Grail saw a new light after the purges of the late 1930's, to say nothing of the attack on Korea.

Had the American intellectuals deserted during the 1920's and 1930's? For every one that had there were ten that hadn't. Most American intellectuals like a lot of ordinary people were not happy with the callous inflation of the twenties and the debacle of the thirties, but their criticisms were the criticisms of disappointed believers in democracy, not converts to a new faith. There were no real symptoms of approaching upheaval in the United States even during the depression.

In the classic revolutions, however, one of the crucial symptoms was a much more profound estrangement of the intellectuals as a class from the institutions of their societies.

b. The second crucial symptom is the appearance of a utopian myth, a vision of a New Jerusalem that is to have none of the faults and injustices of the world as it is. The New Jerusalem for the early Christians was St. Augustine's *City of God*, Heaven. For the English Puritans it was the Society of the Righteous. For the French revolutionists it was the Nation of Brothers—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. For the Bolsheviks it was the Classless Society, the paradise of the workers in which nobody would ever again grind down the poor or send anybody to Siberia! For the American revolutionists it was Independence and Opportunity, the vision of a society of self-governing farmers free from political oppression.

c. The third and perhaps most important symptom of all is the spread of a burning sense of political and especially economic injustice among the most able elements of the repressed classes. Frustration, moral indignation, and economic interest combine to put forced draft under the engine of social change. With the mediators in revolt,

a New Jerusalem just around the corner, and a lot of able men convinced in their bones that old institutions must be changed and changed radically, something has to give. The situation becomes electric. Anything can happen.

3. The third period is the period of the outbreak of violence and the overthrow of the old regime. "The act which starts a revolution is that one of a series of lawless acts which coincides with the completion of the psychological preparation for revolution," as Edwards puts it. He cites the St. Petersburg strike in February, 1917, the storming of the Bastille, the Boston Tea Party, and Charles' attempt to arrest the five members of Parliament as examples of such acts. Their importance is that they dramatize the cleavage that has come to exist between the rulers and the repressed and they are recognized as revolutionary acts.

From that point on the revolution grows by a series of thrusts and counterthrusts by the opposing factions. The inability of the government to suppress its opponents destroys the illusion of irresistibility which is essential to successful government. In every successful revolution this inability culminates either in the defeat of the government forces in the field as in England and America or in the defection of the Army as in France and Russia. When the military arm of government fails, there is nothing left but surrender or flight.

4. Next comes the struggle for control of the revolution and the rise of the radicals. In the classical revolutions in England, France, and Russia the defeat of the old regimes created an illusion of victory—an illusion that it was all over but the shouting. Actually, of course, only the old government officials were out of the way and the real work of shaping the new society was still to be done.

A society in the throes of a revolution breaks into three major factions: reactionaries supporting the old regime; moderate reformers who want to keep the king perhaps under a constitution, or revise the land laws in due course in an orderly way, and so on; and radicals who want to make a clean sweep of episcopacy, the king, feudalism, allegiance to Britain, capitalism, everything. In all four of the classical cases, since the revolutions were gradual growths, it was the moderates who found themselves at the head of the government when the old regime could no longer function. Having no desire to tear things up by the roots the moderates treat their opponents with moderation and try to feel their way forward by trial and error. Since the reactionaries

have fled or have gone into hiding temporarily, the moderates seem to have things their own way. The Radicals are still regarded as cranks.¹⁴

This honeymoon period of a revolution lasts only until the moderates begin to do something about the cramps that still afflict their society. The instant they make any proposal about the English bishops, about the future of Louis XVI, about continuing the war for the Allies, the fat is in the fire. The revolution gets too big for them.

The issues of the great revolutions have always had to be decided by fighting. The moderates are always poor war-makers. They are essentially speech-makers like Kerensky. As the reactionaries and their outside allies begin to gang up on the moderates, ruthless, decisive action becomes essential to save the revolution. Only the radicals are ready to act ruthlessly and decisively. They come to the top. More and more people, groping for a way out of the shortages, perils, and confusions of the revolutionary society, accept their lead. The revolution reaches its decisive crisis.

5. The crisis of the revolution is the period in which it is decided (a) whether the revolution is to fail, the reactionaries are to return, and the entire upheaval is to prove abortive, (b) whether the moderates are to remain in control, or (c) whether the radicals are to take over and make a clean sweep of the old regime. In all four of the classical cases the radicals won. Cromwell beheaded Charles, the Jacobins guillotined Louis XVI, the Colonies broke away from England, and the Bolsheviks won the civil wars.

The moderates lose control precisely because they are moderates. In a situation that demands extreme measures if the revolution is to survive, they insist on behaving like law-abiding gentlemen. Believing in middle-of-the-road solutions, they simply cannot take the ruthless, direct action necessary to dispose of treacherous kings, hostile reactionaries, foreign invasion, civil war. So the radicals take over. It may require a Pride's Purge, mob intimidation of the Convention, a bit of conniving to get the honest farmers squarely in front of the British regulars at Lexington, or an attack on the Winter Palace—but the radicals are never sticklers for niceties of procedure. They

¹⁴ When news reached Kerensky that Lenin, just back from exile, was advocating an immediate Communist revolution, the moderate premier remarked condescendingly, "I'll have to set him straight sometime." Six months later Kerensky escaped the clutches of the victorious Bolsheviks only by having himself spirited out of Petrograd in a laundry basket!

have a revolution to get under control and once they have shoved the moderates out of the way they go about it with brutal directness. The same six kinds of perils immediately confront them that had proved too much for the moderates: (a) their own inexperience in government; (b) economic chaos—trade disrupted, prices shooting up, food shortages, and so on; (c) bureaucratic sabotage—resistance within the government itself; (d) assassination—the old gang fights back with murder (Charlotte Corday kills Marat; Lenin is wounded; Erzberger, Rathenau, and others are slain in postwar Germany); (e) Insurrection and civil war—La Vendée in France, the “White” armies in Russia, uprisings in Germany; (f) foreign intervention (The Duke of Brunswick marches into France; the Allies send troops to Archangel and Vladivostok; etc.; etc.).

The answer to all this is dictatorship, military government, and the Terror. Things have to happen and happen fast and results are all that count. Individual rights which sometimes loom so large in the propaganda for revolution simply disappear in the whirlwind of the crisis. Revolutionary tribunals are set up to dispose of enemies—and an enemy is anybody who so much as raises an eyebrow. Oliver Cromwell is supposed to have invented Terror as a method of government in his campaign to subdue Ireland. But the extremists in all revolutions have used it, and in modern days the totalitarian extremists—Fascists as well as Communists—have made it a permanent technique of government.

Contrary to popular impression, the Terror during the crisis of a revolution is not a symptom of anarchy. It is not due to absence of government but to the most ruthless kind of government—military government in a hurry. Its rationale is very simple. Kill a few thousands of the aristocrats and prominent opponents of the men in power and Jacques Bonhomme and Ivan Ivanovitch in their little shops and villages will shake in their shoes at the thought of what *may* happen to them. Theoretically, it may, but statistically it seldom does.¹⁵

The enemies of the extremists always exaggerate the number of

¹⁵ Although as the Terror wore on in France in 1794 the percentage of lower-class victims of the guillotine rose from only 20 percent in April (compared with 44 percent clergymen, nobles, and Army officers) to 41.5 percent in July (compared with only 15 percent clergymen, nobles, and military). The same tendency probably appeared in Russia as the men in power there as in revolutionary France used their power not merely to exterminate aristocrats and suspected enemies of the regime but to enforce their decrees. See J. M. Thompson, *The French Revolution*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 538–539.

victims of revolutionary Terror. Part of this exaggeration is deliberate for propaganda purposes; part of it is honest misconception of the wickedness of the extremists. In both France and Russia some tens of thousands of aristocrats, moderates, and suspected subversives and saboteurs were executed by guillotining, drowning, shooting, and so on, but the total number in each case was only a fraction of the number popularly believed to have been killed. Which does not in any way change the fact that the actual victims are always just as dead as though they had been ten times as numerous.

Revolution is always an expensive and extremely unpleasant method of readjusting a society to its accumulated problems. In fact, it is so unpleasant that no population seems able to maintain its revolutionary fever heat for more than a few years at a time. Eventually, as one historian observes, every revolution runs out of gas.

6. Finally comes the return to normality. In July, 1794, Robespierre's orgy of bloodletting and his threats of more executions to come so disgusted and terrified many of his own party that they ganged up with his enemies and ended the Terror by executing the revolutionary dictator himself. Hence, in any social upheaval the end of the period of revolutionary crisis and the turn of events toward consolidating revolutionary gains has come to be called Thermidor, the name for July in the French revolutionary calendar. In Russia this turn was probably dated by Lenin's New Economic Policy, which ended his attempt to build Socialism *de novo* and began the period of temporary small capitalism within the framework of continuing Communist control.

In England the analogous period would be the span between the execution of Charles in 1649 and Cromwell's acceptance as Lord Protector in 1653. In the American Revolution the crisis period ended with England's formal recognition of American independence in 1783, although the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown had sealed the military decision in 1781. What follows Thermidor, the end of crisis government, is a struggle within the victorious revolutionary party to determine the type of government and party control that is to consolidate the gains of the revolution.

Revolutionary consolidation in the four great upheavals analyzed by the natural-history school is practically synonymous in each case with the name of the man who dominates the history of each society as its revolution draws to an end. In England the name is Cromwell. In America, Washington. In France, Napoleon. In Russia, Stalin.

The responsibility of each of these men for the victory of the ultimate winners in the crisis period varied widely. Cromwell and Washington were the engineers of military victory. Napoleon had nothing whatever to do with that. He came to power after Robespierre, Carnot, and others had managed it. Stalin had only a minor part in the Bolshevik victory in the crisis. Lenin and Trotsky had steered the party through the crisis. What Stalin did was to maneuver, scheme, and bulldoze his way to the top in the Bolshevik party after Lenin and Trotsky had won the victory in the revolutionary crisis. If he held power longer than the others and impressed his will on his society more ruthlessly than did any of the others, this was partly an accident of longevity, partly a result of individual characteristics, and partly an outcome of the Bolshevik theory and organization with which he had to work. His social function in the revolutionary process was essentially the same—the consolidation of revolutionary gains.

These, then, are the major phases of revolution as identified by the natural-history school of investigators: (1) a preparatory period; (2) a period of increasing tension within the old regime; (3) outbreak and overthrow; (4) the struggle for control of the revolutionary society; (5) the revolutionary crisis; (6) Thermidor and the return to normal on the basis of consolidation of revolutionary changes.

II-13:9. Counterrevolution

Webster defines a counterrevolution as “a revolution opposed to a former revolution,” but this hardly defines counterrevolution in its modern forms. If liberals and radicals were presently to overthrow the Franco Fascist regime in Spain, their revolution would surely be opposed to a former revolution, but nobody would regard it as a counterrevolution at all.

All four of the classical revolutions were movements that resulted in overthrowing repressive regimes. The objective of all the revolutionists, moderates and radicals alike, was to get rid of the cramps and repressions of the old systems and all succeeded in doing so. That the exigencies of revolution presently compelled all of them to impose more drastic repressions and sacrifices than the old regimes had ever imposed is beside the present point. If revolutions involved no struggles beyond those necessary to overthrow the original repressors, they would obviously be liberating changes. In so far as their struggles end in a liberating victory, i.e., in the defeat of the reactionaries who would reimpose the old repressions, the net result is still

liberation—liberation won at terrific cost but still, by old standards, liberation.

Counterrevolution, on the other hand, is essentially repressive in its objectives and results. In so far as the English pretenders in the eighteenth century stood for a return to royal absolutism had they ever succeeded in regaining the crown, they were counterrevolutionaries. The American Tories, opposing independence, were counterrevolutionaries. Louis XVIII, who recovered the French throne after Waterloo, was a counterrevolutionary. The White generals in the Russian civil wars against the Bolsheviks were counterrevolutionaries. All these were not merely opposing previous revolutions; they were opposing the liberations achieved by those revolutions and favoring an increase in repressions.

In this sense Fascist upheavals such as those in Italy, Germany, and Spain were counterrevolutionary. They all resulted in a decrease in the liberties of the middle and lower classes and an increase in repressions. Fascism in Europe has functioned to maintain the old structure of privilege and decrease the privileges of the lower classes.

What about Communism?

Was the October Revolution in Russia actually a revolution or was it a counterrevolution? As an overthrow of property privileges and an attack on the repressions of the old society it was clearly a revolution—a revolution that made a clean sweep of old political institutions and the institution of private property. The fact that in order to survive the Bolshevik regime had to impose sacrifices and repressions far greater than those imposed by czarism is beside the point. Any kind of regime in a life-and-death struggle—Britain, the United States, any nation—has to do the same. The question is not the repressions imposed in a crisis but the repressions maintained as a normal way of life. By this test, as the revolutionary crisis passed away, the Bolshevik regime gradually evolved a system of normal repressions more inclusive and more efficient than anything the czarist autocracy had been able to manage. This was apparently due not merely to the necessity of coercing millions of peasants to carry out the Communist grand design of making everybody work for the state and the state alone, but also to Stalin's own need for an efficient engine of coercion to build and support his personal dictatorship. The net result is that all the Moscow-dominated Communist regimes in the world from Warsaw to Peiping are more repressive and more counterrevolutionary in this sense than any of the societies

that have emerged from the English, American, or French revolutions.¹⁶ The Bolshevik revolution was a real revolution, not a counter-revolution, but the Communist societies that have resulted from later Communist upheavals are as repressive as any Fascist society in the world. On the record so far, while Communists still claim the *mystique* of revolution as the sovereign method for liberating the masses of mankind from their repressors, there is actually little to choose between the "liberating" effects of Communism and those of Fascism. Neither one liberates. Both are repressive. Totalitarianism by whatever name is inevitably the enemy of human freedom.

II-13:10. Counterrevolution and the Natural-History Pattern

Counterrevolution as a revolutionary process seems to fit into the natural-history pattern as the contribution of *reactionary radicals* late in the crisis period of a revolution. There are three outstanding examples of this: Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy in 1922; Hitler's arrival at the chancellorship in Germany via mass organization, mass intimidation, and the final conspiracy of top functionaries that induced old Hindenburg to place him in power; and finally, the conspiracy of Spanish reactionaries that eventuated in civil war and Franco's dictatorship.

In every case Fascism achieved its final conquest of power by conspiracy at the top. In every case that conspiracy was supported financially and otherwise by the privileged classes in the society, classes that had been thoroughly frightened either by a near-revolution as in Italy or by a partial revolution as in Germany and Spain. And in every case the privileged classes had been given their chance to hit back through the reactionary radicals only because the labor radicals had failed to clinch early victories in the class struggle.

Italy emerged from World War I with the psychology of a beaten nation, a terrific revulsion against the war and everyone who had profited from it. Labor seethed with unrest. In 1920, forestalling a lockout, workers seized the factories in Milan and other cities and tried to operate them. Middle-class sabotage, shortages of materials,

¹⁶ That Marxism does not necessarily require rule by terror and slave camps even in a Communist dictatorship is the contention of Tito, the Communist boss of Yugoslavia. While his regime may be more repressive than the self-governing peoples of the West are accustomed to, it may well be less repressive than the regime it replaced. This comparison would certainly not hold for the Communist regime in Russia. The irony of the whole thing is that Marx *intended* his gigantic system to increase the sum total of human freedom in the world!

and lack of credit blocked that, but the government temporized. A leader of street toughs named Mussolini, a former Socialist and now a rabid nationalist, offered his *squadristi* to the labor leaders to seize political power and carry through a revolution. The labor leaders refused.

"We'll do this legally, by parliamentary means," they said in effect.

Unable to operate them, the workers had to evacuate the factories. Their leaders counseled patience. They wanted action. Disillusionment spread.

The crisis had frightened the wits out of the big industrialists of the North and the big landowners of the South. They wanted action too—and Mussolini was the man to give it to them. He changed sides. After a year or two of beating up union men in street fights unmolested by the police, the Fascists were ready to cash in on a palace plot that induced the King to call Mussolini to the premiership. Mussolini "marched on Rome" in a sleeping car from Milan!

Here the crisis of a near-revolution was resolved by mass organization, mass intimidation, and top-level conspiracy that gave the Fascist leader a key governmental position from which he was able to build up his dictatorship.

In Germany the build-up took longer but the concentration of power once the chancellorship had been secured moved much faster and went farther. The German revolution in November, 1918, was at best a half-hearted revolution. The German Socialists who took power when the Kaiser fled were more middle-class-minded than they were Socialist-minded. The first thing they did was to strike a deal with the arch-reactionaries of all Germany, the Army High Command. They agreed to let the German status system alone in return for Army protection against the Communists. Each side kept its bargain: the Socialists did nothing to change the property system and the Army made hash out of the Communists. At first the republican government had the overwhelming support of the mass of the German people. A number of attempted *Putsches* were crushed. But the international situation and the continual pressure from the Junkers, the big industrialists, and the reactionaries in the Army combined to wear down this loyalty. Beginning as No. 7 in a group of fanatics which he had joined as an Army spy, a former Austrian postcard painter named Hitler gradually built up a mass following of Brown Shirts organized on Mussolini's model. When the world depression began to throw tens of thousands of German

workers into the streets Hitler's demagoguery attracted their votes. Thyssen and other industrialists financed his movement. As tensions in Germany mounted, parliamentary government broke down. The Chancellor, Brüning, had to resort to government by decree. Finally, in a flurry of plots and counterplots, a palace camarilla induced President Hindenburg to give Hitler the chancellorship, January 31, 1933.

Again, as in Italy, mass organization, mass intimidation, and top-level upper-class conspiracy had put the Fascist leader in power. And again, as in Italy, this had happened because a partial revolution had merely frightened the privileged without destroying their privileges.

Essentially the same kind of thing happened in Spain except that there the revolutionary struggles had been going on for decades and the reactionary victory in the end had to be won on the battlefield and not merely behind the closed doors of government offices. In 1931 one of the recurrent overturns in Spain that had plagued the country since Napoleon's time drove Alfonso XIII from his throne and placed a liberal government in power in a republic. The new President, supposedly elected to destroy the injustices of privilege in Spanish society, announced that the revolution would be brought about peacefully and without disturbances! As though revolutions are ever made that way!

At the first election the country promptly turned the gentleman out and elected a reactionary government which at least knew what it wanted. The country accordingly sent that outfit packing at the next chance and returned the liberal moderates. But again the moderates fumbled the ball. Instead of closing with the real enemies of liberalism in Spain—the big landowners, the big bankers, the big industrialists, and the Army top command—they wasted their mandate in an attack on the Catholic Church, the traditional enemy of liberalism but not the real muscles of reaction. The frightened reactionaries, reprieved by this bit of stupidity, promptly organized a conspiracy for a military revolt that precipitated civil war in 1936 and eventuated—thanks to Mussolini and Hitler and the stupidity of the British and French governments—in the ultimate victory of Spanish Fascism, the Falange, and Franco.

Here again, as in Italy and Germany, a partial revolution that had failed to strike down the privileges of the reactionaries reaped the whirlwind from its moderation. All three of these counterrevolutions

stand as the decisive turning points of the crisis phases of the social upheavals in which they occurred.

Obviously, whatever one's political faith—democracy, Fascism, Communism, or mugwump—there should be no disagreement about Lenin's sage advice: "Never play at revolution."

II-13:11. The Future of Revolution

There will never be another revolution like the French and the Russian. In the face of tanks, atom bombs, and a loyal air force, street fighting is as obsolete as Noah's Ark. The revolutions of the future will be won in the *minds* of government officials and troop commanders before anybody leaves home. Actually, no revolution has ever succeeded in the past without at least the passive acquiescence of the troops. So long as the army would shoot at command, the boys on the barricades never had a chance. Now barricades are on a par with the stagecoach and saddlebags: interesting antiques.

The great revolutions are out of date in still another sense. They were the results of the intolerable tensions generated wholly by conditions within the countries in which they occurred. Nobody from outside planned them, stimulated them, engineered them. They were indigenous products.

Today the making of revolutions is the full-time business of the Communist parties of the world. In every country there is a core of agitators and organizers devoted to the overthrow of the government of that country and all taking orders from Moscow. In the modern world, revolutions no longer just happen. They are made. And revolution-making has become a formidable weapon in the cold war.¹⁷

At least six periods of Kremlin policy toward revolutionary activity in the West can be discerned: (1) the period of the illusion of the imminent "Second Coming," 1917 to 1919, when Lenin confidently expected another "October Revolution" in Germany, Italy, and other Western countries; (2) the period of what may be called doctrinaire opposition and frustrated hostility, 1919 to 1934—the period of the Third International or Comintern, which masterminded revolutionary activities all over the world in the interest of Moscow with hostility gradually concentrating not on the Fascists but on

¹⁷ It was Tito's refusal to accept a subordinate, satellite role for Communism in Yugoslavia that led to his break with Moscow and his expulsion from the Cominform, the international organization of Communist parties in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Communist nationalism, except in Russia, became the No. 1 heresy in the eyes of the Kremlin.

the liberal and Socialist opponents of Communism, the so-called "Social Fascists," who were supposed to be traitors to the working class; (3) the period when Moscow reversed itself on the "Social Fascists" and now sought to manipulate them in the Popular Front tactic—1934–39—the period between the Kremlin's belated awakening to the deadly menace of Fascism and the nonaggression pact that set Hitler free to attack the West; (4) diplomatic collaboration with Fascism, 1939–41—the period of the "breathing space" during which Stalin tried desperately to strengthen his defenses and used the Communist parties in Britain, France, and the United States to confuse public opinion with peace propaganda against the "imperialist war"; (5) wartime alliance with the West, 1941–45—the period of sweetness and light, the tactical dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 (to be replaced with the Cominform in 1947), and incessant appeals for a second front; and finally, (6) the postwar period of world-wide aggression and cold war, 1946 on. This is the period in which we are still living as this book is written in 1954. It is the period in which, adding to wartime conquests in Poland and the Baltic States, Communists seized power in Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, China and Indo-China, and attempted to capture power in Burma, Korea, Guatemala, and Indonesia.

In nations which have free elections the Communist parties strive to obtain enough votes to place Communist officials in office—if possible in the office of Minister of the Interior, or head of the police, and in the War Office controlling the armed services. Once these offices have been attained, the practice, as demonstrated in the Czechoslovak "revolution" and elsewhere, has been to "discover" reactionary plots against the government, arrest liberals, Socialists, and other "class enemies," muzzle the press, take over the radio, and presently take over the government altogether. If strategic offices cannot be won in this way, Communist members of a legislative body can still carry on disruptive propaganda, and often if Parliament contains many splinter parties, as in Italy and France, the Communists may find themselves holding the balance of power as between liberals and reactionaries. When this happens the government in power, although it contains no Communists in its executive and administrative offices, may actually be powerless to do anything at all unless it makes a deal with its arch enemies—always, of course, a deal that advances the interests of Moscow!

Meanwhile, all over the world Communists have been infiltrating

the upper echelons of the labor movement. This gives them power to precipitate crippling strikes at places and times most advantageous to Kremlin policy. The labor movements in Italy and France have been particularly honeycombed in this way. Since the war American unions have been cleaning out known Communists officers, but it is still (1954) an open question whether national security has been adequately protected in such areas as the water fronts of our great seaports, the atomic energy plants, the electrical industries, airplane factories, government arsenals, and research laboratories.

Americans are, of course, familiar with other Communist tactics for hamstringing a potential enemy: infiltration of government; espionage; sabotage; the manipulation of opinion by misuse of civil liberties; and so on.

What it all comes down to is that in the self-governing nations the Kremlin has turned Communism from an internal ism into a subtle and dangerous weapon of international conflict for utilizing free institutions to bring about their own destruction and the ultimate defeat of the free peoples in the world-wide struggle for survival.

In the backward areas of the world the Communists pose as the champions of the oppressed and the prophets of a new day in which there will be no more colonial exploitation and the marvelous know-how of the New Revelation will lift the teeming populations to a level of living on which even the poorest will have three square meals a day. The brutal facts of Russia's own chronic shortages of everything from lipstick to bread and the little item of ten to twenty million Russians slaving their lives away as political prisoners—these details are always mercifully unmentioned.¹⁸ Words—words are wonderful! "The People's Republic!"

Against the Western nations the tactics of the cold war have included everything except actual hot war by Russia herself: parliamentary obstructionism, governmental infiltration, seizure of government power, strikes, espionage, sabotage, peace propaganda in the

¹⁸ Economists are beginning to recognize, however, that a mechanized slave economy such as the Soviet Union's can eventually provide a plentiful flow of consumer goods, if and when production is concentrated on that kind of products rather than on heavy industry and munitions for war. The crucial factor seems to be the superiority of a managed economy in its great capacity to accumulate capital, once it has reached a certain level of development. The Russian economy seems to have reached that level now and is believed to be accumulating capital faster than the economies of western Europe. This means that within a few years, if the Kremlin so decides, the Russian standard of living could outstrip that of most western European peoples and possibly approach that of the United States. The political repercussions of such a demonstration on the impoverished peoples of Europe would be very unsettling and possibly revolutionary.

midst of new aggressions, denunciation of aggressors while invading peaceful neighbors, insurrection, economic pressure, diplomatic conniving, satellite wars—Korea and Indochina—anything and everything that would weaken the West and enhance the power of Russian imperialism. *Ad nauseam* the United Nations has been used not as an instrument of international coöperation but as a propaganda forum for (1) vetoing world unity, (2) professing Russia's undying love of peace, (3) spewing contempt on capitalist imperialists, i.e., everybody not in the Soviet bloc, and (4) crying to high heaven for the international outlawing of the atomic bomb, either *without* any international inspection of Russia's own atomic stock piles and atomic factories, or without proportional reduction of Russian-Chinese armed man-power as against the heavily outnumbered West.

As a weapon in the international struggle for survival, revolution has obviously changed its character.

II-13:12. Defenses Against Revolution

For the free nations the problem posed by Soviet imperialism with its conspiratorial machinery of Communist revolution is three-fold: (1) external defense; (2) internal defense; (3) treatment of social conditions.

1. External defense is mainly a matter of standing together and maintaining formidable enough military power to convince the Kremlin that any open attack on the West would be suicidal.

2. Internal defense is partly a police problem and partly a problem of reducing to a minimum the causes of mass discontent. No Western government dare any longer take a *laissez-faire* attitude toward labor exploitation, abuse of privilege, poverty, unemployment, and the like.

3. Treatment of social conditions, i.e., the reduction of the causes of mass discontent, is difficult enough in self-governing countries in which the upper classes have managed to entrench themselves so deeply in power and privilege that government is powerless to serve the mass of the people. The French government provided the best example of this kind of upper-class sabotage after World War II, but all Western governments carried some handicaps of a similar sort: entrenched privilege fighting every measure of social reform. In the Near East and the Orient where internal exploitation was an age-old phenomenon sanctioned by custom, tradition, law, and

religion, the problem of mitigating social injustices was even more difficult and was further complicated by mass poverty.

The Truman administration's proposal to share Western know-how with undeveloped areas was designed to attack the problem of mass poverty by increasing productivity in those countries. But how to reduce social injustices themselves in such countries without at the same time furthering Communism seemed to have the West completely baffled. In nearly every one of the backward countries of the world the governments were subservient to privileged classes whose privileges were precisely the issue. These classes were, of course, the "natural" allies of the West against the Communists, but in their own countries their favor was the kiss of death. On the other hand, if the West intervened to destroy their privileges it could not outbid the Communists for mass support and it had no guarantee whatever that once its "natural" allies were out of the way the country would not go Communist anyway. How to parry the revolutionary weapon in the hands of Moscow was one of the major problems facing the West at mid-century.

II-13:13. Defenses Against Counterrevolution

Unless the United States is encircled and defeated in its struggle with the Soviet Union, it is the consensus of informed observers that there is almost no chance of a Communist revolution in the United States. Even a disastrous depression would almost certainly not result in a revolution. Judging from the record in Italy and Germany, depression would be more likely to strengthen the forces of counter-revolution.

Every literate American knows that there are such forces in the United States and they go under the collective name of proto-Fascism: the beginnings or scattered elements of counterrevolution. Fascism itself is the social philosophy or political theory that would concentrate all political power in the hands of one party, abolish other parties, make the party leader a virtual dictator, make nationalism a political religion, and reorganize every aspect of life to further the purposes of the new elite by destroying civil liberty and the welfare state to defend the existing system of privilege.¹⁰

¹⁰ Fascism includes (1) a state of mind or attitude that disregards the rights of others in pursuit of an individual's own goals; (2) a theory of a totalitarian state governed by a new elite in the interests of privilege; (3) a social movement using paramilitary forces to drive other parties from the streets and intimidate government; and (4) a political regime organized to effectuate the theory of the totalitarian state for the benefit of privilege.

The technique of counterrevolution in Europe, as we have noted, has been to capitalize on the frustrations and insecurities of workers, intellectuals, and young members of the middle classes by forming a paramilitary party which intimidates its opponents by open violence, builds up an insurrectionary threat to the government, and comes to power by means of intrigue and conspiracy on the highest levels.

Defense against Fascism, therefore, would seem to require (1) active measures to decrease the frustrations and insecurities of wage earners, middle-class youth, and the intellectuals, specifically the prevention of depressions and the development of more adequate methods of inducting youth into the economy; (2) outlawing of private armies (This will be difficult in America because of the fondness of fraternal orders for regalia and the ease with which a proto-Fascist outfit could pose as a mere fraternal order. Also, the tradition of employer private armies [guards] will be hard to break. But obviously the democratic political process can have no place for organized private coercion.); (3) increased alertness on the part of everyone to prevent Fascist-minded politicians from reaching high office. This last defense points to the basic need if the proto-Fascists are to be prevented from growing into a full-grown counterrevolutionary threat, namely, the need of a more intelligent public opinion in the United States concerning the nature of Fascism itself.

To the average American Fascism is something that afflicted the Germans and had to be licked in World War II but isn't anything we need to worry about ourselves. That the Ku Klux Klan, anti-Semitism, race prejudice, and religious bigotry have anything to do with Fascism never occurs to him.

The truth is, of course, that Fascism begins in a state of mind, an attitude, a personality set. That personality set is simply the hardening of temporary, transient attitudes that all of us express from time to time—the disposition to disregard the rights of others to accomplish some purpose of our own. It takes a lot more than just shoving others out of the way to reach a subway seat during rush hour to make a man a Fascist, but when you put persistent frustration and envy behind that kind of attitude and put it all in a personality that regards the world as a hostile place and views strength and power as vastly more important than decency and fair play, you have the makings of a Fascist personality—a personality willing to trample on the rights of minorities and submerge itself in a gang of storm troopers yelling for a Führer to lead them to the next atrocity. As of today somewhere between 5 and 15 percent of

Americans have the kinds of personalities that Fascists are made of. How many more have sufficiently confused minds and scrambled emotions to make them potential Fascists if and when nation-wide insecurity and a propaganda build-up of the Red menace might combine to stampede them to the banner of some phony political savior, nobody knows. But Fascism organized as "a mask for privilege" is likely to be more of a real threat to American liberties than is the American Communist party.²⁰ Creeping counterrevolution is a much more ominous peril of the future than is either conspiratorial Communism or creeping Socialism. The penalty of democratic failure in America, if democracy fails, is very likely to be not revolution but counterrevolution.²¹

But the question just raised goes far beyond the limits of a chapter on revolution—or even counterrevolution. The future remains one domain that all social scientists know very little about as social scientists. Like other men they have to visualize a future of some sort, but how to do that and how to get some scientific dependability into the visions is one of the most difficult problems in all social science.

²⁰ See Carey McWilliams, *A Mask for Privilege: Anti-Semitism in America*, Boston, Little, Brown Company, 1948.

²¹ This, of course, is a matter of opinion. Most of the former Communists who are warning America about the menace of that kind of totalitarianism would probably not agree. The basis of their fears, however, is the Russian military threat behind American Communism rather than the revolutionary threat of the American comrades themselves. See *Witness* by Whittaker Chambers, New York, Random House, 1952, and *The Techniques of Communism* by Louis F. Budenz, Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1954.

Can Foresight Save the Western World?

II-14:1. What Is Civilization?

There are and have been many civilizations, and there is *Civilization*, the composite of characteristics common to them all.

The number of actual civilizations varies a little, depending on one's definition and whether one includes, as Toynbee does, abortive and arrested civilizations under the term, or excludes those and brings in Soviet Russia and Communist China as new civilizations, as Toynbee does not. As we saw in I-5:1, Note 1, Toynbee confines his list of so-called living civilizations to ten—seven active and three arrested. The active civilizations he lists as Western Society, Near Eastern Orthodox Christendom, its offshoot in Russia (apparently the old Czarist society), Islamic Society, Hindu Society, China, and Japan. The arrested civilizations are the Polynesians, the Eskimos, and the Steppe Nomads. These are the survivors of some thirty civilizations and near-civilizations which he identified. But since the Orthodox Russian civilization has been replaced by a new type of civilization, oriented around a totally different core of social values, and since the traditional Chinese civilization is undergoing a similar transformation, it would seem to be necessary to drop Czarist Society and Old China from the list of active, living civilizations and replace them with Soviet Russia and Communist China.

This means that we must add two to Toynbee's list of thirty civilizations and near-civilizations, bringing the total of these great social experiments to thirty-two. Today's survivors number only seven, and of these seven three—Russian, Chinese and Western—are involved

in a vast two-against-one struggle for survival whose outcome will determine the fate of the others for centuries to come.

Civilizations, as the term implies, are the products of city living. City living in turn depends on a material culture advanced enough to be able to feed a considerable proportion of its people in cities, and this presupposes settled agriculture, a high division of labor, markets, transport beyond the neighborhood, political order, a privileged class, and accumulation of wealth. Another prerequisite seems to be some means of permanent record by which to accumulate the learnings of past generations in a volume and complexity beyond the capacity of the memories of the old men of the tribe to retain. Settled agriculture, high division of labor, markets, distance transport, political order, a privileged class, accumulated wealth, and means of permanent record do not in themselves constitute civilization, but they provide the necessary conditions under which a civilization can develop. A civilized culture is not necessarily less brutal than a barbaric culture, as one can see in the Roman gladiatorial games, Aztec human sacrifices, and modern civilized warfare, but it always contains intellectual, artistic, ethical, social, and material culture traits, particularly values and social organizations, more highly developed than in barbarism. Hence, Webster's *Dictionary* defines civilization as "a state of social culture characterized by relative progress in the arts, science, and statecraft." Since this relative progress appears only if and when peoples live in cities, city living may be taken as the distinctive characteristic of a civilization, marking it off from barbarism, although city living by itself is not civilization.

II-14:2. The High Mortality of Civilizations: Must Civilizations Die?

Primitive, primary-group cultures, left to themselves, seem immortal. Like single-celled biological organisms, they seem able to keep on functioning indefinitely. Not so civilizations. Out of the twenty-six or twenty-eight which are known to have reached some degree of maturity during the last 6000 years of recorded history since the first appeared in the Nile and Mesopotamian valleys, no less than eighteen, or 64 percent, have disappeared. True, many of the traits which they developed, like Greek science, Roman law, Arabian algebra, and so on, are still in use, but the civilizations themselves have disintegrated as cultural entities. Why?

So long as western Europeans believed, as many of them did during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that all history was merely a process building up to its culmination in our own civilization, this problem of the mortality of high cultures troubled nobody. Knowing nothing of any other civilization except that of the ancient world of Greece and Rome, it was possible for European scholars to look forward to an almost endless vista of progress in the Western world. The ancient world had gone to pieces because our vigorous Teutonic ancestors had invaded it, or because of its own vices, and so on. Nobody saw any necessary similarity between that world and our own.

Unfortunately, modern archaeological and anthropological researches have long since dispelled this pleasant myth that all history, except for certain vagaries in classical times, has been a straight-line build-up to our current pinnacle. The discovery that there had been at least three cycles of city living around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East centuries before Western civilization even appeared has necessitated some revision of this simple scheme. So there has come a refurbishing of an idea that has reappeared at intervals since the ancient Stoics—the idea that history repeats itself. The eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giovanni Battista Vico was perhaps the first to elaborate on this idea in terms of nations, each nation supposedly going through an identical cycle: first a “heroic age,” then “barbarism of the senses,” a phase of true civilization, then decline into a “barbarism of reflection,” and ultimately an end of the cycle, which was supposed to start over.¹

II-14:3. Theories of Civilizational Life Careers

The first writer to make civilization the unit of historical study seems to have been a Russian government official, Nikolai Danilevsky, who in 1869 published in a Russian magazine, *Zaria*, a series of articles dealing with the relations between “the Slavic and Germano-Romanic Worlds.” This series was translated into French in 1890 and into German in 1920. No English translation has ever appeared to date. Danilevsky formulated five laws of similarities between what he called “historico-cultural types,” or civilizations, of which the fifth described uniformities through time:

¹ The historical portions of this chapter have drawn heavily on the exceedingly useful summary of this subject by J. G. DeBeus, of the Netherlands Legation, Washington, in his book *The Future of the West*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953.

"The course of development of historico-culture types (civilizations) is similar to the life-course of these perennials whose period of growth lasts indefinitely, but whose period of blossoming and fruit-bearing is relatively short and exhausts them once and for all."—*Zaria*, No. 3, p. 2.²

Three or four phases mark this development: first, the stage of "ethnographic material," which may last for thousands of years and ends with the appearance of an organized society; second, the phase of the accumulation and organization of creative forces for the next phase; and third, the stage of civilization, or cultural blooming, which lasts only four to six centuries. After this come decline and disintegration. Degeneration, as DeBeus interprets Danilevsky, shows itself in a state of "apathy, petrification and self-satisfaction . . . or in a period of political and social contradictions rending the body and soul social, a period of conflicts and despair," which usually ends in a reversion to the state of "apathy of petrification."³

Danilevsky believed that Western civilization had passed its peak and that war between it and united Slavdom was inevitable, a war from which Slavdom would emerge as the victor over a senile and exhausted Europe.

As Sorokin—himself Russian born—notes, "If one removes the Marxist terminology and a few other insignificant details from the policies and political propaganda of the Soviet government, Danilevsky's and 'the Soviet leaders' ideologies regarding Russo-European relations are essentially similar."⁴

Over a generation later and apparently without any knowledge of Danilevsky's ideas a spokesman for the "Germano-Romanic World," Oswald Spengler, a Prussian militarist, published after World War I a book, *The Decline of the West*, which carried Danilevsky's conception of cultural stages even further and produced even gloomier prophecies concerning the fate of the West. Likening a culture to a biological organism, Spengler distinguished four phases: a preliminary phase, an early phase, a late phase, and a civilized phase. His terminology is a bit confusing because, as a good militarist, he sees any mitigation of fighting as degeneracy, and therefore his phase of "civilization" is what others would call disintegration or a dying

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, p. 71, as quoted in *ibid.*, p. 16.

civilization. This phase he divides into two periods: During the period of contending states the center of gravity of a culture shifts from older to newer centers and one state emerges triumphant over the others. This produces a period of civilization-wide peace and Caesarism. But instead of international wars, we now have private wars, "more fearful than any State wars because they are formless." Along with civil wars the last phase of civilization is characterized by the world city, the megalopolis, which reduces everything else to "the provinces"; the "intellectual nomad," "bed-occupiers in a sea of houses," who would rather die than go back to the land; a declining birth rate; the preponderance, then the decline, of the power of money; the disappearance of creativeness; and finally, an outcropping of a "second religiousness" born among the masses, not the classes. Gradually the noncreative society with its falling birth rate and increasing mysticism disintegrates into an aggregation of people without a history, a mass of nonentities.

According to Spengler, the Western world is already far gone although still short of its period of second religiousness. The time of contending states began with Napoleon "and the Caesarism that is to succeed approaches with quiet, firm step."

This, of course, is historical determinism on a par with that of Marxism, which foresees the "inevitable" triumph of the proletariat. As the product of a convinced militarist, it evinces no more faith in the ability of the common man to control his own destiny than does the Soviet dictatorship. More explicitly than Danilevsky, Spengler makes history and the rise and fall of civilizations a superhuman phenomenon governed by its own laws beyond the power of man to change.

This historical determinism of many preceding students of civilizations from Vico to Marx, Danilevsky, and Spengler is precisely the idea that the more recent and most comprehensive philosopher of history, Arnold Toynbee, rejects in his monumental study of thirty "civilizations."⁵ Toynbee is quite sure that authentic civilizations—

⁵ It is a bit difficult to pin down the reference of the term *civilization* in Toynbee's work. Either a culture has reached the stage of civilization or it hasn't. But in regarding the cultures of the Eskimos, the Steppe Nomads, the Spartans, the Polynesians, and the Osmanlis (in the Orthodox Christian world) as "arrested civilizations" Toynbee must mean either that all these *reached* civilization and then stopped developing further—in which case it is curious to find the nonliterate Eskimo and Steppe Nomad "civilizations" lumped with the civilization of Periclean Athens—or they *stopped just short of civilization*—in which case it would be interesting to know how Mr. Toynbee is so certain that just these and no other cultures almost made the grade but didn't. The same fuzziness of

his sixteen past—show similar phases of development, maturity, and decline (a conclusion with which DeBeus, after analyzing the evidence presented by Danilevsky, Spengler, and Toynbee, substantially agrees), but he is equally sure that what really determines the fate of any civilization is not any superhuman fate or implacable law of the universe but human choices, wise or stupid, courageous or craven—the *quality* of the responses that men give to the challenges of their time. And the most recent and most level-headed analyst of these philosophies of history, the Dutchman DeBeus, is also convinced that what will determine the future of Western civilization is no superhuman mechanism or mystic fate but the courage, wisdom, and creativeness of Western man himself. Since DeBeus, unlike Sorokin and others, accepts the general idea that civilizations do apparently have a life cycle, and since, unlike Spengler, he comes out with the conclusion that all need not yet be over with freedom and progress in the Western world, and is somewhat more specific about this than Toynbee, it will be worth our time to examine his position.

II-14:4. Where the West Stands Today

If civilizations do pass through life cycles, it is obviously important to determine in what phase of its life cycle Western civilization now finds itself. Spengler put it on its deathbed and Toynbee decided that it has reached its “time of troubles,” which in other civilizations has always heralded the approach of the universal state and the beginning of the end. DeBeus concludes that it is either in its period of full maturity or in the final stage of developing one civilization-wide, controlling power, universal peace and universal church. But since we are still having terrific conflicts, we can’t be in the final stage yet, so we must be in our stage of maturity, although he admits we may be pretty well along in that stage. The outstanding characteristics of our time, he finds, are:

1. The obsolescence of the nation-state. Technological changes in industry, communications, and the military arts make imperative larger political units than the old nation-states of Europe.
2. Tremendous conflicts within states, between states, and between cultures.

reference afflicts us in Toynbee’s use of other terms such as his *universal state*, which sometimes doesn’t seem to be quite universal, like the empire of Napoleon; his use of the terms *internal proletariat* and *external proletariat*, which can hardly be the same kinds of proletariats; etc., etc.

3. Mass culture, mass influence. The masses now constitute a fourth estate in every country.
4. In the face of existing conflicts the ardent desire of the masses for peace.
5. A tremendous yearning for heroic leadership—a yearning developed by the combination of modern communication and the complexities of modern life. “There are symptoms that history is moving on to accomplish the eternal circle sketched two thousand years ago by Polybius: from monarchy . . . to aristocracy . . . to democracy . . . back to single-headed rule.”⁶
6. The rise of tycoons (men of great power) in finance, in business, in industry, in the labor movement, in government administration. The problem is “to find the right balance between . . . giving to the leaders in all realms enough power to enable them to do an efficient job . . . and on the other hand not giving them so much as to corrupt them or vitiate the minority right of dissent.”⁷
7. The declining power of money, i.e., the rise of taxes, rationing, etc.
8. The growth of world cities—London, New York, Berlin, Moscow, etc.
9. The declining birth rate.
10. The return from rationalism. “The Age of Reason is fading away. . . . This turning away from reason can be traced in religion, in art, in science, in politics. Roughly speaking it seeks a solution in either of two directions: upward, in values higher than Reason, or downward, in values closer to earth than Reason.”⁸
11. Loosened moral standards.
12. Loss of a sense of style—a “sense of promiscuity,” as Toynbee calls it. As Sorokin sees it, “Not idealism but sensory or visual naturalism is now supreme . . . a particular inclination to the reproduction of the negative, the macabre, the pathetic, the passionate, the prosaic, the picturesque, and the ugly phenomena of life. . . . Calm-serenity is gone.”⁹
13. Territorial contraction of Western civilization.

⁶ DeBeus, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

From all this DeBeus concludes that Western civilization is in a phase of transition from maturity to a phase of civilization-wide peace: what Danilevsky considers the "post-civilization state of contractions and conflicts"; what Spengler calls "the epoch of the Caesars"; what Toynbee calls "the time of troubles."

But this does not mean Western civilization is necessarily declining: It may actually be on the eve of its greatest achievements. And this phase may last "four or five hundred years, as it did in Rome, or . . . two thousand years, as it did in Egypt. . . . It is up to us."¹⁰

DeBeus recognizes three major challenges to Western civilization today: (1) the disunity of Europe, which absolutely must be reduced or ended if our civilization is to survive; (2) the anti-Western animus of the awakened nationalism of recently dependent peoples; and (3) Communism, particularly Soviet Russia.

He thinks Europeans are beginning to show creative statesmanship enough to meet the first challenge, their own disunity. He sees no reason why the West cannot show the creative spiritual, political, and economic leadership required to meet the second challenge, the awakening of the underprivileged masses outside of as well as within our civilization, i.e., the challenge of colonial nationalism and of internal Communism. He documents these judgments with recent European achievements in various fields and with evidence of American power in technology and statecraft—our tremendous industrial productivity and the course of American policy since 1945: the Marshall Plan; the Truman Doctrine for containing Communism in Greece and Turkey; the Berlin airlift; the Point Four program; the decision to save South Korea and prevent the encirclement of Japan; the decision to make Germany an integral part of the defense of Europe. All this DeBeus sees as evidence that the West has what it takes to keep its civilization going. The crucial problem, then, is *how* the world is to move into the era of universal peace. This, of course, is the problem presented by the third challenge, Communism and Soviet Russia.

II-14:5. Peace or War?

World control of world peace can be attained (1) by a federation of existing powers or (2) by the victory of one of them over the others in war.

The major obstacle to world federation is the basic philosophy

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

which underlies the Soviet regime in Russia, the philosophy of the irrepressible and inevitable war between the Communist world and the capitalist world. DeBeus presents this Russian philosophy of inevitable conflict as Lenin himself stated it in the Report of the Central Committee at the eighth Party Congress in 1919:

"The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end, and before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois-states will be inevitable."¹¹

DeBeus adds a counsel of wisdom which no Westerner can afford to forget:

"There are no signs that the leaders of world communism intend to drop this credo otherwise than as a temporary stratagem" (italics added).

But he sees no reason why *Socialism* and democracy cannot live in peace together: "Many countries in Europe have successfully blended elements of the democratic and Marxist ideologies," notably Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. With Soviet Russia, however, the outlook for peace is admittedly dim and the prospect of a workable federation nonexistent.

What, then, if war comes?

Without expanding on the growing likelihood that it may destroy both civilizations, the Russian as well as that of the West, DeBeus believes that the West will win because it will possess five specific advantages:

1. Industrial superiority.
2. Superiority at sea, despite the huge Russian submarine fleet.
3. Potential, if not actual, superiority in the air, thanks to Western industrial power.
4. The morale of free men.
5. The support of religion.

That the West does now possess the advantages of industrial superiority, control of the ocean surface, freedom, and belief in supernatural support is unquestionable. It cannot count, however, on superiority in the air unless it can retain its industrial superiority, nor can it count on controlling the sea despite its superior surface fleets unless it can overcome a Russian submarine fleet that now far outnumbers the German U-boats with which Hitler so nearly

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p 146.

strangled Britain. In short, before we can accept DeBeus' optimism we must examine the foundations of it a bit more critically.

II-14:6. Can the West Count on Victory?

DeBeus' optimism about the future of the West rests squarely on two considerations: (1) the important *fact* of Western creativeness and (2) an even more important *assumption* that the West is going to have the *time* necessary to apply this creativeness to its problems.

The fact we can accept. The assumption deserves careful consideration.

Instead of asking the unanswerable question of how much time the West is going to need, we may begin by asking how much time it is likely to have. The answer to that, of course, depends on the nature of the attack.

The Soviet threat to the United States is of three kinds: (1) direct military attack—an aerial blitz by hydrogen bombers and rocket-launching submarines against the United States itself and a land invasion of Europe; (2) creeping encirclement by Communist revolutions and satellite wars in the Far East, the Near East, Africa, Europe, South America; and (3) internal espionage, sabotage, and subversion within the United States itself. This third danger we can dismiss at the moment, not because it is unimportant but because it is mainly a problem of making democracy work, on the one hand, and of doing a good police job, on the other. The twin dangers of direct attack and creeping encirclement are far more deadly and far more likely to fix the timetable of Western defense. Let us take them in order.

1. THE TIMETABLE OF DIRECT ATTACK

From Hiroshima to 1954 the power of offense in modern warfare seemed hopelessly to have outdistanced the power of defense. Whenever that had happened in the past, empire building had been the result: aggressors swallowed up peoples who merely wanted to be let alone.

For several years it looked as though there could be no way of stopping a Russian attack if and when the Kremlin had accumulated a stock pile of hydrogen bombs and was ready to gamble on knocking out America's industrial machine even at the cost of the devastation of Russia's own cities. The only hope seemed to be to build so strong a force of intercontinental bombers as to make certain that any such attack would actually mean suicide for the Moscow regime.

The experts varied somewhat in their estimates of the date when the Russians would be ready, but most of them agreed that it would fall somewhere between 1954 and 1957.

Then in 1953 two things happened: (1) Stalin died; and (2) the development of guided missiles in the United States reached a point at which an effective defense against enemy bombers seemed within reach.

The death of Stalin brought to power a group of men who faced three problems that the old dictator had not had to consider: (a) popular discontent because of consumer-goods shortages; (b) the insecurity of a new regime; and (c) internal rivalries within the Kremlin for ultimate power. The net effect of these was to slow down the Russian military build-up and to encourage a more subtle policy of less open aggression and more indirection by way of peace propaganda and satellite war. During the first few months after Stalin's death the Malenkov regime agreed to a truce in Korea, but the Communist Vietminh put even stronger pressure on the French in Indo-China. This was followed by Chinese Communist threats against the Chinese Nationalists whose base, Formosa, the United States had pledged itself to defend. If direct attack against the United States itself seemed less likely, there was no evidence that creeping encirclement of the West had ceased to be a Moscow objective.

The development of guided missiles, capable of knocking 90 per cent or so of enemy bombers out of the sky, promised to produce for a period of several years at least a military stand-off. Neither side would be able to deliver a knockout blow by air. This condition could be expected to last till scientists discovered either or both of two things: (a) how to deliver intercontinental atomic and hydrogen rockets on enemy targets across the ocean and (b) how to establish a military space platform 1000 miles up from which to dominate the earth's surface either with guided missiles or with heat rays from the sun. The nation that developed either or both of those devices first would have the other at its mercy. The offense would again have forged ahead of defense.

Experts predicted intercontinental rockets within a generation and a space platform before A.D. 2000.

Meanwhile, in 1954 there was a real prospect that thanks to internal tensions within Russia and to guided-missile defenses in the United States, any direct attack on the West need not be expected for several years. Vastly more imminent and more dangerous as the second half

of the century began was the creeping encirclement of the United States by the continuing Communist pressure against Western "weak spots" everywhere in the world.

2. THE TIMETABLE OF ENCIRCLEMENT

Facing Soviet Russia, the Western nations found themselves in somewhat the same kind of situation as a boxer fighting under rules which did not permit him to knock out his opponent but permitted the opponent to knock him out whenever possible. Obviously, such a one-sided contest had only to go on long enough for the knockout fighter to win.

The Western nations, determined to avoid war if possible, had no way of knocking out Soviet Russia, but Soviet Russia had a bagful of ways for knocking out the West. What were some of them? (a) victory at the polls; (b) revolution; (c) satellite wars.

a. In all European nations the Communist party was a legal party permitted to contest elections.¹² Inside Russia no non-Communist party was permitted to exist, much less contest any election. This meant that every western European electorate had the chance open to it to commit political suicide by voting in the Communists while the Russian electorate was already hog-tied and couldn't possibly vote itself back into political life. Whatever electoral victories were to be won, therefore, as between Russia and the West could be won only by the Communists. Inside Western countries Communist votes counted; inside Russia there were no Western votes to be counted. So as between themselves and the West, the Russians were always playing with the electoral dice loaded in their favor.

Conceivably a dozen different conditions—depression, governmental corruption, governmental stagnation, intolerable social injustices, etc.—might drive enough voters in Italy and France particularly to vote Communist and so put a Communist government in power. The instant that happened the Communists would have won not merely an election but a nation. In every Communist police state there was no way to get rid of the Communist government except by revolution—and revolutions did not happen in police states until the government had been utterly defeated in war.

What all this means is that in 1954 the sands in the hourglass of European politics were running all one way against democracy. The democratic process gave Communists most of the aces. Democratic

¹² The United States outlawed the Communist Party in 1954.

parties could never win anything but elections. When the Communists won, they won a nation. With ballots the West could never knock out the Communists. But when the Communists won enough ballots, they could always knock a nation out of the Western alliance. To prevent this from happening nationalists and others were reviving Fascism. Fascism was as antidemocratic as Communism, but at least it was anti-Communist.

For adherents of democracy in western Europe the battle of the ballots was thus a kind of Russian roulette. Given enough tries, the hammer was bound to fall on a live cartridge. Unfortunately, all the bullets were aimed at the head of democracy, not totalitarianism.

But perhaps the United States in this crisis of its history could not afford to be too particular about its allies. Were the man power and machine power of western Europe to be added to that of Russia and China, the utmost productive capacity of the United States would be so overbalanced as to leave us no alternative but to surrender or fight at last against overwhelming odds.

b. Meanwhile, all over the Far East, in the Mohammedan world and looming now in South Africa, internal conditions had prepared the way for revolutionary agitation. Colonialism, native landlordism, mass poverty, race prejudice—every continent at mid-century contained enough social and economic dynamite to blow it off the map. And every day the pages of American newspapers crackled with the preliminary sparks of these impending explosions. In some countries, particularly in the Near East and North Africa, nationalism rather than Communism was the leading challenge to European control, but wherever there was social discontent Communism gained a foothold. All over the world the injustices and mass miseries of five centuries were fighting for Moscow. And the resentments of World War II were not dead. Japan was psychologically and economically one of the weakest Western allies.

c. While the electoral struggle went on in Europe and revolutions smoldered and sputtered in country after country from India to British Guiana and Guatemala, the creeping encirclement crept on in the rest of the world. In 1954 the French gave up in Indo-China and accepted partition.

To the north the Korean truce carried no guarantee whatever that the Communist push to establish the southern claw of a giant military pincher to squeeze unarmed Japan might not yet succeed. Sakhalin Island, in Russian hands, already formed the northern half of the

pincher. As Moscow and Peiping saw it, only the United States, already beginning to pull out of Korea, still stood between the Communist "liberators" and the death squeeze on Japan.¹³ In the jaws of the Sakhalin-Korea pincher and with the Communists controlling the Asiatic markets in which Japan had to sell her manufactured products in order to live, what price American influence in Tokyo?

In the Far East as elsewhere, there was no hurry. If one administration in Washington stood ready to intervene in some turbulent area, another might be more interested in balancing the budget. What is one year, four years, a whole generation? When one plays for national survival and world dominance, a generation is merely one day in a generation of days.

So, what with Russian roulette at the polls in western Europe, the threat of revolution everywhere, and satellite wars wherever the chance for another grab seemed good, the Soviets could afford to slow down their timetable for direct attack. Perhaps direct attack would never be necessary. Perhaps Soviet scientists would outdistance Western scientists in the race for intercontinental rockets and the space platform—and a direct attack *then* would be irresistible.

After all, the democracies seemed very stupid. Marx and Lenin had been right: the average man doesn't know what's good for him! He doesn't know enough to stop the little game of Russian roulette at the polls and he doesn't even seem to know that his only chance of escaping a showdown with the Soviets is to keep ahead of them in science and engineering. True, with the help of the world's best scientists, the Americans had managed to produce the first atomic bomb in 1945, but look at what they had been doing since: drafting engineers and scientists like ordinary louts! In the eight months between May 1, 1953, and January, 1954, they drafted into military service no less than 3000 science students from their graduate schools.¹⁴ Their own officials admitted that the United States in 1954, thanks to its policy of drafting young scientists and engineers during World War II and afterwards, was short of its needs by 35,000 to 40,000 engineers and 5000 to 10,000 scientists.

¹³ At the end of its first year in office the Eisenhower administration announced that in 1954 it would withdraw two American divisions from the six in Korea in order to create a more flexible reserve in less exposed areas. Troops of the Republic of Korea were to replace the missing G.I.'s. United Nations and R.O.K. troops together probably did not exceed 800,000. Chinese Communists were estimated to have about 1,000,000 in North Korea.

¹⁴ Howard A. Meyerhoff, head of the U.S. Scientific Manpower Commission, in interview in *U.S. News and World Report*, January 15, 1954, pp. 46-49.

Even more ominous, the United States was falling behind Soviet Russia in the production of engineers *by more than 30,000 a year!* In 1954 Russia was to graduate 50,000 engineers; the United States, 17,500. Thus, in a struggle for survival whose outcome now depended on trained intelligence as had no previous struggle in the world's history, *democratic stupidity had enlisted on the side of the Communists!*

Taking one thing with another, the Russians could afford to wait. Why risk direct attack on the West for years to come—if ever—when confusion, fear, suspicion, treachery, and conspiracy were coiling so nicely around one's enemies? Perhaps Athena's serpents were not yet dead. In the days of ancient Troy they had polished off Laocoön and his two sons for daring to doubt the wooden horse. Now the coils tightening about the West were no creatures of mythology. Their menace was as real and their grip as relentless as the destinies of eighteen vanished civilizations. What legend of A.D. 5000 would tell the story of the poor, stupid democracies and the clever Soviet serpent long ago in the middle of the twentieth century?

By the timetable of encirclement, 1954 was already a good deal later than the stupid democracies imagined.

II-14:7. The Function of the U.N.

At this point romanticism will undoubtedly reassert itself in the objection that the United Nations was organized to prevent or control just the kind of struggle for survival that is now going on. This is on a par with the pitiful yearning of so many million Americans for a world police force after World War II.

If there is to be collective security enforced by overwhelming coercive power, there must first be collective agreement on the kind of values the collective security is to secure. In the aftermath of World War II the two most powerful governments in the world, the government of the United States and that of Soviet Russia, not only could not possibly agree on the basic social values to be secured by world peace; neither trusted the other around the first corner. In other words, neither could possibly renounce its own sovereignty, its own power of defense, to endow the United Nations with the attributes of a world state. Hence, at best, the United Nations could act only as a forum of debate, a coercer of little disturbers, and an administrative center for incidental collective interests on which the nations could agree—health, postal services, and the like. It could not possibly

control two giant powers, each of which was a match for the rest of the world minus its great opponent. The age-old struggle of power systems in the world arena since the fall of Rome had come down to a polarized struggle between two great protagonists: self-government and totalitarianism. The basic function of the U.N. in this situation was not to coerce either or both into keeping the peace—a function which it lacked the power to perform—but to provide the place, the facilities, and the personnel for keeping the main antagonists in mental contact with one another as long as possible and for focalizing the pressures of the rest of the world for peace. *That* the U.N. could do. It could not possibly function as a world state.


A world state could come into being only in one of two ways: (1) by the victory of either the United States or Soviet Russia over the other, or (2) by the gradual wearing down of mutual antagonisms, fears, and suspicions over many generations until the United States and Russia could agree to pool their mutual sovereignties in a central organization powerful enough to rule them both. Psychologically, politically, socially, and in every other way every nation in the world was still many generations away from any such willingness to submit to world government. Technologically, with jet planes, hydrogen bombs, and economic interests spanning the globe, the world desperately needed world government to abolish war, eliminate poverty, and maximize the possibilities of modern living for everyone everywhere. But the brute fact was that there was still simply too much ignorance, poverty, injustice, fear, and hatred in the world to make politically possible what was technologically so desirable. The U.N. was merely a first step, a compromise, a bare beginning of what must come some day if civilization was to endure.

But toward the control or solution of the terrible struggle that pitted two antagonistic civilizations against each other in the twentieth century the United Nations could do relatively little. The fate of Western civilization rested on America's ability to hold off or defeat any direct attack and to turn back the creeping Communist encirclement that was coiling so relentlessly around the West at mid-century.

II-14:8. How Roll Back the Creeping Encirclement?

As things were going at mid-century, the West *seemed* doomed within two generations.

In 1917 on the eve of the October Revolution the Russian Commu-



Dorothea Lange Photo.

Plate 55. Arkies on the Road in the Depression Decade. A family of migratory farm workers, including seven children, from Paris, Arkansas, fights misfortune in June, 1938. Note from the mattresses and bedclothes that this is a household on wheels in search of work. Thousands of similar domestic tragedies rolled along our highways during the Dust Bowl days and the depression pilgrimages of the 1930's. Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* pictured some of the readjustments forced on families and communities by the great drouths, the depression, and the resistance of conservative classes.

Plate 56. Technological Change in Southern Cotton Fields. Negroes "pulling" cotton by hand in the traditional way on a North Carolina plantation. Dragging their "pickings" laboriously after them, hand workers may average 450 pounds a day at \$1.75 per 100, or about \$7.87 for the day. To "pull" the 2000 pounds required for a 500-pound bale of ginned cotton takes one worker more than four days, and the field cost of hand labor per bale thus approximates \$35. To appreciate the economic forces behind technological change in the cotton fields, compare this cost with that of the machine-stripping process shown in Plate 57.

Plate 57. Technological Change in Southern Cotton Fields. A single-row McCormick-Deering mechanical cotton picker at work on a Southern plantation. International Harvester literature on this machine notes that it will strip an acre 95 percent clean in an hour and fifteen minutes at an overall cost of \$10 to \$25 a bale less than the cost of hand "picking." Southern experts estimate that on the average most cotton picking machines will strip six bales a day at an overall cost of about \$6 a bale. This compares with the cost of \$35 or more per bale for hand-picking as shown in Plate 56. This machine, plus the tractor on which it is mounted as regular but detachable equipment, weighs more than five tons. When all operations of cotton culture—soil preparation, seeding, weeding, and so forth—are performed mechanically the gap in costs between hand and machine operations widens far beyond the \$10 to \$25 per bale margin. (Data, courtesy of the International Harvester Company, and D. W. Sherrill, County Agricultural Agent, Lubbock, Texas.)



Watson from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.

Watson from Monkmeyer Press Photo Service.




Plate 58. The Destructiveness of Modern Warfare. Anyang, South Korea, as United Nations tank and infantry task force moved northward toward Seoul, the South Korean capital, in February, 1951. Terrific fighting had reduced the village to rubble. This is what non-atomic artillery can do to towns and cities. For a glimpse of what atomic warfare can do, see Plate 60.

Plate 59. Airpower in the Atomic Age. A B-52 jet bomber of the United States Air Force in flight. In 1955 these huge planes, each capable when refueled in flight of delivering an atomic or hydrogen bomb on target anywhere in the world, carried the Sunday punch of the United States Strategic Air Force, whose mission it would be in World War III to knock out enemy bases and industrial installations. Meanwhile, the Russians were credited with having developed a 3,500 mile-an-hour rocket capable of knocking out United States bases in Alaska 800 miles away, and United States scientists were likewise working on rocket missiles to replace the bombers. No defense against rocket missiles except subterranean hideaways had yet been suggested.



Wide World Photo.

Courtesy, United States Air Force.





Plate 60. Atomic Warfare. The atomized center of Hiroshima, Japan, three weeks after the first atomic bombing in the history of war killed 70,000 Japanese on August 6, 1945. This bomb had a destructive force equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. A hydrogen bomb is roughly equivalent to 3,000,000 tons of TNT! At Hiroshima, heat burns killed 20 to 30 percent of all the victims and occurred up to a mile and a half from ground zero; up to two miles at Nagasaki, the second city atom-bombed. At Hiroshima the air blast from the bomb crushed light concrete structures and twisted steel frames 5000 feet from ground zero. Radiation sickness from exposure to gamma rays killed victims within 4200 feet of the explosion who had escaped the heat and the blast. (See *The Effects of Atomic Warfare*, United States Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950, pp. 135, 201, 236, and 336.)

The skeleton building in the foreground was a Roman Catholic church.


Plate 61. Atomic Warfare. Burned-out office building and twisted steel skeleton of another modern structure less than a mile from ground zero in Hiroshima a month after the first atomic bomb attack. With a population density of 35,000 per square mile, Hiroshima suffered 15,000 bomb deaths per square mile and 30,000 casualties in the same area. Total killed and missing, 70,000; injured, 70,000. Total casualties, 140,000. Tokyo suffered more heavily from TNT and incendiary raids but it took 93 raids and thousands of planes and 1100 tons of bombs to destroy 15.8 square miles of Tokyo, whereas one plane and one atom bomb destroyed 4.7 square miles of Hiroshima. It is probable that no more than 50 hydrogen bombs delivered on target by plane or rocket on American cities could kill 40,000,000 people and knock out 80 percent of America's war-making industrial potential more completely than the atom bomb did its job on the buildings shown above. Conversely, the same would apply to American hydrogen bombs on Russian cities and military targets.



Wide World Photos.



Wide World Photos.



Wide World Photos.

Plate 62. The Most Ominous Portent in Modern Skies. The death-cloud from an H-bomb over the Pacific. Fifty miles away, 12,000 feet up, an Air Force camera snapped this picture of the mushroom cloud formation about two minutes after the hydrogen fire-ball had blasted one of the Marshall Islands in the fall of 1952. In two minutes the cloud had risen 40,000 feet and in eight more minutes it had trebled its height to 25 miles where near its maximum it had penetrated deep into the stratosphere. A hydrogen bomb has no theoretical limit of size, but current production is believed to be turning out bombs equivalent to from 3,000,000 to 60,000,000 tons of TNT, as compared with the Hiroshima atom bomb, rated as equal merely to 20,000 tons. It was the fall-out of radioactive ash from a bomb like this in 1954 that drifted more than 70 miles down wind and severely burned members of a Japanese fishing boat, *The Fortunate Dragon*, causing the death of one man months later. The radioactive ash also contaminated the boat's cargo of fish which had to be destroyed. The incident incensed the Japanese people and alarmed other governments.

nists numbered perhaps 80,000 believers. By 1939 on the eve of World War II this infinitesimal fraction of the human race—a few hundred thousandths of 1 percent in 1917—had expanded into a disciplined party of several millions now firmly in control of Russia with nearly 8 percent of world population. Ten years later on the eve of the Korean War Communists controlled eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Urals and Asia from the Urals to the Yellow Sea—nearly 800,000,000 human beings, or more than one-third of the human race. The fall of China in 1949 had opened all Asia and the subcontinent of India to Communist penetration. In Russia itself Russian steel, oil, and other vital production—except food—was expanding faster than similar activities in other countries and forced saving was accumulating capital faster than the rate of capital accumulation in free Europe. In terms of military strength Russia had the largest land army in the world, the largest air force, and the second largest navy, including the world's biggest submarine fleet. With Chinese man power added to that of Russia and her satellites, the Communist world in a showdown could throw over 800 divisions into action. The United States fought World War II with approximately 100.

In Indonesia, India, the Near East, Central America, and potentially in Japan, Communist revolutionary agitation constituted a continuing danger.

Economic rivalries, political uncertainties, fears of depression, and personal ambitions divided the non-Communist world. With the survival of the West absolutely dependent on British and American coöperation, the British after the Korean War backed Red China for admission to the U.N., thus playing the Communist game in the Orient, while supporting the United States against the Communists in Europe. In South America, Peron, the dictator of Argentina, aspired to organize his continent against "the Colossus of the North," the United States. French fear of German militarism and her own internal tensions made that country a weak link in the Western defense chain. In Italy Communists threatened at every election to turn that country into a positive menace to Western plans for the defense of the Mediterranean. The Mohammedan world seethed with revolutionary nationalism not altogether impervious to Communist infiltration. With South Africa aflame with race hatreds and the Communists on the march in Indo-China and building hopefully

toward revolution in India, there was little evidence anywhere that the West had even begun to evolve a technique for stopping the creeping encirclement.

Till the end of 1953 the American answer so far had consisted mainly of (1) the investment of billions of dollars in foreign aid; (2) technical missions to share American know-how with backward countries in which the benefits would be years in reaching the submerged masses; (3) propaganda to "sell America" at about one-tenth or one-twentieth of the cost and volume devoted by the Communists to "selling" Communism; (4) military aid to Turkey, Greece, and the French in Indo-China; (5) actual intervention in Korea; and (6) the formation of various alliances with European and Far Eastern governments for the mutual defense of their respective areas against Communist aggression. However, after the French Assembly killed the plan for a European army under international command in 1954, it became an open question whether such treaties and agreements would really be effective. Their effectiveness seemed to depend on the military power that could be mobilized to checkmate Communist aggression. But this in turn depended largely on the power-in-being at the command of the United States government at any given time, on the willingness of its allies to take the risk of action when the time came, and most important of all, it depended on the determination of the people of the United States to stand to their guns and risk partial obliteration if and when the great issue ever came to a showdown.

What all this would actually mean in the years ahead nobody could foretell with certainty.

II-14:9. The Unforeseeable Variables

When great powers move across the years toward the crisis of a world conflict, as Russia and the United States seemed moving at mid-century, social soothsayers always find portents of doom written, if not in the stars, at least in the evidence they select to make themselves uncomfortable. It is impossible for the human mind to compass all the things that are happening in the world, and while the trend of large events may stand out, there are innumerable lesser currents which cannot be glimpsed at all. The appearance of inexorability in history is an illusion. Everything that happens, happens because of human choices. When the Eisenhower administration announced in the winter of 1953-54 that further aggression by Russia or her satellites would bring military retaliation, the announcement signalized a

fateful choice of policy. If it meant what it said, the Soviets could have a military showdown whenever they desired. But the world took it in stride because the impression was abroad that the Kremlin didn't want a military showdown—not yet.

The trend of great events is usually highly visible. The potentialities for changing that trend are never completely visible at all. When Charles I was trying to assert the supremacy of the King over Parliament during the eleven years when he ruled without any Parliament at all, who could have foreseen the potentialities for resistance inherent in the landed gentry and merchants of his kingdom? Until they had their chance, Pym and Cromwell were simply English country gentlemen like many another. When the American colonists were drifting toward open defiance of the homeland, many times more powerful than they, who could have foreseen that the manifold stupidities of the British government would culminate in entrusting the task of suppressing the rebellion to a man like Sir William Howe, who had no sympathy at all with the policy of George III and no eagerness whatever to hunt down the rebels?

Then on the eve of the War Between the States, with the Union falling to pieces before men's eyes, how discern ahead of time the unique saving qualities of an ungainly provincial like Lincoln and a bibulous social failure like Grant?

In June, 1940, as France went down before the Nazi blitz, for all of Churchill's magnificent defiance, who could have guessed the R.A.F.'s life-and-death margin of superiority over Goring's *Luftwaffe*? Or realized that behind all the overpowering conquests of the *Führer* lurked a conception of military strategy that would have destroyed Napoleon himself had the Little Corporal ever been crazy enough to get such an idea in the first place?

It is always easy enough after the event to show that after all that is the way it had to come out, but ahead of time and while the crucial choices still have to be made, the trend of things always has an aura of false inevitability about it that blacks out the unknown potentialities of the evolving situation. We know how things *have* been going. We never can know more than a slim fraction of the potentialities for *making* them go differently. The very fact that men come to realize how they have been going becomes in itself a potential force for making them go differently. But on the present level of dramatic foresight and social science it is quite impossible even to guess at the strength of such a force. All we can be sure of is that most of the broad forecasts

based on past trends will always have to be radically revised because of the impact of these unforeseeable variables.

These variables are not made in heaven or generated by any inexorable laws of history. They are themselves the products of human choices, the products of human courage and determination. If the American people and their allies backed up the Eisenhower warning that further Communist aggression anywhere in the world would bring overwhelming retaliation, the creeping encirclement by means of satellite wars might freeze in its tracks. If they failed to back up that warning, that process seemed likely to go on.

Retaliation against open aggression will not, of course, halt the European game of Russian roulette at the polls or scotch the danger of Communist revolutions in areas ripe for social upheaval. But it will be some gain if the democracies can lop off even one head of the Communist Hydra. Something more than atom bombs will be needed to lop off the others. That becomes a matter of developing more subtle techniques.

The important thing at mid-century was that the democracies face up to the nature of their peril and make a grim and determined business of cutting it down to size. They could count neither on any inevitable trend toward their destruction nor on any mystic power within themselves. The creativeness with which DeBeus credited them could prove their salvation only if they willed to use it while there was yet time. In 1954 it was already much later than most people thought. But it was probably still true, as Toynbee contended, that the fate of Western civilization still rested in the hands of free men themselves.

If they so willed, there might yet be time to stop the Russian build-up in atomic weapons that promised to overcome America's decisive military superiority by 1958. When that military superiority vanished the U.S. could surely count on most of its allies vanishing, too—few European statesmen had the stomach to face up to the prospect of atomic devastation by a Russia no longer deterred by American might. Yet how to preserve the margin of that might *without an atomic war* was the crucial question facing America as the fateful days ticked away.¹⁵

¹⁵ For a grim picture of what a decade of coexistence would probably mean, see "1964: After Ten Years of Coexistence," by Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, Professor of International Relations, Yale University, in *U.S. News and World Report*, December 10, 1954, p. 40 f. As a possible alternative to war or ultimate defeat, another expert urged the West to compel Russia to stop her military build-up while there was yet time. See

II-14:10. Wanted: Fanatics and a Faith

What the West so critically lacked at mid-century and what the Communist world possessed consisted of two things: (1) a world-wide, quasi-military, semireligious *order* dedicated to its cause with the fanaticism of a band of monks; and (2) a *faith* in its cause beyond the power of reason, persecution, or defeat to shake, a faith in the universality of its vision.

1. The free peoples have no political agency to carry their banners comparable to the Communist party. The nearest approach to it in Western history were the Jesuits during the Counter Reformation. In every country Communists constitute a band of fanatics dedicated to revolution and the cause of Soviet Russia. No rational demonstration of the fallacies of Marxism, no persecutions short of actual extermination, and no local defeats have ever succeeded in turning the *hard core* of convinced Communists from their course. Adversities might change their tactics, drive them underground, wring lying professions of loyalty from them, align them temporarily with liberals, Socialists, reformers. But when the opportunity came they always reverted to the party line and the utopian myth of revolution and the classless society. If there were still millions of free men willing to die in a struggle with Communism, they would fight rather as individuals or as soldiers of free nations, not as fanatical brothers of a quasi-military order above and beyond nationalism and the claims of family and locality. The free peoples had no comparable priesthood of freedom, dedicated to the Cause anywhere, everywhere, forever; no professional conspirators for human liberty, self-consecrated to the principle that the end justifies the means. The Communists alone had this army of political Jesuits—and *their* Pope commanded the potential of 800 divisions! What could the creativeness of the West conjure up to counterbalance this tremendous engine of organized fanaticism? It was high time Western leaders set themselves to the answer.

2. Not only did the West have no world-wide, quasi-military organization over and above national parties and national governments, dedicated to the cause of freedom and trained to work within enemy

"A Two-way Peace Plan," by Eli Culbertson, in *The New Leader*, December 13, 1954, pp. 3-6. The alternatives open to the West were shrinking dangerously, but any plan of action presupposed unanimity and willingness to take risks, both dubiously present in 1955.

states, but it seemed to have few organizations of any kind inspired with the burning zeal that Communists displayed. There were plenty of patriotic organizations with zeal enough for their own countries and here and there Fascist outfits with a fanaticism of their own, but where did one find an organization willing to go through fire and water for freedom anywhere, everywhere, all the time?

Communism is a faith like Christianity, or Mohammedanism, supposed to have universal validity. Democracy is a faith that can come to realization only under limited conditions. Mass ignorance, mass poverty, mass hatreds make democracy impossible. They do not make Communism impossible. They feed its fires.

The West faced the conquering sword of a new Prophet without a living faith such as once had inspired the Crusaders.

Here, after all, and not in any military inadequacies of N.A.T.O., or in any feebleness of the U.N., or in any contradictions of foreign policies—here, in the feebleness of the West's own faith in the ultimate values of its own civilization, lay the deadliest peril to the survival of the Western world. No hydrogen bombs, no intercontinental rockets, and no creative ideas, however brilliant, can exorcise the specter that haunts the twentieth century if Western man's own faith in himself is itself only a ghost. *The crisis of the twentieth century is the crisis of the Western mind.*

Can the free world regain a living faith in the values it has created?

If it can, it may yet find some political instrument capable of evangelizing the world for freedom as the Communist party is evangelizing it for servitude and the false utopia. If it can't . . .

The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.

The Moving Finger writes—and Russia and the United States move inexorably across the years toward their great rendezvous with Destiny.

APPENDIX I

DATA ON POPULATION:
WORLD, UNITED STATES,
AMERICAN REGIONS AND STATES

TABLE 1. Population, Area and Density of the World by Continents

Continent	Estimated Population, midyear, 1950	Land Area in square kilometer ^a	Population per square kilometer ^a	Population per square mile
Africa	198,000,000	30,140,000	7	18.1
North America	216,300,000	24,276,000	9	23.3
South America	110,400,000	17,764,000	6	15.5
Asia (excl. USSR)	1,272,000,000	26,859,000	47	121.7
Europe (excl. USSR)	395,400,000	4,955,000	80	207.2
Oceania	12,900,000	8,558,000	2	5.2
USSR (est. 1946)	193,000,000	22,271,000	9	23.3
	2,400,000,000	134,823,000	18	46.6

SOURCE: From *World Almanac*, 1954, p. 263, based on *Demographic Yearbook*, 1951.

^a A meter is 39.37 inches, or 3.28 feet. One kilometer is, therefore, 0.62137 of a mile. A square kilometer is 0.3861 of a square mile. In other words, a square mile is approximately 2.59 times as big as a square kilometer.

TABLE 2. Growth of Total Population of the United States, 1700 to 1960

Year	Total Population (in Thousands)	Rate of Growth in Last Generation: percent increase since preceding count, showing effects of Great Depression (in italics)	Percentage Urban ^a
1700 (estimated)	275		
1770 (estimated on eve of Revolution)	2,205		
1790 (first census)	3,929	—	5.1
1810 (eve of second war with Eng- land)	7,240	—	7.3
1840 (decade of war with Mexico)	17,069	—	10.8
1860 (eve of War Between the States)	31,513	—	19.8
1900 (just after war with Spain)	76,094	—	39.7
1920 (after World War I)	106,466	—	51.2
1930 (at start of depression)	123,077	15.6	56.2
1940 (end of depression decade and eve of World War II)	132,122	7.3	56.5
1950 (eve of Korean war)	151,677	14.8	59.0 ^b
1953 (estimate after Korean "peace")	159,696	—	—
1960 (estimate on projection of high growth rate)	179,812	18.5	—

SOURCE: Adapted from *The Economic Almanac, 1953-1955*, pp. 1-3, as based on Census data and estimates.

^a Residents of places of 2,500 or more.

^b Percentage according to old definition as above. New definition of "urbanized areas" including the "urban fringe," etc., totals 64 percent.

TABLE 3. Percent Population in Urban and Rural Territory, by Size of Place: 1790, 1860, 1930, and 1950

Class and Size	1790	1860	1930	1950
Population United States	3,929,214	31,443,321	122,775,046	150,697,361
Percent of total urban territory	5.1	19.8	56.2	59.0 (64.0)
Places 1,000,000 up	—	—	12.3	11.5
500,000 to 1,000,000	—	4.4	4.7	6.1
250,000 to 500,000	—	.8	6.5	5.5
100,000 to 250,000	—	3.2	6.1	6.4
50,000 to 100,000	—	1.4	5.3	6.0
25,000 to 50,000	1.6	2.1	5.2	6.3
10,000 to 25,000	1.2	2.8	7.4	8.3
5,000 to 10,000	1.2	3.1	4.8	5.2
2,500 to 5,000	1.1	1.9	3.8	3.7
Rural territory	94.9	80.2	43.8	41.0

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1953*, p. 26, as adapted.

TABLE 4. Number of Places in Urban and Rural Territory, by Size of Place: 1860, 1930, and 1950

Class and size	1860	1930	1950
Urban territory	392	3,165	4,023 (4,741) ^a
Places of 1,000,000 or more	—	5	5
500,000 to 1,000,000	2	8	13
250,000 to 500,000	1	24	23
100,000 to 250,000	6	56	66
50,000 to 100,000	7	98	128
25,000 to 50,000	19	185	271
10,000 to 25,000	58	606	814
5,000 to 10,000	136	851	1,133
2,500 to 5,000	163	1,332	1,570
Places under 2,500	—	—	— (457) ^a
Rural territory	—	13,433	13,235 (13,807) ^a
Places of 1,000 to 2,500	—	3,087	3,408
Places under 1,000	—	10,346	9,827

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1953*, p. 27.

^a Figures in parentheses indicate number of places under new (1950) Census definition of urban that includes urbanized rural areas.

TABLE 5. Number of Households in the United States, 1890-1952

Year and Area	Number of Households (in Thousands)	Population per Household
1890	12,690	4.9
1900	15,964	4.7
1910	20,256	4.5
1920	24,352	4.3
1930	29,905	4.0
1940	34,949	3.7
1950	43,468	3.4
1952	45,464	3.3
Urban	30,656	3.2
Rural nonfarm	8,800	3.4
Rural farm	6,008	4.0

SOURCE: *The Economic Almanac*, 1953-1954, p. 5, from Census data.

TABLE 6. Population of 170 Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States: 1940 and 1950, with Percent Change in That Decade

Standard Metropolitan Areas, and Continental U.S.	1940, April 1	1950, April 1	Percent change
Total 170 Areas	69,424,745	84,715,244	22.0
Total cont. U.S.	131,669,275	150,697,361	14.5
Akron, O.	339,405	410,032	20.8
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, N.Y.	465,643	514,490	10.5
Albuquerque, N.M.	69,391	145,673	109.9
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, Pa.	396,673	437,824	10.4
Altoona, Pa.	140,358	139,514	-.6
Amarillo, Tex.	61,450	87,140	41.8
Asheville, N.C.	108,755	124,403	14.4
Atlanta, Ga.	518,100	671,797	29.7
Atlantic City, N.J.	124,066	132,399	6.7
Augusta, Ga.	131,779	162,013	22.9
Austin, Tex.	111,053	160,980	45.0
Baltimore, Md.	1,083,300	1,337,373	23.5
Baton Rouge, La.	88,415	158,236	79.0
Bay City, Mich.	74,981	88,461	18.0
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Tex.	145,329	195,083	34.2
Binghamton, N.Y.	165,749	184,698	11.4
Birmingham, Ala.	459,930	558,928	21.5
Boston, Mass.	2,177,621	2,369,986	8.8
Bridgeport, Conn.	212,569	258,137	21.4
Brockton, Mass.	119,310	129,428	8.5
Buffalo, N.Y.	958,487	1,089,230	13.6
Canton, O.	234,887	283,194	20.6
Cedar Rapids, Ia.	89,142	104,274	17.0
Charleston, S.C.	121,105	164,856	36.1

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1953, pp. 20-21.

TABLE 6. Population of 170 Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States: 1940 and 1950, with Percent Change in That Decade—*Continued*

Standard Metropolitan Areas, and Continental U.S.	1940, April 1	1950, April 1	Percent change
Total 170 Areas	69,424,745	84,715,244	22.0
Total cont. U.S.	131,669,275	150,697,361	14.5
Charleston, W. Va.	276,247	322,072	16.6
Charlotte, N.C.	151,826	197,052	29.8
Chattanooga, Tenn.	211,502	246,453	16.5
Chicago, Ill.	4,825,527	5,495,364	13.9
Cincinnati, O.	787,044	904,402	14.9
Cleveland, O.	1,267,270	1,465,511	15.6
Columbia, S.C.	104,843	142,565	36.0
Columbus, Ga.	126,407	170,541	34.9
Columbus, O.	388,712	503,410	29.5
Corpus Christi, Tex.	92,661	165,471	78.6
Dallas, Tex.	398,564	614,799	54.3
Davenport, Ia.—Rock Island—Moline, Ill.	198,071	234,256	18.3
Dayton, O.	331,343	457,333	38.0
Decatur, Ill.	84,693	98,853	16.7
Denver, Colo.	407,768	563,832	38.3
Des Moines, Ia.	195,835	226,010	15.4
Detroit, Mich.	2,377,329	3,016,197	26.9
Dubuque, Ia.	63,768	71,337	11.9
Duluth, Minn.—Superior, Wis.	254,036	252,777	-.5
Durham, N.C.	80,244	101,639	26.7
El Paso, Tex.	131,067	194,968	48.8
Erie, Pa.	180,889	219,388	21.3
Evansville, Ind.	130,783	160,422	22.7
Fall River, Mass.	135,137	137,298	1.6
Flint, Mich.	227,944	270,963	18.9
Fort Wayne, Ind.	155,084	183,722	18.5
Fort Worth, Tex.	225,521	361,253	60.2
Fresno, Calif.	178,565	276,515	54.9
Gadsden, Ala.	72,580	93,892	29.4
Galveston, Tex.	81,173	113,066	39.3
Grand Rapids, Mich.	246,338	288,292	17.0
Green Bay, Wis.	83,109	98,314	18.3
Greensboro—High Point, N.C.	153,916	191,057	24.1
Greenville, S.C.	136,580	168,152	23.1
Hamilton—Middletown, O.	120,249	147,203	22.4
Hampton—Newport News—Warwick, Va.	84,496	143,227	69.5
Harrisburg, Pa.	252,216	292,241	15.9
Hartford, Conn.	295,613	358,081	21.1
Houston, Tex.	528,961	806,701	52.5
Huntington, W. Va.—Ashland, Ky.	225,668	245,795	8.9
Indianapolis, Ind.	460,926	551,777	19.7
Jackson, Mich.	93,108	107,925	15.9

TABLE 6. Population of 170 Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States: 1940 and 1950, with Percent Change in That Decade—*Continued*

Standard Metropolitan Areas, and Continental U.S.	1940, April 1	1950, April 1	Percent change
Total 170 Areas	69,424,745	84,715,244	22.0
Total cont. U.S.	131,669,275	150,697,361	14.5
Jackson, Miss.	107,273	142,164	32.5
Jacksonville, Fla.	210,143	304,029	44.7
Johnstown, Pa.	298,416	291,354	-2.4
Kalamazoo, Mich.	100,085	126,707	26.6
Kansas City, Mo.	686,643	814,357	18.6
Kenosha, Wis.	63,505	75,238	18.5
Knoxville, Tenn.	246,504	337,105	37.0
Lancaster, Pa.	212,504	234,717	10.5
Lansing, Mich.	130,616	172,941	32.4
Laredo, Tex.	45,916	56,141	22.3
Lawrence, Mass.	124,849	125,935	.9
Lexington, Ky.	78,899	100,746	27.7
Lima, O.	73,303	88,183	20.3
Lincoln, Neb.	100,585	119,742	19.0
Little Rock-North Little Rock, Ark.	156,085	196,685	26.0
Lorain-Elyria, O.	112,390	148,162	31.8
Los Angeles, Calif.	2,916,403	4,367,911	49.8
Louisville, Ky.	451,473	576,900	27.8
Lowell, Mass.	130,999	133,928	2.2
Lubbock, Tex.	51,782	101,048	95.1
Macon, Ga.	95,086	135,043	42.0
Madison, Wis.	130,660	169,357	29.6
Manchester, N.H.	81,932	88,370	7.9
Memphis, Tenn.	358,250	482,393	34.7
Miami, Fla.	267,739	495,084	84.9
Milwaukee, Wis.	766,885	871,047	13.9
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.	940,937	1,116,509	18.7
Mobile, Ala.	141,947	231,105	62.8
Montgomery, Ala.	114,420	138,965	21.5
Muncie, Ind.	74,963	90,252	20.4
Nashville, Tenn.	257,267	321,758	25.1
New Bedford, Mass.	134,435	137,469	2.3
New Britain-Bristol, Conn.	126,709	146,983	16.0
New Haven, Conn.	240,750	264,622	9.9
New Orleans, La.	552,244	685,405	24.1
New York City-Northeastern New Jersey	11,660,839	12,911,994	10.7
Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va.	258,927	446,200	72.3
Ogden, Ut.	56,714	83,319	46.9
Oklahoma City, Okla.	244,159	325,352	33.3
Omaha, Neb.	325,153	366,395	12.7
Orlando, Fla.	70,074	114,950	64.0
Peoria, Ill.	211,736	250,512	18.3
Philadelphia, Pa.	3,199,637	3,671,048	14.7

TABLE 6. Population of 170 Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States: 1940 and 1950, with Percent Change in That Decade—*Continued*

Standard Metropolitan Areas, and Continental U.S.	1940, April 1	1950, April 1	Percent change
Total 170 Areas	69,424,745	84,715,244	22.0
Total cont. U.S.	131,669,275	150,697,361	14.5
Phoenix, Ariz.	186,193	331,770	78.2
Pittsburgh, Pa.	2,082,556	2,213,236	6.3
Pittsfield, Mass.	60,996	66,567	9.1
Portland, Me.	106,566	119,942	12.6
Portland, Ore.	501,275	704,829	40.6
Providence, R.I.	676,766	737,203	8.9
Pueblo, Colo.	68,870	90,188	31.0
Racine, Wis.	94,047	109,585	16.5
Raleigh, N.C.	109,544	136,450	24.6
Reading, Pa.	241,884	255,740	5.7
Richmond, Va.	262,991	328,050	24.7
Roanoke, Va.	112,184	133,407	18.9
Rochester, N.Y.	438,230	487,632	11.3
Rockford, Ill.	121,178	152,385	25.8
Sacramento, Calif.	170,333	277,140	62.7
Saginaw, Mich.	130,468	153,515	17.7
St. Joseph, Mo.	94,067	96,826	2.9
St. Louis, Mo.	1,432,088	1,681,281	17.4
Salt Lake City, Ut.	211,623	274,895	29.9
San Angelo, Tex.	39,302	58,929	49.9
San Antonio, Tex.	338,176	500,460	48.0
San Bernardino, Calif.	161,108	281,642	74.8
San Diego, Calif.	289,348	556,808	92.4
San Francisco-Oakland, Calif.	1,461,804	2,240,767	53.3
San Jose, Calif.	174,949	290,547	66.1
Savannah, Ga.	117,970	151,481	28.4
Scranton, Pa.	301,243	257,396	-14.6
Seattle, Wash.	504,980	732,992	45.2
Shreveport, La.	150,203	176,547	17.5
Sioux City, Io.	103,627	103,917	.3
Sioux Falls, S.D.	57,697	70,910	22.9
South Bend, Ind.	161,823	205,058	26.7
Spokane, Wash.	164,652	221,561	34.6
Springfield, Ill.	117,912	131,484	11.5
Springfield, Mo.	90,541	104,823	15.8
Springfield, O.	95,647	111,661	16.7
Springfield-Holyoke, Mass.	364,680	407,255	11.7
Stamford-Norwalk, Conn.	160,274	196,023	22.3
Stockton, Calif.	134,207	200,750	49.6
Syracuse, N.Y.	295,108	341,719	15.8
Tacoma, Wash.	182,081	275,876	51.5
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fla.	272,000	409,143	50.4
Terre Haute, Ind.	99,709	105,160	5.5
Toledo, O.	344,333	395,551	14.9
Topeka, Kan.	91,247	105,418	15.5
Trenton, N. J.	197,318	229,781	16.5

TABLE 6. Population of 170 Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States: 1940 and 1950, with Percent Change in That Decade—*Continued*

Standard Metropolitan Areas, and Continental U.S.	1940, April 1	1950, April 1	Percent change
Total 170 Areas	69,424,745	84,715,244	22.0
Total cont. U.S.	131,669,275	150,697,361	14.5
Tulsa, Okla.	193,363	251,686	30.2
Utica-Rome, N.Y.	263,163	284,262	8.0
Waco, Tex.	101,898	130,194	27.8
Washington, D.C.	967,985	1,464,089	51.3
Waterbury, Conn.	138,779	154,656	11.4
Waterloo, Io.	79,946	100,448	25.6
Wheeling, W. Va.—Steubenville, O.	364,132	354,092	-2.8
Wichita, Kan.	143,311	222,290	55.1
Wichita Falls, Tex.	73,604	98,493	33.8
Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton, Pa.	441,518	392,241	-11.2
Wilmington, Del.	221,836	268,387	21.0
Winston-Salem, N.C.	126,475	146,135	15.5
Worcester, Mass.	252,752	276,336	9.3
York, Pa.	178,022	202,737	13.9
Youngstown, O.	473,605	528,498	11.6

TABLE 7. Population of the United States, Regions and States:
1790, 1860, 1930, and 1950

	1790	1860	1930	1950
Continental U.S.	3,929,214	31,443,321	122,795,046	150,697,361
<i>Regions</i>				
Northeast	1,968,040	10,594,268	34,427,091	39,477,986
North Central	—	9,096,718	38,594,100	44,460,762
South	1,961,174	11,133,361	37,857,633	47,197,088
West	—	618,976	11,896,222	19,561,525
<i>New England</i>	1,009,408	3,135,283	8,166,341	9,314,453
Maine	96,540	628,279	797,423	913,774
New Hampshire	141,885	326,073	465,293	533,242
Vermont	85,425	315,098	359,611	377,747
Massachusetts	378,787	1,231,066	4,249,614	4,690,514
Rhode Island	68,825	174,620	687,497	791,896
Connecticut	237,946	460,147	1,606,903	2,007,280
<i>Middle Atlantic</i>	958,632	7,458,985	26,260,750	30,163,533
New York	340,120	3,880,735	12,588,066	14,830,192
New Jersey	184,139	672,035	4,041,334	4,835,329
Pennsylvania	434,373	2,906,215	9,631,350	10,498,012
<i>East North Central</i>	—	6,926,884	25,297,185	30,399,368
Ohio	—	2,339,511	6,646,697	7,946,627
Indiana	—	1,350,428	3,238,503	3,934,224

TABLE 7. Population of the United States, Regions and States:
1790, 1860, 1930, and 1950—*Continued*

	1790	1860	1930	1950
Continental U.S.	3,929,214	31,443,321	122,795,046	150,697,361
Illinois	—	1,711,951	7,630,654	8,712,176
Michigan	—	749,113	4,842,325	6,371,766
Wisconsin	—	775,881	2,939,006	3,434,575
<i>West North Central</i>	—	2,169,832	13,296,915	14,061,394
Minnesota	—	172,023	2,563,953	2,982,483
Iowa	—	674,913	2,470,939	2,621,073
Missouri	—	1,182,012	3,629,367	3,954,653
North Dakota	—	(Dakota Territory)	680,845	619,636
South Dakota	—	4,837	692,849	652,740
Nebraska	—	28,841	1,377,963	1,325,510
Kansas	—	107,206	1,880,999	1,905,299
<i>South Atlantic</i>	1,851,806	5,364,703	15,793,589	21,182,335
Delaware	59,096	112,216	238,380	318,085
Maryland	319,728	687,049	1,631,526	2,343,001
Dist. of Columbia	—	75,080	486,869	802,178
Virginia	619,737	1,219,630	2,421,851	3,318,680
West Virginia	55,873	376,688	1,729,205	2,005,552
North Carolina	393,751	992,622	3,170,276	4,061,929
South Carolina	249,073	703,708	1,738,765	2,117,027
Georgia	82,548	1,057,286	2,908,506	3,444,578
Florida	—	140,424	1,468,211	2,771,305
<i>East South Central</i>	109,368	4,020,991	9,887,214	11,477,181
Kentucky	73,677	1,155,684	2,614,589	2,944,806
Tennessee	35,691	1,109,801	2,616,556	3,291,718
Alabama	—	964,201	2,646,248	3,061,743
Mississippi	—	791,305	2,009,821	2,178,914
<i>West South Central</i>	—	1,747,667	12,176,830	14,537,572
Arkansas	—	435,450	1,854,482	1,909,511
Louisiana	—	708,002	2,101,593	2,683,516
Oklahoma	—	—	2,396,040	2,233,351
Texas	—	604,215	5,824,715	7,711,194
<i>Mountain</i>	—	174,923	3,701,789	5,074,998
Montana	—	—	537,606	591,024
Idaho	—	—	445,032	588,637
Wyoming	—	—	225,565	290,529
Colorado	—	34,277	1,035,791	1,325,089
New Mexico	—	93,516	423,317	681,187
Arizona	—	—	435,573	749,587
Utah	—	40,273	507,847	688,862
Nevada	—	6,857	91,058	160,083
<i>Pacific</i>	—	444,053	8,194,433	14,486,527
Washington	—	11,594	1,563,396	2,378,963
Oregon	—	52,465	953,786	1,521,341
California	—	379,994	5,677,251	10,586,223

TABLE 8. Males and Females 14 Years and Over Receiving Income in the U.S., 1949, and Median Incomes of Different Occupational Workers (*blue collar occupations italicized*)

Item	Males with income	Median money incomes, males	Females with income	Median money incomes, females
Employed civilians	39,970,000	\$2,634	14,452,000	\$1,522
Not employed or in armed forces	8,288,000	907	9,058,000	473
<i>By Occupation of Employed Persons</i>				
Professional workers	2,018,000	3,985	1,553,000	2,271
Self-employed	448,000	6,611	95,000	not given
Salaried	1,570,000	3,809	1,458,000	2,338
Semiprofessional workers	547,000	3,030	136,000	not given
Farmers and farm managers	4,274,000	1,027	143,000	not given
Non-farm proprietors, managers, officials	5,345,000	3,556	754,000	1,926
Self-employed	3,174,000	3,025	448,000	1,339
Salaried	2,171,000	4,108	306,000	not given
Clerical	3,093,000	3,060	4,145,000	2,023
Salesmen, saleswomen	2,311,000	2,775	1,088,000	1,115
<i>Craftsmen, foremen and like</i>	7,290,000	3,114	161,000	not given
<i>Operatives and like</i>	8,335,000	2,605	2,982,000	1,539
Domestic service	118,000	not given	1,538,000	458
<i>Service workers, except domestic</i>	2,550,000	2,065	1,808,000	997
<i>Farm laborers and farm foremen</i>	1,125,000	781	90,000	not given
<i>Laborers, except farm and mine</i>	2,964,000	2,025	54,000	not given

SOURCE: *The Economic Almanac, 1951-1952*: The Conference Board Business Fact Book, National Industrial Conference Board, 1951, p. 151.

APPENDIX II

METROPOLITAN REGIONS:
DETROIT-WILLOW RUN AREA

1. Centralization

Total population of four-county area: 2,458,000 in 1940. Total area; 2681 square miles. Population of central cities—Detroit, Hamtramck, Highland Park:

Detroit	1,623,000
Hamtramck	49,839
Highland Park	50,810
	<hr/> 1,723,649

WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF 2,458,000 IS IN THESE THREE CENTRAL CITIES?

2. Suburbanism

Population of Detroit Metropolitan District, 28 townships: 2,295,-867 within 16 miles of river.

SUBTRACTING CENTRAL CITIES LEAVES WHAT PERCENTAGE LIVING WITHIN THE DETROIT METROPOLITAN DISTRICT OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL CITIES BUT WITHIN AVERAGE OF LESS THAN 16 MILES OF WOODWARD AND RIVER?

3. Radial Concentration

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area in Square Miles</i>	<i>Average Density of Population*</i>
33 townships on 7 radials	536,526	1,170.3	
17 townships, semi-radial	93,535	517.6	
28 townships, non-radial	103,977	845.7	
	<hr/> 734,038	<hr/> 2,533.6	

How Radials Differed

N. E. radial (Gratiot)	49,416	160.2
N. radial (Centerline)	37,959	182.7
N. N. W. radial (Woodward)	172,426	184.3
N. W. radial (Grand River)	12,183	106.5
W. radial (Ford-Jackson Roads)	145,340	291.5
S. W. radial (Chicago Road)	26,957	179.7
S radial (Toledo Road)	92,245	65.4
	<hr/> 536,526	<hr/> 1,170.3

* Divide population by area in square miles.

4. Epicentral Clusterings

Number of incorporated places outside central cities but *within* Metropolitan District: 42. Population: 405,661.

AVERAGE PER PLACE? _____

Total incorporated places in the four counties outside the central cities:

	<i>Number of Places</i>	<i>Population</i>
Macomb	14	56,077
Oakland	23	160,757
Washtenaw	7	49,263
Wayne	22	211,297
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	66	477,394

WHAT IS THE AVERAGE PER PLACE? _____

5. Peripheral Fading

<i>Circle at Given Distance from Foot of Woodward</i>	<i>Population in Townships, Villages, and Cities Out By Circle</i>	<i>Approximate Area in Square Miles</i>	<i>Average Density of Population*</i>
10.0 miles	214,568	74.9	
13.5	140,257	162.3	
16.5	102,247	296.3	
22.0	62,520	396.1	
28.0	117,547	421.7	
34.0	71,723	573.0	
40.0	12,868	288.3	
46.0	6,506	176.9	
52.0	5,802	144.1	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
	734,038	2,533.6	

* Divide population by area in square miles.

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